explaining that court should in some manner review recommendations regardless of whether objections were filed
How later courts described this case
- explaining that court should in some manner review recommendations regardless of whether objections were filed
- noting that district courts need not conduct de novo review of portions of recommendation to which no party files specific objections
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BOBBIE L. BROWN, No. 4:17-CV-01342
Petitioner, (Judge Brann)
v. (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
JOHN WETZEL and
PA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents.
ORDER
NOVEMBER 25, 2019
Bobbi L. Brown, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, filed an amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 petition seeking to vacate his convictions and sentence.1 In his amended
petition, Brown asserts that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach a
witness using evidence of a prior conviction and (2) the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury regarding reasonable doubt and the burden of proof for self-
defense.2
In May 2019, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson issued a Report and
Recommendation recommending that this Court deny the petition.3 First, Magistrate
Judge Carlson recommends that Brown’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
related to the failure to impeach a witness is without merit, as the state court’s
1 Doc. 17.
2 Id. at 31-46.
determination that Brown had suffered no prejudice from that failure was not an
unreasonable application of federal law and did not involve an unreasonable
determination of the facts.4 Second, Magistrate Judge Carlson reasons that the trial
court’s jury instructions as a whole adequately apprised the jury of the relevant legal
standards regarding reasonable doubt and self-defense, and therefore any claim
related to the instructions is without merit. Because that claim is without merit,
Magistrate Judge Carlson concludes that Brown’s procedural default may not be
excused.5
After receiving an extension of time from the Court, Brown filed timely
objections to the Report and Recommendation.6 Brown does not object to
Magistrate Judge Carlson’s conclusion that the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim fails.7 Brown contends, however, that the jury instructions were confusing
and inconsistent, such that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the
instructions in an unconstitutional manner.8 Brown also contends that, should his
claim be rejected, he is at least entitled to the issuance of a certificate of
appealability.9
4 Id. at 20-24.
5 Id. at 24-32.
6 Doc. 27.
7 Id. at 6 n.3.
8 Id. at 6-13.
Where no objection is made to a report and recommendation, this Court will
review the recommendation only for clear error.10 Conversely, “[i]f a party objects
timely to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court must
‘make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.’”11 Regardless of whether
timely objections are made, district courts may accept, reject, or modify—in whole
or in part—the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations.12 Because Brown
does not object to the recommended disposition of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, that recommendation is reviewed for clear error only, while the
recommendation related to the trial court’s jury instructions is subject to de novo
review.13
After reviewing the record, the Court finds no clear error in Magistrate Judge
Carlson’s conclusion that Brown’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without
merit. Additionally, although the trial court’s jury instructions were not perfect, the
Court concludes that the instructions “[t]aken as a whole”14 correctly informed the
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878
(3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that court should in some manner review recommendations
regardless of whether objections were filed).
11 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).
12 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31.
13 See Snyder v. Bender, 548 F. App’x 767, 771 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that district courts need
not conduct de novo review of portions of recommendation to which no party files specific
objections).
14 Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 118 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6
jury of the relevant legal standards. With regard to the reasonable doubt instruction,
although the trial court’s use of the term “‘restrain from acting’ formulation
lessen[ed] the prosecution’s burden of proof,”15 the instruction as a whole was
constitutionally adequate, particularly as the court twice explained that reasonable
doubt is “an actual and real doubt that you have from the evidence or lack of
evidence that was presented to you.”16 Because Brown’s claim is without merit, his
procedure default of that claim may not be excused. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:
1. Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson’s Report and Recommendation
(Doc. 23) is ADOPTED;
2. Brown’s amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition (Doc. 17) is DENIED;
3. The Court declines to issue certificate of appealability;17 and
4. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge
15 Id. at 119.
16 See Doc. 4-2 at 236-38. The Court recognizes the somewhat muddled language used by the
trial court in defining what reasonable doubt is not (id. at 237-38), that language is insufficient
to render the definition of reasonable doubt unconstitutional. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d
at 119-20; Rush v. Beard, No. CV 08-4843, 2018 WL 3640599, at *32 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018);
Judge v. Beard, No. 02-CV-6798, 2012 WL 5960643, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2012).