Williams v. PA Department of Corrections

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANTHONY S. WILLIAMS, Civil No. 3:19-cv-1261

Plaintiff . (Judge Mariani)

v. .

PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al, :

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Anthony Williams (“Williams), an inmate confined at the State Correctional

Institution, Coal Township, Pennsylvania, (“SCI-Coal Township’), initiated this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Named as Defendants are Unit Manager

Kathy Biscoe and Correctional Officers Novallis and Wydra. Presently ripe for disposition is

Defendants’ motion (Doc. 16) for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.

I. Statement of Undisputed Facts’

On December 29, 2018, Williams was on janitorial work detail at SCl-Coal Township.

(Doc. 19, Statement of Material Facts, J 1-2; Doc. 23, Counterstatement of Material Facts,

q{ 1-2). Janitorial work detail involves sanitizing, sweeping, mopping, and cleaning. (/d. at

4 3). As part of his janitorial duties, Williams was required to shake out cell rugs to clean

any debris off of them, an act known as “rug popping.” (/d. at 7 4). Williams asserts that he

was shaking out a rug when debris from the rug flew into his face, arms, and hands, causing

eye irritation, a rash, nausea, a stomachache, and vomiting. (Doc. 19-1, Doc. 23, pp. 4-35,

Deposition of Anthony Williams (“Williams Dep.”), at 13:3-4; 13:22-24; 14:1-3; 16:14-16).

Williams contends that he immediately asked Defendant Wydra for medical attention, but

Wydra refused to send him to the medial department. (Doc. 23 7 5). Williams was treated

by medical staff approximately two to three days later. (Doc. 19 ] 5; Doc. 23 ff 5, 6).

Williams states that he received treatment for his eye from December 31, 2018 to January

26, 2019. (Doc. 23 § 6). Defendants maintain that Williams has no lasting injuries from this

event. (Doc. 19 { 6).

‘Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered

paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF

COURT 56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of material

facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party's statement and identifying

genuine issues to be tried. /d. Unless otherwise noted, the factual background herein derives from the

parties’ Rule 56.1 statements of material facts. (Docs. 19, 23).

Williams never spoke directly to Defendant Biscoe, the Unit Manager, regarding “rug

popping” duties. (Doc. 19 J 7). Williams asserts that he told Defendant Novallis that he

was uncomfortable shaking out rugs without personal protective equipment. (Doc. 23 { 7).

Defendant Novallis allegedly informed Williams that he spoke to Defendant Biscoe about

getting personal protective equipment and that “she was on top of it.” (/d.).

Il. Legal Standard

Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not

present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Feo. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “As to materiality,

... [only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence

of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106

S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving

party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a

genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).

Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of

the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the

assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or showing that the

materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an

adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Feb. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1)(A)-(B). In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, “[t]he court

need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”

Feb. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant's, then

the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974

F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912 (1993).

However, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). If a party has carried its burden under the

summary judgment rule,

its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine

issue for trial. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between

the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of

material fact. When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe

it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a

motion for summary judgment.

Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).

lll. Discussion

A. Lack of Personal Involvement of Defendant Biscoe

Defendant Biscoe argues that Williams fails to state a claim against her because she

lacks personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. (Doc. 20, pp. 4-6). Individual liability can

be imposed under section 1983 only if the state actor played an “affirmative part” in the

alleged misconduct and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat

superior.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). “A defendant in a civil rights action must

have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. ... Personal involvement can be shown

through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode,

845 F.2d at 1207-08; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316

F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2003). Such allegations, however, must be made with appropriate

particularity in that a complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time, place, and

person responsible. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Alleging a

mere hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge or involvement in

depriving the plaintiff of his rights is insufficient to establish personal involvement. Rode,

845 F.2d at 1208.

Williams states that Defendant Biscoe is a Unit Manager at SCl-Coal Township and

“is in charge of the supervision and discipline of the Unit Management Team of D Unit at

SCl-Coal.” (Doc. 1 98). The only claim against Defendant Biscoe is that Defendant

Novallis allegedly informed Biscoe about placing an order for more personal protective

equipment. (/d. at ] 22). Williams concedes that he never spoke to Defendant Biscoe.

(Williams Dep. 17:9-14). At his deposition, Williams testified, in response to defense

counsel's questions, as follows:

Q [Attorney]: When did you talk to [Biscoe], if at all?

A [Williams]: Well, | hadn’t spoken with her. Defendant Novallis said that he

spoke to her and that he informed her that inmates are

requesting, me in particular are requesting PPE or safety

equipment when popping out rugs.

