discussing Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
How later courts described this case
- discussing Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRAIG ALFORD, :
Petitioner, : 1:20-cv-1922
:
v. : Hon. John E. Jones III
:
WARDEN DAVID PENCHISHEN, :
Respondent. :
MEMORANDUM
January 25, 2021
On October 19, 2020, Petitioner Craig Alford, a pretrial detainee confined at
the Northampton County Jail, Easton, Pennsylvania, initiated the instant petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting that he is subject
to excessive bail. He also complains various constitutional violations including,
due process and equal protection violations, a lack of access to the law library, and
retaliation. (Doc. 1, pp. 1, 2). He seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (Docs. 4, 5),
and requests a court order granting him access to the law library. (Doc. 9).
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts states that “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached
exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge
must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rule 1(b)
permits application of rules to habeas corpus petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241. A petition may be dismissed without review of an answer when the petition
is frivolous, or obviously lacking in merit, or where . . . the necessary facts can be
determined from the petition itself. . . . ” Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th
Cir. 1970).
Preliminary review reveals that the petition is subject to summary dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner asserts that on June 7, 2020, officials placed him in the Monroe
County Jail “with an excessive bail.” (Doc. 1, p. 1). Additionally, he asserts that
his arraignment had been delayed until September 2, 2020. (Id.). He indicates that
he sought release based on due process violations and that the Pennsylvania State
Attorney General was notified of his circumstances. (Id. at 2).
He also claims that the Monroe County Correctional Facility in Stroudsburg,
Pennsylvania, where he was housed prior to his transfer to the Northampton
County Jail, lacks an adequate law library. And “to add insult to injury, [he] was
transferred from ‘Monroe County’ to “Northampton County” without due process”
and in retaliation for his pursuit of civil litigation. (Id. at 3, 4). He seeks
intervention from this Court, including an order directing he be transferred back to
the Monroe County Correctional Facility.
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An electronic search via the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web
Portal, https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CP.aspx, indicates that he has
two criminal actions pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County,
CP-45-CR-295-2020, and CP-45-CR-929-2020. Presently pending in those
actions are petitions for writs of habeas corpus, appeals to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, and motions for nominal bail. Additionally, on January 21, 2020,
the state amended the criminal informations in both criminal proceedings.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Habeas Corpus Relief
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a person in state custody may file an
application for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the fact or length of his or her
confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973); Tedford v.
Hepting, 990 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1993). However, this section specifically
provides that the person must be in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State. It
is apparent from the instant petition that he has not yet been tried or convicted on
the criminal charges he faces in Monroe County. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Thus,
he is not yet in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court.
Notwithstanding this deficiency, generally, federal courts must adjudicate all
cases and controversies that are properly before them. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
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Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989). Abstention,
however, “is the judicially created doctrine under which a federal court will decline
to exercise its jurisdiction so that a state court or state agency will have the
opportunity to decide the matters at issue.” Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Twp.,
671 F.2d 743, 746 (3d Cir. 1982). In Younger v. Harris, the United States
Supreme Court “established a principle of abstention when federal adjudication
would disrupt an ongoing state criminal proceeding.” Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199,
202 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). The Younger Court
based its decision on the principles of comity and “the longstanding public policy
against federal court interference with state court proceedings.” Younger, 401 U.S.
at 43. Younger abstention applies when the following three requirements are met:
“(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford
an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591
F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of
Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Notably, even when all requirements are met, abstention is not appropriate
when the following extraordinary circumstances exist: “(1) the state proceedings
are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other
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extraordinary circumstances exist, such as proceedings pursuant to a flagrantly
unconstitutional statute. . . .” Schall v. Jovce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).
These exceptions are to be narrowly construed. Loftus v. Twp. of Lawrence Park,
764 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
It is evident from the state court electronic dockets and the petition that
Petitioner is in ongoing criminal proceedings which implicate important state
interests in that he is actively engaged in defending against those proceedings.
Because there is relief available at the state court level, there is an absence of
extraordinary circumstances that would warrant the intervention of a federal court
on this issue. Thus, out of deference to the state judicial process, it is appropriate
to abstain from entertaining the petition. Indeed, “[i]n no area of the law is the
need for a federal court to stay its hand pending completion of state proceedings
more evident than in the case of pending criminal proceedings.” Evans v. Court of
Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992).
B. Civil Rights Claims
To the extent Petitioner includes civil rights claims in his habeas petitions,
“habeas relief is clearly quite limited: ‘The underlying purpose of proceedings
under the ‘Great Writ’ of habeas corpus has traditionally been to ‘inquire into the
legality of the detention, and the only judicial relief authorized was the discharge
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of the prisoner or his admission to bail, and that only if his detention were found to
be unlawful.’” Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding the Availability and Scope of
Review, 114 Harv.L.Rev. 1551, 1553 (2001)). When seeking to impose liability
due to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, the appropriate remedy is a civil rights action. See Leamer,
288 F.3d at 540. “Habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal
remedy.” See Linnen v. Armainis, 991 F.2d 1102, 1109 (3d Cir. 1993).
Those claims for which he seeks to impose liability due to the deprivation of
certain rights and privileges are erroneously included in his petition for writ of
habeas corpus as they do not involve a challenge to the legality of his present
incarceration. Consequently, they will be dismissed without prejudice to his right
to reassert them in a properly filed civil rights action.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be
dismissed.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability (“COA”), an appeal may not be taken from a final order
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in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A COA may issue only if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of
reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional
claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without
reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when
the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, jurists of
reason would not find the disposition of this case debatable. Accordingly, there is
no basis for the issuance of a certificate of appealability.
The denial of a certificate of appealability does not prevent Petitioner from
appealing the order dismissing his petition so long as he seeks, and obtains, a
certificate of appealability from the court of appeals. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1),
(2).
A separate Order will enter.