Stemler v. Borough of Parryville

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARK W. STEMLER, et al., :

Plaintiffs : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-1763

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

BOROUGH OF PARRYVILLE, :

et al.,

:

Defendants

:

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended

complaint pursuant Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 15). For the reasons stated

below, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be GRANTED as to all federal

claims and this court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the remaining state law claims.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 6, 2018, plaintiffs, Mark W. Stemler and Parryville

Properties Too, LLC, (“PPT”)1, commenced the instant action against the

1 Mr. Stemler is the sole member of PPT.

Borough of Parryville, Ralph Washburn, Martin Sowers and Dean Emrey.

(Doc. 1). On November 13, 2018, defendants filed a motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ complaint, after which plaintiffs were granted an extension of time

to either file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to defendants’

motion to dismiss. (Doc. 11).

On January 1, 2019, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint setting forth

the following claims: (1) violation of their §1983 substantive due process

rights; (2) violation of their §1983 procedural due process rights; (3) §1983

retaliation; (4) §1983 conspiracy; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) tortious

interference; and (7) abuse of process. (Doc. 12). On January 15, 2019,

defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Doc. 15)

and a brief in support was filed on January 28, 2019. (Doc. 16). Plaintiffs filed

a brief in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss on February 12, 2019.

(Doc. 18). Defendants’ motion is now ripe for disposition.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Sometime in late 2008 early 2009, Mr. Stemler brought suit against the

Borough of Parryville and Borough officials alleging that Borough officials

targeted him through arbitrary enforcement of building codes and zoning

ordinances in order to harass and damage him and his business interests.

The litigation was resolved by way of a stipulated settlement agreement

(“agreement”) that was executed by the parties in December 2012 and was

accepted and filed of record with the Carbon County Court of Common Pleas

on January 11, 2013. The agreement reflects that, at that time, the Borough

of Parryville was in the process of rewriting its 1986 zoning ordinance which

the plaintiff alleges was an invalid ordinance.

At the time of the agreement, defendant Washburn served as a

Borough councilman and defendant Emrey served as the Borough’s mayor.

Because defendants Washburn and Emrey were Borough officials at the

time of the agreement, plaintiffs believe that the two were aware of the

agreement. From December 2012 until June 2016, Parryville went through a

2 The factual background accepts all of the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded facts as

true as the court must do at the motion to dismiss stage.

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series of zoning and building code enforcement officers. However, plaintiffs

believe that when new personnel started Borough officials did not disclose

the agreement to them in order to avoid the terms of the agreement.

In or before May 2016, defendants Emrey, Washburn and Sowers had

a meeting in which “a plan and scheme was hatched to seek retribution

against [Mr. Stemler] and to otherwise harass and cause harm and damage

to Mr. Stemler and his interests.” (Doc. 12, p. 8). Following the May 2016

meeting, Sowers “purports to have been engaged as Parryville’s zoning

officer, building code officer, UCC Program Manager and enforcement officer

by way of written resolution.” (Doc. 12, p. 8). It is plaintiffs’ belief that Borough

officials purposefully withheld and failed to disclose the agreement to

defendant Sowers at the time of his appointment and “instead left him

unaware of Parryville’s duties and obligations thereunder,” in order that

Sowers would take adversarial action against Mr. Stemler. (Doc. 12, p. 9).

“[I]t was the objective of Parryville, Washburn and Emrey that Sowers remain

ignorant respecting the Stipulated Settlement Agreement and the facts and

circumstances relating to Mr. Stemler, believing that if he were enlightened

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that it would be less likely that Sowers would do their bidding and be part of

their plan and scheme directed at Mr. Stemler.” (Doc 12, p. 9).

After the May 2016 meeting, plaintiffs began to receive various notices,

orders, and demands, including the following:

1) December 5, 2016 - Correspondence asserting that the property

situated at 101 Centre Street is within the floodway.

2) December 12, 2016 - Order to Show Cause asserting that a

structure was being built at 162 Main Street without a building

permit and advising plaintiffs of the right to appeal to the

Parryville Borough UCC Appeals Board, which plaintiffs claim

was non-existent at the time of the order.

