City director of human resources was not entitled to absolute immunity where he discharged his “arguably discretionary” duty to “determine the appropriate disciplinary measures for employees” by applying “specific criteria that are outlined in the personnel code”
How later courts described this case
- City director of human resources was not entitled to absolute immunity where he discharged his “arguably discretionary” duty to “determine the appropriate disciplinary measures for employees” by applying “specific criteria that are outlined in the personnel code”
- “The Third Circuit and its district courts have been wary of finding qualified immunity as a matter of law with respect to warrantless searches.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DOUGLAS L. EASH, : Civil No. 1:19-cv-141
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
COUNTY OF YORK, :
PENNSYLVANIA, et. al., :
:
Defendants. : Judge Sylvia H. Rambo
M E M O R A N D U M
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Kristy Bixler
(“Bixler”), Kimberly Rinker (“Rinker”), Ashli Stroud (“Stroud,” collectively the
“Individual Defendants”), and County of York, Pennsylvania (the “County”),
seeking to dismiss Plaintiff Douglas Eash’s (“Eash”) amended complaint. (Doc. 6.)
For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are garnered from Eash’s amended complaint and are
taken as true for the purpose of resolving Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Eash was
employed by York County at the County of York Department of Emergency
Services (the “County”) from 2005 to 2018. (Doc. 6, ¶ 11.) From February 2007 to
July 2018, Eash held the position of Operations Supervisor. (Id. ¶ 14.)
On June 22, 2018, Eash initiated a private chat with C.H., a female 911
employee with the County who he did not supervise, over Facebook Messenger
during off-the-clock hours. (Id. ¶ 16.) The two followed up on a conversation they
had during work hours, which led to further conversations, “banter regarding sexual
preferences,” and Eash sending photographs of himself partially disrobed and lying
on his stomach after a “fire-cupping session,” which he used as a stress-reduction
technique. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.) C.H. participated in the conversations, including their
sexual content, and did not voice any objection to Eash. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 27 28.)
On June 28, 2018, C.H. filed a complaint with the County’s human resources
department regarding the conversations. (Id. ¶ 31.) Thereafter, Eash was instructed
to attend a June 29, 2018 meeting with human resources. (Id. ¶ 33.) The meeting was
conducted by Rinker, the Deputy Director of Human Resources, and Stroud, the East
End Human Resources Representative for the County of York. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8, 32.)
During the meeting, Plaintiff initially objected to discussing the conversations
with C.H. because they pertained to his “private life.” (Id. ¶ 42.) Rinker and Stroud
then instructed Eash to show them the contents of the communications under threat
of termination. (Id.) Eash eventually complied with the instruction and showed
Rinker and Stroud the messages between him and C.H. out of fear of being
terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 46-50.)
Subsequently, Eash was terminated effective July 2, 2018, and was notified
by letter dated July 3, 2018. (Id. ¶ 51, Doc. 6-1.) The letter was signed by Rinker
and allegedly drafted at the direction of Bixler, the Director of Human Resources for
the County. (Doc. 6, ¶ 51, Doc. 6-1.) It asserted that the human resources
investigation found that Eash engaged in inappropriate communication between a
supervisor and subordinate and that Eash was not truthful during the investigation.
(Doc. 6, ¶ 59; Doc. 6-1.) The letter also listed various sections of the County
disciplinary policy that it claimed Eash violated: “Disregard for policies, procedures
and rules in performance of job duties;” “Theft or any form of dishonesty;”
“Instigating dissatisfaction among fellow employees;” and “Sexual harassment.”
(Doc. 6-1.)
