Brown v. Camp Hill

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES EDWARD BROWN, :

:

Plaintiff, :

: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-2612

v. :

: (Judge Caputo)

WILLIAM D. SPRENKLE, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

M E M O R A N D U M

In December 2010, Plaintiff Charles Edward Brown, a prisoner in the custody of

the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Brown claims

various DOC employees (William D. Sprenkle, Tanya Brandt, Superintendent Michael

Klopotoski; Vincent Mooney, Jerome Walsh and Lori Lyons) transferred him to a different

facility in retaliation for his filing of institutional grievances. (ECF No. 66, Am. Compl.)

Presently before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment limited to the issue

of Mr. Brown’s exhaustion of Grievance 259990. (ECF Nos. 137 and 141).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants’ second motion

for summary judgment and deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. All other

pending motions, except for Plaintiff’s motion to file a response to Defendants’ summary

judgment motion (ECF No. 148), will be denied as moot. The Court will accept Mr.

Brown’s opposition materials as timely filed.

I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2019); Fed

R. Civ. P. 56(a).

To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively identify those

portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material

fact. Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If this burden

is met, the nonmoving party “may not rest on speculation and conjecture in opposing a

summary judgment motion.” Ramara, Inc. v. Westfied Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660, 666 (3d

Cir. 2016). Rather, the nonmovant must demonstrate, from more than the pleadings

alone, the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A dispute of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the non-moving party. Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d

742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015)). “[A]

fact is only material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

[substantive] law.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105 (citing Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ.

State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006.))

In deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the court's role is

not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether

there is a genuine issue for trial. Baloga, 927 F.3d at 752 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Pearson v.

Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 533-34 (3d Cir. 2017)). Credibility determinations are

the province of the factfinder. Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 262

(3d Cir. 2017).

II. Relevant Procedural History

Mr. Brown initiated this action on December 17, 2010. (ECF No. 1.) The DOC

Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint. The Court granted Defendants’

motion in part and denied it in part, allowing Mr. Brown to file an amended complaint.

Brown v. Camp Hill, No. 3:CV-10-2612, 2015 WL 5675575 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2015).

On October 9, 2015, Mr. Brown filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 66.)

Defendants again sought dismissal of the action. (ECF No. 68.) On September 29, 2016,

the Court denied Defendants’ motion finding Mr. Brown had plead a viable retaliation

claim. Brown v. Camp Hill, No. 3:CV-10-2612, 2016 WL 5461986 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29,

2016).

Shortly after Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 80)

they filed a motion for summary judgment based on Mr. Brown’s failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies with respect to his retaliatory transfer claim. Specifically,

Defendants alleged Mr. Brown failed to properly exhaust Grievance 282036. (ECF No.

81.) On September 5, 2017, the Court denied the motion finding that while Grievance

282036 was not properly exhausted, the record demonstrated Mr. Brown had filed

another administrative remedy, Grievance 259990, concerning his alleged retaliatory

transfer which Defendants had not challenged. Brown v. Camp Hill, 3:CV-No. 10-2612,

2017 WL 3872399 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2017). Defendants then sought leave to challenge

Mr. Brown’s exhaustion of Grievance 259990. (ECF No. 126.) The Court granted

Defendants’ request on August 16, 2018. (ECF No. 134.)

On November 2, 2018, Defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment

as to Mr. Brown’s failure to exhaust Grievance 259990. (ECF No. 137.) Defendants filed

a statement of material facts (ECF No. 138), supporting brief (ECF No. 139) and exhibits

(ECF No. 140). On November 2, 2018, in lieu of a response, Mr. Brown initially filed his

own motion for summary judgment asserting that Defendants impeded his ability to

complete the administrative remedy process with respect to Grievance 259990. (ECF

No. 141.) He also filed a statement of material facts, supporting brief and exhibits. (ECF

Nos. 142, 143, 144 and 145.) Mr. Brown then sought an enlargement of time to respond

to Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 148.) Defendants filed

a timely response to Mr. Brown’s motion for summary judgment which included a

response to his statement of material facts and opposition brief. (ECF Nos. 149 and 150.)

On December 7, 2018, Mr. Brown filed exhibits and a brief in opposition to Defendants’

motion for summary judgment. However, he did not address Defendants’ statement of

material facts. (ECF No. 156.)

