The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TARIQ WYATT, : Civil No. 3:16-CV-01438
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
:
LIEUTENANT BUTTS, et al., :
:
:
Defendants. : Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
MEMORANDUM
Before the court in this prisoner civil rights case are Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, a report and recommendation from United States Magistrate
Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. addressing the motion, and both parties’ objections to
the report and recommendation. (Docs. 85, 94, 95, 97.) For the reasons that
follow, the parties’ objections are overruled, the report and recommendation is
adopted in its entirety, and the motion for summary judgment is granted in part and
denied in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case began when Plaintiff Tariq Wyatt (“Wyatt”) filed a complaint as
an unrepresented litigant against various defendants connected to the State
Correctional Institution in Frackville, Pennsylvania (“SCI Mahanoy”) on July 12,
2016. (Doc. 1.) According to the allegations in the complaint, Wyatt was
subjected to verbal harassment from Defendant Malisko and subsequently placed
in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”). (Id. ¶¶ 10–18.) Wyatt alleged that while
he was in the RHU, Defendants Butts and Crawford used excessive force during an
incident in which they were placing him in his cell and that after that incident he
was denied adequate medical care. (Id. ¶ 19.) The complaint alleged that while he
was in the RHU, Wyatt requested the return of his property, including legal
documents connected to various lawsuits he was litigating, but the Defendants
ignored those requests for days. (Id. ¶ 20.) Wyatt was then allegedly placed in an
observation cell with a clogged toilet where feces were smeared on the floor and
walls for some hours as retaliation for requesting his legal documents. (Id. ¶¶ 21–
24.) The complaint further alleged that while Wyatt was in the RHU, he was
served meals on Styrofoam trays and repeatedly subjected to verbal harassment
from Defendant Butts. (Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) Finally, the complaint alleged that
Defendant Luquis violated Wyatt’s constitutional rights when she presided over a
disciplinary hearing for Wyatt. (Id. ¶¶ 27–29.) Based on those alleged facts, the
complaint raised claims for violation of Wyatt’s constitutional rights under the
First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on excessive force, the
denial of adequate medical care, denial of access to the courts, unconstitutional
conditions of confinement, and retaliation. (Id. ¶ 30.)
On September 14, 2016, United States District Judge Edwin M. Kosik sua
sponte dismissed Wyatt’s complaint to the extent that it was based on verbal
harassment, the denial of some meals, and the serving of meals on Styrofoam trays,
and ordered the complaint to be served on Defendants. (Docs. 8–9.) Defendants
then answered the complaint on April 12, 2017. (Doc. 26.) Two days later, the
case was referred to Judge Saporito for all pretrial management.
On December 8, 2017, Judge Saporito granted Wyatt’s motion to appoint
counsel, and pro bono counsel then entered appearances on Wyatt’s behalf on
February 15, 2018. (Docs. 50, 53–54.) On July 31, 2018, the parties stipulated to
the dismissal of Wyatt’s claims against Defendants Malisko, Reese, and Luquis,
with the case proceeding only as to Wyatt’s claims against Defendants Butts and
Crawford. (Doc. 64.)
The remaining Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment
on April 26, 2019, arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment on the
merits of Wyatt’s claims and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc.
85.) Judge Saporito addressed the motion in a report and recommendation on
March 19, 2020. (Doc. 94.) The report and recommendation recommends (1) that
Wyatt’s claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments be dismissed under
the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1), id. at 11–15; (2) that summary judgment be granted as to Wyatt’s
access to courts claim because Wyatt has not introduced any evidence to show an
actual injury to his access to the courts, id. at 17–22; (3) that summary judgment be
denied as to Wyatt’s claim of retaliation arising from the denial of his legal
documents, id. at 22–25; (4) that summary judgment be granted as to Wyatt’s
excessive force claim because the force used was de minimis, id. at 25–30; (5) that
summary judgment be granted as to Wyatt’s medical care claim because there are
no allegations of the remaining Defendants’ personal involvement and because the
evidence does not show that Wyatt had a serious medical need, id. at 30–34; (6)
that summary judgment be granted as to Wyatt’s conditions of confinement claim
because exposure to the conditions in the observation cell for a brief period of
hours does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, id. at 34–36; (7)
that summary judgment be denied as to Wyatt’s retaliation claim arising from his
placement in the observation cell, id. at 36–38; and (8) that Defendants’ claim of
qualified immunity be denied as to Wyatt’s retaliation claims, id. at 38–42.
Both parties objected to the report and recommendation on April 2, 2020.