In January 2019, Eash initiated this action by filing a complaint, which he
subsequently amended in April 2019. The amended complaint alleges claims for (1)
civil rights deprivation of liberty interest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County;
(2) violation of the Fourth Amendment against all the Defendants; (3) intrusion upon
seclusion invasion of privacy against the Individual Defendants; (4) defamation
against the Individual Defendants; and (5) wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy against all the Defendants.1
1 The amended complaint does not specify whether Eash’s defamation and wrongful discharge
claims are being asserted against all of the defendants or just the Individual Defendants. With
respect to the defamation claim, the original complaint specified that it was only being asserted
against the Individual Defendants, and the amended complaint’s failure to do so appears to be the
result of a formatting error. (Compare Doc 1., p. 15, with Doc 6 pp., 19, 21.) In addition, any
defamation claim against the County would almost certainly be subject to dismissal under the
Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”). With respect to Eash’s wrongful
discharge claim, the original and amended complaints fail to specify whether it is intended to be
asserted against the County, but it too would be subject to dismissal under the PSTCA. See
Palazzolo v. Damsker, No. 10-CV-7430, 2011 WL 2601536, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2011)
(“Wrongful termination is a common law tort claim that does not fall within the exceptions
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). In reviewing a
12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in
the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.” Taksir v.
Vanguard Grp., 903 F.3d 95, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The facts
alleged must be “construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations,
brackets, and ellipses omitted). But “[t]he court is not required to draw unreasonable
inferences” from the facts. 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004).
The Third Circuit has detailed a three-step process to determine whether a
complaint meets the pleading standard. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2014).
First, the court outlines the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief.
Id. at 365. Second, the court must “peel away those allegations that are no more than
conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Third, the court
to immunity laid out in § 8542.”) The court will therefore construe these claims as only being
asserted against the Individual Defendants. If Eash believes he can plausibly assert a viable
defamation or wrongful discharge claim against the County, he may file a second amended
complaint within 21 days from the issuance of the accompanying order.
“look[s] for well-pled factual allegations, assume[s] their veracity, and then
‘determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Id.
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The last step is “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
a. The amended complaint states a claim for deprivation of liberty
interest.
The County moves to dismiss Eash’s claim for deprivation of liberty interest.2
“[T]o make out a due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation,
a plaintiff must show a stigma to his reputation plus deprivation of some additional
right or interest.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted) (emphasis original). In the context of public employment, this
“stigma-plus” test “has been applied to mean that when an employer ‘creates and
disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection
with his termination,’ it deprives the employee of a protected liberty interest.” Id.
(quoting Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 (1977)). “To satisfy the ‘stigma’ prong
of the test, it must be alleged that the purportedly stigmatizing statement(s) (1) were
made publicly, and (2) were false.” Hill, 455 F.3d at 236 (citations omitted). The
2 The court need not address the County's request to strike Eash's demand for punitive damages
against it. The amended complaint does not make any express demand for punitive damages
against the County, and Eash's brief represents that he is not seeking such relief.
“plus” prong is met so long as the statements were made in the course of the public
employee’s termination. See id. at 238.
Here, the amended complaint adequately states a claim for deprivation of
liberty interest. Eash alleges that the County created a defamatory impression of him
in connection with his termination by falsely writing in his termination letter that he
violated the County’s policy governing sexual harassment and by disseminating that
letter inside and outside his department. The County’s argument that this claim fails
because Eash “has conceded to his underlying conduct concerning his sexually
oriented text message exchange with C.H.” and instead merely challenges “the
County’s opinion” that the messages rise to the level of sexual harassment is
unavailing.3 The statement in Eash’s termination letter that he “violated” the
County’s employee discipline policy governing sexual harassment is not expressed
3 The sole case the County cites in support of this argument is distinguishable. In Ersek v. Township
of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1996), a golf professional that worked at a municipal golf
course was investigated by the police for discrepancies in his record keeping. After investigating
him for about one year, the police notified the Township Board of Commissioners (the “Board”)
of the results of the investigation, and the Board issued a statement falsely claiming that it had
been aware of the investigation from its outset. Id. The golf professional brought claims against
the Board for violations of his substantive due process rights and alleged that its statement hurt his
future job prospects. Id. at 82. After the district court dismissed the claims on summary judgment,
the golf professional appealed. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed because it found that the golf
professional could not show that the false statement made by the Board caused him any harm—
the Board’s false comment regarding its involvement in the investigation was no worse than a
truthful statement that the police were investigating him. Id. at 84-85. Put differently, a name
clearing hearing “could not be used to prove [the golf professional’s] innocence. He would still
have hanging over his head the cloud of a police investigation.” Id. at 85. In this case, the concerns
expressed by the Third Circuit are absent. While Eash does admit to engaging in conversations
with a colleague of a sexual nature, a hearing would nevertheless be capable of clearing his name
with respect to whether he sexually harassed that colleague in violation of County policy.
