BROWN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RA’ SHEEN J. BROWN, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-1019

:

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

BAYLSON, J. APRIL 17, 2024

Ra’ Sheen J. Brown, an inmate currently confined at SCI Frackville, has filed a pro se

Complaint asserting various civil rights violations in connection with a state court criminal

prosecution. As set forth more fully below, Brown’s claims against the named Defendants in

their individual capacities will be dismissed based on absolute prosecutorial immunity. All

claims based on violations of the Pennsylvania constitution and state tort law also will be

dismissed. The Court will permit Brown to proceed on his Monell claim against the City of

Philadelphia and his official capacity claim against former District Attorney Seth Williams, but

will dismiss the official capacity claims against the Assistant District Attorneys.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Brown’s claims arise out of a state court criminal prosecution for which the conviction

and sentence were subsequently vacated.2 He names the following Defendants in their

1 The allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Brown’s Complaint. The Court

adopts the sequential pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

2 The publicly available state court docket, of which this Court may take judicial notice, see Buck

v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006), reflects that a new trial on the

charges was ordered and is currently scheduled to commence on August 5, 2024. See

Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-51-CR-0002569-2012 (C.P. Phila.).

individual and official capacities: (1) the City of Philadelphia; (2) former Philadelphia District

Attorney Seth Williams; (3) John or Jane Doe #1, a supervisor in the District Attorney’s Office

for the City of Philadelphia; (4), Assistant District Attorney Carolyn Naylor; (5) John or Jane

Doe #2, a supervisor in the Appeals Unit of the District Attorney’s Office for the City of

Philadelphia; and (6) Assistant District Attorney Hugh Burns, Appeals Unit. (Compl. at 7-9.)

Brown was arrested and charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, possession

of a firearm by a prohibited person, carrying a firearm on a public street, and possession of an

instrument of crime, in connection with a shooting that occurred on October 17, 2011 in

Philadelphia. (Id. at 9-10; Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-51-CR-0002569-2012 (C.P. Phila.).)

Brown was held for trial based on the statement of a witness, who recanted the statement at the

preliminary hearing, alleging that it was the product of physical and psychological violence by

Detective James Pitts. (Compl. at 10.) Although Brown moved for discovery of the personnel

files of two of the detectives involved in his case to determine whether there had been any

allegations of misconduct, no discovery was turned over by District Attorney Naylor. (Id.) Two

witnesses who were called at trial disavowed their out of court statements that implicated Brown

in the shooting. (Id. at 11.) The first testified that Detective Pitts physically and psychologically

intimidated him into making the statement, and the second testified that she was pressured by

Detective Ronald Dove when giving her statement and she was under the influence of alcohol

when she gave the statement. (Id.) The witness statements were introduced at trial by Assistant

District Attorney Naylor through the detectives. (Id.) A separate witness testified on behalf of

Brown, stating that he observed an individual other than Brown shoot the victim. (Id.)

According to Brown, the “trial was ultimately a credibility contest between the witnesses and

detectives with Ms. Naylor arguing that the detectives were sworn officers of the law with no

reason to lie.” (Id.) Brown was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to life imprisonment

on June 26, 2013. (Id.)

During Brown’s appeal, which was defended against by Assistant District Attorney Hugh

Burns, it was reported in the news that Detective Pitts was found to have fabricated evidence in

three other cases, and Detective Dove was under investigation “in the cover up of three

homicides and a disappearance.” (Id. at 11-12.) Pitts and Dove were each dismissed from

employment with the Philadelphia Police Department and were prosecuted for their actions in

other criminal investigations and trials. (Id. at 12-13.)

Brown was initially unsuccessful in his attempts to overturn his conviction on direct

appeal and through post-conviction proceedings. (Id. at 12.) He later filed a habeas petition and

a successive petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). (Id.) During the course of

his second PCRA proceeding, the Commonwealth sent Brown “over three (300) hundred pages

of disclosure material that was never turned over previously,” which included three sustained

findings of misconduct against Pitts and one sustained finding of misconduct against Dove. (Id.

at 13.) Brown asserted Brady violations on September 21, 2022, based on information

discovered in another case involving Detective Pitts. (Id.) According to Brown, as part of an

investigation into the other case, “the Conviction Integrity Unit discovered that the District

Attorney’s Office had a general policy of not obtaining or disclosing such records” and advised

counsel to subpoena the records to find the Brady material, thereby “putting the onus on the

defense counsel to find Brady material.” (Id.)3 Brown contends that the investigation into at

least two of the misconducts occurred and concluded prior to his own trial. (See id. at 18.)

