Watley v. Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH WATLEY, : CIVIL NO: 1:20-CV-01146

:

Plaintiff, : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)

:

v. :

:

COMMONWEALTH OF :

PENNSYLVANIA and :

GOVERNOR THOMAS WOLF, :

:

Defendants. :

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction.

This case concerns a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute that deals with

arrests of nonresidents for violations of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.

The defendants have filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint. Because the

plaintiff has not pleaded facts from which it can reasonably be concluded that he

has standing, this court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, we will

dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice, and we will grant the plaintiff

leave to file a second amended complaint to attempt, if appropriate, to plead that he

has standing. Given this, we will dismiss as moot the two pending motions to

dismiss filed by the defendants.

II. Background and Procedural History.

Watley began this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Pennsylvania by filing a complaint naming the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as

the defendant and raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Commonwealth

removed the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). On August 8,

2020, Watley filed an amended complaint naming as defendants the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Governor Wolf, in his individual and official

capacities.

Watley alleges the following facts in his amended complaint. Watley

resides in Connecticut. On May 21, 2016, while Watley was traveling through

Pennsylvania back to his home state of Connecticut, he was issued three traffic

citations that carried a total combined fine of $75. Trooper Michael S. Felsman

arrested Watley for the traffic citations. Watley was taken before a magisterial

district judge, jailed overnight, and stripped searched based on the three traffic

citations. The state courts later ruled that the traffic citations were invalid and

unlawful.

Watley challenges 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6305, which deals with arrests

of nonresidents for violations of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, contending

that it “treats citizens from other states differently in connection with the issuance

of traffic citations and their ability to travel freely through the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania.” Doc. 8 ¶ 6. Section 6305 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) General rule.—Upon arrest of a nonresident for any

violation of this title, a police officer shall escort the defendant

to the appropriate issuing authority for a hearing, posting of

bond or payment of the applicable fine and costs, unless the

defendant chooses to place the amount of the applicable fine (or

the maximum fine in the case of a variable fine) and costs in a

stamped envelope addressed to the appropriate issuing authority

and mails the envelope in the presence of the police officer.

75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6305(a).1 Watley contends that Section 6305 treats

nonresidents of Pennsylvania differently from residents of Pennsylvania due to

their residency. According to Watley, Section 6305 “penalizes non-residents more

harshly than residents since pursuant to Section 6305 non-residents can be

imprisoned for traffic citations while residents are not.” Doc. 8 ¶ 21.

The amended complaint contains only one count titled:

CHALLENGE TO 75 PA.C.S. § 6305

VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL

PLAINTIFF V. DEFENDANTS

Id. at 3. Watley also mentions in his amended complaint “the Fourteenth

Amendment, Due Process Clause, the Privileges and Immunity Clause of Article

VI, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, Equal Protection Clause and . . .

the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1.” Id. ¶4. He alleges that the

1 Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of Section 6305 address the procedure upon payment

by mail, the form of payment, and the receipt for payment respectively.

Commonwealth passed Section 6305 and that defendant Wolf is charged with

enforcing the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania through the

Pennsylvania State Police.

Watley seeks only “prospective injunctive relief.” Doc. 8 at 2,¶ 4 and 6,

“WHEREFORE” paragraph. Watley, who resides in Connecticut, alleges that he

“has standing to bring this suit since he can travel through the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania at any moment.” Id. ¶ 1. He further alleges: “In fact, in 2018,

[Watley] travelled through the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for a jury trial and

could have travelled to the Commonwealth for oral argument before the Third

Circuit this year.” Id.