as an opinion, and its truth or falsity can be determined through the straightforward
task of applying Eash’s underlying conduct to the policy itself. (See infra § IV(d).)
The County also argues that Eash’s claim for deprivation of liberty interest
should be dismissed because it fails to allege a custom or policy necessary to impose
municipal liability under § 1983. To establish municipal liability pursuant to § 1983,
a plaintiff “must show that they were deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, and that the deprivation of those rights was
the result of an official government policy or custom.” Mulholland v. Gov't Cty. of
Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238 (3d Cir. 2013). “A policy is a decision of a
municipality's ‘duly constituted legislative body’ or of ‘officials whose acts may
fairly be said to be those of the municipality.’” B.S. v. Somerset Cty., 704 F.3d 250,
274 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997)).
In this case, Eash alleges that Bixler and Stroud made a recommendation to
the County Commissioners to terminate Eash on the basis of false information; that
the County Commissioners ratified that decision and its underlying bases as outlined
in Eash’s termination letter; that the County Commissioners publicly disseminated
the contents of the letter; and that the County Commissioners had final policymaking
authority with respect to Eash’s termination. This is sufficient to plead municipal
liability under § 1983, since the “policy or custom” requirement is met where the
official or body in question is responsible for making policy in the particular area of
municipal business, and where such authority is final and unreviewable. Hill, 455
F.3d at 245; B.S. v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d 250, 275 n. 36 (3d Cir.2013). Moreover,
the County’s argument that a plaintiff’s allegations of custom or policy are subject
to a heightened pleading requirement is based on outdated caselaw that has since
been abrogated. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004); Evancho v.
Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351-52 (3d Cir. 2005). The amended complaint thus
sufficiently alleges a deprivation of liberty interest claim against the County.
b. The amended complaint states a Fourth Amendment Claim.
i. Only Bixler is entitled to qualified immunity.
The Individual Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on
Eash’s Fourth Amendment claim. Under the defense of qualified immunity,
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This defense calls
for a two-step inquiry. First, the court must decide whether the plaintiff’s allegations
make out a violation of a statutory or constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001). Second, the court must determine whether the right was “clearly
established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. “[F]ederal courts are
‘permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of
the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Zaloga v. Borough of Moosic, 841 F.3d
170, 174 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
“To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”
Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 822 (2015). “That does not require a prior precedent
with indistinguishable facts, ‘but existing precedent must have placed the statutory
or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning, 905
F.3d 711, 719 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011)). “Existing precedent is sufficient to place a constitutional question beyond
debate and to defeat qualified immunity only if it is controlling authority in the
relevant jurisdiction, or if a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the
Court of Appeals has settled the question.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks
and brackets omitted).
At the outset, Bixler is entitled to qualified immunity on Eash’s Fourth
Amendment claim because the amended complaint makes clear that she was not
personally involved in searching Eash’s cell phone. Eash’s Fourth Amendment
claim as asserted against Bixler will therefore be dismissed with prejudice.
However, Rinker and Stroud have not shown that they are entitled to qualified
immunity at this time. Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is
presumptively unreasonable. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
Nevertheless, several exceptions exist, and the Supreme Court has held that “the
special needs of the workplace justify one such exception.” City of Ontario, Cal. v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760–61 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under this exception, where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, a public
employer’s search must in turn be reasonable. See Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia,
719 F.3d 295, 302–03 (3d Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court has held in a plurality
opinion that a non-criminal investigative search by a public employer is reasonable
if there is “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct,” and “the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of the nature of the misconduct.” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726
(1987); see City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 761 (2010).
