Rivera-Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg d/b/a Bureau of Police

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JORGE RIVERA-GUADALUPE, : Civil No. 1:19-CV-1400

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

JACOB PIERCE, et al. :

:

Defendants. : Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

M E M O R A N D U M

Before the court are two motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), one filed by

Defendants City of Harrisburg and Detective Jacob Pierce (“Defendant Pierce”)

(Doc. 38), and another filed by Defendants Dauphin County and Michael Sprow,

Esquire (“Defendant Sprow”) (Doc. 43). For the reasons outlined below, the Police

Defendants’ motion shall be denied, the Prosecutor Defendants’ motion shall be

granted with prejudice, and Plaintiff shall be instructed to clarify a portion of his

complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 21, 2017, Plaintiff Jorge Rivera-Guadalupe (“Plaintiff”) was

assaulted and mugged by unknown individuals. Upon telling his close friend,

Christopher Valkosak (“Mr. Valkosak”), about the occurrence, Mr. Valkosak

volunteered to stay with Plaintiff at his apartment in case the men returned. The next

day, Mr. Valkosak was standing in the doorway to Plaintiff’s apartment when some

individuals began walking towards the residence down the hallway. A scuffle

ensued, resulting in one of the assailants shooting Mr. Valkosak in the abdomen

before fleeing. A man who lives down the hall from Plaintiff, Dave Chapel,

witnessed the fight and informed police that, while Plaintiff is “Puerto Rican, of

short stature, and walks with a limp,” the man who shot Mr. Valkosak was “a Black

male, approximately 5’8” and in his early 20’s.” (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 30-34.)

Detective Pierce with the Harrisburg Police Department took the lead in

investigating this incident. He interviewed several people including Mr. Chapel,

who described the assailant to Detective Pierce as a man who looked substantially

different from Plaintiff. As part of the investigation, Detective Pierce applied for

and was granted a warrant to search Plaintiff’s bedroom, turning up marijuana, a

knife, identification materials, and other miscellaneous items. As a result, Detective

Pierce: (1) was unable to locate a gun in Plaintiff’s apartment; (2) learned from the

most knowledgeable direct witness that the shooter looked strikingly different from

Plaintiff; and (3) listed, in his application for a warrant, that the shooter in question

was black, while Plaintiff is not. Despite these facts, Mr. Pierce arrested Plaintiff on

May 26, 2017.

On June 5, 2017, Detective Pierce received a tip that the shooter was a man

named Robert Flemming. It is unclear whether Detective Pierce conducted any

follow-up investigation to ascertain the veracity of this tip. Nonetheless, Detective

Pierce recommended to Assistant District Attorney Michael Sprow that Plaintiff be

prosecuted for the shooting of Mr. Valkosak, supplying Attorney Sprow with the

factual bases for prosecuting him. Three days later, Magisterial District Judge Sonya

McKnight held a preliminary hearing to determine if probable cause existed to keep

Plaintiff detained. Attorney Sprow presented witnesses at this hearing, choosing to

present Mr. Valkosak, Mr. Valkosak’s roommate—who was neither present at the

shooting nor lived in the same building as Plaintiff—and Detective Pierce.

Allegedly, Attorney Sprow knew that the evidence strongly suggested Plaintiff was

innocent, and that Mr. Chapel’s testimony in particular would have shown as much,

but he elected to nonetheless move forward with the charges and abstain from calling

Mr. Chapel. Judge McKnight found probable cause to keep Plaintiff detained.

On August 4, 2017, Defendants collectively filed nine charges against

Plaintiff: (1) attempted homicide; (2) unlawful possession of a firearm; (3)

possession of an unlicensed firearm; (4) conspiracy to commit aggravated assault;

(5) robbery; (6) recklessly endangering another person; (7) possession of marijuana;

(8) conspiracy to commit homicide; and (9) conspiracy to commit aggravated

assault. (Id., ¶ 48.) Judge Richard A. Lewis of the Dauphin County Court of

Common Pleas set the matter for trial on December 11, 2018. “At the outset of the

trial, Defendants amended the criminal complaint to drop five (5) charges, with the

four (4) remaining charges being: possession of a firearm; possession of a firearm

without a license; robbery; and theft by unlawful taking.” (Id., ¶ 50.) On December

12, 2018, the jury found Plaintiff not guilty on all counts.

