Brown v. Martin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RUBIN BROWN, :

Plaintiff, No. 3:19-cv-01087

v. (Saporito, M.J.)

LEA MARTIN and LAWRENCE :

MAHALLY, :

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

This is a pro se prisoner civil rights action. At the time of the

alleged injury the plaintiff, Rubin Brown, was incarcerated at the State

Correctional Institution at Dallas (SCI-Dallas) which is located in

Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. The parties have consented to the

jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge under

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. (Doc. 7).

Brown initiated this action on May 20, 2019, by filing a complaint

in the Court of Common pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, which

was removed to this court on June 25, 2019.1 In the complaint, Brown

alleged that he brought this suit under Pennsylvania’s Medical Care

Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, 40 P.S. § 1303.503, “to

redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by the

Constitution of Pennsylvania and the United States.” (Doc. 1-1 4 1.)?

Brown named two defendants: Lawrence Mahally, a former

superintendent at SClI-Dallas, and Leah Martin, the health care

administrator at SCI-Dallas. The complaint alleges that on August 10,

2018, Brown sustained an injury to his right foot while playing basketball

and, despite his request for a “sick-call” on the date of the injury, three

days later, while at the “sick-call,” he did not receive any medical

treatment. (Ud. J{ 8-9.) In the complaint, he alleged that his Eighth

Amendment rights under the Constitution were violated. Ud. 9424, 26-

underlying state action is Brown v. Mahally, Docket No. 2019-05766

(Luzerne Cty. (Pa.) C.C.P. filed May 20, 2019).

* Based on his repeated references to the Eighth Amendment, we have

construed Brown’s complaint as a federal civil rights action. Mala v.

Crown Bay Marina, 704 F.3d 239, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing a

court’s obligation to liberally construe pro se pleadings and other

submissions, particularly when dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants).

The cited Pennsylvania statute pertains to medical professional liability,

but neither of the named defendants is alleged to be a licensed medical

professional.

27, 31.)

Pending before us is the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 8.) For the reasons

set forth herein, we will grant the motion.

I. Statement of Facts

Brown is an inmate at SCI-Dallas. He alleged that he received a

right foot injury while playing basketball on August 10, 2018. (Doc. 1-1

4 8.) Upon returning to his housing unit, he submitted a “sick-call”

request form. (/d.) Three days later, he was called for the sick-call where

he alleged that he received “absolutely no medical treatment.” (Ud. § 9.)

On August 16, 2018, he returned to the medical department for an x-ray

of his foot. Ud. { 10.) An unidentified non-party physician assistant (the

“PA”) told him the x-ray showed structural damage to his foot and

suggested that he should be seen by a foot specialist. The PA wrapped

his foot with an ace bandage, gave him crutches, and advised him to stay-

off his foot. (d.)

On September 7, 2018, the medical department replaced his

crutches with an “ill-fitting” walking boot. (Ud. § 11.) Despite his

complaints to the contrary, an unidentified non-party nurse took his

crutches from him. (Ud.) On September 24, 2018, it is alleged that

another set of x-rays confirmed that the structural damage to his foot

worsened. (/d. { 12.) He was informed he would be seen by a foot

specialist and he was denied the use of crutches. (/d.)

On October 2, 2018, Brown was seen by an unidentified non-party

foot specialist who allegedly informed him that the injury had worsened,

requiring further medical treatment. (Ud. 13-15.) He further alleged

that the foot specialist informed him that the medical staff committed

“gross negligence” by forcing him to wear a walking boot while his foot

remained broken. (Id. § 15.)

Thereafter, Brown filed a grievance. On October 25, 2018, the

grievance was denied by defendant Martin, the health care administrator

responsible for the administration of prompt, proper, and adequate

health care services to all inmates and to confirm that all staff are

properly trained and possessed with medical knowledge and skill. (Doc.

1-1 □□ 5,17.) After appealing this decision, facility manager, defendant

Mahally, a former superintendent of SCI-Dallas, upheld the denial of

Brown’s inmate appeal on December 3, 2018. Ud. 4, 18-19.)

The defendants have moved to dismiss this action for failure to

state a claim. (Doc. 8). The matter is fully briefed and ripe for a decision.

(Doc. 9; Doc. 10; Doc. 18; Doc. 19.)

IT. Legal Standards

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a

defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a

motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded

allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiffs claims lack facial

plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc, 643 F.3d 77, 84 (8d Cir.

2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56

(2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged

on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial

notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322

(2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the

complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions

and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (8d Cir. 2013) (quoting

Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Nor is it required

to credit factual allegations contradicted by indisputably authentic

documents on which the complaint relies or matters of public record of

which we may take judicial notice. In re Washington Mut. Inc., 741 Fed.