(Docs. 95, 97.) Defendants object only to the recommendation that summary
judgment be denied as to Wyatt’s retaliation claims. (Doc. 95.) Wyatt objects
only to the recommendation that summary judgment be granted as to his excessive
force claim. (Doc. 97.) Those objections have been fully briefed and are
considered below. (Docs. 96, 98–101.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the
district court is required to conduct a de novo review of the contested portions of
the report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3);
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). The district court may
accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in
whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may also receive
further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with further
instructions. Id. “Although the standard is de novo, the extent of review is
committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on
the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.”
Weidman v. Colvin, 164 F. Supp. 3d 650, 653 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Rieder v.
Apfel, 115 F. Supp. 2d 496, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2000)).
De novo review is not required for portions of a report and recommendation
to which no objections have been raised. Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc.,
702 F. Supp. 2d 465, 469 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
149 (1985)). Instead, the court is only required to “satisfy itself that there is no
clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is material if resolution of
the dispute “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is
not precluded by “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary.” Id. “‘A
dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the
nonmovant’ and ‘material if it could affect the outcome of the case.’” Thomas v.
Tice, 943 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh
Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012)).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288
(3d Cir. 2018) (citing Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher
Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006)). The court may not “weigh the evidence”
or “determine the truth of the matter.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Instead, the
court’s role in reviewing the facts of the case is “to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id.
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The non-moving party must then
oppose the motion, and in doing so “‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of [its] pleadings’ but, instead, ‘must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or
suspicions will not suffice.’” Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288–89 (quoting D.E. v. Cent.
Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2014)).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party “fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support
of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the
jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Where
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
DISCUSSION
At the outset, the court will address Judge Saporito’s recommendations
regarding Wyatt’s Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, access to courts,
medical care, and conditions of confinement claims and Defendants’ assertion of
qualified immunity. Because neither party has objected to these recommendations,
the court reviews them only for clear error. Univac Dental, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
Finding none, the court adopts those portions of the report and recommendation.
Turning to the recommendations to which objections have been raised, the
court will first address Judge Saporito’s recommendation that summary judgment
be denied as to Wyatt’s retaliation claims. (See Doc. 94 at 22–25, 36–38.)
Defendants object to these recommendations, arguing that they did not take
adverse actions against Wyatt and that there is no evidence that they had a
retaliatory motive when taking the allegedly retaliatory actions. (Docs. 95–96.)
The court will overrule Defendants’ objections. To prevail on a retaliation
claim, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct, (2) the defendant engaged in retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person
of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link
existed between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.”
Javitz v. Cty. of Luzerne, 940 F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 2019). In this case, there is
evidence of record from which a reasonable finder of fact could find that
Defendants withheld Wyatt’s legal documents and placed him in an unsanitary
observation cell and that they did this because Wyatt was “acting like a dickhead”
by “asking for [his] legal work.” (See, e.g., Wyatt Deposition at 27, 30, 38.) This
is sufficient for Wyatt’s retaliation claims to survive summary judgment. The
court will accordingly overrule Defendants’ objections.
Finally, the court will address the recommendation that summary judgment
be granted as to Wyatt’s excessive force claim because the force used was de
minimis. (Doc. 94 at 25–30.) Wyatt objects to this recommendation, arguing that
it misapplies the standard for excessive force claims set out in Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34 (2010) by focusing on the extent of his injuries rather than the nature
of the force used by the Defendants. (Doc. 97.)
In Wilkins, the Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1 (1992) that the use of excessive force may violate the Eighth
Amendment even where a plaintiff does not suffer serious injuries. Wilkins, 559
U.S. at 34. Under both Hudson and Wilkins, the “‘core judicial inquiry’ [is] not
whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather ‘whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.’” Id. at 37 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).
The absence of serious injury is not irrelevant to the court’s inquiry under
Wilkins. Id. “The extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may
suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a
particular situation.” Id. (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.) “The extent of injury
may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied.” Id.
In this case, Wyatt’s excessive force claim is based on an incident involving
Defendants Butts and Crawford in which the Defendants allegedly pushed Wyatt
into his cell and Crawford tightened his handcuffs and twisted his arms. (See Doc.
94 at 27.) The report and recommendation analyzed the evidence surrounding the
incident and found that Wyatt had suffered nothing more than a de minimis injury.
(Id. at 28.) Based on the lack of evidence of serious injury and the other evidence
surrounding the incident, the report and recommendation found “that Wyatt has
adduced nothing more than a de minimis use of force by Crawford and Butts.”
(Id.) Thus, rather than treating the lack of serious injury as dispositive, the report
and recommendation used the lack of serious injury as evidence that “provide[d]
some indication of the amount of force applied.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. This is
in line with the Supreme Court’s holding in Wilkins. The court has also reviewed
the evidence de novo and agrees that it shows only a de minimis use of force by the
Defendants. Accordingly, the court will overrule Wyatt’s objections.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the parties’ objections are overruled, the report
and recommendation is adopted in its entirety, and the motion for summary
judgment is granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Court Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: June 4, 2020