Mauder v. Brittain

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANDREW MAUDER., : Civil No. 1:21-CV-0256

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

KATHY BRITTAIN, :

SUPERINTENDNET OF SCI– :

FRACKVILLE, et al., :

:

Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Self-represented Plaintiff, Andrew Mauder, a state inmate, filed this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserts an Eighth Amendment

failure to protect claim. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff also seeks allowance to proceed in

forma pauperis and the appointment of counsel. (Docs. 3, 6.) Based on Plaintiff’s

request to proceed in forma pauperis, the court is required to examine the

complaint for legal sufficiency in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For

the reasons set forth below, the court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in

forma pauperis, but will dismiss the pleading without prejudice and grant Plaintiff

leave to file a curative amended complaint.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the complaint, on August 20, 2020, Andrew

Mauder (“Plaintiff” or “Mauder”) was housed at the Frackville State Correctional

Institution (“SCI–Frackville”) in Frackville, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1.) On that day,

prison staff alerted him that he would be moving from cell 23 of E block, B wing

to cell 29, of E Block, B wing. (Id., ¶¶ 10–11.) Mauder gave Sgt. John Doe and

Corrections Officer (“CO”) John Doe “several warnings” that he had a past

“conflict” with the inmate in cell 29 and was not to be housed with that inmate.

(Id., ¶ 12.) Sgt. Doe and CO Doe ignored Mauder’s cautionary statements and

moved him into cell 29. “[A]fter 10–20 minutes,” Sgt. Doe and CO Doe removed

Mauder from cell 29. (Id., ¶ 13.)

Mauder filed a grievance the following day. The Grievance Coordinator,

Jennifer Newberry, granted the grievance in part and denied it in part. She said,

“they did it, but wasn’t giving [Plaintiff] compensation.” (Id., ¶ 14.)

Superintendent Kathy Brittain denied Mauder’s grievance appeal. (Id., ¶ 15.)

Mauder “informed” Lt. Newberry and Captain Reese of the incident and asked that

any video footage of the incident be preserved. (Id., ¶ 17.) Although not

physically injured, Mauder suffered severe anxiety, anguish, and paranoia as a

result of Sgt. Doe and CO Doe’s deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of

serious harm to his safety when housing him with an inmate that he repeatedly

warned he had a “conflict” with due to a past “misconduct.” (Id., ¶ 20.) Plaintiff

also claims Superintendent Brittain failed to properly train the John Doe

Defendants. (Id., ¶ 22.)

JURISDICTION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 this court has subject matter jurisdiction in

civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

Venue is proper in this district as the alleged acts and omissions giving rise

to the complaint occurred at SCI-Frackville in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania,

which is located in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a litigant seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, without the prepayment

of fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires the court to screen the complaint. Likewise,

when a prisoner seeks redress from a government defendant in a civil action,

whether proceeding in forma pauperis or not, the court must screen the complaint.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915(A) give the

court the authority to dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1)–(2). In deciding whether the complaint fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted, the court employs the standard used to analyze

motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d

366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.

2003)). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well pleaded allegations as

true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe

v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020).

The pleadings of self-represented plaintiffs are held to a less stringent

standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally

construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att’y Gen.,

655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Self-represented litigants are to be granted

leave to file a curative amended complaint even when a plaintiff does not seek

leave to amend, unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. See

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). However, a

complaint that sets forth facts which affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff has

no right to recover is properly dismissed without leave to amend. Dooley, 957

F.3d at 376 (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir.

2002)).

DISCUSSION

A. Failure to State a Claim against Defendants Brittain,

Grievance Coordinator Newberry, Lt. Newberry, and Capt.

Reese

Plaintiff alleges that he has been deprived of certain constitutional rights in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that persons acting under

color of state law may be held liable if they deprive an individual of “any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United

States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two

essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person

acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right,

privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1998); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563

(3d Cir. 2011).

A defendant in a civil rights action “cannot be held responsible for a

constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.”

Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007). “[A] government official

is liable only for his or her own conduct and accordingly must have had some sort

of personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.” Argueta v. U.S.

Immigration & Customs Enf't, 643 F.3d 60, 71 (3d Cir. 2011). “[T]here are two

theories of supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they

established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the

constitutional harm, and another under which they can be liable if they participated

in violating plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation and

alteration marks omitted); see also Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207–08

(3d Cir. 1988) (the after the fact submission of a grievance is “simply insufficient”

to establish a defendant’s knowledge of an underlying constitutional violation at

the time it occurred); Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (Grievance Coordinator and

Superintendent’s involvement in review and denial of grievance insufficient to

establish personal involvement). Alleging a mere hypothesis that an individual

defendant had personal knowledge or involvement in depriving the plaintiff of his

rights is insufficient to establish personal involvement. Rode, 845 F.2d 1208.

