Wyatt v. Malisko

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TARIQ WYATT, : Civil No. 3:16-CV-1438

:

Plaintiff :

:

v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

C.O. MALISKO, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. Factual Background

This case is currently scheduled for a non-jury trial before the undersigned

relating to the plaintiff’s sole surviving claim, a First Amendment retaliation claim

based on the alleged denial of access to legal papers and placement in an unsanitary

psychiatric observation cell. The remaining Defendant, Lt. Butts of the Department

of Corrections (“Department” or “DOC”), has filed a motion in limine to exclude

evidence pertaining to claims that have been previously dismissed or withdrawn.

(Doc. 116). The plaintiff has responded to this motion, (Doc. 122), conceding that

certain claims have been dismissed, but noting that brief testimony regarding these

matters may still be relevant to the retaliation claim, to questions of administrative

exhaustion, and further asserting that the need for a pre-trial ruling on a motion in

limine is reduced here, where we will be conducting a non-jury trial. We agree that

the non-jury trial of this case reduces the urgency and necessity of pre-trial

evidentiary rulings like those sought here since:

[A]ny concern about juror confusion is obviated, and the Court is well-

positioned to make judgments regarding the admissibility of evidence

within the context of the trial itself. Indeed, although courts will rule

on motions in limine in advance of bench trials in appropriate cases,

Velez v. Reading Health System, 2016 WL 9776079 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24,

2016), they often will find it unnecessary to do so because the concerns

over prejudice or confusion to a jury are absent. See 9 Charles A.

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d §

2411 (3d ed. 2008); see also United States v. Brown, 2017 WL 219521

(N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2017) (noting that concerns over the potential for

prejudice from improper evidence “are minimal in bench trials ...

rulings on motions in limine are less important.”); Alan L. Frank Law

Assocs., P.C. v. OOO RM Invest, 2016 WL 9348064 (S.D. Fla. Nov.

30, 2016).

Buhler Versatile Inc. v. GVM, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-00217, 2018 WL 6062307, at *5

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2018). Nonetheless, understanding the value of some guidance

from the court on these evidentiary issues we provide the following further guidance:

As discussed below, we will GRANT this motion in limine in part and DENY the

motion, in part. Specifically, we will deny this motion to the extent that it seeks

wholesale exclusion of this evidence, but will grant the motion, in part, and require

the plaintiff to make specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating

to previously dismissed claims during the course of the non-jury trial prior to

admitting any such evidence.

II. Discussion

A. Motions in Limine—Guiding Principles

The Court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its cases, which

carries with it the discretion and authority to rule on motions in limine prior to trial.

See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re Japanese Elec. Prods.

Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.,

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (the court

exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues “in appropriate cases”).

Courts may exercise this discretion in order to exclude unfairly prejudicial,

confusing, cumulative, or irrelevant evidence. United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d

812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). Courts may also do so in order to “narrow the evidentiary

issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley v.

Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

However, courts should be careful before doing so.

In considering motions in limine that call upon the Court to engage in

preliminary evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we

begin by recognizing that these “evidentiary rulings [on motions in limine] are

subject to the trial judge’s discretion and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of

discretion . . . . Additionally, application of the balancing test under Federal Rule of

Evidence 403 will not be disturbed unless it is ‘arbitrary and irrational.’ ” Abrams v.

Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see

Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1994) (reviewing in

limine rulings for abuse of discretion). One of the key guiding principles governing

the exercise of this discretion is reflected in the philosophy that shapes the rules of

evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence can aptly be characterized as evidentiary

rules of inclusion, which are designed to broadly permit fact-finders to consider

pertinent factual information while searching for the truth. Adopting this broad view

of relevance, it has been held that

Under [Rule] 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” [Therefore] “[i]t follows that evidence is irrelevant only

when it has no tendency to prove the fact. Thus the rule, while giving

judges great freedom to admit evidence, diminishes substantially their

authority to exclude evidence as irrelevant.”

Frank v. Cnty. of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Spain v.

Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 452 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted)). Rule 402 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence, in turn, provides that all “[r]elevant evidence will be

admissible unless the rules of evidence provide to the contrary.” United States v.

Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

This principle is then tempered by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

which sets legal grounds for exclusion of some evidence, stating that:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion

of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

These broad principles also shape and define the scope of this Court’s

discretion in addressing motions in limine like those filed here, which invite us pre-

trial to rule that evidence relating to claims that have been dismissed should be

excluded at trial. Reasoning that evidence regarding dismissed claims that have

failed as a matter of law typically has little relevance, courts have often excluded

evidence of dismissed claims from trial. See, e.g., Branch v. Brennan, No. 2:17-CV-

00777, 2019 WL 3892850, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2019); Brown v. Johnson &

Johnson, No. CV 12-4929, 2015 WL 12834346, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2015);

Moore v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., No. CV 02-

1734, 2005 WL 8165154, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2005); Devine v. Pittsburgh Bd.

of Pub. Educ., No. 2:13-CV-220, 2015 WL 7301149, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18,

2015). However, those courts that have excluded this evidence often have done so

without prejudice to the plaintiff presenting some specific and narrowly-tailored

offer of proof as to the relevance and admissibility of particular evidence. Id.

Guided by these principles, we turn to consideration of the instant motion in

limine. In this case, the plaintiff argues that some evidence concerning these

previously dismissed claims is still relevant to his sole remaining claim, a First

Amendment retaliation claim. The plaintiff also asserts that this evidence may be

relevant to questions of administrative exhaustion, and provide essential context to

the plaintiff’s remaining legal claims. Accordingly, consistent with caselaw

governing the exercise of discretion in this field, this motion in limine will be denied

to the extent that it seeks wholesale exclusion of this evidence, but we will require

the plaintiff to make specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating

to previously dismissed claims during the course of the non-jury trial.

By adopting this course, we avoid the concerns that justify motions in limine,

excluding unfairly prejudicial, confusing, cumulative or irrelevant evidence,

Romano, 849 F.2d at 815, and “narrow[ing] the evidentiary issues for trial and to

eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1069 (citation

omitted). Yet following this course does not absolutely preclude the plaintiff from

presenting specific evidence if he can first demonstrate its relevance through an offer

of proof.

An appropriate order follows.

S/Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: May 17, 2021

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TARIQ WYATT, : Civil No. 3:16-CV-1438

:

Plaintiff :

:

v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

C.O. MALISKO, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 17th day of May 2021, in accordance with the accompanying

Memorandum, upon consideration of the defendant’s motion in limine (Doc. 116),

which seeks exclusion of evidence relating to any previously dismissed claims in

this lawsuit, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED

the motion, in part. Specifically, we will deny this motion to the extent that it seeks

wholesale exclusion of this evidence, but will grant the motion, in part, and require

the plaintiff to make specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating

to previously dismissed claims during the course of the non-jury trial.

S/Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge