Stockton v. Wetzel

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONALD STOCKTON, :

:

Plaintiff :

: CIVIL NO. 1:16-CV-0613

v. :

: (Judge Caputo)

JOHN WETZEL, et al., :

:

Defendants :

M E M O R A N D U M

Plaintiff, Ronald Stockton, an inmate formerly housed at the Smithfield State

Correctional Institution (SCI-Smithfield) in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, filed this civil-rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting two Eighth Amendment claims against

various Pennsylvania Department of Corrections employees.1 Mr. Stockton’s claims that

on December 20, 2013, Defendants Corrections Officer (CO) Barndt, CO Harpster, CO

Parks, CO Willinsky, CO Wilson and Lt. Bard assaulted him when he exited his Restricted

Housing Unit (RHU) cell after his cell door was mysteriously opened.2 Following the

assault, he claims Nurse Houck denied him medical treatment for his injuries. (ECF No.

33.)

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ properly supported motion for summary

judgment with supporting brief, statement of undisputed facts and exhibits. (ECF No. 95,

96, 97, and 98.) Plaintiff has filed multiple opposition briefs, answers to Defendants’

1 Mr. Stockton is currently housed at SCI-Houtzdale.

2 On March 26, 2018, pursuant to a joint stipulation, the parties dismissed Sergeant

Timothy Miller as a Defendant. See ECF No. 65.

statement of material facts and exhibits. (ECF Nos. 102, 103, 104, 110, and 111.)

Defendants’ have filed a Reply and a Court sanctioned Supplemental Reply. (ECF Nos.

105 and 112.)

On summary judgment Defendants argue that: (1) Mr. Stockton’s excessive use of

force claim is barred by the holdings in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364,

129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) and Jacobs v. Bayha, 616 F. App’x 507 (3d Cir. 2015) following

his criminal conviction for aggravated assault of CO Willinsky during the December 2013

altercation; (2) Nurse Houck was not deliberately indifferent to Mr. Stockton’s medical

needs that day; (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Mr. Stockton

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against CO Harpster and Nurse Houck.

(ECF No. 98.) Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Mr. Stockton argues that his criminal

aggravated assault conviction for striking CO Willinsky does not bar his excessive use of

force claim and that the force Defendants used against him was excessive for the

situation. He claims to have properly exhausted his administrative remedies against all

Defendants either through a misconduct, grievance, or the inmate abuse allegation policy.

As for Nurse Houck, he claims “the blood pouring down [his] face clearly shows that

Plaintiff needed some form of treatment” yet she did not examine his injuries or provide

him with any treatment. (ECF No. 111 at 3.) The motion is fully briefed and ripe for

disposition by the Court.

The Court will grant in part and deny in part the Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. As there are genuine issues of material fact whether Defendants used

excessive force to subdue Mr. Stockton prior to transporting him to the strip search cell,

Defendants’ motion will be denied with respect to CO Park, CO Barndt, CO Harpster, CO

Willinsky, CO Wilson, and Lt. Bard. Summary judgment will be entered for Defendant

Houck with respect to Mr. Stockton’s Eighth Amendment claim against her. This matter

will be set for trial at the convenience of the Court.

II. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after reviewing the entire record in a case,

the court is satisfied that no genuine issues of material fact exist, and that the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view all

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in that party’s favor. Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2019). An issue of

fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the non-moving party. (Id.) Issues of fact are “material” only if establishment of such

facts might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing substantive law. (Id.)

To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively identify those

portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2015). If this burden is met, the nonmoving

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to

material facts.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d

Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the party opposing

summary judgment “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348,

89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

III. Statement of Undisputed Facts

The following facts are undisputed or, where disputed, reflect Mr. Stockton’s

version of the facts, pursuant to this Court’s duty to view all facts and reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105.

A. Related Criminal Proceeding

On September 16, 2014, following a jury trial, Mr. Stockton was convicted of

aggravated assault, 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(3).3 (ECF No. 96-2.) Specifically, a jury

convicted Mr. Stockton of assaulting CO Willinsky on December 20, 2013 in SCI-

Smithfield’s RHU. (ECF No. 96, Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (DSMF) at ¶ 20; see

also ECF No. 96-3 at 2.) On November 13, 2014, Mr. Stockton received a sentence of

27 to 100 months’ confinement to run consecutively to any sentence he was serving at

that time. Commonwealth v. Stockton, CP-31-CR-0254-2014 (Huntingdon Cty. Ct. Com.

Pl.)(docket sheet). 4

3 A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause or intentionally or

knowingly causes bodily injury to any of the officers, agents, employees, or other persons in

subsection (c), in the performance of duty.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(3). Section (c)(9) extends this

coverage to, inter alia, an “officer or employee of a correctional institution” such as CO Willinsky.

4 See https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CPReport.ashx?docketNumber=CP-31-

CR-0000254-2014&dnh=pWvlvvJ4R6yS41wB6A%2bz6g%3d%3d (last visited September 26,

2019).

Mr. Stockton, represented by counsel, did not testify at this criminal trial. (ECF No.

96-3.) CO Park, Lt. Bard, CO Willinsky, CO Barndt, CO Wilson, CO Harpster all testified,

under oath, at the criminal trial. (Id.)

CO Park testified that he was working in the K Block control bubble on December

20, 2013. He mistakenly remotely opened Mr. Stockton’s and another inmate’s RHU cell

doors that day. (Id. at 16.) CO Park opened the control bubble window and verbally

ordered both RHU inmates to return to their cells. (Id.) Only Mr. Stockton came out of

his cell. (ECF No. 96-5 at 4.) Mr. Stockton then returned to his cell, donned his jumpsuit,

and came out of his cell. (Id.)