On August 13, 2019, Plaintiff sued the Defendants, in essence alleging that

they knew he was innocent but nonetheless kept him imprisoned for nineteen months

while they prosecuted him. Plaintiff included six claims in his complaint: (1)

“malicious prosecution violation of 4th and 14th amendments”; (2) a 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claim for malicious prosecution in violation of the 4th and 14th amendments;

(3) “Monell”; (4) civil conspiracy claims under both § 1983 and § 1985(2); (5) a

“state common law malicious prosecution” claim; and (6) “punitive damages.” (Id.,

pp. 7-15 of 15.) On October 14, 2019, the Police Defendants and the Prosecutor

Defendants filed respective motions to dismiss. (See Docs. 11-12.) Plaintiff

responded (Docs. 16-17) and Defendants filed reply briefs (Docs. 20-21). In their

reply brief, the Prosecutor Defendants raised the issue of state common law

immunity for the first time, and neither Plaintiff nor the City Defendants had ever

briefed the matter. The court therefore ordered the parties to submit briefs on the

issues of immunity under Pennsylvania law. (Doc. 22). The parties thereafter

submitted the ordered briefing. (See Docs. 24-26.) The court thus granted and

denied the motions in part. (See Docs. 30-31.)

On August 3, 2020, Plaintiff amended his complaint, adding new facts and

complexity to his allegation that Defendant Pierce had complete knowledge of

Plaintiff’s innocence yet nonetheless insisted Defendant Sprow prosecute him. (See,

generally, id.) His amended complaint contained the following causes of action: (1)

“Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Malicious Prosecution/4th and 14th Amendment

Violations”; (2) “Monell”; (3) “Violation State Common Law Malicious

Prosecution;” and (4) “Punitive Damages.” (Id., ¶¶ 53-117.) Defendants filed new

motions to dismiss (Docs. 38-39, 43-44), Plaintiff responded to both (Docs. 50 &

52), and Defendants filed reply briefs (Docs. 51 & 55). The motions are thus ripe

for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). “When

reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, we ‘accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in

the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.’” Estate

of Ginzburg by Ermey v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 783 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d

Cir. 2019) (quoting Taksir v. Vanguard Grp., 903 F.3d 95, 96-97 (3d Cir. 2018)).

The facts alleged must be “construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In

re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal

quotations, brackets, and ellipses omitted). The universe of facts upon which the

court may rely includes those facts alleged in the complaint, facts which the court

may take judicial notice of, and indisputably authentic documents referred to in the

plaintiff’s complaint. Hartig Drug Co., Inc. v. Senju Pharm Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268

(3d Cir. 2016).

The Third Circuit has detailed a three-step process to determine whether a

complaint meets the pleading standard. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2014).

First, the court outlines the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief.

Id. at 365. Second, the court must “peel away those allegations that are no more

than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Third, the

court “look[s] for well-pled factual allegations, assume[s] their veracity, and then

‘determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Id.

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The last step is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Id. In assessing the level of factual details required under Twombly, the Third Circuit

has held:

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8

requires only a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to

give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests, and that this standard does

not require detailed factual allegations.

Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Plaintiff Has Withdrawn His Monell Claims, Leaving Only Individual

Capacity Claims Against Defendants Sprow and Pierce.

Here, Plaintiff has stated in his briefing that he shall be withdrawing both of

his Monell claims against the County and the City. Plaintiff has not indicated that

he has any intention of re-filing these claims. The court will thus dismiss both with

prejudice. Because “a judgment against a public servant ‘in his official capacity’

imposes liability on the entity that he represents,” the court will also dismiss the

claims against Defendant Sprow and Pierce in their official capacities. Brandon v.

Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985).

b. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim Against Defendant Sprow.

In its previous memorandum, the court explained that Defendant Sprow was

protected by absolute immunity from any claims stemming solely from his quasi-

judicial decision-making as a prosecutor. The court nonetheless noted that, under

the current state of the law, a prosecutor can be liable for engaging in malicious pre-

prosecutorial investigative conduct, and Plaintiff came close to alleging Defendant

Sprow had tortiously involved himself in the investigation of Plaintiff’s alleged

criminal activity. The court thus granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint and

potentially state such a claim against Defendant Sprow.

In response, Plaintiff appears to have made two relevant additions to his

complaint. First, Plaintiff has buffed up his allegations against Defendant Sprow by

alleging he had actual knowledge of Defendant Pierce’s alleged poor investigation.