In the interim, Mr. Brown filed multiple motions for sanctions. (ECF Nos. 146, 152,

158 and 160.) He seeks sanctions against defense counsel for his failing to mark their

litigation correspondence as “legal mail” under the DOC’s new mailing system which

results in his delayed receipt of such mailings,1 and because of his dissatisfaction with

Defendants’ response to his request for production of documents.2 He also sought

1 Mr. Brown does not identify the basis of his alleged privileged or confidential relationship

with defense counsel, a prerequisite to having correspondence identified as “legal mail” under the

DOC’s mail policy. Moreover, he does not suggest how defense counsel’s actions prejudiced him

in this matter or prevented him from seeking an enlargement of time from this Court to respond

to any Court ordered or pleading deadlines.

2 On August 20, 2018, the Court directed Defendants to respond to ¶¶ 1-5 of Mr. Brown’s

March 18, 2011-request for production of documents. (ECF No. 135.) Defendants then provided

sanctions against Chief Grievance Coordinator Dorina Varner for misrepresenting to the

Court that Grievance 282036 was the “sole” administrative remedy he filed concerning

his retaliatory transfer.3

III. Statement of Undisputed Facts4

Plaintiff Charles E. Brown is presently housed at the Smithfield State Correctional

Institution (SCI-Smithfield), in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 138, Defs.’

Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 1; ECF No. 142, Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 1; and

ECF No. 149, Defs.’ Answer to Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts.) The following DOC

employees are named as defendants: William Sprenkle, Lori Lyons, Tanya Brandt,

Michael Klopotoski, Jerome Walsh and Vincent Mooney. (ECF No. 138 at ¶ 2; ECF No.

149 at ¶ 2 and ECF No. 149 at ¶ 2.) The sole issue presented in this action is whether

Defendants transferred Mr. Brown from SCI-Dallas to SCI-Smithfield on December 16,

reasons and approval of his retaliatory transfer from SCI-Dallas to SCI-Smithfield” (ECF No. 147

at 4), Defendants are not required to create additional documents of formulate interrogatory-type

responses to his request for production of documents. Nonetheless, if this matter were to proceed

to trial, the Court would prevent Defendants from proffering documents responsive to Mr. Brown’s

request that they did not produce in discovery.

3 The Court previously denied Mr. Brown’s earlier motion for sanctions against defense

counsel concerning this same issue. See ECF No. 136. Upon examination of Ms. Varner’s

declaration, the Court find’s Mr. Brown’s representation of her declaration to be inaccurate. See

ECF No. 84-3, Declaration of Dorina Varner. She does not represent that Grievance 282036 is

the sole grievance Plaintiff filed. Instead, she addresses the exhaustion of the grievance defense

counsel asked her to examine.

4 Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise statement of the material

facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue

to be tried.” Pa. M.D. Local Rule 56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must

file a separate statement of material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in

the moving party’s statement and identifying genuine issue of trial. See Id. Although familiar with

the requirements of Local Rule 56.1, see ECF No. 142, Mr. Brown did not address Defendants’

2008, in retaliation for his filing of grievances. (ECF No. 66, Am. Compl.) The parties

have limited their summary judgment motions to the issue of Mr. Brown’s exhaustion of

Grievance 259990.

A. DOC’s Grievance Process

The DOC’s Administrative Directive DC-ADM 804 (DC-ADM 804) is known as the

Inmate Grievance System. (ECF Nos. 140-1 and ECF No. 145 at 3 – 17.) It provides

inmates with a multi-step administrative grievance appeal process to raise and resolve

issues arising during the course of their incarceration. Pursuant to DC-ADM 804, inmates

must first file a grievance with the Facility Grievance Coordinator at the facility where the

events giving rise to the grievance occurred. The grievance must be filed within fifteen

working days of the event upon which the grievance is based. If unsatisfied with the initial

review of his grievance, the inmate may appeal the decision to the Facility Manager

(Superintendent). If dissatisfied with the Facility Manager’s response, the inmate may

appeal that decision to final review by the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance Appeals

(SOIGA).

Via the DOC’s Inmate Handbook, the DOC provides inmates with notice of the

Grievance System and the procedural and substantive requirements they must follow to

properly exhaust their issue through the administrative remedy process. Extensions of

the filing deadlines for grievances and inmate appeals are available where the inmate

notifies the agency of the reason for the delay and it is determined that the delay was

attributable to reasons unrelated to the inmate’s actions; i.e., an inmate’s transfer or

delays with the mail delivery. (ECF Nos. 140-1 and ECF No. 145 at 3 – 17.)