Here, Eash alleges that Rinker and Stroud violated his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches by searching the contents of his
Facebook communications with C.H. using his personal cell phone. The Individual
Defendants do not contest that a search occurred when Rinker and Stroud reviewed
the contents of Eash’s Facebook communications with C.H, or that Eash had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in those messages. The central question is
therefore whether Rinker and Stroud had reasonable grounds for suspecting that a
search of those messages would turn up evidence of work-related misconduct—a
determination that cannot be made at this time.4 The amended complaint alleges that
C.H. approached human resources regarding her-off-the clock communications with
Eash. While the communications were of a sexual nature, the amended complaint
alleges that C.H. actively encouraged the conversations, that Eash was not a
supervisor to C.H., and that personal and sexual contacts are the norm among County
employees. Moreover, the nature of C.H.’s complaint to human resources and what
she told them is unclear. Accepting Eash’s allegations as true, the court cannot find
as a matter of law that Rinker and Stroud had a reasonable basis for believing that
the search would turn up evidence of workplace misconduct so as to fall within the
workplace search exception to the warrant requirement.5 The complaint thus states
a Fourth Amendment claim against Rinker and Stroud.
4 While it is true that questions of qualified immunity should be decided in the early stages of
litigation, the court simply does not have sufficient facts before it to conclusively determine
whether Rinker and Stroud’s actions violated Eash’s clearly established constitutional rights. See
Snyder v. Daugherty, 899 F. Supp. 2d 391, 405 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (“The Third Circuit and its district
courts have been wary of finding qualified immunity as a matter of law with respect to warrantless
searches.”).
5 While Eash’s termination letter attached to the complaint does indicate that Stroud and Rinker
may have had a reasonable basis for conducting the search, its language is (understandably)
couched in conclusory terms, and Eash’s complaint repeatedly alleges that the letter is false and
defamatory.
Moreover, Eash has a well-established Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches, conducted by his public employer, of his personal
electronic communications, and the Individual Defendants do not argue otherwise.
Rinker and Stroud are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity at this time.6
ii. The amended complaint sufficiently pleads liability by the
County.
Eash alleges that the County is liable for Rinker and Stroud’s alleged Fourth
Amendment violation based on its failure to train. In order to impose liability on the
County based on a failure to train theory, a plaintiff must show “deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom those employees will come into
contact” and a “causal nexus” between the failure to train and the plaintiff’s injury.
Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Carter v.
City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir.1999); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 391 (1989)). “To find deliberate indifference from a single-incident violation,
the risk of [the plaintiff’s] injury must be a ‘highly predictable consequence’” of the
failure to train. Id. at 225 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
51, 64 (2011)). “Liability in single-incident cases depends on ‘the likelihood that the
situation will recur and the predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to
6 For the avoidance of doubt, the court offers no opinion as to whether Eash is likely to prevail on
the merits of his Fourth Amendment claim.
handle that situation will violate citizens' rights.’” Thomas, 749 F.3d 217, 223–24
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409) (brackets omitted).
Here, Eash only generally alleges that Rinker’s and Stroud’s search of his
communications were attributable to the County’s failure to train its employees.
However, the complaint does allege that personal and sexual fraternization between
employees regularly occurs inside and outside the workplace, including allegations
that sex occurs inside the workplace (Doc. 6 ¶ 63); that sex, “sometimes in groups,”
has occurred between managers and subordinates at out-of-work functions (id. ¶ 67);
that female employees and supervisors “frequently communicate statements of a
sexual nature…during work hours (id. 69); that a supervisor uses Facebook to
“constantly” promote fraternization (id. ¶ 71); and that a local restaurant provides a
“customary place for fraternization and alcohol consumption” by employees (id. ¶
72). While these allegations obviously do nothing to show a pattern of Fourth
Amendment violations, they are sufficient to support a plausible inference that
Eash’s alleged Fourth Amendment injury was a highly predictable consequence of
the failure to train employees on privacy rights in the context of investigating
potential inappropriate communications between employees. See Thomas, 749 F.3d
at 225; Robinson v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 722 F. App'x 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2018).
Similarly, the purported frequency of employee communications of a personal
and sexual nature gives rise to a plausible inference that similar situations are likely
to recur, in turn supporting the County’s alleged deliberate indifference. Moreover,
the alleged deficiency in training human resources employees on the privacy rights
of employees is related to the ultimate injury—invading Eash’s privacy rights in his
personal communications. The complaint therefore adequately alleges a Fourth
Amendment claim against the County.
c. The Individual Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity
from Eash’s state law claims.
The Individual Defendants argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity.
Pennsylvania law exempts high public officials “from all civil suits for damages
arising out of false defamatory statements and even from statements or actions
motivated by malice, provided the statements are made or the actions are taken in
the course of the official's duties or powers.” Smith v. Borough of Dunmore, 633
F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Lindner v. Mollan, 544 Pa. 487, 677 A.2d
1194, 1195 (1996)). While absolute immunity serves the practical function of
protecting high public officials from the “expense, publicity, and danger of
defending the good faith of [their] actions before the jury,” it also serves the “deeper
purpose [of protecting] society's interest in the unfettered discharge of public
business and in full public knowledge of the facts and conduct of such business.”
Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100, 103 (Pa. 1958). In
an effort to balance societal interests in encouraging uninhibited participation by
public officials in public business against the possibility that an individual may
suffer irreparable harm due to the actions of a public official, courts have concluded
that only “high public officials” should be entitled absolute immunity. See Osiris
Enters. v. Borough of Whitehall, 877 A.2d 560, 566–67 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
“An official's status as a high public official for purposes of absolute immunity is
determined on a case-by case basis, and depends on the nature of his duties, the
importance of his office, and particularly whether. . . he has policy-making
functions.” Zugarek, 214 F.Supp.2d at 479.
Here, the Individual Defendants argue that they are entitled to absolute
immunity because the initial complaint alleged that they maintained “final
policymaking authority,” while the amended complaint omits and contradicts that
allegation by claiming that “county human resource departments do not make public
policy for a county.” This argument raises questions of judicial estoppel, which
requires “a finding of bad faith on the part of the party against whom the doctrine is
invoked.” Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 253
(3d Cir. 2010). On one hand, Eash’s amended allegation is clearly in tension with
the initial complaint and its primary basis does appear to be a desire to stave off
dismissal based on absolute immunity. On the other hand, neither allegation is
particularly informative—they both resemble legal conclusions to which the court
gives little weight—and it would be inequitable to dismiss the Individual Defendants
based on a single conclusory statement that has since been amended.
More importantly, applying absolute immunity here would extend the
doctrine too far. Regardless of the verbiage contained in the initial complaint, human
resource officers do not traditionally make policy in the vein of officials such as
council members, Smith v. Borough of Dunmore, 633 F.3d 176, 181–82 (3d Cir.
2011), school board members, Zugarek, 214 F.Supp.2d at 479, and mayors.
McKibben v. Schmotzer, 700 A.2d 484 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); see Ballas v. City of
Reading, 168 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (City director of human resources
was not entitled to absolute immunity where he discharged his “arguably
discretionary” duty to “determine the appropriate disciplinary measures for
employees” by applying “specific criteria that are outlined in the personnel code”).
There are no facts before the court to indicate that the Individual Defendants are any
exception. The Individual Defendants therefore do not have absolutely immunity
from Eash’s state law claims.
d. The amended complaint states a claim for intrusion upon seclusion.
The Individual Defendants move to dismiss Eash’s claim for intrusion upon
seclusion. To state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion under Pennsylvania law,
“plaintiffs must allege conduct demonstrating ‘an intentional intrusion upon the
seclusion of their private concerns which was substantial and highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and aver sufficient facts to establish that the information
disclosed would have caused mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities.’” Boring v. Google Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 278–79 (3d Cir.