Because these allegations of knowledge are conclusory, they are insufficient to

survive a 12(b)(6). Second, Plaintiff has added a new paragraph into his complaint

accusing an unidentified person from the District Attorney’s office of contacting

Defendant Pierce and instructing him to question Mr. Rivera-Guadalupe, suggesting

Defendant Sprow participated in the pre-arraignment investigation. In his briefing,

however, Plaintiff admits that this is not enough on its own to raise a reasonably

plausible claim against Defendant Sprow and therefore requests discovery to bolster

the specificity of his claims. Because the general rule under Ashcroft and Twombly

is that the complaint itself must contain plausible allegations, the court cannot grant

discovery merely to allow Plaintiff to reach that point post-discovery. As such, the

court will grant Defendant Sprow’s motion to dismiss any allegations against him in

his individual capacity.

This ruling will also result in a complete dismissal of Defendant Sprow with

prejudice. Plaintiff makes clear in his briefing that an additional opportunity to

amend would not yield any new facts. Thus, an additional order granting leave to

amend would be futile, justifying the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendant Sprow with prejudice.

c. The Court Will Deny Defendant Pierce’s Motion Under the Consolidation

Rule, but Will Nonetheless Address the Substance of the Parties’ Disputes

to Streamline the Progress of this Case.

Under Rule 12(g)(2), “a party that makes a motion under [Rule 12] must not

make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available

to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.” “This consolidation rule is intended

to eliminate unnecessary delay at the pleading stage by encouraging the presentation

of an omnibus pre-answer motion in which the defendant advances every available

Rule 12 defense simultaneously rather than interposing these defenses and

objections in piecemeal fashion.” Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat. Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316,

320 (3d Cir. 2015). “The procedural bar of Rule 12(g)(2) [] covers all motions to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, regardless of the grounds asserted.” Id. at 321.

Here, Defendant Pierce already challenged whether the original complaint

alleged sufficient facts to state claims against him, and the court already rejected

those arguments. Defendant Pierce’s brief in support of his motion to dismiss the

amended complaint violates the consolidation rule by rehashing those arguments and

by making new arguments, such as on the defense of qualified immunity, that could

have been raised in his original brief. The court will therefore deny Defendant

Pierce’s motion to dismiss on procedural grounds.

Nonetheless, for the sake of streamlining the process of this lawsuit, the court

will address the substance of the significant legal dispute between the parties—

whether, as a matter of law, an investigator violates a clearly-established

constitutional right when he has probable cause to arrest a man for one crime yet

nonetheless recommends multiple groundless charges be brought against him.

Having reviewed the Third Circuit law on the matter, the court finds it clearly

established that government officials may not bring charges against an individual

lacking probable cause simply because they had probable cause to charge him with

one crime.

In Wright v. City of Philadelphia, a woman was sexually assaulted by two

men in one of the men’s sister’s house. 409 F.3d 595, 596-597 (3d Cir. 2005). After

assaulting her, the assailants kicked the woman out of the house while retaining

many of her items, including clothing. Id. The woman knocked on various doors

seeking help. Id. When she was unable to receive any, she broke back into the house

to acquire her clothes, and, while inside, took many items not belonging to her. Id.

While she later claimed that she grabbed extra items solely for the sake of identifying

her assailants, she did appear to grab somewhat valuable and generic objects that

served no such purpose. Id. at 602.

Following this event, the owner of the house filed a burglary report with the

police, while the victim filed a sexual assault report with them. Id. at 597-98. This

resulted in two different officers investigating the incident in question. Id. At the

conclusion of the two officers’ investigation, they concluded that the woman had

actually just robbed the house and not been assaulted. Id. She was thus charged

with burglary, theft, and criminal trespass. Id. The assailants were not charged with

sexual assault. Two months later, however, all charges against the victim were

dropped at her preliminary hearing. Id. As such, neither the plaintiff’s harms nor

the defendants’ conduct at issue in Wright extended beyond the plaintiff’s pre-

arraignment arrest.

Later, a women’s advocacy group compelled the police to re-open several

sexual assault cases, accusing them of failing to competently review the evidence.

Id. In response, the police re-examined the Wright victim’s case, locating DNA

evidence from her rape kit proving that her story was true. Id. When the police

presented this evidence to the assailants, they pleaded guilty to sexual assault and

were imprisoned. Id.

