Murdock v. Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIC MURDOCK, :

Plaintiff :

: No. 1:20-cv-2138

v. :

: (Judge Rambo)

GENE BROWN, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

This matter is before the Court pursuant to the motion to dismiss (Doc. No.

19) filed by Defendant Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”).

I. BACKGROUND

On November 17, 2020, pro se Plaintiff Eric Murdock (“Plaintiff”), who is

currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution Benner Township in

Bellefonte, Pennsylvania (“SCI Benner Township”), initiated the above-captioned

action by filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants inmate

Gene Brown (“Brown”), C.O. 1 Rosse (“Rosse”), C.O. 1 Terra (“Terra”), Lt.

Rinnger (“Rinnger”), PSS Dunn (“Dunn”), Robert Marsh (“Marsh”), and the DOC.

(Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from an attack by inmate

Brown. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages as well as unspecified injunctive

and mandamus relief. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 18.) In an Order dated November 25, 2021, the

Court dismissed Brown as a Defendant and directed service of the complaint on the

remaining Defendants. (Doc. No. 5.) After receiving several extensions of time,

Defendant DOC filed their motion to dismiss on April 20, 2021 and their brief in

support thereof on May 25, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 19, 25.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences

that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The Court’s

inquiry is guided by the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under Twombly and Iqbal,

pleading requirements have shifted to a “more heightened form of pleading.” See

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). To prevent dismissal,

all civil complaints must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is

facially plausible. Id. The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility

that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. As the Supreme Court

instructed in Iqbal, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has

not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Accordingly, to determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and

Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified the

following steps a district court must take when determining the sufficiency of a

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6): (1) identify the elements a plaintiff must plead to

state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint “not

entitled” to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded

factual allegations” contained in the complaint “plausibly give rise to an entitlement

to relief.” See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a

court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters

of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s

claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d

Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998

F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). A court may also consider “any ‘matters

incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice,

matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.’”

Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B

Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d Ed.

2004)); see also Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.

2002) (noting that when considering a motion to dismiss, courts may consider

“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading”).

In the context of pro se prisoner litigation specifically, the court must be

mindful that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,”

must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”

and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond a doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

B. Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress for

violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The statute states, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress.

Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means

through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.”

See Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To state a cause of action

under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct complained of was

committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a

right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant DOC asserts that Plaintiff’s claims against it are barred by

sovereign immunity. (Doc. No. 25 at 3-5.) The Eleventh Amendment bars suits

against a state and its agencies in federal court that seek monetary damages. See

Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984).

“Because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department of Correction sis part

of the executive department of the Commonwealth , . . . it shares in the

Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,

224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against the

DOC are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Beckett v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,

597 F. App’x 665, 667 (34d Cir. 205) (citing Will v. Mich Dep’t of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Moreover, the DOC does not qualify as a “person” amendable

to suit pursuant to § 1983. See Pettaway v. SCI Albion, 487 F. App’x 766, 768 (3d

Cir. 2012) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71). The Court, therefore, will grant Defendant

DOC’s motion to dismiss.

Courts are cautioned that because of the liberal pleading standard, a plaintiff

should generally be granted leave to amend before dismissing a claim that is merely

deficient. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

The federal rules allow for liberal amendments in light of the “principle that the

purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Foman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court may

deny a motion to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on

the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of

the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Id. The Court must also determine

that a proposed amendment would be futile if the complaint, as amended, would not

survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig.,

306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002). Based on the foregoing discussion, it would be

futile to grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint against the DOC.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendant DOC’s motion to

dismiss. (Doc. No. 19.) Plaintiff will not be permitted to file an amended complaint.

The above-captioned action will proceed on his claims against Defendants Rosse,

Terra, Rinnger, Dunn, and Marsh. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Sylvia H. Rambo

United States District Judge

Dated: June 10, 2021