CO Park notified area officers and Lt. Bard that Mr. Stockton was out of his cell.

(ECF No. 96-3 at 19.) Lt. Bard ordered Mr. Stockton to return to his cell. (Id. at 23.) CO

Willinsky also ordered Mr. Stockton to return to his cell. (Id. at 31; DSMF at 22.) As CO

Willinsky approached Mr. Stockton, he ordered Plaintiff to face the wall and place his

hands behind his back. CO Harpster recounted hearing Mr. Stockton say “Fuckin’ make

me go in.” Mr. Stockton ignored the order and took a defensive stance as CO Willinsky

approached and punched the officer in the head. (ECF No. 96-3 at 17, 30 and 49; DSMF

at 23.) Mr. Stockton threw multiple closed fist punches at CO Willinsky, many of them

landed on his head and neck. (ECF No. 96-3 at 32; DSMF at 24.) Other officers arrived

and attempted to subdue Mr. Stockton by striking him. Mr. Stockton continued to be

combative and kick. (ECF No. 96-3 at 24, 32 and 50.) After additional officers responded,

they assisted in getting Mr. Stockton to the ground and secured him in handcuffs. (Id. at

42.)

B. The Escort Video

This video does not capture the events of December 20, 2013, in SCI-Smithfield’s

RHU prior to prison staff applying leg shackles and a tether to an already handcuffed Mr.

Stockton. The 34-minute video depicts the process of escorting Mr. Stockton off the RHU

tier to the unit’s strip search cell, his strip search, an encounter with Nurse Houck and his

transfer back to his RHU cell. See ECF No. 96-4, Attach. A. Mr. Stockton claims

Defendants ceased their assault once the video camera arrived on the scene.

The video commences with Mr. Stockton, who is wearing an orange jumpsuit, face

down on the floor of the tier surrounded by several staff members. As the officers applied

the leg shackles and tether to Mr. Stockton, a small spot of blood from his right index

finger is visible on the back of his jumpsuit. Less than a minute later a staff member

makes a radio request to call “medical.” Five staff members escort Mr. Stockton from the

top tier of the RHU to the stairwell. One staff member, holding the tether, leads Mr.

Stockton who walks backwards and bent at the waist, to the staircase. Another staff

member stands in front of Mr. Stockton while two officers flanked either side of Mr.

Stockton hold his arms. One officer supervised the process and gave verbal directions

to the other officers and Mr. Stockton. Staff tell Mr. Stockton he must go to the strip

search cell. Staff permit Mr. Stockton to stand up, face forward and walk down the steps.

Still escorted by staff, Mr. Stockton remains upright as he walks off the unit without

incident or assistance. Mr. Stockton does not attempt to physically resist the process.

Staff do not push, pull, shove, or strike Mr. Stockton during this process. Mr. Stockton

and staff pass through at least two secure doors prior to reaching the strip search area

without incident. Mr. Stockton did not appear confused, disoriented, or clumsy as he

walked backward off the tier or down the steps. No blood is visible on his face or the front

of his jumpsuit.

Some members of the escort team depart while others place Mr. Stockton in the

strip search cell, direct him to get on his knees and remain there while staff exit the strip

cell. Staff remove his leg shackles and hand cuffs without incident. Once secured in the

cell, Mr. Stockton stood up, faced the camera, and stood next to the back wall of the cell.

Mr. Stockton flexed the fingers on his right hand and wiped his hand of the front of is

jumpsuit. After standing silently for four minutes, Mr. Stockton calmly told the cameraman

“Sorry, (inaudible), I need to call the abuse hotline” as he visually examined his right hand.

The officer responds “Alright.” Mr. Stockton resumes standing face forward and leaning

against the back of the cell. He continues to occasionally wipe his right hand on his

jumpsuit.

Eleven minutes into the video, Nurse Melissa Houck enters the strip search area.

The camera operator tells Nurse Houck she may have to wait to examine Mr. Stockton

“until they are done feeding.” Mr. Stockton continues to silently stand against the back

wall.

Twelve and a half minutes into the video someone off camera enters the area and

states that “he just assaulted staff”. Mr. Stockton responded that he did not assault staff,

but that staff assaulted him while he was in handcuffs. He voiced that Level 5 housing

security procedures prohibit the opening of his cell door unless he is in cuffs. He stated

his cell door opened and that he was backing up when staff attacked him. He also said

that he was not supposed to be in the RHU as his disciplinary sentence expired.

Staff asked Mr. Stockton if he would comply with a strip search so medical could

photograph him. He stated that no pictures, other than of his face, were necessary. Staff

explained that DOC policy required Nurse Houck to take a minimum of four pictures of

him. Mr. Stockton initially refused to allow medical to take any pictures of his body other

than his face because “that’s the only marks I have on my body, is on my face.” Although

Mr. Stockton states “I ain’t got no marks on my body to do no strip search,” he does not

verbally refuse to be strip searched.

Mr. Stockton removed his jumpsuit, t-shirt, socks, and shoes without assistance

and handed them to the officer for inspection. He then removed his undershorts and

followed the officer’s verbal instructions for the remainder of the visual strip search. Mr.

Stockton easily and quickly turned his head to both sides, bent his neck, bent over at the

waist, moved both arms in front of him as well as above his head. He turned around and

stood on alternating feet without wobbling or losing his balance. An officer returned his

undershorts to him and he put them back on.

Nurse Houck returned to the area. Mr. Stockton again told officers he would only

allow her to photograph his face. An officer commented that Mr. Stockton’s “knuckle [was]

bleeding.” Mr. Stockton said, “I’m not worried about that.” Nurse Houck told Mr. Stockton

that she must take four pictures of him: top, bottom, front and back. He said, “you just

got to take pictures of anything that got hurt.” He said he was not refusing to take the

pictures but telling staff “where my injuries are.”

