Benjamin v. Clark

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GEORGE CHARLES :

BENJAMIN, JR., :

Plaintiff :

: No. 1:20-cv-1991

v. :

: (Judge Rambo)

WARDEN BRIAN S. :

CLARK, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants’ motion to dismiss

(Doc. No. 10) pro se Plaintiff George Charles Benjamin, Jr. (“Plaintiff”)’s complaint

(Doc. No. 1). For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution

Benner Township in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania (“SCI Rockview”), initiated the

above-captioned action on October 29, 2020 by filing a complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden Brian S. Clark (“Clark”), Jon Addison (“Addison”),

Brenda Hopper (“Hopper”), Gregory Briggs (“Briggs”), Chad Saylor (“Saylor”),

Jeffrey Haste (“Haste”), Mike Pries (“Pries”), George P. Hartwick, III (“Hartwick”),

Joseph A. Crucillo (“Crucillo”), Frederick Lighty (“Lighty”), Guy Beneventano

(“Beneventano”), Tucker Hill (“Hill”), Josh Autry, Esq. (“Autry”), Frank J. Lavery

(“Lavery”), and Stephen B. Edwards (“Edwards”). (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff also paid

the requisite $400.00 filing fee. Accordingly, in an Order dated October 30, 2020,

the Court directed service of the complaint upon Defendants. (Doc. No. 4.)

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 10) on December 28, 2020 and

their brief in support (Doc. No. 11) on January 11, 2021.

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on March 6, 2018, he was arrested by

the Harrisburg police and was incarcerated at the Dauphin County Prison (“DCP”),

subject to a cash bail amount of $200,000. (Doc. No. 1 at 5-6.) On March 7, 2018,

the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) issued a parole detainer

because new charges were pending against Plaintiff. (Id. at 6.) On July 11, 2018,

Plaintiff was indicted by a federal grand jury on charges related to his March 6, 2018

arrest. (Id.) Plaintiff “was given a parole hearing and it was decide[d] by the Board

that [he] was to be held [as a parole violator pending] until the outcome of the case.”

(Id.) On October 15, 2018, the Dauphin County District Attorney’s Office nolle

prossed Plaintiff’s state charges due to the federal indictment. (Id.)

On October 30, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred to SCI Camp Hill. (Id.) Upon

his release from DCP, Plaintiff asked for the balance of his inmate account and was

told it would be sent to SCI Camp Hill. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that he had

approximately $6,498.61 in his inmate account. (Id.) Two weeks passed with no

response from Defendants Hopper and Clark. (Id.) In November of 2018, Plaintiff

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contacted Defendant Addison, and he forwarded Plaintiff’s grievance to Defendant

Clark. (Id.) In December of 2018, Plaintiff received a letter from the business office

indicating that he owed money to DCP. (Id.) Enclosed was a financial responsibility

statement indicating that Plaintiff had been a sentenced inmate for 238 days and was

therefore charged $2,380.00 for those days. (Id.) Plaintiff responded that he had not

been sentenced and that he had been a federal inmate. (Id.) He argued that he was

a “parole violator pending and not a technical PV.” (Id.) Plaintiff avers that he was

then sent a check for $4,118.61. (Id.)

On December 12, 2018, Defendant Clark sent a letter to Plaintiff regarding

his concerns. (Id. at 15.) Defendant Clark quoted the following language from the

DCP Financial Responsibility Policy:

As per Dauphin County Prison’s Financial Responsibility Policy,

which was adopted by the Prison Board of Inspectors and is outlined in

the Inmate Handbook, “At the time of release, Room and Board charges

will be assessed on all sentenced inmates incarcerated at DCP. For

purposes of Room and Board charges, a County or State Parole

Violation is considered a sentence. Also, sentenced inmates from other

counties that have been transferred to DCP will be assessed Room and

Board charges.

(Id.) Defendant Clark noted that Plaintiff had been a sentenced inmate from March

7, 2018 through October 30, 2018. (Id.) He rejected Plaintiff’s argument that he

was a federal inmate, stating that the “U.S. Marshals had a detainer lodged against

you for when you finished serving time for the case you were being housed on here.”

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(Id.) On January 15, 2019, Plaintiff appealed Defendant Clark’s response to the

Prison Board. (d. at 18-19.)

On May 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas

for Dauphin County against the DCP, Defendant Clark, the Dauphin County Prison

Board, and John Doe. (Doc. No. 11-1.) In that complaint, Plaintiff alleged that DCP

had erroneously charged him for room and board despite his charges being dismissed

by the District Attorney’s Office. (Id.) Plaintiff sought $2,380.00 as relief. (Id.)

On August 13, 2019, the Court of Common Pleas sustained the preliminary

objections filed by the defendants and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with

prejudice. (Doc. No. 11-5 at 2-3.) Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of that

order was denied on September 3, 2019. (Id. at 4.)

