Rivers v. Mahally

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TYREEM M. RIVERS, Civil No. 3:16-cv-2092

Plaintiff . (Judge Mariani)

v .

SUPERINTENDENT LAWRENCE □

MAHALLY, ef al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Tyreem Rivers (“Rivers”), an inmate currently confined at the State

Correctional Institution, Dallas, Pennsylvania (“SClI-Dallas’), initiated this action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Named as Defendants are Superintendent Lawrence Mahally,

Deputy Superintendent Joseph Zakaraukas, Safety Manager Eric Sowga, Shift Commander

Stanley Pohlidal, and Correctional Officer Jose Correa. (/d. at pp. 1-2). Presently pending

before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 64). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the

motion.

l. Allegations of the Complaint

On October 16, 2014, between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m., there was a fire at SCI-

Dallas. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Rivers alleges that he awoke to the sound of a firm alarm and

flashing lights. (/d. at p. 3). A block officer removed Rivers from his cell and placed him in

the dayroom with approximately two hundred (200) other inmates until the fire was under

control. (/d.). Rivers claims this action violated the prison’s fire evacuation plan and safety

policy posted in the housing unit. (/d.). Rivers claims that he inhaled “toxic smoke and

fumes” as a result of the block officer’s actions. (Id.). As a result of the smoke inhalation,

Rivers, an asthmatic, alleges that he suffered from pain, dizziness, migraines, difficulty

breathing, and irritation of the throat, eyes, nose, and chest. (/d.). He states that he was

treated by the medical department and received several medications to treat his alleged

injuries. (/d.).

Rivers alleges that Defendant Zakaraukas arrived at the scene and was

“negligent/liable in failing to follow a proper evacuation plan and/or for ordering that this

Plaintiff... be locked in the day room{] while the fire took place and sought to be placed

under control.” (/d.). He alleges that Defendant Sowga “failed to insure that the B-Block

Housing Unit was expected, safe, and free from a unreasonable fire incident, and/or

liable/negligent for not enforcing a proper plan which would have prevented this Plaintiff

from being injured etc.” (/d.) (sic). He further alleges that Defendant Mahaily was “negligent

and/or liable in this matter due to his failure to ‘enforce’ a proper fire evacuation plan in

consideration of the general safety and welfare of this Plaintiff here at SCI Dallas,” and “due

to ‘his failure’ to properly train each of the above stated Defendants in following the proper

fire evacuation plan.” (/d. at p. 4).

On October 21, 2014, Rivers filed a grievance pertaining to the fire on October 16,

2014, designated as Grievance Number 533613. (/d. at p. 7). On November 6, 2014,

Safety Manager Sowga denied the grievance on initial review. (/d. at p. 13). Rivers filed an

appeal to the Facility Manager. (/d. at p. 14). On November 28, 2014, Facility Manager

Mahally upheld the response of Safety Manager Sowga. (/d. at p. 14). Rivers then filed an

appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). (/d. at p.

16). On January 27, 2015, the Chief Grievance Officer upheld the decisions of Safety

Manager Sowga and Facility Manager Mahally. (/d. at p. 17).

In the complaint, Rivers alleges that Defendants acted negligently and thereby

violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1). Rivers seeks declaratory relief,

compensatory and punitive damages, and costs. (/d. at pp. 8-9).

ll. Statement of Undisputed Facts

DC-ADM 15.1.1 Section 2D states that “[t]he facility will have a written fire plan that

plans for protection of all persons in the event of a fire and/or an evacuation to an area of

refuge. Facility fire plans will include, but are not limited to, the following: a. internal and

external fire notification procedures; b. fire evacuation procedures; c. key control/remote-

unlocking procedures; Fire Emergency Response Team (FERT) deployment procedures; e.

detailed floor plans identifying primary and secondary routes of egress in relation to

location; and f. available types of fire detection, notification and suppressions systems.”

(Doc. 66, Statement of Material Facts, J 8; Doc. 77, Counterstatement of Material Facts,

8). Defendants contend that DC-ADM 15.1.1, Section 2D does not require full, outdoor

evacuation in the event of every fire or emergency. (Doc. 66 7 9). Rivers asserts that DC-

ADM 15.1.1 does not specifically state that an outdoor evacuation is not required in the

event of a fire. (Doc. 77 § 9).

