BROWN v. BRITTAIN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARTIN B. BROWN : CIVIL ACTION

Petitioner, pro se :

: NO. 23-2890

v. :

:

MS. K. BRITTAIN, et al. :

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 20th day of May 2024, upon consideration of pro se Petitioner Martin

Brown’s (“Petitioner”) amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, (the “Petition”), filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, (ECF 8), the Report and Recommendation issued by United States

Magistrate Judge Lynne A. Sitarski, (the “Magistrate Judge”), which recommended that the

Petition be dismissed, as untimely, (ECF 24), and Petitioner’s response/objections to the Report

and Recommendation, (ECF 27), and, after conducting a de novo review of the objections, it is

hereby ORDERED that:

1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED;

2. The objections to the Report and Recommendation are OVERRULED;1

1 Following his 2013 conviction, Martin Brown (“Petitioner”) was sentenced in 2014 to an

aggregated term of 30 to 60 years’ incarceration on the following offenses: third-degree murder, possession

of a firearm by a prohibited person, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on a public

street in Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of crime. Petitioner filed numerous post-conviction

appeals. This procedural history underlying Petitioner’s conviction and appeals, the subject matter of the

Report and Recommendation, (the “R&R”), is summarized in the R&R and is herein incorporated.

However, relevant portions of that history may be repeated below.

On July 8, 2023, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed an initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, (ECF 1), which he amended on August 21, 2023, (ECF 8). In the amended

petition, (the “Petition”), Petitioner seeks relief from his conviction on the grounds that: (1) his due process

rights were violated when the Post-Conviction Relief Act (the “PCRA”) court accepted the Government’s

late-filed motion without permitting a reply from him; (2) he is actually innocent based on newly discovered

evidence that the victim died of nursing home neglect rather than from being shot by him; and (3) the

Government violated Brady v. Maryland when the Commonwealth withheld evidence and elicited false

testimony. (ECF 8). In its response to the Petition, the Government argues, inter alia, that the Petition is

untimely because it had been filed long after the expiration of the applicable one-year statute of limitations.

(ECF 16). After carefully reviewing the record and considering the arguments, the Magistrate Judge issued

a thorough, well-reasoned R&R, and found, inter alia, that the Petition was untimely, and that Petitioner

failed to demonstrate actual innocence. As such, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Petition be

dismissed. (ECF 24). Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed objections to the R&R. (ECF 27).

When timely objections to an R&R are filed, a court must conduct a de novo review of the contested

portions of the R&R. See Sample v. Dieks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C)); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6–7 (3d Cir. 1984). In conducting its de novo review, a court

may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the factual findings or legal conclusions of the magistrate

judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Although the review is de novo, the statute permits the court to rely on the

recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.

667, 675–76 (1980); Goney, 749 F.2d at 7.

A. Statutory Tolling

In his objections, as best discerned, Petitioner argues, inter alia, that the Magistrate Judge erred in

concluding that his Petition was untimely. Petitioner is, however, mistaken. Under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996, petitions for writs of habeas corpus are subject to a

one-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C § 2244(d)(1), which commencement depends on certain events

occurring. This one-year statute of limitations is statutorily tolled during the time in which a petitioner

has a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” pending. Id. at §

2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); see also Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). An “application is ‘properly

filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing

filings.” Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added). Where a state court finds that a collateral challenge to a

state conviction is not properly filed under applicable state law, the challenge is not “properly filed” for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2) and does not toll the limitations period. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417

(2005); Wallace v. Mahonoy, 2 F.4th 133, 149 (3d Cir. 2021).

Here, Petitioner was sentenced in 2014. In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge found that the applicable

starting point for the one-year habeas statute of limitations is the “conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review,” or March 21, 2016. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus,

Petitioner had until March 21, 2017, to file his habeas petition. The Magistrate Judge further found that,

after accounting for the statutory tolling resulting from his various state-court appeals, the AEDPA’s statute

of limitations commenced again on May 26, 2021, (after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s petition for allowance of appeal of his first PCRA petition). See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S.

327, 332 (2007) (“[T]he text of the [AEDPA] must mean that the statute of limitations is tolled only while

state courts review the application.”). Thus, Petitioner had until May 2, 2022 to file his habeas petition.

Petitioner, however, did not file his initial habeas petition until July 8, 2023, more than 14 months after

the expiration of the statute of limitations. Under the habeas statute of limitations timeline, the Petition is

untimely.

Though Petitioner filed a second PCRA petition on August 10, 2021, this filing did not toll the

habeas statute of limitations. The PCRA court concluded on April 29, 2022, that the second petition was

untimely; a decision affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on February 24, 2023. See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 2023 WL 2196613, at *4 (Feb. 24, 2023). An “untimely application” for state

post-conviction relief is “not ‘properly filed’ under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),” and, thus, does not toll the

habeas statute of limitations. Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2003).

For the reasons set forth, this Court having found that under the habeas statute of limitations

timeline, the Petition is untimely, Petitioner is barred from presenting his claims unless his Petition is

subject to equitable tolling or Petitioner establishes a credible showing of actual innocence.

B. Equitable Tolling

Undisputedly, “the timeliness provision in the federal habeas corpus statute is subject to equitable

tolling.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010). To establish the doctrine of equitable tolling, a

litigant bears the burden of establishing two elements: “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649

(quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418); see also Williams v. Beard, 300 F. App’x 125, 129 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).

Here, in both his Petition and objections, Petitioner has failed to establish either element needed to

assert an equitable ground for relief. As noted by the Magistrate Judge, Petitioner cannot establish that he

has been diligently pursuing his rights or that some extraordinary circumstance caused his untimely filing.

Petitioner filed his habeas claim more than 14 months after the statute of limitations had expired. He

makes no argument as to equitable grounds for relief and does not provide an explanation for the late filing.

Even if Petitioner believed that the second, untimely PCRA petition filed during the pendency of

his habeas statute of limitations tolled the deadline — which it does not — this belief does not affect the

calculations of the habeas statute of limitation provision. “It is well-settled that a prisoner’s ignorance of

the law and lack of legal expertise does not excuse his failure to make a prompt and timely filing.”

Hendricks v. Johnson, 62 F. Supp. 3d 406, 411 (D. Del. 2014). Notably, Petitioner waited more than four

months after the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that his second PCRA petition was untimely to file a

habeas petition. Petitioner provides no explanation for this delay. As such, Petitioner has not established

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and/or that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way’ and prevented timely filing. He has not established any basis to find that his Petition is subject to

equitable tolling.

C. Actual Innocence

As the Magistrate Judge found, “[t]o prevent a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice,’ an untimely

petition is not barred when a petitioner makes a “credible showing of actual innocence,” which provides a

gateway to federal review of the petitioner’s otherwise procedurally barred claim of a constitutional

violation.” Reeves v. Fayette SCI, 897 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S.

383, 386 (2013)). McQuiggin “establishes an exception to the statute of limitations, even where a petitioner

may not qualify for an extension to the statute of limitations via equitable tolling.” Wallace, 2 F.4th at 151

(citing McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 400). To satisfy the McQuiggin standard, a petitioner must first present

new, reliable evidence and, second, must show that it is “more likely than not any reasonable juror would

have reasonable doubt.” Reeves, 897 F.3d at 160 (quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006)). This

requires that the petitioner furnish “evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in

the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional

error.” Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161. As to the second prong, the court “must consider all the evidence, old and

new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under rules

of admissibility that would govern at trial.” Id. (quoting House, 547 U.S. at 538).

3. The amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED without an

evidentiary hearing;

4. No probable cause exists to issue a certificate of appealability.2

To analyze Petitioner’s actual innocence claim, this Court has considered the following facts: On

January 11, 2011, Petitioner shot Clyde Raynor, (“Raynor” or the “victim”), a fact Petitioner has not

denied. Raynor was paralyzed from the waist down and spent the remainder of his life in the hospital and

various care facilities before he passed away in May 2012. Petitioner was convicted in 2013 of third-

degree murder. At the trial, the Medical Examiner was questioned on the negligent care the victim

received at the nursing facilities and opined that the cause of death was homicide. In the Petition,

Petitioner asserts that in March 2021, it became known to him that Raynor’s family had filed a wrongful

death lawsuit against the nursing home where the victim received care and that a financial settlement was

reached with the victim’s family and the care providers. (Am. Habeas Pet., ECF 8, at p. 6). Petitioner

now argues that this “new” evidence regarding the settlement would have proven the gunshot wound was

not the victim’s true cause of death but instead that Raynor’s death was due to negligence. (Id.). Petitioner

is mistaken. Without deciding whether the evidence regarding the settlement agreement is “new”

evidence under McQuiggin, this evidence does not show that its more likely than not any reasonable juror

would have reasonable doubt about his guilt. Clearly, Petitioner’s actions of shotting the victim remain

the direct and substantial factor of the victim’s death regardless of negligent care by the nursing home.

See Commonwealth v. Nunn, 947 A.2d 756, 760 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008); Hill v. Harry, 2024 WL 944023,

at *12 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2024) (holding that “[s]o long as the defendant’s conduct started the chain of

causation which led to the victim’s death, criminal responsibility for the crime of [third-degree murder]

may properly be found” where victim was raped by petitioner and sent to the hospital where she contracted

pneumonia and died one week later). As such, Petitioner has failed to make a credible showing of actual

innocence.

D. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth, Petitioner’s objections are overruled. This Court finds that the Petition

was filed untimely; that Petitioner has failed to establish that his Petition is subject to equitable tolling; and

that Petitioner has not made a credible showing of actual innocence. This Court further finds that the

Magistrate Judge did not err in the recommendations made and, accordingly, approves and adopts the R&R.

Lastly, in his response/objections, Petitioner has asked this Court to upgrade his sentence and order

his immediate death. This request is clearly beyond the authority of this Court and is, therefore, denied.

2 A district court may issue a certificate of appealability only upon “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). When a federal court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claims, a certificate of appealability may

not be issued unless the petitioner demonstrates that jurists of reason would find it debatable: (1) whether

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the district court was

correct in its procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “Where a plain procedural

bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could

not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be

allowed to proceed further.” Id. For the reasons set forth herein and in the R&R, this Court concludes that

the Petition is time barred and no reasonable jurist could conclude that this Court erred in the procedural

ruling. Accordingly, there is no basis for the issuance of a certificate of appealability.

The Clerk of Court is directed to mark this matter CLOSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO

Judge, United States District Court