Eighteen minutes into the video, staff ordered Mr. Stockton to back up to the cell

door so staff could reapply his handcuffs before Nurse Houck entered the cell. At first Mr.

Stockton refused and agreed to allow only pictures of his face because “you don’t see no

marks on my body”. Staff repeated the order for Mr. Stockton to put his hands through

cell door slot to allow staff to apply the handcuffs. Mr. Stockton continued to argue with

staff. Nurse Houck asked him if he was giving up his right to claim injuries from the

incident. Mr. Stockton responded that he had injuries to his right shoulder and face. After

a period of argument, Mr. Stockton agreed to be handcuffed but pulled away from officers

when he thought Nurse Houck was taking pictures of his hands. Eventually Mr. Stockton

agreed to allow staff to handcuff him. Officers then opened the cell door and entered the

strip search cell accompanied by Nurse Houck. She took several photographs of Mr.

Stockton, including his hands. Nurse Houck and the cameraman had an unobstructed

view of Mr. Stockton during this process. Mr. Stockton also said his lip was injured. When

an officer again noted that his hands were bleeding, Mr. Stockton said the blood belonged

to someone else.

With Mr. Stockton facing forward, two small areas of swelling are visible on the

front of his forehead; one about an inch over his left eyebrow and the other at his hairline

on the outer portion of his left eyebrow. The video reveals several unobstructed views of

his face and torso from the front and back. There is no visible bleeding from his forehead

or the bridge of his nose. There are no visible injuries or swelling to his arms, chest, ribs

or back. Nurse Houck asked him “if anything hurt?” Mr. Stockton replied “yeah, my face.”

Nurse Houck then asked him if he had any blurred vision. He said, “a little bit.” Nurse

Houck then instructed him to wash the injured area with soap and water when he returned

to his cell. She also told him she would see about getting him some ice for his injury.

Twenty-four minutes into the video, Nurse Houck left the area.

Mr. Stockton then dressed without any difficulty. His speech was clear, direct, and

he did not appear disoriented or confused. He asked the Sargent when he would get to

use the abuse hotline. He also said he did not get his meal yet. Staff told Mr. Stockton

he would get to use the phone to make his abuse hotline as well as his meal tray.

After Mr. Stockton returned to his cell, he continued to speak to the cameraman.

He recounted that his cell door was “mysteriously popped open.” He repeated that the

video camera did not arrive on scene until after staff ceased their assault. Other inmates

were yelling to Mr. Stockton the names of COs Willinsky, Barndt and Wilson as being

involved in the assault on him.

C. DOC’s Grievance Policy, DC-ADM 804

The DOC’s Administrative Directive DC-ADM 804 (DC-ADM 804) is known as the

Inmate Grievance System. See www.cor.state.pa.us, DOC Policies, DC-ADM 804,

Inmate Grievance System Policy; see also ECF No. 96, Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts

(DSMF) at ¶¶ 1-4.) The three-tiered grievance serves as an inmate’s administrative

remedy to address a DOC or facility action or policy that has affected them. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

A Grievance Coordinator initially reviews the grievance. If dissatisfied with the initial

grievance response, the inmate may appeal the decision to the Facility Manager

(Superintendent) or designee. Upon receiving a decision from the Superintendent, the

inmate may file an appeal with the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances (SOIGA) for

final review. (Id. at ¶¶ 5 - 6.)

The grievance policy sets forth several requirements for inmate grievances. All

grievances must be submitted to the Grievance Coordinator within 15 working days after

the event upon which the claim is based, must not exceed two written pages and “shall

include the date, approximate time and location of the event(s) that gave rise to the

grievance” and “shall identify [the] individuals directly involved in the event(s).” (Id. at ¶

7-8.) The inmate must also “specifically state any claims he/wishes to make concerning

violations of Department directives, regulations, court orders, or other law.” (Id. at ¶ 8.)

The Grievance Coordinator assigns the grievance a tracking number and enters the

grievance, even if rejected, into the Automated Inmate Grievance Tacking System. (Id.

at ¶ 10.) Inmates seeking to appeal either the Initial Review Response or rejection must

do so within 15 days from its receipt. (Id. at ¶ 11.) The inmate’s appeal to the Facility

Manager must include the reasons for the appeal. Only issues raised in the Initial Review,

determination of frivolousness, rejection and/or placement on grievance restriction may

be appealed to the Facility Manager. (Id. at ¶ 12.) An inmate dissatisfied with the Facility

Manager’s decision may file an appeal for final review with SOIGA. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Along

with the written appeal to SOIGA, the inmate must provide SOIGA with a copy of the initial

grievance, Initial Review Response, appeal to the Facility Manager, and Facility

Manager’s response. (Id. at ¶ 16.) SOIGA will either uphold the response, uphold the

inmate, dismiss, uphold in part/deny in part, or remand the grievance for further response

or review. (Id. at ¶ 17.)

D. Grievance Nos. 49066-13 & 491051-13

Mr. Stockton filed Grievance No. 490666-13 concerning the December 20, 2013

use of force event to final review. (Id. at ¶ 18; see also ECF No. 96-1 at 80 – 87.) He

filed the grievance on December 20, 2013. Mr. Stockton asserts CO Willinsky, CO

Barndt, CO Wilson, Lt. Bard and Sgt. Miller attacked him. (Id.) He states he “was kicked

and punch[ed] profus[ely] in the facial area. The blood from a wound of the left side of

my forehead was cleaned by an inmate, and a staff member who […] did not take pictures

of the crime scene”. (Id.) Mr. Stockton fails to name either Defendant Harpster or Nurse

Houck in the grievance. (ECF No. 96 at ¶ 18-19.) On December 27, 2013, the Facility

Grievance Coordinator notified Mr. Stockton she received an extension of time to reply to

his grievance while staff investigated his allegations of abuse in accordance with DC ADM

001. (ECF No. 96-1 at 81.) On March 29, 2014, prison officials denied Grievance No.