The victim then sued the two investigating officers for false arrest and

malicious prosecution, arguing that they should have concluded she had a valid

intent for breaking into the home (i.e. the collection of her things and evidence of

assailants’ identity), thus negating scienter necessary for any of her crimes. Id. The

parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and the district court denied the

motions. Id. at 598-99. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the

appellee appeared to confess to several elements of her crimes by admitting that she

broke into a house and took items that had little evidentiary value, hence giving the

police probable cause to arrest her for at least one charge. Id. at 603. The court

noted that, while burglary requires entry into a house with the intent to commit an

additional crime, criminal trespass only requires the intent to enter another’s

property with knowledge that one lacks permission to do so. Id. at 602-03. Thus,

the Wright Plaintiff’s admissions to the police were sufficient to give rise to probable

cause that she did in fact engage in at least one crime, creating a reasonable basis for

her arrest. Id. Following this analysis, the court also quickly dismissed the Wright

plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims without conducting a charge-by-charge

analysis. See id. at 604. It did not, however, go so far as to establish any general

rule of law. See id. at 604.

Two years later, the Third Circuit more thoroughly analyzed the specific

question of whether, as a matter of law, a malicious prosecution claim must be

dismissed if there was probable cause for one charge against the plaintiff. See

Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 2007). In contrast to Wright, the “principle

issue” in Johnson was “whether the finding that the agents had probably cause to

arrest Johnson on [one charge] without findings that they also had probable cause

for his arrest on other charges made against him defeats Johnson’s cause of action

for malicious prosecution on the remaining charges.” Id. at 78.

To begin its analysis, the Johnson court emphasized that “[m]alicious

prosecution differs from false arrest inasmuch as a claim for false arrest, unlike a

claim for malicious prosecution, covers damages only for the time of detention until

the issuance of process or arraignment, and not more.” Id. at 82 (internal quotations

and brackets omitted); see also Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d

Cir. 1998) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)). The Johnson court

acknowledged that Wright did not involve a charge-by-charge analysis of the

plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims, but Johnson nonetheless emphasized that

“we do not understand Wright to establish legal precedent of such broad application

that it would ‘insulate’ law enforcement officers from liability for malicious

prosecution in all cases in which they had probable cause for the arrest of the plaintiff

on any one charge.” Id. at 83. Instead, the Johnson court emphasized that Wright

truly turned on the fact that “the officers took their actions by the time of the arrest

and thus before the prosecution.” Id. at 82 n. 9 (emphasis added); see also id. at 84.

The Johnson court further distinguished Wright by pointing out that those

officers relied primarily on the victim’s admission of several facts that constituted

elements of the crimes she was arrested for. In contrast to relying upon clear

admissions by the plaintiff, the officers in Johnson were accused of “intentionally

misrepresent[ing]” the plaintiff’s conduct. Id. at 84; see also see also Reedy v.

Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 n. 35 (3d Cir. 2010) (distinguishing Wright, holding it

only applies to probable cause analysis where the plaintiff “admitted to having

committed elements of the crime charged”). Moreover, “unlike the conduct of the

defendants in Wright, Knorr’s involvement in both the arrest and initiation of

criminal proceedings against Johnson was more extensive and lasted beyond the

issuing of an affidavit of probable cause for his arrest.” Johnson, 477 F.3d at 84.

Hence—due to the conduct of the defendants and the injuries suffered by the plaintiff

all ending before the plaintiff was arraigned and prosecuted—the Wright plaintiff’s

claims all boiled down in substance to false arrest claims, not genuine malicious

prosecution claims. See Wright, 409 F.3d at 598; Johnson, 477 F.3d at 82; De

Simone, 159 F.3d at 126; Heck, 512 U.S. at 484; see also Jarbough v. Att’y Gen. of

U.S., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We are not bound by the label attached by

a party to characterize a claim and will look beyond the label to analyze the substance

of a claim. To do otherwise would elevate form over substance and would put a

premium on artful labeling.”).

The Johnson court went further to state that this manner of distinguishing

Wright was significant due to the meaningful difference between a false arrest and

malicious prosecution claim. Regardless of why a person is arrested, they will be

detained and treated largely the same way until their arraignment. In contrast, extra

charges post-arraignment impose a substantial burden on the defendant, including

altering trial preparations, plea negotiations, the emotional and reputational impact

on the defendant, bail amount, and pre-trial detention time. Johnson, 477 F.3d at 83

(citing Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 1991)). Hence, the different

policies underlying malicious prosecution and false arrest claims compel courts to

analyze each charge against a defendant when addressing a malicious prosecution

claim, and such a general rule is consistent with the holding in Wright due to the

idiosyncratic facts present within it. Id. at 84-85.