Q [Attorney]: You never talked to Biscoe?

A [Williams]: No.

Q: [Attorney]: You just heard what she may or may not have said from the

other defendants?

A [Williams]: Correct.

Q [Attorney]: And [Biscoe] was not present or involved the specific day of this

incident?

A [Williams]: She was not present during this incident.

(Williams Dep. 17:9-14; 21:19-23; 23:3-5).

It appears that Williams attempts to hold Defendant Biscoe liable based on her

supervisory role of Unit Manager. Any attempt by Williams to hold Defendant Biscoe liable

for the actions of her subordinates is essentially an assertion of respondeat superior liability

which seeks to hold her liable based on her supervisory role. This ground of constitutional

liability has been squarely rejected by the courts. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Williams

has failed to establish that Defendant Biscoe was personally involved in the alleged violation

of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Defendant Biscoe is entitled to judgment in her

favor to the extent that Williams’ claims against her rely on a respondeat superior theory of

liability.

B. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claim

Williams asserts that his requirement to work in “unsafe, hazardous conditions”

constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

(Doc. 1, p. 6). A condition of confinement violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is so

reprehensible as to be deemed inhumane under contemporary standards or such that it

deprives an inmate of minimal civilized measure of the necessities of life. See Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). When an

Eighth Amendment claim is brought against a prison official it must meet two requirements:

(1) the deprivation alleged must be objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official

must have been deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan,

911 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard in that the prison

Official must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.

Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). “[C]laims of negligence, . . .

without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute ‘deliberate indifference.”

Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Rouse v.

Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

As part of his prison job, Williams was required to perform basic janitorial duties such

as cleaning showers, disinfecting gym equipment, wiping down surfaces, mopping and

sweeping, and shaking out rugs. (Williams Dep. 7:6-24). Williams asserts that he was

required him to shake out rugs without appropriate personal protective equipment and he

suffered injuries by working without such safety gear. (Williams Dep. 9:17-25; 12:23-13:9).

First, the record does not establish that Williams was exposed to an unreasonably

high level of harm by shaking out rugs that posed a substantial risk to his present or future

health. There is no evidence that Williams’ common janitorial work duties, including shaking

out rugs, meets the high standard required to show a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Second, the record fails to establish that Defendants were aware of and disregarded

an excessive risk of harm to Williams. The record reflects that Williams informed

Defendants Wydra and Novallis that the was “uncomfortable” shaking out rugs without

personal protective equipment. (Doc. 23 J 7; Williams Dep. 10:14-19; 11:1-6; 12:11-21).

Although Williams expressed his concern about working without personal protective

equipment, there is simply no evidence that Defendants were aware of or should have been

aware of an excessive risk to Williams’ safety. The record establishes that shaking out rugs

is “a normal practice” at SCl-Coal Township, it has been occurring since approximately

2017, and the work assignment is well within prison policy. (Williams Dep. 19:5-12; 20:25-

21:1). Williams offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the

Defendants knew of and disregarded the risk that caused him to suffer injuries.

In sum, Williams has failed to establish that he was exposed to a serious risk to his

health or safety, or that any Defendant was aware of and failed to protect him from a serious

risk of present or future injury from performing basic janitorial duties of shaking out rugs.

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this ground.

C. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim

Williams asserts that Defendant Wydra was deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, for refusing to allow him to see

medical immediately after shaking out the rugs.2 (Doc. 1 9] 32, 38). The Eighth

Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment on prisoners. Fuentes

v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 344 (3d Cir. 2000). In the context of medical care, the Eighth

Amendment “requires prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it

has incarcerated.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. To establish an Eighth Amendment claim

based on a prison’s denial of medical care, an inmate must allege acts or omissions by

prison officials that were sufficiently harmful to establish deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v. Camden

Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). The relevant inquiry is whether the

2 Williams makes no claims regarding the adequacy of his medical treatment once he was

treated by the medical department.

defendant: (1) was subjectively deliberately indifferent (2) to the plaintiff's objectively serious

medical needs. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837; Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d

210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015).

The “deliberate indifference” prong of the applicable Eighth Amendment analysis

requires that the defendant actually know of and disregard “an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Circumstantial evidence can establish

subjective knowledge on the part of the defendant if it shows that the excessive risk was so

obvious that the official must have known about it. See Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 133

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference when a

prison official: “(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses

to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3)

prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse,

182 F.3d at 197.

The second prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry is whether the plaintiff's medical

needs were serious. A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily

recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v.

Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 19875. Not every condition is a serious medical need;

instead, the serious medical need element contemplates a condition of urgency, namely,

one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain. See id.

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Williams asserts that when he was shaking out a rug, debris from the rug flew into

his face, arms, and hands. (Williams Dep. 13:3-4). As a result, he suffered eye irritation, a

rash, nausea, a stomachache, and vomiting. (Williams Dep. 13:22-24; 14:1-3; 16:14-16).

Williams testified that the nausea, stomachache, and vomiting were a “momentary thing”

and only occurred right after the incident. (Williams Dep. 16:14-21). With respect to the eye

injury and rash, Williams received medical treatment for these ailments. Two days after the

incident, a nurse prescribed eye drops to flush-out any particles in Williams’ eye and

advised him to purchase ointment from the commissary to “solve the rash issues.”

(Williams Dep. 15:9-16; 16:4-13; Doc. 23, p. 39-40). Williams testified that he used the eye

drops on an as-needed basis for three to four months, the drops healed his eye, and after

he finished the last bottle of eye drops, he was “fine.” (Williams Dep. 15:17-25; 16:1-3:

17:4-6). Williams further asserts that he received treatment for his eye from December 31,

2018 through July 26, 2019, and that he has no permanent injuries from this incident. (Doc.

19 6; Doc. 23 J 6; Williams Dep. 21:9-11).

Assuming that Williams has suffered a serious medical condition sufficient for

purposes of a deliberate indifference claim, the summary judgment record lacks any

evidence tending to show that Defendant Wydra was deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs. On the day of the incident, December 29, 2018, Williams informed

Defendant Wydra that “something flew into [his] eyes and [his] face” and he requested

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medical attention for his eye irritation. (Williams Dep. 14:11-12). The record fails to

establish that Defendant Wydra had actual knowledge or reason to believe that any debris

in Williams’ eye constituted an excessive risk to his health or safety. The delay attributable

to Defendant Wydra’s alleged failure to secure immediate treatment for Williams was two

days. Williams sustained injuries on December 29, 2018 and was treated by the medical

department on December 31, 2018. (Doc. 23 ff 2, 6; Doc. 23, pp. 46-47). Williams has

failed to establish that his need for more immediate medical attention was so obvious that

the delay he experienced constituted deliberate indifference. Furthermore, the record

demonstrates that the two-day delay in receiving medical treatment did not result in any

permanent, lasting injuries to Williams. See, e.g., Ayala v. Terhune, 195 F. App’x 87, 91 (3d

Cir. 2006) (holding that there was no deliberate indifference when a prisoner suffered

sporadic delays of up to four days in receiving prescription medicine).

The Court finds that Defendant Wydra, a correctional officer, lacked the requisite

knowledge to realize the potential for a serious eye injury which required urgent medical

attention, and thus could not have been deliberately indifferent. Williams has failed to

establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim against Wydra and Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment will be granted on this basis as well.

3 Williams did not experience a skin rash until a few days after the incident. (Williams Dep.

14:23-24).

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D. Qualified Immunity

Even if Williams had stated a colorable constitutional claim, the Defendants are

nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity from this claim for damages. In order to establish

a civil rights claim, Williams must show the deprivation of a right secured by the United

States Constitution or the laws of the United States. However, government officials

performing “discretionary functions,” are insulated from suit if their conduct did not violate a

“clearly established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Qualified immunity

balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they

exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction,

and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. It

“provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “Thus, so long as an official

reasonably believes that his conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield

that official from liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244). Although qualified immunity is generally a question of law that

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should be considered at the earliest possible stage of proceedings, a genuine dispute of

material fact may preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity. Giles v. Kearney, 571

F.3d 318, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2009).

A qualified immunity determination involves a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether a

constitutional or federal right has been violated; and (2) whether that right was “clearly

established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555

U.S. at 236 (permitting federal courts to exercise discretion in deciding which of the two

Saucier prongs should be addressed first). As stated, the Court finds that Williams failed to

establish the violation of a constitutional right. Defendants simply could not have

recognized that shaking out rugs as part of janitorial duties would violate a “clearly

established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. Therefore, Defendants are protected from liability by

qualified immunity.

IV. Conclusion

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion (Doc. 16) and enter judgment in their favor.

A separate Order shall issue.

WN calle

Robert Mariani

United States District Judge

Dated: February ke 2021

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