The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEFFREY LOVE DAWKINS, : Civil No. 3:20-CV-1467
:
Plaintiff :
:
v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
KEVIN RANSOM, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
This is a civil rights action brought by Jeffrey Dawkins, an inmate housed in
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at the State Correctional Institution
(SCI) Dallas. Dawkins’ case arises out of a singular, and singularly unexpected
event: On January 15, 2020, the porcelain toilet in Dawkins’ cell shattered
underneath him while he was using this facility, and Dawkins was injured when
shards of porcelain pierced him. For their part, the defendants concede that there was
an unfortunate accident in Dawkins’ cell relating to the collapse of this toilet but
have filed a motion for summary judgment, which disputes whether this incident
rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. (Doc. 37).
With respect to this pending summary judgment motion, it is entirely
uncontested that this event was both unprecedented and unexpected. Prior to January
15, 2020, Dawkins had experienced no problems with this toilet. Moreover, prison
officials have attested that they had never previously encountered a mishap of this
type, the catastrophic failure and collapse of a porcelain toilet resulting in injuries to
an inmate.
Dawkins has framed his constitutional tort claims in this case in terms of an
alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. In this setting, where a prisoner is injured due to a hazardous condition
in the prison, in order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation Dawkins must be
shown that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk to his health
and safety. At a minimum, this deliberate indifference standard means that the
defendants must have a subjective awareness of the dangers presented by some
condition of confinement, and then fail to ameliorate that danger.
Given this constitutional benchmark, which requires subjective awareness of
some grave risk to inmate safety, we find that Dawkins’ constitutional claims
founder and fail since the unexpected nature of this mishap, which was without
precedent at the prison, rebuts any assertion that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to a known danger. Accordingly, we will grant the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.
II. Statement of Facts1
The pertinent facts in this case can be simply stated: Jeffery Dawkins is a state
inmate who is currently housed at SCI Dallas. Beginning on November 14, 2019,
Dawkins was housed with a cellmate in Cell 86, on J-Block in this prison. This cell
was equipped with a porcelain toilet.
In January of 2020, Dawkins weighed approximately 250 to 270 pounds.
While housed in Cell 86, Dawkins regularly used the toilet in the cell, utilizing that
facility three to four times each day. Prior to January 15, 2020, Dawkins had never
experienced any problems or issues with the toilet, and the only issue Dawkins
recalled his cellmate reporting related to the toilet moving or being loose at some
otherwise unidentified time.
At approximately 7:20 p.m. on January 15, 2020, Dawkins was using the toilet
when it shattered unexpectedly. Dawkins fell to the floor on top of the broken
porcelain, water, and human waste, suffering cuts to his buttocks and left wrist.
Dawkins required eight stitches to close the wound on his buttocks and an additional
six to seven stitches on his wrist injury. Dawkins remained at the prison infirmary
for approximately two weeks while he was treated for his injuries.
1 This statement of facts is taken from the parties’ submissions to the extent that
undisputed evidence of record in this case supports those submissions. (Doc. 43).
Dawkins’ deposition testimony makes it clear that this mishap was a wholly
unforeseen event. Dawkins had experienced no problems with the toilet prior to
January 15, 2020 and reported nothing unusual or untoward at the outset of his use
of this facility on January 15. Rather, Dawkins described the toilet collapse as a
sudden event, which took place without any prior warning, beyond a sound like a
gunshot at the moment that the toilet broke and collapsed.
Prison officials have also attested that the catastrophic failure of this toilet
resulting in an inmate injury was an unprecedented event. Both Bryan Brown, the
Safety Manager at SCI Dallas, and Paul Mooney, the facility maintenance manager
at this prison, reported that they were unaware of any similar incidents ever
occurring at the prison.2 Thus, for all concerned, this regrettable event appears to
have been entirely unforeseen, unexpected, and unprecedented.
It is against this factual backdrop that Dawkins filed the instant lawsuit. In his
complaint, Dawkins does not challenge the medical care he received in the wake of
this accident. Instead, he simply alleges that this episode violated his constitutional
2 It is reported that the prison’s porcelain toilets are being replaced by stainless steel
facilities, a process that began prior to Dawkins’ injury and continues to this day.