On October 31, 2019, Plaintiff received his federal sentence. (Doc. No. 1 at

7.) On November 1, 2019, Defendant Lavery, as the solicitor for the Prison Board,

sent Plaintiff a response denying his grievance appeal to the Prison Board. (Id. at

24.) Defendant Lavery explained that because he was being held on a parole detainer

“either for new state charges or subsequently for new federal charges,” Plaintiff was

“a sentenced prisoner on the original conviction upon which the detainer was issued.

In other words, the detainer was in connection with a prior conviction and therefore,

you are a sentenced prisoner to whom room and board charges could be assessed.”

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(Id.) Plaintiff subsequently appealed to the final level, the Dauphin County Solicitor.

(Id. at 25.)

On January 20, 2020, the PBPP revoked Plaintiff’s parole and changed his

status to a convicted parole violator based upon his federal sentence. (Id. at 7.) The

PBPP gave Plaintiff a recalculated maximum date and controlling minimum date

based on the new charges. (Id.) The PBPP noted that Plaintiff would serve “24

months back time and did not credit time from July 11, 2018 to October 31, 2019.”

(Id.) On February 18, 2020, Defendant Curcillo, as the Chief Solicitor, denied

Plaintiff’s grievance appeal. (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff avers that he contacted the DCP

solicitor, Prison Board chairman, and Defendant Clark and told them that he could

not be held financially responsible because the time he spent at DCP was not credited

towards his state sentence and because he was not guilty of a new charge. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff avers that he received no response “despite sending them the calculation

sheet provided by PBPP.” (Id.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 4.) As relief, he seeks $2,380.00, court costs

in the amount of $600.00, and for DCP “to rewrite the Financial Responsibility

portion of [their] policy so that it may not be implied so broadly and unfairly.” (Id.

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at 8.) He also asks to “stop calculating state Parolees time if they are not convicted

of any offense.” (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences

that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The Court’s

inquiry is guided by the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under Twombly and Iqbal,

pleading requirements have shifted to a “more heightened form of pleading.” See

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). To prevent dismissal,

all civil complaints must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is

facially plausible. Id. The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility

that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. As the Supreme Court

instructed in Iqbal, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has

not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

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Accordingly, to determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and

Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified the

following steps a district court must take when determining the sufficiency of a

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6): (1) identify the elements a plaintiff must plead to

state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint “not

entitled” to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded

factual allegations” contained in the complaint “plausibly give rise to an entitlement

to relief.” See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a

court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters

of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s

claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d

Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998

F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). A court may also consider “any ‘matters

incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice,

matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.’”

Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B

Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d Ed.

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2004)); see also Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.

2002) (noting that when considering a motion to dismiss, courts may consider

“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading”).

In the context of pro se prisoner litigation specifically, the court must be

mindful that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,”

must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”

and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond a doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

B. Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress for

violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The statute states, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress.

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Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means

through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.”

See Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To state a cause of action

under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct complained of was

committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a

right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint for the following reasons:

(1) Plaintiff has failed to sue a proper party; (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

under § 1983; (3) Plaintiff fails to allege the requisite personal involvement; and (4)

the attorney-Defendants are not state actors. (Doc. No. 11 at 2.)

1. Proper Party

Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal because

Plaintiff has brought suit against them in their official capacities only. (Id. at 12-

14.) They assert that “official capacity suits are actions against the municipality, not

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the individual, and here, the municipality is not a named defendant.” (Id. at 14.)

In his complaint, Plaintiff states that he has named Defendants “in their

official and official capacities.” (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) As an initial matter, the Court

must liberally construe Plaintiff’s pro se complaint. It appears that Plaintiff intended

to state “official and individual capacities” and mistakenly repeated the word

“official” when preparing his complaint.

Official capacity claims under § 1983 are indistinguishable from claims

against the entity that employs the officials. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). “[A]n official-

capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.” Id. Here, Plaintiff has not named Dauphin County as a defendant.

Therefore, his official capacity claims against Defendants must be construed as

claims against Dauphin County. See Pryor v. Harper, No. 19-1387, 2021 WL

37628, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2021) (concluding same).

To plead a basis for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

that the municipality’s policy or custom caused the violation of his constitutional

rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff]

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must . . . specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York,

564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). “‘Policy is made when a decisionmaker

possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action

issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’” Estate of Roman v. City of

Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,

895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). In his complaint, Plaintiff explicitly maintains

that the Dauphin County Prison’s room and board policy led to the alleged violations

of his constitutional rights. At this stage of the litigation, and given Plaintiff’s pro

se status, the Court concludes that his allegations plausibly plead an official capacity

claim sufficient to meet the Monell standard. Accordingly, the Court will not grant

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis.