3 Brown alleges that the misconducts were initially detailed in a Joint Stipulation of Fact filed by

the Commonwealth and the defendant in an unrelated case, Commonwealth v. Onyiah, No. CP-

51-CR-00001632-2011 (C.P. Phila.).

Brown further asserts that the Commonwealth acknowledged that it “had suppressed exculpatory

and impeachment evidence regarding Pitts and Dove, critical witnesses for the Commonwealth at

[Brown’s] trial on the merits, the Commonwealth conceded to vacate [his] conviction on March

29, 2023” and the sentencing judge vacated the judgment of sentence on May 5, 2023. (Id.)

Brown asserts various constitutional claims, as well as state law claims based on

Defendants’ actions.4 (Id. at 19.) He seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages. (Id. at

20.)5

4 Brown lists various constitutional amendments and legal theories as the basis for his claims.

However, passing references to various legal precepts, without further development, are not

sufficient to raise claims under such principles. See Campbell v. LVNV Finding, LLC and

Resurgent Capital Servs., No. 21-5388, 2022 WL 6172286, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2022) (A

“‘passing reference’ to jurisprudential precepts without more does not bring that issue before the

Court in that it provides no basis for a ruling one way or the other.”) (citing Laborers’ Int’l

Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994));

Alexis v. Sessions, No. 18-2099, 2018 WL 5077899, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2018). Thus, the

Court construes the Complaint as raising only the claims discussed in detail below. In any event,

to the extent Brown invokes other legal provisions, for instance, § 1985 and § 1986, he has not

stated a plausible basis for a claim under those provisions. “[T]o state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1985(3), a plaintiff must allege (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class based

discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons

to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury

to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United

States.” Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997); Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d

131, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that Ҥ 1985(3) defendants must have allegedly conspired

against a group that has an identifiable existence independent of the fact that its members are

victims of the defendants’ tortious conduct”). “[T]o properly plead an unconstitutional

conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred.”

Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010). “[A]

bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

(2007). “[Section] 1986 constitutes an additional safeguard for those rights protected under 42

U.S.C. § 1985, and ‘transgressions of § 1986 by definition depend on a preexisting violation of §

1985.” Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Rogin v. Bensalem Twp.,

616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980)). Thus, “to maintain a cause of action under § 1986, the

plaintiffs must show the existence of a § 1985 conspiracy.” Id. at 1295 n.5.

5 Declaratory judgments are unavailable to litigants who seek a proclamation that their rights

were violated in the past, as Brown requests here. See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84

(3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although Brown has paid the filing fee in full, (see ECF No. 4), the Court has the

authority to screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d

113, 116 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the district courts have the authority to screen a

prisoner complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) even if the prisoner is not proceeding in forma

pauperis). Section 1915A requires that the Court “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any

event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In doing so, the Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that

“is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” id. §

1915A(b)(1), or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief,”

id. § 1915A(b)(2).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) is governed by the same

standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See

Harris v. Wetzel, 822 F. App’x 128, 130 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam); see also Tourscher v.

McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether

the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). ‘“At

this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se]

complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only

conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); see also

Andela v. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)

(“Declaratory judgments are meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in the

anticipation of some future conduct.”). Accordingly, declaratory relief is not available here. The

Court addresses Brown’s remaining claims for damages below.

whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible []

claim.’” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio,

792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678.

