Grajales-El v. Amazon Prime

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HENRY GRAJALES-EL,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-CV-00572

v.

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

AMAZON PRIME, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

This action brought by pro se Plaintiff Henry Grajales-El (“Grajales-El”) was

commenced by the filing of a complaint on March 29, 2021. (Doc. 1). Grajales-El also filed a

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on the same date, which the Court granted. (Doc.

2; Doc. 6). On August 25, 2021, the Court found that the complaint failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted and granted Grajales-El leave to amend his complaint. (Doc.

5; Doc. 6). On September 24, 2021, Grajales-El filed an amended complaint against

Defendant Amazon Prime (“Amazon”). (Doc. 7). In the amended complaint, Grajales-El

seeks relief against Amazon for its alleged deliberately erroneous reporting and

implementation of his driving scores while he was employed by the company. (Doc. 7).

Grajales-El claims he was deprived of financial incentives and subjected to discipline as a

result of the incorrect driving scores. (Doc. 7). Grajales-El is requesting recovery of lost wages

and punitive damages. (Doc. 7, at 3).

Having conducted the statutorily-mandated screening of the amended complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court finds that Grajales-El fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted and grants leave to amend in accordance with this

Memorandum. (Doc. 7).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 29, 2021, Grajales-El, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action against

Amazon, Fair Isaac Corporation, and eDriving, LLC. (Doc. 1, at 1). Upon performing its

mandatory screening function, the Court held that Grajales-El’s claims failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 5, at 1; Doc. 6, at 1). The Court granted Grajales-El

leave to amend his complaint. (Doc. 5, at 1; Doc. 6, at 1). Grajales-El filed the amended

complaint on September 24, 2021, naming Amazon as the sole defendant and expelling the

other Defendants.1 (Doc. 7).

In the amended complaint, Grajales-El bring two claims for relief. (Doc. 7, at 2). In

Count 1, Grajales-El alleges that Amazon violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by

unlawfully disciplining Grajales-El and withholding financial incentives without due process.

(Doc. 7, at 2). Grajales-El alleges that Amazon does not have established disciplinary

protocols in place for delivery drivers that protect their rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Doc. 7, at 2). Additionally, Grajales-El alleges that, as a diabetic, he “is

registered as a worker with disabilities,” and that Amazon failed to accommodate his

disabilities in the workplace. (Doc. 7, at 2). In Count 2, Grajales-El asserts that Amazon

violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from “cruel and unusual disciplinary methods

as punishment, which were deliberately designed to cause adverse mental effects.” (Doc. 7,

at 2); U.S. Const. amend. VIII. As relief, Grajales-El is requesting recovery of lost wages and

punitive damages. (Doc. 7, at 3).

1 In the amended complaint, Grajales-El does not list Fair Isaac Corporation or

eDriving, LLC, as defendants. (Doc. 7). Thus, these parties were terminated from this action

on September 24, 2021. (Doc. 7).

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II. SECTION 1915(E)(2) STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court is statutorily required to review the

complaint of a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis prior to service of process. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see generally Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587–89 (W.D.

Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and standards). In

performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard

applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first

take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions

which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the

complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal

claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well

as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court

may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should

“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff

must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal

conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting

In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the

court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen.

Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals

Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in

the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for

which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.

President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading

requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.

Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded

complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right

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to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a

cause of action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt,

839 F.3d at 347 (citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule

8(a) requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).

With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally

construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully

pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”

and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond a doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed

that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must

permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson

v. Mayview St. Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

A. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Grajales-El’s amended complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 8(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must

be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); Scibelli v. Lebanon Cty., 219 F. App’x

221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Dismissal under Rule 8 is proper when a complaint “le[aves] the

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defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action].”

Binsack v. Lackawanna Cty. Prison, 438 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011). While the undersigned

must construe the amended complaint liberally due to Grajales-El’s status as a pro se litigant,

the amended complaint fails to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. (Doc. 7).