490666-13. (Id. at 82.) Prison staff and the Pennsylvania State Police sought to interview

Mr. Stockton during their investigations, he declined both requests. (Id.) Mr. Stockton

filed an appeal to the Facility Manager on April 3, 2014. (Id. at 83 - 84.) He did not

reference CO Harpster or Nurse Houck in the appeal. (Id.) Superintendent Fisher denied

the appeal on April 15, 2014. (Id. at 85.) Mr. Stockton filed a timely appeal to SOIGA.

(Id. at 86.) Mr. Stockton again does not mention either CO Harpster or Nurse Houck in

his appeal. (Id.) The Chief Grievance Officer denied the appeal on June 3, 2014. (Id. at

87.) The Chief Grievance Officer noted that “[t]he investigation determined that your

allegations against staff were not substantiated and no abuse was established.” (Id.)

On December 27, 2013, Mr. Stockton filed Grievance No. 491051-13 concerning

the medical care he received following the December 20, 2013 use of force event. In that

grievance he references Nurse Melissa (Nurse Houck) and Nurse Jackie. (ECF No. 104

at 4 and ECF No. 105-1 at 6.) Mr. Stockton reported “pictures were taken by Nurse

Melissa, and a blood test was performed by nurse Jackie, which was deeply appreciated.”

He stated that pictures and a blood test “was not the only treatment that should have been

administered. With the lumps in my head and I may have had several concus[s]ions.”

He requested an x-ray. (ECF No. 105-1 at 6.) Staff denied the grievance on January 10,

2014. The responding Corrections Health Care Administrator noted that Mr. Stockton

was seen by a second nurse, RN Cutler, the same day, at his cell, who reported Mr.

Stockton “only had a superficial abrasion above his left eye and no further injuries noted

or reported by inmate Stockton. Inmate Stockton had lab work drawn” at that time. (Id.

at 7.) A medical staff member gave Mr. Stockton the results of his blood test on January

2, 2014 and that staff ordered a facial x-ray. (Id.) Mr. Stockton filed an appeal to the

Facility Manager on January 21, 2014. Mr. Stockton claims that pictures taken on the

day of the assault will show that his “lip was busted, forehead opened, with a mark on

[his] eye.” (Id. at 8.) He also claims he told the nurse “that [he] was experiencing

headaches, dizzy spells, etc., in which she told [him] to keep the wound on his head clean

and that she will send ice which [he] never received.” (Id.) He also notes he was seen

by a member of the medical staff on January 10, 2014. (Id.) The denial of the grievance

was upheld on January 31, 2014. (Id. at 9.) Mr. Stockton did not submit an appeal to

SOIGA. (Id., Shambaugh Decl. at ¶ 8.)

E. DC-ADM 001, Inmate Abuse Investigation5

The initial response to Mr. Stockton’s abuse grievance, Grievance No. 490666-13,

was delayed pending the investigation of his abuse allegations pursuant to DC ADM 001.

(ECF No. 96-1 at 81.) The investigator assigned to review the matter reviewed “DC-121

5 The Court takes judicial notice of DC-ADM 001 which is the is the DOC’s Inmate Abuse

Policy. It is available on-line at the DOC’s public website. See https://www.cor.pa.gov. (Search:

About Us; DOC Policies;001 Inmate Abuse) (last visited September 26, 2019).

reports, grievance submitted by Stockton, Abuse hotline complaints and review of the

DiBos video system”. (ECF Nos. 58-1 at 6-104 and 105-2 at 2 – 6.) The investigator

sought to interview nine inmates and nine staff members. (Id.) Mr. Stockton refused to

participate in the investigation process. (Id. at 6.) On December 20, 2013, all involved

officers (CO Willinsky, CO Kennedy, CO Park, CO Wilson, CO Barndt, Sgt. Miller and Lt.

Bard), including CO Harpster filed a DC-121, Employee Report of Incident, following his

involvement in the use of force event. (ECF 33-1 at 14.) CO Harpster sustained an injury

to his left hand during the incident. (Id.) During the course of the investigation, several

of the Defendants acknowledged striking Mr. Stockton while he resisted staff. Several

inmates reported witnessing staff assault Mr. Stockton. (ECF No. 58-1 at 6 - 7.)

The investigation was unable to substantiate Mr. Stockton’s allegations. (Id. at 7.)

“[A]ction that occurred in the corner of the tier are undeterminable due to the positioning

of the camera”. (Id.) However, the investigator concluded that:

It is believed that inmate Stockton had every opportunity to go

back into his cell and close the door. He made a conscious

decision to walk back into his cell, put his orange jumpsuit on,

come back on the tier, sits on the steps and waits for staff,

then got up and closed his door and remained on the tier.

When given orders to go back to his cell, he refused and then

started to assault officer Willinsky. Staff responded in an

appropriate manner and used the amount of force necessary

to restrain the inmate.

(Id.)

F. Nurse Houck’s Medical Evaluation of Mr. Stockton

following the December 20, 2013 Use of Force Event.

Within ten minutes of staff placing Mr. Stockton in restraints, Nurse Houck reported

to the strip search cell where Mr. Stockton was held. (ECF No. 96, Ex. D, Attach. A.) The

strip search cell has wire grating which allows for visual observation of the occupant.

