NATIVIDAD v. RALEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICARDO NATIVIDAD,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 22-5061

DETECTIVE PAUL RALEY, et al.,

Defendants.

PAPPERT, J. November 9, 2023

MEMORANDUM

Ricardo Natividad sued the City of Philadelphia, three Philadelphia police

detectives and two Philadelphia assistant district attorneys after Natividad was

sentenced to death and spent nearly twenty-four years in prison in connection with a

murder for which his conviction was ultimately vacated. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

Natividad alleges that the officers and prosecutors conspired to deprive him of a fair

trial and manufactured a case against him by fabricating evidence and withholding

exculpatory evidence. He claims these violations of his constitutional rights were

caused by a longstanding City policy or custom.

The Defendants move to dismiss most of the claims against them pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The prosecutors cite absolute immunity for

their conduct, while the City and police officers argue Natividad has not alleged facts

specific enough to establish a civil rights conspiracy, or to state a claim for municipal

liability.

The Court grants the motions in part and denies in part. The prosecutors are

entitled to absolute immunity, though Natividad will be allowed to amend his

complaint one last time to include the allegation that one of them defied court orders by

refusing to disclose certain discovery during post-conviction proceedings. Natividad

plausibly alleges the officers conspired to deprive him of his due process rights and took

overt acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, and that a City policy or custom led

to the violation of his constitutional rights.

I

Following Robert Campbell’s 1996 murder at a West Philadelphia gas station, a

squad of Philadelphia police detectives, including Paul Raley, James Dougherty and

Arthur Mee were assigned to investigate. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 27, ECF 19). Ricardo

Natividad emerged as a suspect in Campbell’s killing after his friend, Byron Price,

implicated him. (Id. ¶ 10, 12).

Natividad alleges all evidence against him was fabricated by the detectives as

well as prosecutors assigned to the case, Richard Sax and Charles Gallagher. (Id. ¶ 31).

He claims Price was coached by the detectives and prosecutors in exchange for a

promise not to be prosecuted as an accessory. (Id. ¶ 9–10). In exchange for this favor,

Price contradicted his initial statement to police that Natividad possessed a .38 special

when Campbell was killed. After learning police recovered a .354 revolver with black

grips, Price said he saw Natividad with that type of weapon. (Id. ¶ 11). Natividad also

claims the Defendants manufactured a story that Natividad stole a two-door Lincoln

Continental to tie him to the murder, while concealing evidence that a four-door

Lincoln was seen leaving the murder scene, and that a man nicknamed “Rob” drove a

black Lincoln. (Id. ¶ 26).

Aside from coaching witnesses and manufacturing a narrative, Defendants also

allegedly buried exculpatory evidence. Numerous witnesses implicated Rob in the

murder, (id. ¶ 13–23, 28), with one police officer allegedly overhearing Rob admit to

killing Campbell. (Id. ¶ 22). The Defendants also allegedly deep-sixed a statement of

an eyewitness, John McCullough, who said “that [Natividad] was not one of the two

individuals involved in the killing.” (Id. ¶ 13). Despite knowing of the evidence

implicating Rob, Gallagher approved Natividad’s arrest warrant and he was

subsequently charged.

Instead of disclosing the exculpatory evidence, Natividad claims prosecutors

concealed it and continued to build a case against him. (Id. ¶ 31). Both prosecutors

sought and obtained phone records from Natividad’s family members, and Gallagher

approved an arrest warrant for Natividad’s uncle, allegedly for witness intimidation

purposes. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 78). Sax sought ex parte bench warrants for exculpatory

witnesses, purportedly to conceal them. (Id. ¶ 52).

At trial, Natividad was convicted and sentenced to death, and the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. (Id. ¶ 34). In 2014, during post-

conviction proceedings, a court order granted Natividad access to discovery, where he

learned of two previously undisclosed exculpatory statements fingering Rob as the

killer. (Id. ¶ 35). Natividad then filed a petition seeking relief pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act. (Id. ¶ 36). Even in the PCRA proceedings, however, certain

Defendants continued their alleged cover-up; Dougherty purportedly threatened a

witness’s son and presented fabricated notes from a conversation that occurred nearly

twenty years prior. (Id. ¶ 37).

Natividad’s PCRA petition was dismissed in 2017, but in 2021, his federal

habeas corpus petition was granted and his conviction vacated. (Id. ¶ 40). Rather than

remain in custody and proceed to a new trial, and afraid to face police and prosecutors

again, Natividad pled guilty to third-degree murder. (Id. ¶¶ 41–42).

Natividad now seeks damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional

rights. Defendants moved to dismiss Natividad’s original complaint, and Judge

Robreno granted the motions in part, while allowing amendment. (ECF 18). Natividad

filed his amended complaint on May 3, 2023, alleging the individual Defendants

violated his due process right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count I)

and conspired to deprive him of his civil rights (Count II). Count III asserts a Monell

claim against the City. Gallagher and Sax move to dismiss Counts I and II based on

absolute immunity. Raley, Dougherty and Mee also move to dismiss Count II, arguing

the conspiracy claim is not pled with adequate specificity, while the City moves to

dismiss Count III.

II

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we “consider only

the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, [and] matters of public record, as

well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon

these documents.” Alpizer-Fallas v. Favero, 908 F.3d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 2018). The

Court takes factual allegations of the complaint as true and draws all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc., 672 F.3d 241,

245 (3d Cir. 2012). Legal conclusions receive no deference, and the Court is “not bound

to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Wood v. Moss, 572

U.S. 744, 755 n.5 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

A plaintiff must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim” which gives

the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 47 (1957)). The complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter to show that the

claim is facially plausible,” and thus enabling the Court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct. Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen,

Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,

210 (3d Cir. 2009)). Plausibility does not mean probability, but it asks for more than

sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The motion to dismiss will be granted pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) if the factual allegations in the complaint are not sufficient “to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Geness v. Admin. Off. of Pa. Cts., 974 F.3d 263, 269

(3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2670 (2021).

III

Absolute immunity extends to both in-court activity, such as the presentation of

evidence or legal argument, as well as out-of-court behavior “intimately associated with

the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430

(1976). In contrast, prosecutors are entitled only to qualified immunity for actions

taken in an investigative or administrative capacity. Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d

1454, 1463 (3d Cir. 1992).

The Third Circuit employs a two-part test to evaluate such claims. Schneyder v.

Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 332 (3d Cir. 2011). First, courts must “ascertain just what

conduct forms the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action,” and then it must “determine

what function (prosecutorial, administrative, investigative, or something else entirely)

that act served.” Id. In determining immunity, courts must examine “the nature of the

function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Forrester v. White,

484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988). While it is “tempting to derive bright-line rules” from the

Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Third Circuit has “cautioned against such

categorical reasoning” to “preserve the fact-based nature of the inquiry.” Fogle v. Sokol,

957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 210 (3d Cir.

2008)).

To determine whether Gallagher and Sax are entitled to absolute immunity, the

Court must “parse the fine lines between advocacy and investigation,” id. at 160, focus

on the unique facts of the case, and carefully dissect the prosecutors’ actions. Odd, 538

F.3d at 210. The onus is on the prosecutor to demonstrate that “absolute immunity

should attach to each act he allegedly committed that gave rise to the cause of action.”

Fogle, 957 F.3d at 160 (quoting Light v. Haws, 472 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Asserting absolute immunity in a 12(b)(6) motion is especially challenging

because “it is the defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized.”

Id. (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996)) (emphasis in original). Put

another way, to earn absolute immunity, the defendants must show the conduct

triggering absolute immunity “clearly appear[s] on the face of the complaint.” Id.

(quoting Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1989)).

A

Natividad’s claims against Gallagher and Sax—violation of due process rights by

fabricating evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence and civil rights conspiracy—

hinge on the same alleged conduct: (1) Gallagher and Sax coached Byron Price and

another adverse witness, Robert Golatt, to manufacture a case against Natividad; (2)

Gallagher approved an arrest warrant for Natividad despite knowledge of evidence

implicating Rob; (3) Gallagher approved an arrest warrant for Natividad’s uncle for

witness intimidation; (4) Sax sought bench warrants for exculpatory witnesses so he

could hide them; and (5) Gallagher and Sax “approved of and had access to” phone

records of Natividad’s family members to taint the investigation and falsely implicate

Natividad. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 74–80). In the alternative, Natividad asks for leave to

again amend his complaint to add an allegation that Sax violated court orders requiring

he disclose exculpatory evidence during the state and federal post-conviction

proceedings. (Resp. To Mot. To Dismiss, at 10–11, ECF 28).