Every individual housing unit at SCl-Dallas including B-Block, has an Emergency

Evacuation Plan visually posted that instructs all staff and inmates to exit through primary

and secondary emergency exits that lead to outdoor safety in the event of an actual fire.

(Doc. 66 J 10; Doc. 77 § 10). The parties dispute when a full evacuation outdoors is

required. (Doc. 66 J 10; Doc. 77 Ff 10-16, 35-36).

Defendants assert that every staff member employed at SCI-Dallas properly receives

emergency training to handle themselves and the lives of inmates in all potential emergency

situations, including fires. (Doc. 66 11).

Defendants contend that routine fire drills are conducted once per quarter in

accordance with policy and all drills are reported on the standard Fire Drill Report Form.

(Doc. 66 ff 12, 13). Defendants further contend that drills include evacuation of all staff

and inmates, except when there is clear and convincing evidence that security may be

jeopardized. (/d. at 14). When security is in question, actual evacuation during drills is

not required. (/d.).

Defendants aver that the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) operates under a

“defend in place” policy, and evacuation does not always mean moving the inmates

outdoors. (Doc. 66 fff] 15, 16).

Fire drills are not held in the middle of the night. (Doc. 66 | 17; Doc. 77 17). For

safety and security reasons, the fire drill procedures are only reviewed with staff on the

overnight, 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift. (Doc. 66 {| 18).

On October 16, 2014, Rivers was housed at SCI-Dallas on the B-Block Housing Unit

in cell 72, top tier. (Doc. 66 J 19; Doc. 77 J 19). At that time, B-Block held approximately

two hundred (200) inmates. (/d. at J 20).

On October 15, 2014 at approximately 10:25 p.m., SCl-Dallas experienced a power

outage affecting half of the institution, and the facility was operating at half-power. (Doc. 66

q 21; Doc. 77 J 21). Maintenance staff and Defendant Deputy Zakarauskas were notified of

the situation. (Doc. 77 § 21).

On October 16, 2014 at approximately 1:15 a.m., Facility Maintenance Manager

Mooney reported that a transformer was on fire under B-A Block and the Fire Emergency

Response Team was activated. (Doc. 66 J 22; Doc. 77 J 22). On October 16, 2014 at

approximately 1:16 a.m., the Emergency Plan was activated as per Captain Stanley

Pohlidal. (/d. at ] 23). On October 16, 2014 at approximately 1:18 a.m., inmates were

evacuated from the immediate area of concern to the dayroom. (Id. at J 24).

On October 16, 2014 at approximately 1:20 a.m., the Fire Emergency Response

Team entered the area of the fire. (Doc. 66 | 25; Doc. 77 ff 24, 25).

On October 16, 2014 at approximately 1:45 a.m., exhaust fans were placed on B-A

Block. (Doc. 66 ¥] 27; Doc. 77 ¥ 27).

On October 16, 2014 at approximately 1:50 a.m., Superintendent Lawrence Mahally

was notified of the incident. (/d. at J 28).

On October 16, 2014 at approximately 2:00 a.m., the fire was reported extinguished

by utilizing fire extinguishers. (Doc. 66 {| 26; Doc. 77 {| 26).

On October 16, 2014 at approximately 2:20 a.m., inmates affected by the smoke

were escorted to the infirmary for medical assessment. (/d. at J 29).

After the smoke cleared from the housing unit, inmates were escorted from the

dayroom back to their cells. (/d. at J 30).

On October 16, 2014 at approximately 2:59 a.m., Kim Lux, RN reported to B-A Block

to address any medical issues with inmates. (/d. at J 31).

On October 16, 2014 at approximately 3:02 a.m., a notification was made that the

institution was operating under a limited state of emergency. (/d. at J 32).

On October 16, 2014 at approximately 3:15 a.m., water containers with drinking

water were delivered to A-A, A-B, and B-A Blocks to be distributed to inmates. (Id. at J 33).

On October 16, 2014 at approximately 3:15 p.m., SCl-Dallas was returned to normal

operations. (/d. at J 34).

Defendants contend that with respect to the October 16, 2014 incident, a full

evacuation was not required because it was a small fire in an unoccupied electrical vault in

the basement of the housing unit. (Doc. 66 J 35). Defendants state that the fire plan was

followed and did not require full evacuation outside due to security reasons, and that the

safety and security of the inmates was a priority at all times during the response to this fire.

(Doc. 66 Ff 36, 37).