In 2009, the Third Circuit, in an en banc opinion, did state that Johnson and

Wright were in “considerable tension.” Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 193 (3d

Cir. 2009). Before making this comment, however, it repeatedly and explicitly noted

that Johnson and Wright were not properly before the court, rendering this statement

dicta. Id. at 192 (describing Johnson as “a case that on its face has no applicability

to the one at hand”); id. at 193 (“Johnson involved an entirely different analysis than

the one at issue here. . . . The favorable termination element and the probable cause

element are distinct requirements.”); id. at 194 (“Johnson and Wright are not directly

applicable to the instant case. . . . [W]e do not rely on the approach taken in either

Johnson or Wright.”). Plus, while pointing out tension between the two holdings,

the Kossler court resolved it by stating that “Wright and Johnson both illustrate that

the analysis of malicious prosecution claims involving multiple charges is a fact-

intensive one.” Id. at 194.

Thus, even if there may be some precarious circumstances, such as the unique

facts of Wright, where the court dismisses all malicious prosecution and false arrest

claims together for the same reason, the Third Circuit has succinctly established the

general rule as follows:

In light of . . . malicious prosecution claim[s] . . . we will

assess whether any reasonable jury could find a lack of

probable cause as to any of the five crimes charged against

him, bearing in mind that although false arrest or

imprisonment claims will necessarily fail if probable cause

existed for any one of the crimes charged against the

arrestee, “probable cause on one charge does not foreclose

a malicious prosecution cause of action” based on

additional charges for which there was no probable cause.

In the case of prosecution, unlike arrest, unfounded

charges almost surely will place an additional burden on

the defendant, and thus we must consider probable cause

as to each of the charges.

Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 477 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations

omitted) (quoting Johnson, 477 F.3d at 83-84) (emphasis in Dempsey).

Defendant Pierce disputes this legal position on multiple grounds, all of which

are inconsistent with the law. First, Defendant Pierce claims that he is entitled to

qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claims because it was ambiguous at the time of the

his conduct whether Wright or Johnson is good law. The court disagrees. An issue

being complex is not the same as it being ambiguous. It is clear, under Third Circuit

law, that an investigator cannot aid a prosecutor in charging a defendant with

multiple crimes without any probable cause when they have actual knowledge of

this lack of probable cause, even if the defendant was arrested for another reasonably

suspicious crime. While a web of confusing and entangled facts may show that the

prosecutor or investigator’s position on the charges was reasonable, satisfying

probable cause at the time of arrest, the law has never opened the door for the

government to charge someone with a laundry list of crimes simply because they

have probable cause for one crime. Otherwise, the government could hold murder,

terrorism, and assault charges over a man who was simply arrested for a DUI—an

absurd outcome with flagrant disregard for a defendant’s due process rights. See

Johnson, 477 F.3d at 83 (citing Posr, 944 F.2d at 93).

Second, Defendant Pierce suggests that Wright controls here because Plaintiff

effectively admits in his Amended Complaint that he was a felon in possession of a

firearm. The court will not address this argument at this time because it violates

Rule 12(g)(2)’s consolidation rule1 and because it asks the court to inappropriately

resolve a fact-intensive question at the 12(b)(6) stage. See Hill v. Borough of

Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 232 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006). The court nonetheless does agree

with Defendant Pierce that Plaintiff’s position on whether he was actually a felon in

possession of a firearm or not is unclear, with his amended complaint and his brief

appearing to contradict one another. Plaintiff is therefore instructed to amend his

complaint for the limited purpose of giving further clarification on this issue, as it

1 Indeed, one of the key factual issues Defendant Pierce relies on here is that Plaintiff refers,

in his amended complaint, to a gun as “Plaintiff’s gun,” yet Plaintiff made this same reference in

his original complaint. (Doc. 1, ¶ 73 (“Defendant Pierce knew that shell casings were found in the

hallway outside Unit B-3 and that they did not belong to Plaintiff’s gun.”); Doc. 36, ¶ 77 (same).)

could influence how Defendant Pierce prepares for summary judgment or trial.

Third, Defendant Pierce argues that the court should reject Johnson because it

inappropriately attempts to overturn an earlier panel opinion, while only an en banc

or Supreme Court decision could do so. As shown above, however, Wright and

Johnson are both good law, and the tension between the two is merely specious.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the court will grant Defendant Sprow’s

motion, dismissing all claims against him and Dauphin County with prejudice. The

court will also dismiss all claims against the City of Harrisburg with prejudice. The

court will deny Defendant Pierce’s motion and grant Plaintiff twenty-one days leave

solely to clarify the firearm issue. An appropriate order will follow.

/s/ Sylvia H. Rambo

SYLVIA H. RAMBO

United States District Judge

Dated: January 20, 2021