As Brown is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the allegations in the Complaint

liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,

Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). “This means we remain flexible, especially ‘when

dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants[.]’” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). The Court will

“apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However,

‘“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.’” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims

Brown raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the vehicle by which federal constitutional

claims may be brought in federal court. Section 1983 “does not, by its own terms, create

substantive rights; it provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in

the Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996); Pappas

v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (“Section 1983 is not a source of

substantive rights,” but is merely a means through which “to vindicate violations of federal law

committed by state actors.”) (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). “To

state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

1. Individual Capacity Claims

Brown’s claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities are based on their

actions taken during the prosecution of Brown’s state criminal case. Specifically, he claims that

Seth Williams acted as final policymaker and supervisor for the District Attorney’s Office,

including the decision of what material was to be provided to criminal defendants. (Compl. at

19.) He further alleges that the actions of John or Jane Doe #1 were taken in his or her role as

supervisor for the District Attorney’s Office and he or she was legally responsible for the actions

of his or her subordinates during his or her shift. (Id.) Additionally, Brown contends that

Carolyn Naylor acted in her role as Assistant District Attorney and she prosecuted cases in

accordance with the policy of the District Attorney’s Office. (Id. at 20.) He further claims that

the actions of John or Jane Doe #2 were taken in his or her role as supervisor for the Appeals

Unit in the District Attorney’s Office and he or she was legally responsible for the actions of his

or her subordinates during his or her shift. (Id.) Brown also alleges that the actions of Hugh

Burns were undertaken in his role as Assistant District Attorney in the Appeals Unit for the

District Attorney’s Office and he prosecuted cases on appeal in accordance with policy of the

District Attorney’s Office. (Id.)

It is well settled that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for

damages under § 1983 for acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). “[W]hether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute

immunity depends on whether she establishes that she was functioning as the state’s ‘advocate’

while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation.” Yarris v.

Cty. of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006). Absolute immunity extends to the decision

to initiate a prosecution, including “soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury

proceedings and probable cause hearings,” presenting a state’s case at trial, and appearing before

a judge to present evidence. Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal citations

omitted). “[P]rosecutors [also] are entitled to absolute immunity from claims for damages

related to their roles in choosing when and whether to dismiss charges or withdrawal [sic] an

arrest warrant lodged against a defendant.” Garcia v. Philadelphia Dist. Attorney’s Off., No. 23-

1224, 2023 WL 3750604, at *2 (3d Cir. June 1, 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-6327, 2024 WL

675086 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024), (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (extending

absolute immunity to protect those functions in which the prosecutor acts as an “advocate for the

State,” even if they “involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions

apart from the courtroom”)). After a conviction is obtained, a prosecutor’s conduct is entitled to

absolute immunity where the conduct is “part of the prosecutor’s continuing personal

involvement as the state’s advocate in adversarial post-conviction proceedings.” Yarris, 465 F.

3d at 137. “[P]rosecutors are [also] entitled to absolute immunity from claims based on their

failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, so long as they did so while functioning in their

prosecutorial capacity.” Id.; see also Munchinski v. Solomon, 747 F. App’x 52, 58 (3d Cir. 2018)

(“[T]he prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from suit - even when he intentionally

withholds evidence that is exculpatory under Brady” because “‘accurately determining guilt or

innocence requires that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct

of the trial and the presentation of evidence’” (citing Imbler, 242 U.S. at 426)). Moreover,

District Attorneys and other supervisory prosecutors are likewise entitled to absolute immunity

from claims based on their role in pursuing a prosecution on behalf of the Commonwealth. See

Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 348-49 (2009).

Because Brown’s claims against each of the named individual Defendants are clearly

based upon their actions as prosecutors representing the Commonwealth in the judicial phase of

his state criminal proceedings, each is entitled to absolute immunity. The claims against

Defendants Williams, Naylor, Burns, as well as the John and Jane Does, in their individual

capacities will be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Official Capacity Claims and Claims Against the City of Philadelphia

Brown alleges that prior to trial, he moved for discovery of, inter alia, the personnel files

of Detectives Pitts and Dove to ascertain whether there were any allegations of misconduct

against them, but no discovery with respect to Pitts and Dove was turned over by ADA Naylor.

(Compl. at 10.) During the pendency of Brown’s appeal, it was reported in the media that Pitts

had been found to have fabricated evidence in three cases and that Dove was under investigation;

Brown then requested a hearing based on after-discovered evidence on January 6, 2015. (Id. at

11-12.) Brown raised a Brady violation in his successive PCRA petition in September 2019, and

during an evidentiary hearing on June 17, 2022 on the successive PCRA petition. (Id. at 12-13.)