Dawkins invites us to infer from this toilet replacement project that prison officials
must have been aware of the specific danger he experienced, injuries caused by the
sudden implosion of porcelain toilet bowls, but this speculative inference draws no
support from the evidentiary record. Instead, Mr. Mooney’s uncontradicted
declaration explains that the replacement project, which began four years ago, was
initiated because the steel toilet bowls are more water efficient and less expensive
that the older, porcelain toilets. (Doc. 43-4).
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment in
that the defendants displayed deliberate indifference to the serious risk to his health
and safety presented by the sudden collapse of this toilet.
The defendants have now moved for summary judgment, arguing on these
undisputed facts that it cannot be said that they were deliberately indifferent to the
plaintiff’s safety, the touchstone standard for a viable Eighth Amendment claim.
This motion is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. As discussed below,
given the wholly unanticipated nature of this injury, we find that the uncontested
evidence rebuts any claim of deliberate indifference by prison officials to a known
danger to Mr. Dawkins’ well-being. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment
will be granted.
III. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment – Standard of Review
The defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that
do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), and
for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co.
v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law
identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis
that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Id., at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes
shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown
that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s claims, “the
non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest
solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.”
Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary
judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also
appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or
speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla
of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the
Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing
to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual
disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne
cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing
any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 F. App’x
896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere
allegations or denial.” Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676
F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697
F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue
of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is
also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969).
Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon
bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338,
341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or
assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in
adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most
favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW,
Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where
the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s
must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the
evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility
determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a
verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see
also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third
Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not
match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant.
In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla”
threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court
cannot credit the movant’s version of events against the opponent, even
if the quantity of the movant’s evidence far outweighs that of its
opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the
believability and weight of the evidence.
Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d
464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
It is against these legal benchmarks that we assess the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
B. Guiding Principles: Eighth Amendment Claims
Several overarching and animating constitutional considerations govern
analysis of any Eighth Amendment claim. As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Eighth Amendment protects against infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishment.” However, “not every governmental action affecting the
interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89
L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citation and internal
quotations omitted). “It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence
or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in
connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying
medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.”
Id.
Resolution of an Eighth Amendment claim therefore “mandate[s] an
inquiry into a prison official's state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). Two considerations
define that inquiry. We must first determine if the deprivation was
sufficiently serious to fall within the Eighth Amendment's zone of
protections. Id. at 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321. If not, our inquiry is at an end.
However, if the deprivation is sufficiently serious, we must determine if
the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. In other
words, we must determine if they were motivated by a desire to inflict
unnecessary and wanton pain. “What is necessary to establish an
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ...’ varies according to the
nature of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).
Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2000).
Thus, while prison officials may violate an inmate's rights under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by displaying “deliberate indifference”
to an inmate's needs, to sustain such a claim an inmate must:
[M]eet two requirements: (1) “the deprivation alleged must be,
objectively, sufficiently serious;” and (2) the “prison official must have
a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). In prison conditions cases, “that state of mind is one
of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. “Deliberate
indifference” is a subjective standard under Farmer-the prison official-
defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk
to inmate safety.
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
This deliberate indifference standard is an exacting benchmark for
constitutional tort liability under the Eighth Amendment. As we have observed:
As explained in Beers–Capitol, in cases based on allegations
of deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials or
other supervisory defendants, the Supreme Court has “rejected an
objective test for deliberate indifference; instead it looked to what the
prison official actually knew rather than what a reasonable official in his
position would have known.” Id. at 131. Specifically, the Supreme
Court “held that ‘a prison official cannot be found liable under
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the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety.’ ” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837,
114 S.Ct. 1970). This requirement of actual knowledge on the part of
supervisory officials “means that ‘the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’
” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970).
At the same time, this subjective standard does not insulate officials
from liability where such officials choose to
remain deliberately indifferent to an excessive or substantial or serious
risk of harm to inmates. The Supreme Court explained:
We are no more persuaded by petitioner's argument that,
without an objective test for deliberate indifference, prison
officials will be free to ignore obvious dangers to inmates.
Under the test we adopt today,
an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a
prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm
would actually befall an inmate; it is enough that the
official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The Supreme Court also noted
that a supervisory defendant's knowledge of a risk may be proved
through circumstantial evidence, so that “a factfinder may conclude that
a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk
was obvious.” Id.