The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c), and the case was referred to the undersigned. Currently pending

is a motion to dismiss filed by the Commonwealth and a motion to dismiss filed by

Governor Wolf. Because we conclude that Watley has not alleged facts from

which it can reasonably be inferred that he has standing to seek injunctive relief

(the only relief that he seeks), we will dismiss Watley’s amended complaint

without prejudice. We will, however, give Watley leave to file a second amended

complaint. Given this, we will deny as moot the defendants’ motions to dismiss.2

2 Because Watley has not shown that he has standing, this court lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction. Thorne v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc., 980 F.3d 879,

883 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, we will not address the defendants’ arguments that the

III. Discussion.

“It is well established that a federal court has a duty to assure itself that the

persons invoking its power have standing to do so under Article III of the

Constitution.” Wayne Land & Mineral Grp., LLC v. Delaware River Basin

Comm’n, 959 F.3d 569, 570 (3d Cir. 2020). Article III standing “is an ‘irreducible

constitutional minimum,’ without which a court” does not have jurisdiction to

decide the case on the merits. Id. at 574 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Thus, we immediately turn to the question whether Watley

has alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that he has standing.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)3 permits the dismissal of an action

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. “Constitutional standing, which is properly

tested under Rule 12(b)(1), may be challenged facially or factually.” Thorne v. Pep

Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc., 980 F.3d 879, 885 (3d Cir. 2020). “A facial

challenge argues that the plaintiff’s factual allegations cannot meet the elements of

standing.” Id. In other words, a facial attack on subject-matter jurisdiction contests

the sufficiency of the pleadings. Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co., 842 F.3d 805, 811

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. (observing

that the court “has no jurisdiction to rule on the merits when a plaintiff lacks

standing”).

3 In their motions to dismiss, the defendants cite to both Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In their briefs in support of their motions to dismiss,

the defendants raise numerous arguments including a cursory standing argument.

(3d Cir. 2016). When there is a facial attack, “we apply the same standard as on

review of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” In re Horizon Healthcare

Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625,633 (3d Cir. 2017). “Consequently,

we accept the Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all

reasonable inferences from those allegations in the Plaintiffs’ favor.” Id. (footnote

omitted). “Nevertheless, ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of [standing],

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “We disregard such legal conclusions.” Id.

“Thus, ‘[t]o survive a motion to dismiss [for lack of standing], a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter,’ that would establish standing if accepted as true.”

Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Here, the defendants make only a cursory argument regarding standing, and

they do not focus on whether Watley has standing to seek prospective injunctive

relief, which is the only relief that he seeks. The defendants contend that to the

extent that Watley seeks to challenge the charges brought again him, he lacks

standing because the charges against him were ultimately dismissed. Whatever the

merits of such an argument, it misses the mark here because Watley is seeking only

prospective injunctive relief. Thus, as discussed below, the standing inquiry

focuses on whether Watley has alleged facts from which it can reasonably be

inferred that he will suffer a future injury.4 Because “it is well established that the

court has an independent obligation to assure that standing exists, regardless of

whether it is challenged by any of the parties,” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555

U.S. 488, 499 (2009), we proceed to address whether Watley has sufficiently

alleged a future injury.

Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the United States

to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Constitution, art. III, § 2. “This case-or-

controversy limitation, in turn, is crucial in ‘ensuring that the Federal Judiciary

respects the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic

society.’” Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534, 539 (3d Cir. 2017)

(quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)). “And courts

enforce it ‘through the several justiciability doctrines that cluster about Article III,’

including ‘standing, ripeness, mootness, the political-question doctrine, and the

prohibition on advisory opinions.’” Id. (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of

Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009)).

“One of the essential elements of a legal case or controversy is that the

plaintiff have standing to sue.” Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018).

4 Watley’s response to the defendants’ standing argument is difficult to follow.

He starts out by citing a case regarding future injury, but then he concludes that he

has standing because he was seized, imprisoned, and strip searched in connection

with the traffic citations. See doc. 24 at 4–5, doc. 31 at 5–6. Watley makes this

argument in a section of his brief entitled “The statute of limitation has not

expired.” See doc. 24 at 4, doc. 31 at 5.

“Standing requires more than just a ‘keen interest in the issue.’” Id. (quoting

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700 (2013)). Rather, “[t]he plaintiff must

have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged

conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable

judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). “The

plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing

these elements.” Id. And “[w]here, as here, a case is at the pleading stage, the

plaintiff must ‘clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating’ each element.” Id. (footnote

omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)).

Here, we are concerned with whether Watley has alleged an injury in fact,

“the ‘[f]irst and foremost’ of standing’s three elements.” Id. (quoting Steel Co. v.

Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). “This element ‘is

intended to weed out claims that are nothing more than an ingenious academic

exercise in the conceivable.’” Schaller v. United States Soc. Security Adm., No. 20-

1876, 2021 WL 237273, at *4 (3d Cir. Jan. 25, 2021) (quoting Thorne, 980 F.3d at

893). “To plead an injury in fact, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must

establish three sub-elements: first, the invasion of a legally protected interest;

second, that the injury is both ‘concrete and particularized’; and third, that the

injury is ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Thorne, 980 F.3d at

885 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548). We focus here on the third sub-

element—whether Watley has alleged an injury that is actual or imminent as

opposed to conjectural or hypothetical.

Watley suggests that the fact that he was seized, imprisoned, and strip

searched in connection with the traffic citations shows that he has standing. But

because the only relief that Watley seeks is prospective injunctive relief, the fact

that he was previously exposed to allegedly illegal conduct is not sufficient to

establish standing. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (“Past

exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy

regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present

adverse effects.”). Rather, “[w]hen, as in this case, prospective relief is sought, the

plaintiff must show that he is ‘likely to suffer future injury’ from the defendant’s

conduct.” McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 223 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)).

With regard to future injury, Watley alleges that he “has standing to bring

this suit since he can travel through the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at any

moment.” Doc. 8 ¶ 1. But “[m]ere ‘allegations of possible future injury are not

sufficient.’” Schaller, 2021 WL 237273, at *4 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l

USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)). Rather, “the ‘threatened injury must be certainly

impending to constitute injury in fact.’” Thorne, 980 F.3d at 893 (quoting Clapper,

568 U.S. at 409). “And there must be at least a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will

occur.” Id. (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5). “When an injury rests on a

claimed desire to travel somewhere, providing specific dates is crucial, as

imminency would be ‘stretched beyond the breaking point when, as here, the

plaintiff alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time.’” Schaller, 2021 WL

237273, at *4 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2). Thus, “indefinite ‘some day

intentions’” to travel are not sufficient. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564).

Watley’s allegation that he can travel through the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

at any moment is not sufficient to show an imminent actual injury. Rather, that

allegation refers only to at most a conjectural or hypothetical future action, which

is insufficient to show an injury in fact.

Moreover, in this case, to show an imminent actual injury that is not

conjectural or hypothetical requires more than an intent to travel through

Pennsylvania. Rather, for Section 6305 to come into play, Watley would not only

need to travel through Pennsylvania, but he would have to be stopped for a traffic

violation and arrested for that violation. That “highly attenuated chain of

possibilities,” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410, is too speculative to support standing.

Further, the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to ‘conclude that the case-or-

controversy requirement is satisfied by’ the possibility that a party ‘will be

prosecuted for violating valid . . . laws.’” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S.

Ct. 1532, 1541 (2018) (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 497). Instead, it is

‘“assume[d] that [litigants] will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid

prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of

conduct.’” Id. (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 497).

In sum, Watley has failed to allege an actual injury. Thus, he has not shown

that he has standing. And without standing, this court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction. Thus, we will dismiss Watley’s amended complaint without

prejudice. Thorne, 980 F.3d at 896 (“Dismissal for lack of standing reflects a lack

of jurisdiction, so dismissal of Thorne’s amended complaint should have been

without prejudice.”). The issue then becomes whether we close this case or grant

Watley leave to file a second amended complaint to attempt to meet the

requirements for pleading standing. In his briefs in opposition to the defendants’

motions to dismiss, Watley requests leave to amend if the court finds his amended

complaint is defective. Although Watley does not specifically request leave to

amend regarding standing, in an abundance of caution, we will grant Watley leave

to file second amended complaint.

IV. Summary.

For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Watley’s amended complaint

without prejudice based on lack of standing. We will grant Watley leave to file a

second amended complaint within 21 days. And given the above, we will deny the

defendants’ motions to dismiss as moot. An appropriate order will be issued.

S/Susan E. Schwab

Susan E. Schwab

United States Magistrate Judge