On August 21, 2022, Brown received 300 pages of discovery material that had not been

previously disclosed to him, including three sustained misconduct findings with respect to Pitts,

and one sustained misconduct finding with respect to Dove. (Id. at 13.) These misconducts were

detailed in the Joint Stipulation in the Onyiah case. (Id.) Two of the misconduct investigations

were completed prior to Brown’s trial, while a third investigation was concluded during the

pendency of Brown’s appeal. (Id. at 18.) Brown alleges that the Commonwealth acknowledged

that it “had suppressed exculpatory and impeachment evidence regarding Pitts and Dove, critical

witnesses for the Commonwealth” at his trial and vacated his conviction on March 29, 2023.

(Id.) The judgment of sentence was vacated on May 5, 2023. (Id.)

Brown claims that Defendants’ conduct deprived him of his constitutional rights during

his prosecution, including, e.g., inter alia, the right to a fair trial, due process, cross examination,

and compulsory process. (Id. at 19.) He asserts that the actions of the individual Defendants

were taken pursuant to the practices and policies of the City of Philadelphia “to prosecute

individuals without due process and to deny a fair trial as evidence[d] by the policy of the

District Attorney’s Office.” (Id.) He further avers that the actions of the individual Defendants

were caused by the failure of the City, “with deliberate indifference, to properly train, control or

supervise the individual defendants with respect to their powers under the Constitution and laws

of the United States.” (Id.)

From his allegations, it appears that Brown seeks to pursue claims for municipal liability

pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Local

governments and municipalities are considered persons under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.

However, municipal liability cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior basis, meaning that

municipalities may not be held liable simply because their employees committed a constitutional

violation. Id. at 691. Rather, “under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for ‘their

own illegal acts.”’ Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in original)). There are two ways for a § 1983

claim against a municipality to proceed: “[a] plaintiff may put forth that an unconstitutional

policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries, or that they were caused by a

failure or inadequacy by the municipality that reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.” Forrest

v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “‘Policy is

made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with

respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’” Estate of Roman v. City

of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d

1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “‘Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given

course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and

permanent as virtually to constitute law.’” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850

(3d Cir. 1990)). For a custom to be the proximate cause of an injury, a plaintiff must establish

that the defendant “had knowledge of similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take

precautions against future violations, and that its failure, at least in part, led to [plaintiff’s]

injury.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). “A plaintiff must also allege that the

policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.” Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798

(citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)). This can be done “by

demonstrating an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom and the particular

constitutional violation” alleged. Id.

If the alleged policy or custom at issue is a failure to train or supervise, the plaintiff must

show that this failure “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the .

. . employees will come into contact.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d

Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation omitted). “The failure to train an employee must be a

choice on the part of the supervisor or supervising entity knowing that the training that is (or is

not) being provided is not sufficient for the employees and the choices they encounter on the

job.” Curran v. Venango Cnty., No. 23-0019, 2023 WL 8439274, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2023)

(citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90 (1989)), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 23-19, 2023 WL 8061513 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2023). “A plaintiff

claiming a failure to train must allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained

employees that puts . . . decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary.” Johnson,

975 F.3d at 403 (citations and quotations omitted). “Otherwise, the plaintiff needs to show that

failure to provide the identified training would likely result in the violation of constitutional

rights - i.e., to show that the need for more or different training was so obvious.” Id. (quotations

and citations omitted).

A claim against a government employee named in his official capacity is

indistinguishable from a claim against the governmental entity that employs the defendant. See

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally

represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent.’”) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55). “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects

other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. Thus, to state a § 1983 claim

against a public entity’s employees acting in an official capacity, a complaint must allege that a

constitutional deprivation was caused by an official policy or informally adopted custom.

Garcia, 2023 WL 3750604, at *2 (internal citations omitted).