3) January 23, 2017 - Findings of Facts asserting that the property

situated at 101 Centre Street is within the floodway and that the

off-street parking to seat ratio was 1.5 to 1.

4) March 23, 2017 - Notice of Violation regarding the 300 Block of

Main Street asserting that a concrete pad and structure was

constructed, that shipping/storage containers are on the

property and that the property is within a flood plain. Citing

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§7.903 of the allegedly invalid 1986 ordinance, the notice

threatens criminal sanctions for failure to comply.3 The notice

proceeds to inform plaintiffs of their right to appeal to the Zoning

Hearing Board within twenty (20) days.

5) March 27, 2017 - Order to Show Cause in which no address was

identified asserting a violation of the Pennsylvania Uniform

Construction Code, that a building permit is necessary and

ought to be obtained through Sowers’ employer, and advising of

a right to appeal to the Parryville Borough UCC Board, which

plaintiffs again claim was non-existent at the time of the order.

3 The notice provides:

Failure to comply will result in further action in accordance with

Section 7.903 which states, “Any person, firm or corporation

violating any provision of this ordinance shall, upon conviction,

be punished by a fine not to exceed $100 for any offense,

recoverable with costs, together with judgement or imprisonment

not exceeding thirty (30) days if the amount of said judgement is

not paid. Each day that a violation is permitted shall constitute a

separate offense.

(Doc. 15, Ex. 5).

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6) March 27, 2017 - Order to Show Cause regarding the property

situated at 162 Main Street asserting alteration to the property’s

foundation, advising of a right to appeal to the Parryville Borough

UCC Board.

7) April 10, 2017 - Order to Show Cause regarding the property

situated at 101 Centre Street asserting a violation of the

Pennsylvania Uniform Construction Code, that a building permit

is necessary and ought to be obtained through Sowers’

employer and advising of a right to appeal to the Parryville

Borough UCC Board.

8) April 10, 2017 - Notice of Violation regarding the property

situated at 101 Centre Street alleging a violation, utilizing the

same failure to comply language previously noted and, again,

informing plaintiffs of their right to appeal.

9) July 24, 2017 - Notice of Violation regarding 204 Main Street

alleging a violation, utilizing the same failure to comply language

previously outlined and, again, informing plaintiffs of their right

to appeal.

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Plaintiffs allege that these correspondences contained

misrepresentations of fact and were unlawful but were sent for the purpose

of harassing and causing harm, damage and undue expense to Mr. Stemler.

According to the amended complaint, plaintiffs were treated differently than

other property owners, in that Borough officials enforced ordinances against

them while ignoring glaring violations relating to defendant Emrey’s property.

While plaintiffs provide that nothing of substance came of the majority of the

above described notices, orders and demands, defendants did pursue civil

actions where plaintiffs failed to appeal to the Zoning Hearing Board upon

issuance of a Notice of Violation and proceeded to a judgment uncontested.

As of the filing of plaintiffs’ amended complaint, defendants’ civil proceedings

against plaintiffs had apparently not been closed, as plaintiffs have filed

appeals in those matters.

Plaintiffs contend that, although defendants had not for six years made

any attempt to rewrite, rescind, or replace the allegedly invalid 1986

ordinance, shortly after they commenced this action, the ordinance was

repealed during a special meeting, although the requirements for repeal

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were apparently not satisfied.4 Plaintiffs provide that they never received

notice of the special meeting or that the alleged invalid ordinance had been

repealed. Seemingly, plaintiffs allege that a replacement ordinance was not

approved, and a zoning board was not appointed.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The defendants’ motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to the provisions

of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This rule provides for the dismissal of a complaint,

in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has

been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005), and

dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the

complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (abrogating “no set of facts” language found in

4 The Parryville Zoning Ordinance posted to Parryville Borough’s public

website is dated July 1, 2017. Parryville Zoning Ordinance,

parryville.org/?page_id=1335. Last accessed March 31, 2020.