Quarles v. Palakovich, 736 F.Supp.2d 941, 947–48 (M.D. Pa. 2010). Thus, the Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference standard, at a minimum, calls for knowledge of
some substantial risk to the health and safety of inmates, and a failure to act in the
face of that known danger. A necessary corollary to this deliberate indifference
standard is the notion that “deliberate indifference entails something more than
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mere negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Therefore, a mere accident or
inadvertence on the part of corrections officials does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1976).
The same guiding principles apply to inmate complaints, like those made here,
regarding conditions of confinement. “When an Eighth Amendment claim arises in
the context of a challenge to conditions of confinement, we must determine if prison
officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to the inmate's health.” Fuentes, 206
F.3d at 345 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “The objective
inquiry is whether the inmate was ‘denied the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.’ ” Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1991)). In this
setting, it is clear that:
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments inconsistent with
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d
251 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2
L.Ed.2d 630 (1958)). Conditions of prison confinement violate the
Eighth Amendment only if they “deprive inmates of the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, these claims also require
proof of a both culpable state of mind and objective proof of physical conditions of
confinement that shock the conscience and depart from minimal civilized standards
of life's necessities. Simply put, “[t]o violate the Eighth Amendment, conditions of
confinement must be dangerous, intolerable or shockingly substandard.” Hammond
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v. Bledsoe, 2013 WL 5797647, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2013) (citing Riley v. Jeffes,
777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985)); Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612
F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir. 1979)).
C. Dawkins’ Eighth Amendment Claim Fails on Its Merits.
Given that Eighth Amendment claims are governed by this subjective
deliberate indifference standard, Dawkins’ complaint runs afoul of an
insurmountable obstacle: this accident, and Dawkins’ injuries, were entirely
unexpected, unforeseen, and unprecedented. Since mere negligence or inadvertence
with not suffice to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, the fact that no one anticipated this
extraordinary event—the sudden, catastrophic implosion of a porcelain toilet while
in use—defeats any deliberate indifference claim.
Simply put, facts are stubborn things, and the undisputed facts in this case show
that neither Dawkins, nor the defendants, had any reason to anticipate that this toilet
would violently implode while in use. Since the defendants cannot be deliberately
indifferent to unprecedented and unknown mishaps or dangers, the lack of any
foreseeability to this accident rebuts any Eighth Amendment claim that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to a known risk to Dawkins’ safety and
compels the dismissal of this complaint.
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D. The Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity.
In any event, even if we determined that Dawkins had stated a colorable
constitutional claim, we believe that the defendants would still be entitled to qualified
immunity from damages. “Qualified immunity shields government officials from
civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right
that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v.
Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). A qualified immunity analysis involves two
questions: whether the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and whether
that right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Lower courts have the discretion to decide which
question to analyze first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The
Supreme Court has cautioned courts to “think carefully before expending scarce
judicial resources to resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or
statutory interpretation that will have no effect on the outcome of the case.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted); see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735.
An official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, “at the time of the
challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every
‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that
right.’” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)). The Supreme Court has stated that this standard does not require a case
14
directly on point, but requires that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory
or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. “When properly
applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 743 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)); see also Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015).
The dispositive question that the court must ask is “whether the violative nature
of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308
(2015) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). The inquiry “must be undertaken in light
of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id.; see also
Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2017). This “clearly
established” standard ensures that an official can reasonably anticipate when his or
her conduct may give rise to liability, and “protects the balance between vindication
of constitutional rights and government officials’ effective performance of their
duties.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664.
In the instant case, based on our analysis of Dawkins’ Eighth Amendment
claim, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Just as the
wholly unanticipated nature of this mishap defeats any claim of deliberate
indifference, it follows that the defendants’ conduct in failing to anticipate an
unknown hazard presented by the sudden implosion of a toilet could not have
transgressed clearly established caselaw. Accordingly, the defendants are also
15
entitled to qualified immunity, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
will be granted.3
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 37) will be GRANTED.
An appropriate order follows.
s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: January 7, 2022
3 We note that in proper cases the court may consider the question of qualified
immunity sua sponte. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 2001).
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