On October 17, 2014 at approximately 2:15 a.m., Rivers reported to medical with

complaints of nausea and vomiting as a result of recent smoke inhalation. (Doc. 66 {[ 38;

Doc. 77 J 38). Rivers was evaluated, treated, and released by Kim Lux, RN. (/d.). Rivers

was again treated on October 17, 2014 for a lung assessment and was prescribed

medication. (/d. at J 39). Rivers suffers from chronic asthma and uses an albuterol inhaler

when he has trouble breathing. (/d. at J] 40, 41). He carries the albuterol inhaler with him.

(Id, at ] 42). He usually gets sick two times per year when the weather changes. (/d. □□

41). After the fire, Rivers had to use his albuterol inhaler more frequently, approximately

two (2) puffs, twice a day. (/d. at J 43).

On October 20, 2014, Rivers received follow-up care regarding smoke inhalation.

(Doc. 66 J 44; Doc. 77 44). It was noted that his condition improved, but he reported

having lingering headaches. (/d.). Rivers was prescribed Tylenol for twelve (12) days for

headaches and Q-Tussin cough syrup for six (6) days for chest congestion. (/d. at J] 45).

On October 21, 2014, Rivers filed a grievance with Facility Grievance Coordinator

Robin Lucas seeking no less than ten (10) million dollars for physical and mental suffering

as aresult of the October 16, 2014 fire incident. (/d. at ] 46). The grievance was assigned

number 533613. (/d. at 9 47). Grievance number 533613 claimed that all staff members

failed to follow the proper fire evacuation rules causing Rivers to be subjected to smoke

inhalation. (Id. at J 48).

On November 6, 2014, Defendant Sowga denied Grievance number 533613, stating

that the DOC operates on a “defend in place” strategy, but that evacuation of inmates from

their cells was determined to be the best action and, therefore, inmates in the affected area

were placed in the dayroom. (/d. at ] 49). The response to Grievance number 533613

states that “[a]t no time were you or your wellbeing put into a dangerous situation by being

put into the dayroom” and if “the situation had gotten worse the entire block would have

been evacuated.” (/d. at ] 50). The response to Grievance number 33613 also states that

10-30-14 [Defendant Sowga] went to medical to ensure you received the proper

medical care, which you did.” (/d. at J 51).

On November 7, 2014, Rivers filed an appeal to the Facility Manager. (/d. at J 52).

On November 18, 2014, Defendant Mahally denied the appeal, noting that the initial

response contained detailed information regarding the matter. (/d. at J] 53).

On November 28, 2014, Rivers filed an appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate

Grievances and Appeals. (/d. at 954). On January 27, 2015, the Chief Grievance Officer

for DOC denied Rivers’ final appeal, stating that a complete evaluation was done regarding

the incident and that “placing inmates into the dayroom was substantial. Had the situation

worsened, the inmates would have been evacuated to another location.” (/d. at 55). The

response further stated there was “no evidence provided that housing rules were violated.

The Inmate Handbook addresses the procedure to be followed during a fire drill. This was

an actual event that staff handled appropriately.” (/d. at {| 56).

lll. Legal Standard

Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not

present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “As to

materiality, . . . [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence

of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106

S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving

party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a

genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat’! Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).

Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of

the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the

assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or showing that the

materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an

adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c)(1)(A)-(B). In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, “[t]he court

need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”

FED. R. ClV. P. 56(c)(3). “Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then

the non-movant's must be taken as true.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974

F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912 (1993).

However, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). If a party has carried its burden under the

summary judgment rule,

its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine

issue for trial. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between

the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of

material fact. When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe

it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a

motion for summary judgment.

Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).

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IV. Discussion

A. — Eighth Amendment Claim

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when: (1) the prisoner suffers an

objectively, sufficiently serious deprivation; and (2) the prison official acts with deliberate

indifference to the prisoner's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994): Fortune v. Hamberger, 379 F. App’x 116, 122 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating, “an inmate [is

required] to show that ‘he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm,’ and that prison officials demonstrated a ‘deliberate indifference’ to his health

or safety”). Under the first element, a “prison official’s act or omission must result in the

denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To

establish deliberate indifference under the second element, the prison official must: (1)

know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; (2) be aware of facts

from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and

(3) draw the inference. /d. at 837. Negligence is not the same as wanton or deliberate

indifference, and will not support a § 1983 claim. /d. at 835.