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Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts alleged must be

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. This requirement “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” necessary elements of the

plaintiff’s cause of action. Id. Furthermore, in order to satisfy federal pleading

requirements, the plaintiff must “provide the grounds of his entitlement to

relief,” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Phillips v. County

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (brackets and quotations

marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 555).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the

complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. See Sands v.

McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider

“undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit

to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached]

documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d

1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are

alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

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are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However,

the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to

dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250,1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

Generally, the court should grant leave to amend a complaint before

dismissing it as merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote

Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v.

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver,

213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). “Dismissal without leave to amend is

justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.”

Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.

Plaintiffs’ first claim is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and

alleges a violation of their substantive due process rights. In support of their

claim, plaintiffs allege that defendants “arbitrarily, willfully, and intentionally

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disregarded the law on numerous occasions, schemed, plotted and testified

falsely, with the intended purpose to interfere with, retaliate against, and

harm plaintiffs’ constitutional, personal, property and contractual rights.”

(Doc. 12, p. 22). According to the amended complaint, defendants’ actions

were motivated by self-interest and animosity towards Mr. Stemler. In

response, defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to allege any

conscience shocking behavior in order to sustain a substantive due process

claim.

In order to state a §1983 claim, a “plaintiff must demonstrate the

defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived [plaintiff] of a right

secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Chainey v.

Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Kaucher v. County of Bucks,

455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006)). To establish a substantive due process

claim, “a plaintiff must prove the particular interest at issue is protected by

the substantive due process clause and the government’s deprivation of the

protected interest shocks the conscience.” Id. (citing United Artists Theatre

Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 400-02 (3d Cir.

2003)).

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The Third Circuit has held that “ownership is a property interest worthy

of substantive due process protection.” Id. (citing DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of

Adjustment for Twp. of W. Amwell, 53 F.3d 592, 600 (3d Cir. 1995)).

However, even when a plaintiff alleges the deprivation of a fundamental

property interest, the deprivation is actionable under substantive due

process principles only when the conduct at issue is so irrational as to “shock

the conscience.” United Artists, 316 F.3d at 402 (citing County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844-45 (1998)). Substantive due

process is not aimed at government actions that are merely taken for an

“improper purpose” or in “bad faith.” See United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400-02;

Corneal v. Jackson Twp., 313 F.Supp.2d 457, 465-66 (M.D.Pa. 2003), aff’d,

94 Fed. Appx. 76 (3d Cir. 2004). “What ‘shocks the conscience’ is ‘only the

most egregious official conduct.’” Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385

F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400 (quoting

County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 846)). In the land-use context,

substantive due process claims are often unsuccessful, with the Third Circuit

providing:

every appeal by a disappointed developer from an adverse ruling

of the local planning board involves some claim of legal authority,

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but “[i]t is not enough simply to give these state law claims

constitutional labels such as ‘due process’ or ‘equal protection’

in order to raise a substantial federal question under [42 U.S.C.

§1983].”

Sutton v. Chanceford Twp., 298 F.Supp.3d 790, 809 (M.D.Pa. 2018), aff'd,

763 Fed. Appx. 186 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing United Artists, 316 F.3d at 402

(citation omitted)). In fact, the Third Circuit has found that official conduct

“shocks the conscience” only in limited circumstances.

For example, evidence of “corruption or self-dealing” might

meet this standard. Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286. Likewise, a

municipal action that reflects “bias against an ethnic group” could

shock the conscience. Id. at 286. The Court suggested that a

“virtual taking” of property might satisfy this standard. Id. In

addition, a municipality’s land-use decision that is animated by

“hostility to constitutionally-protected activity on the premises”

might be sufficiently outrageous, in some situations, to rise to

conscience-shocking conduct. Id. at 285 (citing Assocs. in

Obstetrics & Gynecology v. Upper Merion Twp., 270 F.Supp.2d

633 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (denying motion to dismiss complaint in

which the plaintiff alleged that the municipality selectively

enforced zoning regulations to restrict access to legal abortions).

Id.