Appx 88, 91 n.3 (8d Cir. Sept. 25, 2018); Sourovelis v. City of

Philadelphia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1075 (E.D. Pa. 2017); Banks v. Cty.

of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 588-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008).

I, Discussion

In his complaint, Brown alleged that the defendants violated his

constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution. The crux of Brown’s complaint is that he

did not receive timely or proper medical care to treat his right ankle for

an injury during a basketball game at SCI-Dallas. Neither defendant is

alleged to have been involved with Brown’s medical treatment. The

defendants now move for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

A. Section 1983 / Eighth Amendment Claim

Pro se litigants’ “pleadings, like the plaintiffs, are held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In interpreting the pleadings of pro

se litigants, the Third Circuit has held that courts “have a special

obligation to construe [the] complaint liberally.” Higgs v. Attorney Gen.,

655 F.3d 333, 339 (8d Cir. 2011). Thus, we have construed the complaint

as stating that the plaintiff has asserted a federal civil rights claim

against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a

private cause of action with respect to the violation of federal

constitutional rights. The statute provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress... .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but

instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere. City of

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To establish a § 1983

claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant, acting under color of

state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States

Constitution. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1187, 1141 (8d Cir.

1995). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a civil rights

complaint must state the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible

for the alleged civil rights violations. Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347,

353 (3d Ci. 2005).

It is well established that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action

‘must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable,’ and

‘cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she

neither participated in nor approved.’ ” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d

187, 210 (8d Cir. 2007) (nternal citations omitted). “Personal

involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of

actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual

knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate

particularity.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (8d Cir. 1988).

An allegation seeking to impose liability on a defendant based on

supervisory status, without more, will not subject the official to § 1983

liability. Padilla v. Beard, No. CIV. 1:CV-06-0478, 2006 WL 1410079, at

*3 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2006); see also Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.

Here, the only conduct alleged with respect to the two named

defendants, Martin and Mahally, is their denial of the plaintiffs

grievance and grievance appeal. The filing of a grievance is not sufficient

to show the actual knowledge required for personal involvement.

Moreover, participation in the after-the-fact review of a grievance is not

enough to establish personal involvement. See Pressley v. Beard, 266

Fed. Appx 216, 218 (8d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“The District Court

properly dismissed these [supervisory] defendants and any additional

defendants who were sued based on their failure to take corrective action

when grievances or investigations were referred to them.”); Brooks v.

Beard, 167 Fed. App’x 923, 925 (8d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that

allegations that prison officials and administrators responded

inappropriately to inmate’s later-filed grievances do not establish the

involvement of those officials and administrators in the underlying

deprivation); Ramos v. Pa. Dep’*t of Corr., No. CIV. 4:CVB06B1444, 2006

WL 2129148, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2006) (“[C]ontentions that certain

correctional officials violated an inmate’s constitutional rights by failing

to follow proper procedure or take corrective action following his

submission of an institutional grievance are generally without merit.”);

Wilson v. Horn, 971 F. Supp. 948, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd, 142 F.3d 430

(3d Cir. 1998) (noting that prison officials’ failure to respond to inmate’s

grievance does not state a constitutional claim).

Accordingly, we find that Brown has failed to plausibly allege

personal involvement by either defendant, and thus we will grant the

motion to dismiss.

B. Leave to Amend

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is

vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court

must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be

inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108

(8d Cir. 2002).

Here, it is clear from the facts alleged in the pro se complaint that

any attempt to amend the plaintiffs §1983 claims against these

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defendants would be futile. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d

Cir. 2004). Therefore, we will dismiss the plaintiff's §1983 claims without

leave to amend.

C. State Law Claims

In addition to his federal civil rights claims, the complaint may be

liberally construed to assert a state-law claim of ordinary negligence

against Martin and Mahally. But where a district court has dismissed

all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the Court may decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). Whether the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction is

within its discretion. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (8d Cir. 2009).

That decision should be based on “the values of judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484

U.S. 348, 350 (1988). Ordinarily, when all federal law claims have been

dismissed and only state-law claims remain, the balance of these factors

indicates that these remaining claims properly belong in state court.

at 350. Finding nothing in the record to distinguish this case from

the ordinary one, the balance of factors in this case “points[s] toward

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declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”

See id. at 350 n.7. Therefore, Brown’s state-law ordinary negligence

claims will be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne

County, Pennsylvania, for further proceedings on the surviving state-law

claims. See id. at 357.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss (Doc. 8) shall be granted, the plaintiff's §1983 claims shall be

dismissed, and the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims shall be

remanded to state court.

An appropriate Order follows.

Jose F ros IX

OSEPH F. SAP@RITO, JR.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated: January 27, 2020

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