Here, Brown brings claims against the City, as well as claims against Defendant Williams

and the individual ADAs in their official capacities. Brown’s claims against the Assistant

District Attorneys in their official capacities will be dismissed because they do not have

policymaking authority. See DeSousa v. City of Philadelphia, No. 11-3237, 2012 WL 6021319,

at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2012) (dismissing official capacity claims against Assistant District

Attorney because “under Pennsylvania law, assistant district attorneys do not possess

policymaking authority for the District Attorney’s Office”) (citing Patterson v. City of Phila.,

No. 08-2140, 2009 WL 1259968, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 2009); Payson v. Ryan, No. 90-1873,

1992 WL 111341, at *11 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1992), aff’d, 983 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also

Bey v. Sierra Streets, No. 21-0685, 2021 WL 735724, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2021) (official

capacity claim against Assistant District Attorney is essentially a claim against the Philadelphia

District Attorney’s Office for which the plaintiff must identify a custom or policy, and specify

what exactly that custom or policy was to satisfy the pleading standard).

This leaves Brown’s Monell claim against the City, and official capacity claim against

former District Attorney Williams. Brown identifies a specific policy of the City and District

Attorney’s Office — to refrain from obtaining and disclosing Internal Affairs investigation

reports concerning police misconduct, and instead to notify defense counsel that they should

subpoena the records themselves. Brown asserted a Brady violation on the basis that exculpatory

evidence was withheld from him as a result of this policy, and his conviction and sentence were

vacated. Thus, Brown has pled an affirmative link between the alleged policy and the alleged

constitutional violation. At this stage, the Court will allow Brown’s Monell claims against the

City and former District Attorney Williams in his official capacity to proceed past statutory

screening. See Poteat v. Lydon, No. 22-2114, 2023 WL 6620368, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 11, 2023),

cert. denied, No. 23-6683, 2024 WL 1348921 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2024) (noting that the Lehigh County

District Attorney’s Office might have been subject to liability for § 1983 claims if its official

policy or custom caused Poteat’s deprivation of rights) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95; City

of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385).

B. State Law Claims

Brown seeks to assert claims based on the Pennsylvania constitution and state tort law

against the individual Defendants. (See Compl. at 19-20.) This he may not do. First, Brown

may not proceed on any claims for damages based on the Pennsylvania constitution.

“Pennsylvania does not have a statutory equivalent to § 1983 and does not recognize a private

right of action for damages stemming from alleged violation of the state constitution.” Miles v.

Zech, 788 F. App’x 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam); see also Plouffe v. Cevallos, 777 F.

App’x 594, 601 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[N]or is there a private right of action for damages under the

Pennsylvania Constitution”); Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442

F. App’x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (“No Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no Pennsylvania

court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania

Constitution.”).

Second, to the extent Brown seeks to assert claims against the individual Defendants

under state tort law, such claims will be dismissed. In Pennsylvania, common law tort immunity

protects “high public officials,” including district attorneys and assistant district attorneys, from

suit when acting in the scope of their official duties and authority, as the individual Defendants

were in pursuing Brown’s prosecution. See Poteat, 2023 WL 6620368, at *3 (citing Heller v.

Fulare, 454 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2006); Durham v. McElynn, 772 A.2d 68, 69-70 (Pa. 2001));

see also Johnson v. City of Reading, No. 21-4860, 2023 WL 1783775, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6,

2023) (“The standard used to determine who qualifies as a ‘high public official’ under

Pennsylvania common law (1) depends on the nature of their duties, (2) the importance of their

office, and (3) whether the role has policy-making functions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

has held that District Attorneys and Assistant District Attorneys qualify as a high official for

purposes of immunity.”) (internal citations omitted); Wilson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 21-

2057, 2023 WL 5186258, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2023) (because Court had determined that

ADA, and by extension, DA, were participating in “prosecutorial” activity that was absolutely

protected, this necessarily meant that they were operating within the scope of their official duties

and powers, and were immune from plaintiff’s claims for civil damages based on state law tort

claims of malicious prosecution and reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress). As

discussed above, the facts alleged show that the individual Defendants acted within their

prosecutorial roles. Accordingly, any claims based on violations of the Pennsylvania

constitution and state tort law will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Brown’s claims against the Defendants in their individual

capacities will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to

state a claim based on absolute prosecutorial immunity. Moreover, any claims based on

violations of the Pennsylvania constitution and state tort law will be dismissed with prejudice

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. Brown’s Monell claims against

the City and former District Attorney Williams in his official capacity will be allowed to

proceed; however, the Court will dismiss the official capacity claims against the Assistant

District Attorneys.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Michael M. Baylson

_________________________________________

MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, J.