B. Consolidated Grievance 259990

On December 22, 2008, Mr. Brown notified SCI-Dallas’ Grievance Coordinator,

Ms. Lucas, of his intent to file a “late” grievance challenging his retaliatory transfer from

SCI-Dallas to SCI-Smithfield. (ECF No. 140-2 at 1 – 2; ECF No. 145 at 19 – 20.) On

January 19, 2009, Mr. Brown filed Grievance 259990 addressing Ms. Lucas’ failure to

process his December 30, 2008-grievance about his retaliatory transfer. He attached a

copy of his unprocessed December 30, 2008-grievance, inter alia, as an exhibit to

Grievance 259990. (ECF No. 140-2 at 3 – 6 and ECF No. 145 at 22 – 25.)

Plaintiff also wrote to Dorina Varner, the DOC’s Chief Grievance Officer,

concerning Ms. Lucas’ failure to process his December 30, 2009 grievance. (ECF No.

140-2 at 7 – 8 and ECF No. 145 at 26 - 27.) Ms. Varner responded to Plaintiff on February

4, 2009. She advised Mr. Brown that Ms. Lucas received, and was processing, his

January 2009-grievance concerning the alleged failure to process his December 30, 2008

transfer related grievance as Grievance 259990. (ECF No. 140-2 at 9 and ECF No. 145

at 29.) Ms. Varner also addressed Mr. Brown’s inquiry as to the status of another

unrelated grievance, Grievance 255532.

[T]he initial response to Grievance No. 255532 was

completed on January 28, 2009. If you have not already

received a copy of the response, you should be receiving it

shortly. If you do not receive a copy, you should contact the

Facility Grievance Coordinator at SCI Dallas.

(ECF No. 140-2 at 9 and ECF No. 145 at 29.)

On February 13, 2009, Mr. Brown sent then Secretary Beard a letter requesting

that Ms. Lucas process his December 30, 2008 grievance pertaining to his alleged

retaliatory transfer. (ECF No. 140-2 at 10 and ECF No. 145 at 28.)

Ms. Lucas notified Mr. Brown via a February 18, 2009-memo that she requested,

and was approved, a ten-day extension to further investigate and respond to the

allegations of Grievance 259990. (ECF No. 140-2 at 11and ECF No. 145 at 31.) On

February 23, 2009, Unit Manager Galen Miller, responded to Grievance 259990. (ECF

No. 140-2 at 12.)

On February 25, 2009, Ms. Varner responded to Mr. Brown’s February 13, 2009-

letter to then Secretary Beard. (ECF No. 140-2 at 13 and ECF No. 145 at 30.)

As you were informed in this office’s Action Taken Notice

dated February 4, 2009, this office was informed that

institutional staff did not receive your December 30, 2008

grievance regarding your transfer. However, Ms. Lucas, the

Facility Grievance Coordinator, received your grievance dated

January 19, 2009 regarding your concerns that the December

30, 2008 grievance was not processed. Your January 19,

2009 grievance was received and processed as Grievance

No. 259990 on February 3, 2008 and assigned to Mr.

Demming. As Mr. Demming reviewed your January 19, 2009

grievance, it was discovered that a copy of your December

30, 2008 transfer grievance was attached to Grievance No.

259990. Mr. Demming then spoke to Ms. Lucas regarding the

grievance. A determination was then made that the copy of

your December 30, 2008 transfer-related grievance that you

attached to your January 19, 2009 grievance would be

assigned as Grievance No. 259990. Your December 30,

2008 transfer-related grievance and your January 19, 2009

grievance relating to the non-receipt of the December 30,

2008 grievance were combined. Ms. Lucas was attempting

to address the main crux of your concerns which seemed to

be your alleged retaliatory transfer. Grievance No. 259990

was then re-assigned to Mr. Miller to address the concerns

regarding your transfer. On February 18, 2009, Mr. Lucas

sent correspondence to you advising you that a ten-day

extension was requested and approved for staff to investigate

the concerns of Grievance No. 259990. According to

institutional staff, an initial review response was completed on

February 23, 2009.

It should be noted that an actual DC-804 grievance packet

dated December 30, 2008 was never received by the

institution. It is also noted that institutional staff was not

grievance as an actual grievance. However, although

somewhat confusing, institutional staff took the above actions

in an attempt to address your concerns regarding your

transfer.

