Opinion

Perez v. Larson

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Sep 11, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.1%

“Once a § 1983 plaintiff identifies a municipal policy or custom, he must ‘demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.””

How later courts described this case

  • “Once a § 1983 plaintiff identifies a municipal policy or custom, he must ‘demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.””
  • applying Monell to a private company providing medical services to inmates

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOEL PEREZ, Civil No. 3:19-cv-1015

Plaintiff (Judge Mariani)

v. .

JAMES J. LARSON, et al, .

Defendants .

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Joel Perez (“Perez”), an inmate who was housed at all relevant times at the

Luzerne County Correctional Facility, in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, commenced this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Named as Defendants are Correct Care Solutions,

LLC (“Correct Care”), the Pennsylvania State Police’, and several individuals employed by

Luzerne County. (/d.). Presently ripe for disposition is a Rule 12(b) motion (Doc. 29-1) to

dismiss by Correct Care. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion

and dismiss the claims against Correct Care with leave to amend.

I. Allegations of the Complaint

Perez alleges that he was assaulted by correctional officers at the Luzerne County

Correctional Facility in October 2016. (Doc. 1] 29). Specifically, on October 12, 2016,

Perez was ordered by a guard to pack his belongings for transport back to state prison.

‘By Order dated September 9, 2020, the Court dismissed the Pennsylvania State Police as a

party to this action. (Docs. 50, 51).

(Id.). Perez believed this was an error and asked the guard to double-check his return date

to state prison. (/d. at J 30). Perez believed his transfer date to state prison was October

20, 2016, not October 12, 2016. (/d. 31). Perez alleges that a sergeant told him that he

was going back to state prison “for other reasons.” (/d. at § 32). Perez claims that he was

packing his property when, suddenly, a prison guard began to pepper spray him. (/d. at □□□

36-37). He alleges that he was dragged, punched, kicked, and choked. (/d. at J 37-39,

41, 42, 46). During his walk through the facility and transport to state prison, the guards

allegedly pushed Perez into walls and continued to hit him. (/d. at 9] 44, 46, 50, 52-55).

Perez asserts that Correct Care is the medical provider for the Luzerne County

Correctional Facility and is contracted to provide medical care for inmates at the prison. (/d.

at 23). He alleges that Correct Care was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. □□□□

at J 82).

Il. Legal Standard

A complaint must be dismissed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), if it does not allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must

aver “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

“Though a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop.

Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,

‘[flactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court “take[s] as true all the factual

allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those

facts, but . . . disregard|s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ethypharm S.A. France v.

Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Twombly and /qbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to

determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the

elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

“[W)here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” /qba/, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). This “plausibility” determination will be a “context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d.

However, even “if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court

must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or

futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a

defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment

would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she

has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.

Id.

lll. Discussion

Correct Care argues that Perez’s Eighth Amendment claim fails because he failed to

plead a policy, practice, or custom of Correct Care that violated his constitutional rights and

caused him harm, failed to identify a final policymaker, and failed to allege “but for”

causation. (Doc. 29, pp. 3, 7-14).

Correct Care provides healthcare services to inmates incarcerated within the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. (/d.; Doc. 1 J 23). Under § 1983, a private

corporation contracted by a prison to provide healthcare for inmates cannot be held liable

for Eighth Amendment violations on a respondeat superior theory. Natale v. Camden Cty.

Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003). Rather, pursuant to Monell, a private

corporation can be held liable for constitutional violations only if it has a custom or policy

exhibiting deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs. See Monell v. New

York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (subjecting municipalities to liability for

policies or customs that cause constitutional deprivations); Natale, 318 F.3d at 584

(applying Monell to a private company providing medical services to inmates). See also

Weigher v. Prison Health Servs., 402 F. App’x 668, 669-70 (3d Cir. 2010) (nonprecedential)

(noting that a private corporation providing medical service at a state correctional facility

cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior in a § 1983 suit). Thus, to

prevail on his § 1983 claims against Correct Care, Perez must establish that there “there

was a relevant [Correct Care] policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional

violation” for which he seeks relief. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84. “Policy is made when

a ‘decisionmaker possess{ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the

action’ issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d

1469, 1480 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106

S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991,

Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072, § 102. A course of conduct not expressly authorized

by law becomes a “custom” when the challenged “practices of state officials [are] so

permanent and well settled” as to virtually constitute law. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. In order

to establish Correct Care’s § 1983 liability under either a policy or a custom argument, ‘it is

incumbent upon [plaintiff] to show that a policymaker is responsible either for the policy or,

through acquiescence, for the custom.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citing Jett v. Dallas

Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). The “policymaker” is the person who “has

final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take an action,” and who is or is nota

policymaker is determined by reference to state law. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481.

In the complaint, Perez broadly alleges that “[nurse] E. Joyce and Correct Carel]

Solutions” were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Doc. 1 J 82). Perez

fails to allege any facts demonstrating that any perceived deficiency in his medical treatment

may be the result of Correct Care’s policies, practices, or customs, or that the purported

policy was the “moving force behind the injury alleged.” Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219

F.3d 261, 275-76 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). The complaint does not even identify any Correct Care

policies or procedures that may be at issue. See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d

261, 275-76 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Once a § 1983 plaintiff identifies a municipal policy or custom,

he must ‘demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving

force’ behind the injury alleged.””) (quoting Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). Moreover, Perez has not alleged the existence of a final

policymaker who affirmed Correct Care’s policies. Consequently, as presently stated, Perez

cannot maintain a Monell claim against Correct Care.

IV. Leave io Amend

When a complaint fails to present: a orima facie case of liability, district courts must

generally grant leave to amend before dismissing the complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d

Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has admonished that when a

complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, courts should liberally grant

leave to amend “unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515

F.3d at 245 (citing Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)). Perez will be

afforded the opportunity to amend his claims against Correct Care.

V. Conclusion

The Court will grant the motion (Doc. 29-1) to dismiss by Correct Care Solutions,

LLC, and grant Perez an opportunity to file an amended complaint in the event he can state

a plausible claim for relief. A separate Order shall issue.

GY sue

Robert D. Mariani

United States District Judge

Dated: September - LL. 2020

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.