2010) (quoting Pro Golf Mfg., Inc. v. Tribune Review Newspaper Co., 570 Pa. 242,
809 A.2d 243, 247 (2002)).
Here, Eash adequately alleges that Rinker and Stroud committed intrusion
upon seclusion by reviewing the contents of his Facebook communications with
C.H., which included photographs of Eash partially disrobed after a “fire-cupping
session” and him discussing his sexual preferences. While Eash’s privacy interests
in this context must be balanced against the County’s legitimate interest in
preserving harmony among its employees and preserving normal operations, Borse,
963 F.2d at 627, that determination is a fact question that cannot be made at this
stage based on the allegations before the court. (See § IV(a)(i))
The Individual Defendants’ argument that they could not have intruded upon
Eash’s seclusion because the amended complaint alleges that they already possessed
the conversations between Eash and C.H. is intuitively appealing. However, they
provide no authority in support their argument, and the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion is intended to remedy injury associated with the intrusion itself, not merely
those indirectly suffered as a result of the intrusion. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652B, cmt. b (1977) (“The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to
liability, even though there is no publication or other use of any kind of the
photograph or information outlined.”).
That said, if the Individual Defendants did actually already possess the
information they subsequently gleaned from searching Eash’s cell phone, that fact
might diminish the nature of the intrusion itself and support the Individual
Defendants argument that the invasion was justified. Such a determination is a fact
question that cannot be resolved at this stage. The amended complaint therefore
states an intrusion upon seclusion claim.
However, Eash’s intrusion upon seclusion claim as asserted against Bixler
fails because the amended complaint does not allege that Bixler took any action to
personally intrude upon his seclusion. Eash’s intrusion upon seclusion claim as
asserted against Bixler will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
e. The amended complaint states a claim for defamation.
The Individual Defendants also move to dismiss Eash’s defamation claim.
“To state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defamatory character
of the communication; (2) its publication by the defendant; (3) its application to the
plaintiff; (4) the understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning; (5) the
understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff; (6)
special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication; and (7) abuse of a
conditionally privileged occasion.” Byars v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 942 F. Supp.
2d 552, 563 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8343(a)). “Whether a
communication is capable of defamatory meaning is a ‘threshold issue’ to be
determined by the court.” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 434 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Kurowski v. Burroughs, 994 A.2d 611, 617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)). “The
statement must be examined in context to determine its likely effect on the reader,
and the Court should evaluate the effect it is likely to produce in the minds of the
average persons among whom it is intended to circulate.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Here, the amended complaint adequately asserts a claim for defamation
against Rinker and Bixler because it alleges that Eash’s termination letter was
written by Rinker and directed to be written by Bixler and falsely states that he
violated the County’s policy governing sexual harassment, and that the Defendants
disseminated the letter to persons inside and outside his department.7 As with Eash’s
deprivation of liberty interest claim, the Individual Defendants’ argument that they
cannot be liable for defamation because their statement “is merely an opinion as to
the underlying undisputed facts” is not persuasive. The statement that Eash
committed sexual harassment is not expressed as an opinion, and its truth or falsity
7 Eash’s allegation that the Defendants defamed him by asserting in his termination letter that he
committed theft is unpersuasive. The termination letter provides that Eash violated the County’s
policy governing “[t]heft or any form of dishonesty.” Read in the context of the surrounding
paragraphs, which make clear that dishonesty, and not theft, formed one of the bases for Eash’s
termination, it would be unreasonable to interpret the reference to the policy as a purported
statement of fact that Eash committed theft. See St. Surin v. Virgin Islands Daily News, Inc., 21
F.3d 1309, 1317 (3d Cir. 1994).
is readily capable of being determined by applying Eash’s underlying conduct to the
policy at issue. At least one other federal court has found the same:
[I]n the context of a sexual harassment policy violation, it is a relatively
straightforward process to compare evidence of a person's conduct to
conduct which is prohibited by objective policy guidelines. Therefore,
this Court finds that the alleged statements regarding Plaintiff's
violation of his employer's sexual harassment policy are statements
which could be reasonably construed as objectively verifiable. The
Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that these statements are non-
actionable.