Rivers asserts that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety because an

outdoor evacuation did not occur during the fire at SCl-Dallas on October 16, 2014. DC-

ADM 15.1.1 Section 2D, Facility Fire Plans, states as follows:

The facility will have a written fire plan that plans for protection of all persons

in the event of a fire and/or an evacuation to an area of refuge. Facility fire

plans will include, but are not limited to, the following:

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a. internal and external fire notification procedures;

b. fire evacuation procedures;

c. key control/remote-unlocking procedures;

d. Fire Emergency Response Team (FERT) deployment

procedures;

e. detailed floor plans identifying primary and secondary

routes of egress in relation to location; and

f. available types of fire detection, notification and

suppressions systems.

(DC-ADM 15.1.1 Section 2D). There is no language in DC-ADM 15.1.1, Section 2D that

requires a full, outdoor evacuation in the event of every fire.

The SCl-Dallas facility Emergency Evacuation Plan states as follows:

When an alarm sounds or notice is given, ALL persons will evacuate the

building in an orderly manner. Evacuation shall be through the “Primary Exit”

unless otherwise instructed to use the “Secondary Exit”. All persons shall

assemble at least 50 feet from the building.

(Doc. 76, p. 2). This plan is visually posted on the housing blocks. Although this plan

instructs all persons to exit through primary and secondary exits that lead to outdoor safety

in the event of a fire, Defendants have submitted evidence that evacuation does not always

mean moving the inmates outdoors and that the DOC uses a “defend in place’ strategy.

(Doc. 66-3, p. 10). Defendant Safety Manager Sowga indicated that the “defend in place”

policy is followed when a full evacuation is not required. (/d.). However, in this instance,

evacuation of the inmates from their cells was determined to be the best course of action.

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The undisputed evidence establishes that prison officials made the decision to keep the

inmates indoors due to the time of day, the location of the fire away from any real threat to

the inmates, and the small size of the fire. (Doc. 66 ff] 35, 36, 49, 50). Defendants did not

believe the inmates were in danger in the dayroom, and they were immediately evacuated

from the area of the fire to a safe, secure area. (/d. at Jf] 37, 50, 56). This alternate

strategy of evacuating inmates to an indoor, secure area is reasonable when circumstances

make evacuation outdoors impractical.

The record reflects that prison officials provided a swift response to the incident on

October 16 and 17, 2014. The Fire Response Team responded to the fire immediately and

began extinguishing the fire. (Doc. 66-5, p. 12; Doc. 76, p. 23). The fire was contained in a

small area in an electrical vault underneath B-Block, away from inmates. (Doc. 66-5, p. 39).

Because there was smoke on B-Block, the inmates were evacuated from their cells to the

dayroom. (Doc. 66-5, p. 12; Doc. 76, p. 23). This evacuation occurred within three (3)

minutes of the fire. (/d.). Once the inmates were in the dayroom, exhaust fans were placed

on the block and inmates were immediately escorted to the medical department. (Doc. 66-

5, pp. 12-13; Doc. 76, pp. 23-24). After the fire was extinguished and the smoke was

cleared from the housing unit, the inmates were placed back in their cells, and water was

provided to them. (Doc. 66-5, pp. 13, 21; Doc. 76, p. 24).

The record reflects that Rivers was treated by medical twice on October 17, 2014.

(Doc. 66-5, pp. 128-31). He was first treated at approximately 2:15 a.m. for complaints of

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nausea and vomiting. (/d.). Later that day, medical performed a lung assessment,

prescribed medication, and Rivers continued to use his albuterol inhaler. (/d.). On October

20, 2014, Rivers received follow-up medical care. (/d.). At this visit, it was noted that his

condition improved, but he suffered from headaches and a cough. (/d.). Therefore, Rivers

was prescribed Tylenol and cough syrup. (/d.).

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants did not act with deliberate

indifference when responding to the fire. Under the circumstances, Defendants took the

most secure path to move the inmates to safety without evacuating them outside. A party

opposing summary judgment must come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond the

allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331

F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). This evidence must be

adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party on the

claims. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). Rivers has failed to

meet his burden with respect to his deliberate indifference claim and summary judgment will

be entered in favor of Defendants on this claim.

B. Claims of Alleged Violation of Prison Policy

Rivers asserts liability based on Defendants’ violation of prison policies, procedures

and rules. Specifically, Rivers asserts that Defendants violated prison policy by failing to

fully evacuate the inmates outside pursuant to the “proper fire evacuation plan.” (Doc. 1, p.