Initially, Mr. Stockton reported he only had injuries to his face, and no other marks on his

body. However, he later reported an injury to his lip and right shoulder. (Id.) When

questioned as to the blood on his hands, Mr. Stockton reported “that’s not my blood, it’s

someone else’s”. (Id.; see also ECF No. 96-7.)

Nurse Houck completed a Medical Incident/Injury Report following her evaluation

of Mr. Stockton. (ECF No. 58-1.) She noted Mr. Stockton was argumentative during the

assessment and had superficial laceration and hematoma on his forehead above his left

eye and that Mr. Stockton denied any serious injuries. (Id.) Nurse Houck advised Mr.

Stockton to wash his forehead with soap and water when he was returned to his cell. (Id.)

She noted sick call as needed as follow-up. (Id.) She told him she would try to send

some ice to him. (ECF No. 96, Ex. D, Attach. A.) Mr. Stockton never specifically asked

Nurse Houck for any type of treatment. (ECF No. 96-5 at 9.)

In his grievance, Mr. Stockton claimed Defendants assaulted him from 10:30 a.m.

to 1:30 p.m. (ECF No. 58-1 at 54.) He was “kicked and punched profusively (sic) in the

facial area.” (Id.) He claims “blood from a wound of the left side of [his] forehead” was

cleaned from the “crime scene” and the area was not photographed to preserve the

evidence. (Id.)

During his deposition Mr. Stockton reported that the blood on his hands was from

his own forehead. (ECF No. 96-5 at 9.) He also reported that staff kicked him in the

chest, the bridge of his nose and head. He wanted Nurse Houck to clean his wounds and

let him see a doctor. (Id.) This is because his “head was swelled” and he “could have

suffered concussions”. (Id.) He testified that when Nurse Houck saw him his “forehead

was split and [he had] a few marks,” but the next day “both [his] eyes black and all that.”

(Id. at 10.)

On December 20, 2013, once returned to his cell, “Nurse Jackie” (RN Cutler)

came to his cell and drew his blood. (ECF No. 105 at 6 - 7.) Plaintiff requested an x-ray

on December 25, 2013. (Id. at 8.) Staff told him to fill out a sick call request. (Id.) Two

weeks later, on January 9, 2014, Mr. Stockton filled out a sick call request and was seen

the following day. (Id.) A facial x-ray was ordered and performed. (Id. at 7.)

IV. Discussion

A. Mr. Stockton’s Aggravated Assault Conviction Does Not

Preclude his Eighth Amendment Excessive Use of Force

Claim

The United States Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff may not recover

damages under § 1983 if doing so would imply the invalidity of a prior criminal conviction.

Heck, supra. The Supreme Court explained that:

[W]hen [an individual] seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the validity of his conviction

or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed

unless the plaintiff can demonstrate the conviction or

sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court

determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will

not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal

judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to

proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. The Heck doctrine does not create a per se

bar to a claim of excessive force even where the plaintiff was previously convicted of

resisting arrest, assault, or similar crime arising out of the same incident. Garrison v.

Porch, 376 F. App’x 274, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2010) (simple assault conviction did not bar

excessive force claim); Lora-Pena v. FBI, 529 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2008) (resisting

arrest and assault conviction did not bar excessive force claim); Nelson v. Jashurek, 109

F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1997) (resisting arrest conviction did not bar excessive force

claim). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that where a “reasonable juror,

considering the totality of the circumstances, could find that the arrestee resisted arrest”

or assaulted the arresting officer, “but was still subjected to an unreasonable excessive

level of force” by the responding officer, plaintiff’s claim was not barred by Heck. Garrison,

376 F. App’x at 277-78 (citing Nelson, 109 F.3d at 146); Lora-Pena, 529 F.3d at 506.

Here, Mr. Stockton was convicted of assaulting CO Willinsky while in performance

of his duty of returning Plaintiff to his RHU cell after he refused direct orders to do so and

then resisted staff efforts to subdue him. In this case, Mr. Stockton alleges that more than

the necessary amount of force was used to subdue him when responding to CO Park’s

call that he was out of his RHU cell. Under the facts presented in this case, there remains

a possibility that a reasonable jury could find that the Defendants responded to Mr.

Stockton’s physical resistance to their efforts with excessive force, especially after CO

Willinsky was assaulted. Garrison, 376 F. App’x at 277-78; Lora-Pena, 529 F.3d at 506;

and Nelson, 109 F.3d at 146. Because this possibility is not foreclosed by Mr. Stockton’s

conviction for assault, a finding that Defendants used excessive force against Mr.

Stockton when returning him to his cell would not necessarily imply the invalidity of Mr.

Stockton’s conviction for aggravated assault, and thus the Heck rule does not apply.

B. Excessive Use of Force Claim

When prison officials use excessive force against prisoners, they violate the

inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 - 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 997 - 99, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). In

determining whether the use of force is excessive, courts are instructed to examine: (1)

the extent of the injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the

relationship between that need and the amount of force used; and (4) whether the force

was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore order. Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d

102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As with any Eighth

Amendment violation, Plaintiff must prove the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986).

Not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of

action.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S. Ct. at 1000. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de

minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to

the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9 - 10, 112 S.Ct. at 1000. An inmate who complains

of a “push or shove” that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid

excessive force claim. Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).

The “core judicial inquiry” is not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but

rather “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130

S.Ct. 1175, 1178, 175 L.Ed. 2d 995 (2010) (per curiam); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7,

112 S.Ct. at 999. “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may

suggest ‘whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a

particular situation.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37, 130 S.Ct. at 1178.

Mr. Stockton claims that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether

Defendants used unreasonable force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The

Court agrees that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Stockton, a reasonable

jury could determine that Defendants used unreasonable force while detaining him on the

top tier of the RHU on December 20, 2013.