2. Failure to State a Claim

As noted supra, Plaintiff asserts violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) Defendants assert that his

complaint should be dismissed because he has failed to state a plausible claim for

relief. (Doc. No. 11 at 14-17.)1

1 In his complaint, Plaintiff avers that the DCP room and board policy does not even apply to him

because he was not a sentenced inmate within the meaning of the policy. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.)

Defendants have addressed this argument as well. (Doc. No. 11 at 16-17.) Pennsylvania law

provides that parolees who are charged with violations “of the laws of this Commonwealth” are

automatically subject to a detainer. 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6138(b). Moreover, if a parolee is arrested

pursuant to an automatic detainer, he may be considered to be a technical violator without a formal

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a. Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights to be

free from illegal search and seizure and the deprivation of property by charging him

the room and board fee for sentenced inmates and keeping $2,380.00 from his prison

account. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) The Supreme Court has noted, however, that “prisoners

have no legitimate expectation of privacy and . . . the Fourth Amendment’s

prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells.” Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984); see also Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir.

2001) (noting that Fourth Amendment rights are “fundamentally inconsistent with

incarceration”). Courts have extended this logical to conclude that the Fourth

Amendment does not apply to seizures from inmate accounts. See Taylor v. Knapp,

871 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1989); Jackson v. SCI Camp Hill, No. 1:11-cv-1135,

2012 WL 3990888, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2012) (concluding that an inmate “has

no Fourth Amendment rights in his prison financial account”), aff’d, 530 F. App’x

150 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Talley v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 19-1589, 2019 WL

2866103, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2019) (citing Taylor and Jackson for the same

conclusion). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim will be dismissed.

conviction. See id. § 6138(c). Plaintiff readily admits that he was arrested and charged with state

criminal offenses in March of 2018 and that a parole detainer was issued because of those charges.

(Doc. No. 1.) A parole violation is considered to be a sentence for purposes of DCP’s room and

board charges. (Id. at 15, 24, 26.)

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b. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff also maintains that by enforcing the DCP policy, Defendants violated

his rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from the imposition of excessive

fines. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) The Third Circuit has previously considered this “pay-to-

stay” issue before and concluded that room and board fees are not punishment but

are rather “designed to teach financial responsibility.” Tillman v. Lebanon Cty.

Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 420 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, the Third Circuit

concluded that such “fees can hardly be called fines when they merely represent

partial reimbursement of the prisoner’s daily cost of maintenance, something he or

she would be expected to pay on the outside.” Id. In Tillman, the Third Circuit

concluded that because the provision of life’s necessities is not contingent on an

inmate’s ability to pay for such services, it is permissible for prison authorities to

“seek reimbursement from the party receiving the benefit of [this] care.” Id. at 418-

19; see also Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1997).

In 2013, the late Judge Caputo of this Court considered DCP’s financial

responsibility and room and board policies and determined that they did not violate

the Eighth Amendment. See Heim v. Dauphin Cty. Prison, No. 3:10-cv-1656, 2013

WL 1833777, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. May 1, 2013). Instead, he concluded that the “fees

imposed pursuant to the DCP’s Room and Board fee are ‘nonpunitive and related to

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the legitimate purpose of partially reimbursing’ the DCP for housing and treatment

services for the inmates they are entrusted to house.” Id. at *6 (quoting Carson v.

Mulvihill, 488 F. App’x 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2012)). Here, Plaintiff challenges the

same policy that Judge Caputo previously found constitutional. Accordingly, his

Eighth Amendment claim is foreclosed by Heim and will be dismissed.

c. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff also asserts that the deprivation of his funds violated his Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process and equal protection rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has

failed to set forth a plausible Fourteenth Amendment claim.

i. Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment forbids state actors from depriving individuals of

life, liberty, or property without due process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The

Third Circuit has recognized that inmates have a property interest in the funds held

in their prison accounts. See Burns v. PA Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 286 (3d Cir.

2008) (citing Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 1997)). Identifying

what process is due, however, “generally requires consideration of the [following]

three distinct factors”:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;

second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the

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procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would

entail.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Neither negligent nor intentional deprivations of property by state officials

give rise to a due process violation if state law provides adequate post-deprivation

remedies. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (negligent acts of

officials causing unintentional loss of property do not violate due process); Hudson,

468 U.S. at 533 (intentional deprivation of property does not violate due process if

meaningful post–deprivation remedy for loss is available). However, if the

deprivation occurs pursuant to a prison policy, the balancing test set forth in

Mathews must be examined to determine if a pre-deprivation hearing is necessary

under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Third Circuit has considered the requisite level of procedural due process

necessary for collection of prisoner room and board fees and has concluded that

prisoners cannot be expected to provide pre-deprivation proceedings “even when the

inmate refuses to grant authorization.” Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Correctional

Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 421-22 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, any assessment

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errors “may be corrected through the prison’s grievance program without any burden

on the prisoner’s rights.” Id. at 422. Thus, due process is satisfied where post-

deprivation procedures are available through the normal prison grievance system.