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3). However, a violation of an internal prison policy does not automatically rise to the level

of a constitutional violation. “[A] prison policy manual does not have the force of law and

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F.Supp.2d 532,

556, n. 24 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 154

(3d Cir. 2004)). The Third Circuit has clearly stated that “agency interpretive guidelines ‘do

not rise to the level of a regulation and do not have the effect of law.” Mercy Catholic Med.

Ctr., 380 F.3d at 155 (citation omitted). Consequently, Defendants cannot be liable simply

for violating a prison policy and their motion will be granted as to this claim. See Estrella v.

Hogsten, 2007 WL 2065879 (M.D. Pa. July 16, 2007) (holding that mere failure of prison

officials to follow their own regulations alone is not a constitutional violation).

C. Negligence Claim

Rivers also asserts that Defendants were negligent in placing inmates in the

dayroom instead of evacuating them outside. Defendants contend that they are immune

from liability with respect to this state law claim of negligence. (Doc. 65, pp. 16-17). State

prison Officials are immune from suit for those actions within the scope of their duties,

except in instances in which the immunity has been specifically waived. See 1 PA. CONS.

STAT. ANN. § 2310. Rivers’ claims do not fall under any one of the nine listed categories for

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which immunity has been waived by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.t See 42 PA.

CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b). As such, Defendants are entitled to immunity on the state law

negligence claim and the Court will enter judgment in favor of Defendants on the negligence

claim.

D. Official Capacity Claims

Defendants argue that any claims seeking monetary damages against them in their

official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Doc. 65, pp. 22-23). Personal

capacity suits under section 1983 seek to recover money from a government official, as an

individual, for acts performed under color of state law. Official capacity suits, in contrast,

generally represent an action against an entity of which the government official is an agent.

Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1988); see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). When suits are brought against state officials in their official

capacities, those lawsuits are treated as suits against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,

25 (1991). However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, established by the Eleventh

Amendment, protects states, such as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, from suits by

citizens. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01, 117 (1984);

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122, 134 L.Ed.2d 252, 265

~The nine categories for which sovereign immunity will not apply are: (1) vehicles in the

possession or control of a Commonwealth party; (2) acts of health care employees of Commonwealth

agency medical facilities or institutions; (3) the care, custody, or control of personal property; (4) a

dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate and sidewalks; (5) dangerous conditions of

highways created by potholes or sinkholes; (6) the care, custody, or control of animals; (7) liquor store

sales; (8) National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines. See 42 Pa. Cons. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b).

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(1996); Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2000). That immunity runs to

State officials if they are sued in their official capacity and the state is the real party upon

which liability is to be imposed. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974).

Congress has not abrogated the immunity regarding Rivers’ claims, nor has Pennsylvania

waived this grant of immunity. See 42 PA. STAT. ANN. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8521(b).

Hence, Rivers’ claims for money damages against the Defendants in their official capacities

are barred by sovereign immunity. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249,

204 (3d Cir. 2010).

E. Qualified Immunity

Even if Rivers had stated a colorable constitutional claim, Defendants are

nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity from this claim for damages. In order to establish

a civil rights claim, Rivers must show the deprivation of a right secured by the United States

Constitution or the laws of the United States. However, government officials performing

“discretionary functions,” are insulated from suit if their conduct did not violate a “clearly

established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Qualified immunity

17

balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they

exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction,

and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. It

“provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “Thus, so long as an official

reasonably believes that his conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield

that official from liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244). Although qualified immunity is generally a question of law that

should be considered at the earliest possible stage of proceedings, a genuine dispute of

material fact may preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity. Giles v. Kearney, 571

F.3d 318, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2009).

A qualified immunity determination involves a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether a

constitutional or federal right has been violated; and (2) whether that right was “clearly

established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555

U.S. at 236 (permitting federal courts to exercise discretion in deciding which of the two

Saucier prongs should be addressed first). As stated, the Court finds that Rivers failed to

establish the violation of a constitutional right. Defendants simply could not have

recognized that their action of evacuating inmates to a secure, indoor location would violate

a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would

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have known.” Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. Therefore, Defendants are protected from liability

by qualified immunity.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion (Doc. 64) and enter

summary judgment in their favor. A separate Order shall issue.

Dated: February / Y 20 SAU samt

obert D. Mariani

United States District Judge

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