Prior to the arrival of the video camera, Mr. Stockton and the Defendants have two

vastly different accounts of what happened that day. Mr. Stockton contends that the

Defendants, intentionally opened his cell door to create an opportunity to assault him due

to prior grievances/lawsuits. He claims that although he was out of his cell, he was

confined to a secure area (the RHU) and that all other inmates were locked in their cells.

He argues that he did not pose a threat or security risk warranting the level of force used

against him. He was “backing up” and non-combative when Defendants attacked him.

Because he posed no immediate security threat, he argues that Defendants’ failure to

follow DOC policy and assemble as use of force team, which would have included the

video recording of the entire event, demonstrates their malicious intent to assault him. In

his deposition he suggests he did not initially return to his cell because the unit’s cameras

could not see what happens in his cell, therefore he wanted to meet the officers where

Defendants’ actions would be recorded. In contrast, Defendants contend CO Park

accidently opened Mr. Stockton’s RHU cell door. Various Defendants ordered Mr.

Stockton to return to his cell but he refused. He came out of his cell, went back into his

cell, dressed, and came out again and shut his cell door. He then proceeded to walk

around the tier. When Defendants approached Mr. Stockton, he took a defensive stance,

swung, and kicked at officers. Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s threatening words and

aggressive manner warranted the force they used to subdue him.

At this point, taking the facts in a light most favorable to the non-movant, a

reasonable jury could find Plaintiff’s version of events credible and conclude that

Defendants used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment during the process

of detaining him prior to the arrival of the camera on the unit. The fact that Mr. Stockton

assaulted staff during this altercation does not negate and is not inconsistent with the

possibility that Defendants used excessive force against him. The Court accordingly

declines to grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

C. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). “The doctrine is designed to ‘give[

] government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments by

protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Bryan

v. United States of Am., 913 F.3d 356, 362 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting City and Cty. of San

Francisco, Cal. v. Sheehan, _____ U.S. _____, _____, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1774, 191

L.Ed.2d 856 (2015)); see also Blackhawk v. Pa., 381 F.3d 202, 215 (3d Cir. 2004)

(qualified immunity provides “ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.”); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231, 129 S.Ct. at 815 (“The

protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s

error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law

and fact.’” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Qualified immunity will not,

however, act as a shield for “the official who knows or should know he is acting outside

the law.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 506-07, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911, 57 L.Ed.2d 895

(1978).

At the summary judgment stage, when an official asserts qualified immunity, the

district court must first determine whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, the facts could support a jury finding that the defendants violated the Constitution.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Next,

the Court must determine whether such right was “clearly established” at the time of

Defendants’ actions. Santini, 795 F.3d at 417. These two inquiries need not be

addressed in order; courts “are permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding

which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in

light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129

S.Ct. at 818. “A clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”

Mullenix v. Luna, _____ U.S. _____, _____, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)

(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985

(2012)). This means “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” Id.

Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Stockton’s claim

of excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights because “Plaintiff attacked

the defendant officers. This necessitated use of force. As evidenced by his lack of

serious injuries, the force was reasonable.” (ECF No. 98 at 18.) Here, Mr. Stockton

claims that Defendants kicked and punched him in the facial area prior to placing him in

handcuffs and continued until the camera arrived on the unit. Even if Mr. Mr. Stockton

assaulted at least one officer in the altercation, there exists a genuine issue of material

fact as to the force Defendants used to subdue Mr. Stockton was excessive, and whether

the officers’ use of force ceased once he was in handcuffs. There exists a clearly

established right to be free from physical abuse, reasonable officers would have

understood in December 2013 that physically assaulting an inmate in restraints violated

the Constitution. See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 – 27 (3d Cir. 2009). To the

extent Defendants argue that Mr. Stockton’s lack of serious injuries demonstrates their

use of “reasonable” force, the Court disagrees. “Injury and force ... are only imperfectly

correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten

by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he

has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38, 130 S.Ct.

at 1178 - 79. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to summary

judgment as to Mr. Stockton’s excessive use force claim based on qualified immunity. In

reaching this conclusion the Court is not making a finding that any of Mr. Stockton’s

allegations are true, and Mr. Stockton continues to carry the burden of proving them at

trial.

D. Mr. Stockton’s Exhaustion of his Available Administrative

Remedies against CO Harpster and Nurse Houck

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner must pursue all

available administrative remedies within the prison's grievance system before bringing a

civil rights action concerning prison conditions in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. §

1997(e)(a); Ross v. Blake, _____ U.S. _____, _____, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1855, 195 L.Ed.2d

117 (2016). This “exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,

whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they

allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122

S.Ct. 983, 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Exhaustion is mandatory and must be “proper,”

which requires a prisoner to “us[e] all steps that the agency holds out, and [to do] so

properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” Woodford v. Ngo, 548

U.S. 81 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2382, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (emphasis in original). This

means that the prisoner plaintiff must have completed "the administrative review process

in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition

to bringing suit in federal court." Id. The "filing [of] an untimely or otherwise procedurally

defective administrative grievance or appeal" does not satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion

requirement. Id. “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the

grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the

prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper

exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218, 127 S.Ct. 910, 923, 166 L.Ed.2d 798

(2007). Failure to comply substantially with the procedural requirements of the applicable

prison's grievance system will result in a procedural default of the claim. Spruill v. Gillis,

372 F.3d 218, 227 – 32 (3d Cir. 2004); Robinson v. Supt. Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148,

153 (3d Cir. 2016). “[P]risoners must complete the administrative review process in

accordance with the applicable procedural rules, rules that are defined not by the PLRA,

but by the prison grievance process itself.”).