In this matter, plaintiffs have failed to allege facts as found sufficient

by the Third Circuit to state a substantive due process claim. Even to the

extent plaintiffs allege that defendants’ actions were motivated by self-

interest and animosity toward Mr. Stemler, plaintiffs do not provide facts

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supporting corruption or self-dealing in their amended complaint which the

Third Circuit has stated could violate substantive due process. See

Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286. See also, e.g., Giuliani v. Springfield Township,

726 Fed.Appx. 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2018) (Where defendants’ actions rested

on revenge and spite, the court found no substantive due process violation

where there was no evidence of corruption or self-dealing, such as bribery

or an attempt by a Township official to acquire the property for themselves).

Further, plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants disregarded the law on

several occasions and knowingly enforced the alleged invalid 1986 zoning

ordinance does not rise to the level of conscience shocking behavior, as such

behavior may be a violation of state law but not a violation of substantive due

process. See Highway Materials, Inc. v. Whitemarsh Tp., 386 Fed.Appx.

251, 258 (3d Cir. 2010). See also United Artists, 316 F.3d at 402 (citing

Chesterfield Development Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102,

1104-05 (8th Cir. 1992) (“decision would be the same even if the City had

knowingly enforced the invalid zoning ordinance in bad faith . . . A bad-faith

violation of state law remains only a violation of state law.”)).

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Because plaintiffs have failed to meet the high standard established

for substantive due process violations, defendants’ motion to dismiss Count

I of the amended complaint will be GRANTED.

B. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

In Count II of the amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants

have caused enforcement actions and civil suits to be filed against them

without basis and, in doing so, defendants invoked, or allowed to be invoked,

the alleged unlawful ordinance which they had previously agreed to rewrite.

According to plaintiffs, said actions sought to bring criminal sanctions against

plaintiffs through the use of civil procedures. Defendants argue that plaintiffs

were afforded procedures which have been held to satisfy federal due

process.

When a plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the court employs a

“familiar two-stage analysis, inquiring (1) whether the asserted individual

interests are encompassed within the fourteenth amendment’s protection of

life, liberty, or property; and (2) whether the procedures available provided

the plaintiff with due process of law.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d

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Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). There is no general

requirement that a plaintiff exhaust their available remedies under 42 U.S.C.

§1983. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496,

(1982). However, where a plaintiff, as here, brings a claim for violation of the

right to procedural due process, a plaintiff “must have taken advantage of

the processes that were available, unless those processes were patently

inadequate.” Alvin v. Suzuki, supra. See also Garzella v. Borough of

Dunmore, 280 Fed.Appx. 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2008). “A state cannot be held to

have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural

protection available and the plaintiff has simply refused to avail himself of

them.” Id. (citing Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1982)).

“The Third Circuit has conclusively held Pennsylvania’s statutory

scheme adequately protects the procedural due process rights of a plaintiff

challenging a municipality’s zoning decisions.” Tri–County Concerned

Citizens Ass’n v. Carr, 2001 WL 1132227, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 18, 2001)

(citing Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 694-95 (3d Cir.1980)).

“Pennsylvania provides adequate due process because it provides

reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error by a local administrative

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body.” 8131 Roosevelt Blvd. Corp. v. City of Phila., 2003 WL 57903, at *7

(E.D.Pa. Jan.6, 2002) (citing Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1128 (3d

Cir.1988)).

In this case, each notice of violation issued to plaintiffs explained the

alleged violation, as well as the process of appeal which required plaintiffs to

appeal the notice to the Borough’s Zoning Hearing Board. Plaintiffs did not

appeal any of the notices of violation. When plaintiffs failed to act, defendants

pursued civil actions with regard to the notices of violation. See Borough of

Parryville v. Parryville Properties Too, LLC, Docket Nos. MJ-56302-CV-

0000152-2017, MJ-56302-CV-0000153-2017. The civil docket sheets reflect

that defendants obtained uncontested judgments in those matters, after

which plaintiffs pursued appeals through the state courts. In fact, at least one

of those matters is still on-going. See Borough of Parryville v. Parryville

Properties Too, LLC, 2020 WL 563509 (Pa.Cmwlth. Feb. 5, 2020). Because

plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at state law to rectify any legal errors

with respect to the notices of violation and, in fact, are actively pursuing those

remedies, the court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for due

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process violations. As such, defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II of the

amended complaint will be GRANTED.