Gerrard v. Garda, No. 08-CV-1146, 2009 WL 269028, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 30,
2009); see also Moore v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., No. 398-CV-2773L, 1999 WL
354235, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 1999).
The amended complaint therefore adequately states a claim for defamation
against Rinker and Bixler. Nevertheless, Eash’s defamation claim will be dismissed
without prejudice as to Stroud since he fails to allege that Stroud had any role in
drafting the termination letter.
f. The amended complaint states a claim for wrongful discharge.
The Individual Defendants also move to dismiss Eash’s claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. “In Pennsylvania, an employer may terminate
an employee without cause provided that ‘the dictates of public policy,’ contract, or
a statutory provision do not prohibit such termination.” Gillispie v. RegionalCare
Hosp. Partners Inc., 892 F.3d 585, 597 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Spierling v. First
Am. Home Health Servs., Inc., 737 A.2d 1250, 1253 (Pa. 1999)). A narrow exception
exists “only in the most limited of circumstances where the termination implicates a
clear mandate of public policy in this Commonwealth.” McLaughlin v.
Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 561 Pa. 307, 750 A.2d 283, 287 (2000). “[T]he
employee must point to a clear public policy articulated in the constitution, in
legislation, an administrative regulation, or a judicial decision.” Hunger v. Grand
Central Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173, 175 (Pa. Super. 1996). “Pennsylvania courts have
construed the public policy exception to at-will employment narrowly, lest the
exception swallow the general rule.” Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d
107, 111 (3d Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 20, 2004) (citation omitted).
Here, Eash alleges that the Individual Defendants committed wrongful
discharge because he was terminated in connection with the alleged unreasonable
search of his cell phone. In their motion, the Individual Defendants argue that an
employer cannot be liable for wrongful discharge based on an alleged violation of
invasion of privacy. However, while it is true that the public policy exception to the
at-will employment doctrine is narrowly construed, the Third Circuit and
Pennsylvania courts have not shut the door to wrongful discharge claims based on
underlying invasions of privacy. See Borse, 963 F.2d at 622 (“[W]e believe that
when an employee alleges that his or her discharge was related to an employer's
invasion of his or her privacy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would examine the
facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged invasion of privacy.”); Geary v. U.
S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974) (“It may be granted that there are areas of
an employee's life in which his employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into
one of these areas by virtue of the employer's power of discharge might plausibly
give rise to a cause of action, particularly where some recognized facet of public
policy is threatened.”).
The Western District of Pennsylvania case relied upon by the Individual
Defendants is distinguishable. In Rogers v. International Business Machines
Corporation, 500 F. Supp. 867, 870 (W.D. Pa. 1980), the Western District dismissed
invasion of privacy and wrongful discharge claims asserted by a plaintiff against his
former employer after he was terminated for poor work performance following an
investigation into his conduct. The court found—on summary judgment—that the
former employer’s investigation was “limited to interviews of full time employees
and an examination of company records” and that the former employer “acted
reasonably” in investigating and terminating the plaintiff. Id. at 869. In this case, by
contrast, Eash alleges that the investigation intruded his privacy by involving an
unjustifiable search of his personal communications, and that his ensuing
termination based on the information gleaned from that search was unjustifiable.
Moreover, the extent to which the Defendants acted reasonably in conducting an
investigation and terminating Eash is a fact question that cannot be answered based
on these pleadings. (See supra, § IV(b)(1).) Defendants thus have not met their
burden of showing that the amended complaint fails to state a wrongful discharge
claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
amended complaint will be granted insofar as the Court will (1) dismiss with
prejudice the Fourth Amendment claim as asserted against Bixler; (2) dismiss
without prejudice the defamation claim as asserted against Stroud; and (3) dismiss
without prejudice the invasion of privacy claim as asserted against Bixler.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge
Dated: March 30, 2020