Applying this procedural default component to the exhaustion requirement, the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that:

[a]s for the failure to identify named defendants on the

grievance form, … to the extent the identity of a defendant

was “a fact relevant to the claim,” Pennsylvania’s prison

grievance policy mandated that the identification be included

in the inmate’s statement of facts on the grievance form. And,

… in the absence of any justifiable excuse, a Pennsylvania

inmate’s failure to properly identify a defendant constituted a

failure to properly exhaust his administrative remedies under

the PLRA.

Williams v. Pennsylvania Dep’t. of Corr., 146 F. App’x 554, 557 (3d Cir. 2005). However,

prison authorities may waive the exhaustion requirement if the ultimate administrative

authority fully examines the inmate’s complaint on the merits and found them wanting.

Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2000) (exhaustion requirement met where

OPR fully examined merits of excessive force claim where prison officials may have

interfered with grievance process).

(i) CO Harpster

Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Stockton presented, and pursued, a grievance to

final review that raised his excessive use of force claim arising from the events of

December 20, 2013. It is also undisputed that his grievance, Grievance No. 490666-13,

named Defendants CO Willinsky, CO Barndt, CO Wilson, and Lt. Bard as being involved

with the assault. Mr. Stockton failed to name Defendant Harpster as being involved in

the use of force event, however, the parties do not contest CO Harpster’s involvement in

the use of force event. (ECF No. 96-1 at 80.) Defendants move to exclude CO Harpster

from this action exclusively based on Mr. Stockton’s failure to name him in his grievance.

It is clear that the DOC’s grievance procedures “supply the yardstick” to determine

whether Mr. Stockton has procedurally defaulted his claims under the PLRA when he

omitted naming any Defendant in his grievance. Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639

(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231). However, contrary to Defendants’

assertion, neither the DOC’s grievance policy nor the PLRA requires a prisoner-plaintiff

to name all perspective civil defendants in his prison administrative remedy. The United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has repeatedly held that “[t]he primary

purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal

notice to a particular official that he might be sued.” Williams, 482 F.3d at 640 (quoting

Jones, 549 U.S. at 219, 127 S.Ct. at 923); see also Diaz v. Palakovich, 448 F. App’x 211,

217 (3d Cir. 2011) (procedural default that may have resulted from failing to name prison

officials in a fully exhausted grievance can be excused depending on the nature of the

claim). Pursuant to the DOC’s Grievance policy, allegations of abuse grievances “shall

be handled in accordance with the Department policy DC-ADM 001.” (ECF No. 96-1 at

56.) That is precisely what occurred with Mr. Stockton’s Grievance No. 490666-13. (Id.

at 81.) How the DOC learned of Mr. Stockton’s abuse allegations, whether due to Mr.

Stockton’s telephone call to the abuse hotline, his grievance, or the involved staff

reporting Plaintiff’s allegation6 of abuse, is irrelevant. All reporting mechanisms lead to

6 Mr. Stockton, while detained in the strip search cell, in the presence of staff, asserted

staff assaulted him. See Escort Video.

the same result, an investigation by the Office of Special Investigations and Intelligence

(OSII). The depth and breadth of the investigation is clear. See ECF No. 58-1. The

report lists the following information was available to the investigator: his interviews of

involved staff members (CO Willinsky, CO Harpster, CO Kennedy, CO Park; CO Wilson;

CO Barndt; Sgt. Miller, Lt. Bard) and several inmates; Grievance No. 490666-13; two

videos; written statements by the involved staff; the Employee Report of Incident (DC-

121 Part 3) written by each involved staff member (including CO Harpster) on the day of

the incident; the medical incident/injury reports (and pictures) for each staff member

injured (including CO Harpster) as well as Mr. Stockton; a copy of the misconduct issued

to Mr. Stockton for assault. (Id.) Upon completion of the investigation, and based on the

investigation, DOC staff provided an Initial Review Response to Grievance No. 490666-

3. (Id. at 82.) “The outcome of the investigation could not substantiate your claims …

your grievance is denied[,] and all staff actions were justified”. (Id.) At final review, the

Chief Grievance Officer noted that Mr. Stockton’s allegation of abuse “was investigated

by the Security Office staff and reviewed by the Office of Special Investigations and

Intelligence … the investigation determined that your allegations against staff were not

substantiated and no abuse was established.” (Id. at 87.) The DOC’s investigation of Mr.

Stockton’s abuse allegations encompassed the appropriateness of the actions of all staff

involved in the use of force event, not just those named in Mr. Stockton’s grievance. (ECF

No. 58-1.) The Defendants argue that all claims against CO Harpster, who admits to

using “strikes” (Id. at 63) to gain Mr. Stockton’s compliance, was identified by other

Defendants as being involved in the event (Id. at 61-76), and whom the OSII investigation

found “[s]taff responded in an appropriate manner and used the amount of force

necessary to restrain the inmate” (ECF No. 58-1 at 7), should be dismissed because he

was not named in the grievance, is over simplifying the administrative exhaustion

requirement. Under the facts of this case, to bar suit against CO Harpster would

“engender a prison grievance review culture marked by technicalities,” Spruill, 372 F.3d

at 235, defeating the objective of the PLRA, i.e. “afford[ing] corrections officials time and

opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal

case.” Nussle, 534 U.S. at 524-25, 122 S.Ct. at 988. The identify of all staff that laid

hands upon Mr. Stockton on December 20, 2013, were known to the institution. The

investigation of Mr. Stockton’s abuse allegations included the actions of all of the officers,

not just those named in the grievance. The fact that Mr. Stockton was unable to provide

the names of all the officers involved in the single event did not prevent the DOC from

investigating the matter. Because the Chief Grievance Officer relied upon OSII’s

investigation to deny Mr. Stockton’s abuse grievance finding that his allegations against

staff “were not substantiated and no abuse established,” the Court finds the issue of

Plaintiff’s failure to specifically name CO Harpster in the grievance waived. See Camp,

219 F.3d at 279.

(ii) Nurse Houck

Mr. Stockton argues that Nurse Houck, known to him as Nurse Melissa, was

included in his abuse allegation complaint as well as Grievance No. 4910513. (ECF No.