(ECF No. 140-2 at 13 and ECF No. 145 at 30)(emphasis in the original).

Mr. Brown did not pursue an appeal of Grievance 259990 to either the Facility

Manager level or SOIGA. (ECF No. 138 at ¶ 26; ECF No. 140-3, Varner Decl., ¶ 23.)

IV. Discussion

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1996, Section 1997e(a), provides:

“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this

title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits

about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and

whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Exhaustion is “mandatory”; an

inmate may not bring any action absent exhaustion of available administrative remedies.

Id. at 524, 122 S.Ct. at 988. The idea is to eliminate unwarranted federal-court

interference with the administration of prisons by affording corrections officials time and

opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2387, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006).

Furthermore, “exhaustion” under the PLRA means “proper exhaustion.” (Id.) “Proper

exhaustion” is defined as “compliance with the agency’s deadlines and other critical

218, 127 S.Ct. 910, 923, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (“[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and

not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”). Thus, inmates who fail

to fully, or timely, complete the prison’s grievance process cannot satisfy the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement and are prohibited from litigating the claim in federal court.

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 83-84, 126 S.Ct. at 2382.

“The only limit to [the PLRA’s] mandate is the one baked into its text: An inmate

need exhaust only such administrative remedies as are ‘available.’” Ross v. Blake, _____

U.S. _____, _____, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1862, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016). If the actions of

prison officials directly caused the inmate’s procedural default of a grievance, the inmate

will not be held to strict compliance with this exhaustion requirement. See Camp v.

Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has explained that there are

“three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on

the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” Ross, _____ U.S. at _____, 136 S.Ct. at

1859. First, an administrative remedy will be deemed unavailable where the remedy

“operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide

any relief to aggrieved inmates”. (Id.) Second, a remedy is not available if the

“administrative scheme [is] so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of

use” and cannot be navigated by an ordinary prisoner. (Id.) Third, a remedy will be

deemed unavailable “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage

of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at

_____, 136 S.Ct. at 1858-60.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has found an inmate’s administrative remedy

“unavailable” where prison officials thwarted an inmate’s exhaustion efforts by providing

misleading filing instructions, see Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2002), and when

they “failed to timely (by its own procedural rules) respond to his grievance and then

repeatedly ignored his follow-up requests for a decision on his claim.” Robinson v. Supt.

Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2016). However, an inmate cannot cite to

alleged staff impediments to grieving a matter as grounds for excusing a failure to

exhaust, if it also appears that the prisoner did not pursue a proper grievance once those

impediments were removed. Oliver v. Moore, 145 F. App’x 731 (3d Cir. 2005) (failure to

exhaust not excused if, after staff allegedly ceased efforts to impeded grievance, prisoner

failed to follow through on grievance). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has also found

that where prison officials deter an inmate from pursuing an administrative remedy by

making “serious threats of substantial retaliation …. and bodily harm,” the administrative

remedy process is not “available.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 267 (3d Cir.

2018). To defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense based on such threats, “an inmate must

show (1) that the threat was sufficiently serious that it would deter a reasonable inmate

of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance and (2) that the threat actually

did deter this particular inmate.” Id. at 269.

Inmates are not required to plead and provide exhaustion in their complaint, rather

a prisoner-plaintiff’s failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the defendants must plead

and prove. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216, 127 S.Ct. at 921; see also Small v. Camden Cty.,

728 F.3d 265, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2013). Finally, “exhaustion is a question of law to be

determined by a judge, even if that determination requires the resolution of disputed

facts.” Id. at 269. “[J]udges may resolve factual disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue

without the participation of a jury.” Id. at 271.

B. Analysis

Defendants assert that Mr. Brown failed to exhaust his available administrative

remedies with respect to Grievance 259990 because he did not appeal the Initial Review

Response to final review as required by DC-ADM 804. (ECF No. 139.) Mr. Brown

contends the DOC’s administrative remedy process was unavailable to him because

“SCI-Dallas prison officials withheld the Initial Review response from Plaintiff” and

therefore he could not pursue an appeal. (ECF No. 142 at ¶ 34.)

This is not a situation where prison officials rendered their administrative remedy

process unavailable by failing to timely (by its own procedural rules) to respond to Mr.