Mauder does not allege any facts in his complaint that suggest that

Superintendent Brittain, Grievance Coordinator Newberry, Lt. Newberry or Capt.

Reese had contemporaneous knowledge of his August 20, 2020 concerns of being

housed with the inmate in cell 29, directed his transfer to that cell, or knew that

others were moving him to cell 29. From a review of Mauder’s complaint, it is

clear that he seeks to impose liability on Superintendent Brittain and Grievance

Coordinator Newberry based on their involvement in processing, reviewing, and

responding to his grievance concerning the events of August 20, 2020. This is not

a viable claim. See Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374.

Also, with respect to Superintendent Brittain, Mauder has not adequately

plead a “failure to train” claim against her. “[T]he inadequacy of … training may

serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of the persons with whom the [inadequately

trained subordinates] come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

388 (1989). Additionally, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate

indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,

62 (2011). In the absence of such a pattern, a plaintiff must show that the harm

suffered was “so predictable that failure to train the [subordinate] amounted to

conscious disregard” for plaintiff’s rights. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original).

However, “[w]ithout notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular

respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training

program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id. at 62.

Here, Mauder fails to allege that Superintendent Brittain was on notice that

her training program insufficiently prepared the John Doe staff members on how to

respond to an inmate’s concerns when being housed with another inmate. He also

does not allege a pattern of alleged constitutional violations occurring at SCI–

Frackville due to similar training failures as the one he experienced on August 20,

2020. Instead he makes a conclusory assertion that Sgt. Doe and CO Doe’s actions

were due to a failed training policy. As such, he fails to state a failure to train

claim against Superintendent Brittain.

Finally, Mauer’s claim that he informed Lt. Newberry and Capt. Reese of

the incident after it occurred does not demonstrate their personal involvement in

the decision to place him in cell 29 despite his security concerns. Accordingly,

Mauer fails to allege the personal involvement of Superintendent Brittain,

Grievance Coordinator Newberry, Lt. Newberry, or Capt. Reese in the events of

August 20, 2020. Additionally, his failure to train claim against Superintendent

Brittain will be dismissed.

B. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claim Against Sgt.

Doe and CO Doe

To state a cognizable Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that: (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing substantial

risk of serious harm; (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial

risk; and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused his harm. Proctor v.

James, 811 F. App’x 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2020); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hamilton

v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997). A prison official is deliberately

indifferent if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference” of such harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Nevertheless, not all injuries

suffered by an inmate at the hands of another prisoner result in constitutional

liability for prison officials under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 834.

Clearly, Mauder states a viable Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim

against Sgt. Doe and CO Doe for the events of August 20, 2020 concerning his

placement in cell 29 with an inmate whom he had expressed conflict with. With

that said, whether his claim will ultimately be successful is left to be seen.

However, because Mauder fails to identify these individuals, the court cannot

properly serve them. Pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, defendants not served within 90 days following the filing of the

complaint may be subject to dismissal. Therefore, Mauder will be given 90 days to

provide the names of his John Doe Defendants.

C. Leave to Amend

The court will dismiss Mauder’s complaint against all named Defendants

due to his failure to state a claim against them for which relief may be granted

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). However,

because it is conceivable that Mauder may be able to cure the defects identified in

this memorandum, the court will grant Mauder leave to file an amended complaint.

If Mauder decides to file an amended complaint, he must clearly label the

document “Amended Complaint.” It must bear the docket number assigned to this

case (Civ. No. 1:21-CV-0256) and must be retyped (double spaced) or legibly

rewritten (double spaced) in its entirety, on the court-approved form.1 In addition,

any amended complaint filed by Mauder supersedes (replaces) the original

complaint already filed. It must be “retyped or reprinted so that it will be complete

1 In the “Caption” section of the amended complaint, Plaintiff must state the first and last name, to

the extent he knows it, of each defendant he wishes to sue. Plaintiff should also indicate whether

he intends to sue each defendant in his or her individual capacity, official capacity, or both.

in itself including exhibits.” M.D. Pa. LR 15.1; see also W. Run Student Hous.

Assocs. v. Huntingdon Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013).

If Mauder fails to file an amended complaint on the court’s form within 21

days, and in compliance with the court’s instructions, this matter will be dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Finally, Plaintiff is reminded of his

ongoing obligation to advise the court of any change of address. See M.D. Pa. LR

83.18. His failure to do so will be deemed as abandonment of the lawsuit resulting

in the dismissal of the action.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the

court will dismiss Mauder’s complaint. Mauder will be granted leave to file an

amended complaint. An appropriate order will issue.

s/ Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Court Judge

Dated: May 5, 2021 Middle District of Pennsylvania