103 and 111).

Unlike Mr. Stockton’s abuse allegations, his allegations against Nurse Houck were

not part of the OSII allegation of abuse investigation. The DC-ADM 001 investigation

addressed only his allegations of abuse by the corrections officers responding to return

him to his RHU cell. This is not a situation where Mr. Stockton participated in the

investigation and voiced his complaints concerning Nurse Houck’s actions that day,

broadening the scope of the investigation and prison officials ignored his claim. Neither

Grievance No. 409666-13 (abuse allegations) nor the DC-ADM 001 investigation

addressed his post-incident medical care.

Medical treatment received by an inmate is considered a prison condition. Stewart

v. Kelchner, 358 Fed. Appx. 291, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2009). As previously noted, proper

exhaustion of administrative remedies requires substantial compliance with the rules of

the internal prison grievance process, which are defined by the prison, not the PLRA.

Jones, 549 U.S. at 218, 127 S.Ct. at 922-23; Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 271

(3d Cir. 2013); Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231.

The record supports Mr. Stockton’s assertion that he filed a timely grievance

concerning his lack of medical care and it does mention Nurse Houck. To the extent it

challenges the care Nurse Houck rendered, the complete exhaustion of the grievance is

undetermined. (ECF No. 105-1 at 6.) The undisputed record reveals that Mr. Stockton

was provided a timely initial response to his grievance on January 10, 2014. (Id. at 7.)

Mr. Stockton then filed an appeal to the Facility Manager who issued a response on

January 31, 2014. (Id. at 8 - 9.) Ms. Helen Shambaugh, a Grievance Officer with SOIGA,

affirms that Mr. Stockton did not appeal the Facility Manager’s determination to SOIGA.

(Id. at 3.) Mr. Stockton counters he “exhausted grievance # 491051-13 to the highest

level as shown by exhibit-g and had to mail the final appeal to central office by giving the

mail to the same officer’s in incident as Plaintiff did not have direct access to mail box in

the RHU at SCI-Smithfield.” (ECF No. 111 at 4.) Exhibit G is a copy of Mr. Stockton’s

“Final Grievance Appeal #491051-13” dated February 5, 2014. (Id. at 13.)

When considering a motion for summary judgment, “a district court may not make

credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence.” Paladino v.

Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Marino v. Indus. Crating Co.,

358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)). Instead, “the non-moving party’s evidence is to be

believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 210 (quoting

Marino, 358 F.3d at 247). Thus, in light of Mr. Stockton’s assertions, there is a genuine

factual dispute concerning whether Defendants failed to deposit Mr. Stockton’s appeal to

final review in the mail as he was confined to the RHU and could not do so himself, a

dispute which is material to whether the administrative remedy process was available to

him such that he could exhaust the claim against Nurse Houck.

E. Mr. Stockton’s Eighth Amendment Medical Claim

The Eighth Amendment “requires prison officials to provide basic medical

treatment” for those “incarcerated.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)

(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed. 2d 251 (1976)). To establish

an Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate medical care, an inmate must show

“(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate

deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cty Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575,

582 (3d Cir. 2003). A plaintiff must make both an “objective” showing that the deprivation

was “sufficiently serious,” as well as a “subjective” showing that the defendant acted with

“a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” See Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499

(3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.

2d 271 (1991) ).

Defendants argue that Nurse Houck is entitled to summary judgment because Mr.

Stockton merely disagrees with her prescribed course of treatment and therefore no

reasonable juror could find she was deliberately indifferent toward Plaintiff’s medical

condition. Mr. Stockton argues that his immediate involvement in an unplanned use of

force event with several staff members, as well as his head and facial injuries, support a

finding that Nurse Houck provided inadequate medical care with deliberate indifference

in violation of his Eighth Amendment constitutional rights.

The record before the Court establishes that Mr. Stockton was non-cooperative

during Nurse Houck’s evaluation. She assessed him based on her encounter with him,

his physical injuries, and verbal complaints. She adjudged his injuries to be minor and

not requiring further immediate medical attention. She advised him to go through sick

call procedures if he needed further care. While Mr. Stockton was unsatisfied with the

care he received, his vague complaints of what care he wanted because he “could have

had a concussion” fail to show that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. See

generally Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235 (explaining that “mere disagreement as to the proper

medical treatment” is insufficient to state a constitutional violation (alteration omitted)

(quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates, v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d

Cir. 1987))). The undisputed record of Nurse Houck’s encounter with Mr. Stockton,

confirmed by Mr. Stockton’s appearance, statements, demeanor, abilities, lack of physical

inabilities, lead the Court to conclude that no reasonable juror could find Nurse Houck

was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.7 Accordingly, summary judgment is

warranted on this claim.

An appropriate order follows.

Date: September 30, 2019 /s/ A. Richard Caputo

A. RICHARD CAPUTO

United States District Judge

7 In cases where pertinent events are captured on video, courts should not rely merely on

the parties’ characterization of the events but rather should view the facts are they are depicted

by the video. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686

(2007). If, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to a plaintiff, no reasonable fact finder

could view the video of the incident and determine that the defendants acted maliciously and

sadistically, summary judgment is appropriate. Tindell v. Beard, 351 F. App’x 591, 596 (3d Cir.

2009).