“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons his case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons his case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRIAN KELLY FREEMAN, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-1270
:
EMPLOYEES OF THE :
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF :
PROBATION AND PAROLE, et al., :
Defendants. :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2024, upon consideration of Plaintiff Brian
Kelly Freeman’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1), Prisoner Trust
Fund Account Statement (ECF No. 4), and Complaint (ECF No. 2), it is ORDERED
that:
1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915.
2. Brian Kelly Freeman, #KN-0816, shall pay the full filing fee of $350 in
installments, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), regardless of the outcome of this case.
The Court directs the Superintendent of SCI Greene or other appropriate official to
assess an initial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to
Freeman’s inmate account; or (b) the average monthly balance in Freeman’s inmate
account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of this case. The
Superintendent or other appropriate official shall calculate, collect, and forward the
initial payment assessed pursuant to this Order to the Court with a reference to the
docket number for this case. In each succeeding month when the amount in Freeman’s
inmate trust fund account exceeds $10.00, the Superintendent or other appropriate
official shall forward payments to the Clerk of Court equaling 20% of the preceding
month’s income credited to Freeman’s inmate account until the fees are paid. Each
payment shall refer to the docket number for this case.
3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the
Superintendent of SCI Greene.
4. The Complaint is DEEMED filed.
5. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons
in the Court’s Memorandum.
6. Freeman may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the
date of this Order. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption
of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended
complaint and shall state the basis for Freeman’s claims against each defendant. The
amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial
Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. The amended complaint
may not rely solely on exhibits to state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint,
Freeman should be mindful of the Court’s reasons for dismissing the claims in his
initial Complaint as explained in the Court’s Memorandum. Upon the filing of an
amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court.
7. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of the Complaint (ECF
No. 2) to Freeman for his review, along with a blank copy of the Court’s form complaint
for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action number.
Freeman may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.
8. If Freeman does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends
to stand on his Complaint as originally pleaded, he may file a notice with the Court
within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the
Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled
“Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case.
See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to
amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to
stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be
appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976)));
In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the
otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims”
when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the
remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).
9. If Freeman fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude
that Freeman intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing
this case.1 See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand
1 The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863
(3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on
his complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint”
doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure
to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also
Elansari v. Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an
analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes
adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his
complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F.
App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates
that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so
contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of
on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him
to take action to cure a defective complaint).
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gerald J. Pappert
GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.
the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D.
171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors
in cases where a party willfully abandons his case or otherwise makes adjudication of the
matter impossible.” (citing cases)).