In Count I, Grajales-El asserts that Amazon allegedly violated his right to due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment because “[w]ithout any kind of a fair impartial hearing,

investigation or defense/rebuttal allowed, Amazon took action to have [Grajales-El]

terminated.” (Doc. 7, at 2); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment of the

Constitution provides in part:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

As the Amendment is directed at the States, it can be violated only by conduct that may be

fairly characterized as “state action.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 929

(1982). The Fourteenth Amendment applies only to actions that may fairly be said to be those

of the “States,” and not to actions of private individuals or entities. Jackson v. Metropolitan

Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Shelley

v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

Here, the facts before the Court do not indicate that the State played any part in

Amazon’s disciplinary proceedings against Grajales-El. (Doc. 7, at 2). Grajales-El alleges that

by forcing him “into a 3 day disciplinary action, where he was not compensated for his time

and suffered a Post-Traumatic Stress break down,” Amazon violated his Fourteenth

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Amendment right to due process of law. (Doc. 7, at 2). However, this claim fails as a matter

of law because he has not alleged, nor could any of his allegations be expansively read to

allege, that Amazon was acting under color of state law, a necessary element for claims

brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51, 358 (privately

owned and operated utility, despite extensive state regulation and a state-protected monopoly,

did not commit state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment when it terminated

electrical service to plaintiff without notice or hearing); Paige v. Crozer Chester Medical Center,

2009 WL 533068, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2009) (Fourteenth Amendment claim failed as a

matter of law because plaintiff failed to allege that private medical center was acting under

color of state law when it terminated plaintiff’s employment). Therefore, Grajales-El has

failed to state a claim alleging a violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 7, at 2).

In Count II, Grajales-El alleges that Amazon’s disciplinary action violated his right to

be free from cruel and unusual disciplinary methods as punishment under the Eighth

Amendment. (Doc. 7, at 2). Protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment “d[o] not apply

until after sentencing and conviction.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005)

(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1989)); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

312, 318 (1986). “[T]he Eighth Amendment’s protections do not apply ‘until after the State

has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal

prosecutions.’” Hudson v. Coxon, 149 Fed. Appx. 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Graham,

490 U.S. at 398-99).

Grajales-El alleges that Amazon violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he was

subjected “to cruel and unusual disciplinary methods as punishments, which were

deliberately designed to cause adverse mental effects.” (Doc. 7, at 2). At no point in his

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amended complaint does Grajales-El allege that he was detained by police or another state

actor. Because a party may not bring an Eighth Amendment claim until after a sentencing

and conviction by the State, Grajales-El fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

(Doc. 7, at 2).

Finally, Grajales-El alludes to workplace discrimination for unlawful disciplinary

action and failure to accommodate his disability, as he is a diabetic and “registered as a worker

with disabilities.” (Doc. 7, at 2). To state a claim for discrimination under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) a plaintiff must show: “(1) he is a disabled person within the

meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the

job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an

otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Gaul v. Lucent Tech.,

134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1996));

see also Ostrowski v. Con-Way Freight, Inc., 543 F. App’x 128, 130 (3d Cir. 2013)). A “disability”

is defined by the ADA as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C)

being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Taylor v. Phoenixville

Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 305–06 (3d Cir. 1999).

Grajales-El alleges that on April 29, 2020, the day Amazon’s e-Mentor driving

monitoring application completed its driving assessment, Grajales-El notified his supervisor

that he was feeling ill due to diabetic symptoms, but his illness was not accommodated for

during the disciplinary process. (Doc. 7, at 2). However, this statement fails to sufficiently

present a claim for workplace discrimination. (Doc. 7, at 2). In order to present a claim of

discrimination under the ADA, Grajales-El must allege with sufficient particularity that the

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rights afforded to him under the ADA have been violated. See Gaul, 134 F.3d at 580; Binsack,

438 F. App’x at 160. In addition, Grajales-El must adhere to Rule 8 by alleging concise

allegations of specific conduct that he believes violated his rights under the ADA. See Binsack,

438 F. App’x at 160; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

B. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure

to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment

would be inequitable or futile. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. Further, “[a] district court has

‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.’” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales

Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App'x 672, 673 (3d Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting

Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). In this case, the Court will grant Grajales-

El leave to file a second amended complaint in an attempt to cure the deficiencies outlined

herein. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108.

The amended complaint must consist of concise and direct statements alleging which

civil rights were violated, and the specific acts that established each violation. Mere

speculation is insufficient. Grajales-El is advised to assert his claims with a corresponding

good-faith request for relief. Grajales-El must limit his claims to those by which he has

suffered actual harm due to the actions of Amazon. Finally, the “amended complaint must

be complete in all respects. It must be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate

complaint without reference to the complaint already filed.” Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp.

1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992).

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IV. CONCLUSION

As it stands, Grajales-El’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. (Doc. 7). The Court grants Grajales-El leave to file a second amended

complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of the Order filed concurrently with this

Memorandum, on or before Wednesday, January 26, 2022.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: December 28, 2021 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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