C. §1983 RETALIATION

Count III of the amended complaint sets forth a §1983 retaliation claim.

In support of this claim, plaintiffs allege that they engaged in constitutionally

protected speech by making complaints with respect to the unkempt nature

and obvious ordinance violations of defendant Emrey’s property. In

response, plaintiffs allege defendants caused baseless orders, notices and

demands to be issued to them. In seeking to dismiss this count of the

plaintiffs’ amended complaint, defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to

properly allege a causal link between his alleged protected speech and the

alleged retaliatory conduct of defendants.

To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, plaintiffs must prove:

“(1) that [they] engaged in a constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the

government responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity

caused the retaliation.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010)

(citing Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind., 385 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2004)).

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In this case, the court initially notes that plaintiffs do not set forth any

allegations in the facts of their complaint indicating that they made

complaints with respect to the condition of defendant Emrey’s property. The

only mention of defendant Emrey’s property in the facts is that “Parryville has

selectively, arbitrarily and wrongfully endeavored to ‘enforce’ is [sic]

ordinances against Plaintiffs all the while ignoring glaring violations, including

those of Defendant Emry [sic]/relating to Emrey’s property.” (Doc. 12, p. 17,

¶55). In fact, upon review, the facts of the amended complaint seem to imply

that it was the 2008/2009 litigation and subsequent agreement entered in

January 2013 which prompted defendant Washburn and Emrey to want to

“seek retribution.”

Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to offer any facts that would support the

finding that his alleged complaints about defendant Emrey’s property were a

substantial or motivating factor in the issuance of the orders, notices and

demands. Plaintiffs simply allege that they made complaints at some

unspecified time and then, in a conclusory manner, allege that defendants

retaliated against them. Because plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient

facts of a causal connection between the alleged protected speech and

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retaliation, an essential element of a §1983 retaliation claim, their claim must

fail as a matter of law. For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to

dismiss Count III of the amended complaint will be GRANTED.

D. §1983 CONSPIRACY

In Count IV of the amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants

“conspired, by agreement, to deprive, interfere, suppress, harass, threaten,

intimidate, retaliate against, and harm Plaintiffs and their constitutionally-

protected rights under the color of state authority.” To the extent that

defendants Washburn and Emrey were acting in their individual capacities,

plaintiffs allege that they “furthered, or failed to prevent, and engaged in a

conspiracy involving the other Defendants.” Plaintiffs allege that defendants

took “overt acts in a common purpose to interfere with and injure Plaintiffs’

constitutional, property, and contractual rights.”

The United Sates Supreme Court has outlined the required elements

of a §1983 conspiracy claim. To succeed, the plaintiff must prove (1) that

defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of

the United States and (2) that defendants deprived plaintiffs of this

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constitutional right under color of law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

144, 150 (1970). To sustain a claim of conspiracy under §1983, there must

be a finding of an actual violation of a constitutional right. Dykes v.

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 68 F.3d 1564, 1570 (3d Cir.

1995).

In this case, the court has found that plaintiffs have failed to

successfully plead an underlying §1983 violation and thus a §1983

conspiracy claim cannot stand. Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss

Count IV of the complaint will be GRANTED.

E. REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS

Where a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had

original jurisdiction, the court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3). It is

within the court’s discretion to determine whether it will exercise

supplemental jurisdiction. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009).

That decision should be based on “the values of judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484

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U.S. 343, 350 (1988). When only state law claims remain, typically, the

balance of these factors indicates that the remaining claims properly belong

in state court. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350.

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges the following state law claims:

(1) civil conspiracy; (2) tortious interference; and (3) abuse of process.

Because this court will dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims over which it has

original jurisdiction, only the state law claims remain. This court will exercise

its discretion and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining claims.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 15)

will be GRANTED as to all claims over which this court has original

jurisdiction. Moreover, the court will decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. An appropriate order shall

follow.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: April 13, 2020

18-1763-01.dox

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