Brown’s grievance and then repeatedly ignored his follow-up requests for a decision on

his grievance. It is undisputed that prison officials did not receive the original mailing of

Mr. Brown’s December 30, 2008-grievance. They received a copy of it on January 19,

2009 in connection with Mr. Brown’s grievance concerning Ms. Lucas’ alleged failure to

process the December 30, 2008-grievance. Prison officials did not reject the December

30, 2008-grievance as untimely, instead they consolidated the matter, for consideration

with Mr. Brown’s complaint that against Ms. Lucas under Grievance 259990. SCI-Dallas

officials formulated an Initial Review Response to Grievance February 23, 2009.

Contrary to Mr. Brown’s assertion, Defendants did not play “hide & seek” with the

Initial Review Response. (ECF No. 156 at 12.) While there is a dispute of fact as to

whether Mr. Brown received a contemporaneous copy of the February 23, 2009 Initial

Review Response, it is not a material dispute. Mr. Brown admits that “[o]n March 3, 2009,

[he] received a response from Ms. Varner on behalf of Secretary Beard about Grievance

December 30, 2008.” (ECF No. 35 at 3 and ECF No. 156-2 at 11). In that response, Ms.

Varner advises that “an initial review response [to Grievance 259990] was completed on

February 23, 2009.” (ECF No. 140-2 at 13 and ECF No. 145 at 30.) Thus, at the latest,

Mr. Brown learned of the Initial Review Response on March 3, 2009.

Aware of the Initial Review Response, Mr. Brown’s has not supported his assertion

that Defendants played “hide & seek” with it or withheld it from him thwarting his

exhaustion efforts. (ECF No. 156 at 12.) Mr. Brown was not left on uncharted ground

without recourse under the DOC’s grievance policy if he failed to receive a copy of the

February 23, 2009 Initial Review Response. Mr. Brown, who successfully demonstrated

his knowledge of his options when he pursued the processing of his December 30, 2008-

grievance, chose to ignore the same options when seeking to appeal the Initial Review

Response to Grievance 259990. After March 3, 2009, Mr. Brown could have alerted SCI-

Dallas officials that he would be filing a late appeal due to his lack of receipt of a copy of

the grievance response. Alternatively, he could have contacted Ms. Lucas and requested

an additional copy of the response.5 Mr. Brown does not suggest he ever requested, or

was denied, a copy of the initial review response from prison officials.6 He also does not

address why after learning of the response being filed, he did not seek an extension of

time to file an appeal or a copy of the grievance response.

This is not a case where prison officials directly caused the inmate’s procedural

default of grievance. Mr. Brown provides no excuse, other than his lack of receipt of a

physical copy of the Initial Review Response, to explain why did not pursue remedies

available to him under the DOC’s grievance policy. Once alerted to its existence, even

5 A month earlier Ms. Varner recommended he do just that if he did not receive an Initial

Review Response to Grievance 255532. See ECF No. 140-2 at 9 (“If you have not already

received a copy of the response (to Grievance 255532), you should be receiving it shortly. If you

do not receive a copy, you should contact the Facility Grievance Coordinator at SCI Dallas.”)

6 Mr. Brown states he did not receive a copy of the February 23, 2009, initial grievance

though he did not have a copy in hand, Mr. Brown cannot rest on his laurels and claim

staff interference with his access to the grievance process. Mr. Brown inexplicitly failed

to take any action on his own behalf to appeal the Initial Review Response of Grievance

259990 through the DOC’s Inmate Grievance System following his March 3, 2009 notice

of the existence.

It is undisputed that he failed to exhaust Grievance 259990 to final review. Prison

officials responded to his grievance and Mr. Brown was aware that SCI-Dallas officials

had completed an initial response to the grievance. Based on the record before the Court,

Mr. Brown has not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact to

suggest prison officials prevented him from exhausting his administrative remedies with

respect to Grievance 259990. Because Mr. Brown submits no competent summary

judgment evidence to show that any of the three circumstances described by the

Supreme Court are present in this case to the degree that “an administrative remedy,

although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief,” Ross, _____ U.S.

at _____, 136 S.Ct at 1859, there is no basis to excuse his failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies.

Based on the foregoing, the Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment will

be granted on the grounds that Mr. Brown failed to exhaust his available administrative

remedies as to his retaliatory transfer claim. Accordingly, Mr. Brown’s motion for

summary judgment will be denied.

An appropriate Order follows.

/s/ A. Richard Caputo________

A. RICHARD CAPUTO

United States District Judge

Dated: August 27, 2019