Id.

Plaintiff’s due process claim is also foreclosed by Judge Caputo’s decision in

Heim. In Heim, Judge Caputo dismissed the plaintiff’s due process claim regarding

DCP’s room and board policy, concluding that it was clear that the plaintiff had

notice of both the fee and the grievance policy and that the DCP grievance policy

provided a sufficient post-deprivation remedy. Heim v. Dauphin Cty. Prison, No.

3:10-cv-1656, 2011 WL 3875998, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011). In the instant

case, Plaintiff’s claim is squarely controlled by Heim and Tillman. It is clear that

Plaintiff had notice of both the room and board fee and the grievance policy during

his incarceration at DCP. To the extent Plaintiff asserts that his grievances regarding

the fee were mishandled or wrongfully denied, he has not alleged the denial of a

federal right. See Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App’x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2009). The

Court, therefore, will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s

procedural due process claim.

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i. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause requires all persons “similarly situated” to be

treated alike by state actors. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.

432, 439 (1985). Traditionally, “[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, [plaintiffs] need[] to prove that

they were members of a protected class [such as race or gender] and that they

received different treatment than that received by similarly-situated individuals.”

See Oliveira v. Twp. of Irvington, 41 F. App’x 555, 559 (3d Cir. 2002). However,

where a plaintiff alleges that he alone “has been intentionally treated differently from

others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in

treatment,” he may raise a “class of one” equal protection claim. See Engquist v.

Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008). To maintain such a claim, a plaintiff

must establish that he has been irrationally singled out for disparate treatment. See

id. “[A]t the very least, to state a claim under [a class of one theory], a plaintiff must

allege that (1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated,

(2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Mosca v. Cole, 217 F. App’x 158, 164 (3d Cir. 2007).

When alleging the existence of similarly situated individuals, plaintiffs “cannot use

allegations . . . that amount to nothing more than ‘conclusory, boilerplate language’

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to show that he may be entitled to relief,” and “bald assertion[s] that other[s] . . .

were treated in a dissimilar manner” will not suffice. See Young v. New Sewickley

Twp., 160 F. App’x 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347,

353 (3d Cir. 2005)).

As an initial matter, neither prisoners nor indigent individuals constitute a

suspect class. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2011).

Thus, Plaintiff fails to allege that he is a member of a suspect class. Moreover,

Plaintiff fails to allege facts suggesting that he was intentionally treated differently

from other similarly situated DCP inmates. Plaintiff’s allegations amount to nothing

more than conclusory language and bald assertions. See Young, 160 F. App’x at

266. Moreover, the Third Circuit has recognized that “the purposes of teaching fiscal

responsibility and partially recouping the costs of incarceration are surely rationally

related to requiring inmates to pay for their share of maintenance.” Tillman, 221

F.3d at 423. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss with

respect to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.2

2 The Court also agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite personal

involvement and that the attorney-Defendants are not state actors for purposes of § 1983. Like in

Heim, nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint plausibly suggests that any of the named Defendants were

responsible for enacting the policy that Plaintiff challenges. See Heim, 2013 WL 1833777, at *7.

Moreover, Defendants Crucillo, Lighty, Beneventano, Hill, Autry, Lavery, and Edwards, as

solicitors and attorneys for Dauphin County and the other Defendants, are not automatically state

actors for purposes of § 1983. See Belkowski v. Kruczek, No. 2:09-cv-1549, 2010 WL 1433099,

at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2010). “To the extent that an attorney renders advice, drafts

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B. Leave to Amend

Courts are cautioned that because of the liberal pleading standard, a plaintiff

should generally be granted leave to amend before dismissing a claim that is merely

deficient. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

The federal rules allow for liberal amendments in light of the “principle that the

purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Foman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court may

deny a motion to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on

the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of

the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Id. The Court must also determine

that a proposed amendment would be futile if the complaint, as amended, would not

survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig.,

306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002). From the foregoing discussion, the Court

concludes that it would be futile to permit Plaintiff to file an amended complaint in

this matter.

correspondence on behalf of a client as to legal disputes, or otherwise engages in litigation and

equivalent legal activities, he or she will generally not be subject to liability as a state actor.” Id.

(citing Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., 184 F.3d 268, 276-78 (3d Cir.1999)). Here, nothing in

Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that these Defendants invoked the force of the state to accomplish

their clients’ goals or went beyond their traditional roles to actually make official policy decisions.

See Angelico, 184 F.3d at 277.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 10) will

be granted. Plaintiff will not be permitted to file an amended complaint in the above-

captioned case. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Sylvia H. Rambo

United States District Judge

Date: February 4, 2021

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