1

Natividad claims that as part of an investigative function Gallagher and Sax

coached witnesses like Price and Golatt to implicate him. But Natividad needs more

than the “naked assertion” that this conduct occurred in the investigatory phase. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Gallagher and Sax focus on the specific factual allegations and

point out it was Price and Golatt’s trial testimony that directly implicated Natividad,

giving them absolute immunity for their alleged conduct. (Mot. To Dismiss, at 9, ECF

23). The amended complaint supports their assertion. Natividad says, “[A]t trial, Price

testified that he saw Plaintiff with a .357 revolver,” and “Robert Golatt, a witness at the

criminal trial, testified also that all individual Defendants had told him about the .357

Magnum in order to implicate Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12) (emphasis added). Prosecutors

are acting as advocates during trial, and at common law prosecutors were absolutely

immune “for eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses.” Burns, 500 U.S.

at 489–90; see also Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 344 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that the

solicitation of false testimony for grand jury proceedings is “encompassed within ‘the

preparation necessary to present a case’ and therefore immunized.”).

2

Next, Natividad contends Gallagher approved his arrest warrant despite

knowing of evidence implicating Rob. The arrest of a criminal defendant and the filing

of charges are at the core of the prosecutorial function, and “[a] prosecutor is absolutely

immune when making [the decision to initiate a prosecution], even where he acts

without a good faith belief that any wrongdoing has occurred.” Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at

1464; see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (holding that a prosecutor's

filing of an arrest warrant and charging documents are protected by absolute

immunity). This immunity encompasses decisions to continue a prosecution despite

conflicting evidence. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426 n.24. Gallagher’s decision to approve

Natividad’s arrest warrant—despite the alleged existence of exculpatory information—

was within Gallagher’s professional judgment and entitles him to absolute immunity.

3

For similar reasons, Gallagher is also absolutely immune from liability for

allegedly approving the arrest warrant for Natividad’s uncle. Although Natividad

alleges this was for “witness intimidation purposes” and was “wholly pretextual,” (Am.

Comp. ¶ 50), again, a prosecutor is absolutely immune when making the decision to

initiate a prosecution, even when acting without a good-faith belief that any wrong-

doing has occurred. Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1464 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–28)

(“The [Supreme] Court has explicitly stated that even groundless charges are protected,

in the interest of maintaining vigorous prosecution of crime.”).

4

Sax is entitled to absolute immunity for allegedly seeking the bench warrants for

exculpatory witnesses to “conceal evidence prior to trial.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 77). This is

not only because prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for seeking bench

warrants, see generally Odd, 538 F.3d at 212, but also because prosecutors are

absolutely immune for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, so long as they did so

while functioning in their prosecutorial capacity. Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465

F.3d 129, 137 (3d Cir. 2006). Sax sought the bench warrants while acting his in role as

an advocate and is entitled to absolute immunity. Id.

5

Finally, Natividad alleges that Gallagher and Sax “approved of and had access

to” the phone records “[i]n 1996 and prior to [Natividad’s] arrest in 1997” as part of an

effort to taint the investigation. Preparation for both the initiation of criminal

proceedings and trial may require obtaining, reviewing and evaluating evidence,

conduct which tends to be prosecutorial in nature. Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402,

1414, 1417 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.). And while timing is not

dispositive, it can be instructive. See, e.g., Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1465 (“Evidence

obtained at or after the filing is likely to be connected with an existing prosecution, and

is absolutely protected.”). While the complaint alleges the Defendants coached

witnesses during the investigative stages, courts may also consider statements made by

counsel at oral argument “to clarify allegations in the complaint when the meaning is

unclear.” Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 485 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000). During oral argument

on the previous motion to dismiss, Natividad’s counsel acknowledged the alleged

misconduct “happened between the time of arrest and the time of trial.” (Oral Arg. Tr.

17:4-14, ECF 16). Gallagher and Sax are alleged to have obtained the phone records in

late 1996 and early 1997, including the time after Natividad’s arrest warrant was

approved on or around December 31, 1996. Given these alleged facts, the prosecutors

were compiling and evaluating evidence to present their case, core prosecutorial

functions that entitle them to absolute immunity.

6

Alternatively, Natividad asks for leave to amend his complaint to allege that Sax

defied court orders to disclose exculpatory evidence during his post-conviction state and

federal proceedings. (Resp. To Mot. To Dismiss, at 10–11).

Absolute immunity extends to post-conviction proceedings, but it may not apply

when a prosecutor defies a court’s order. See Munchinski v. Solomon, 618 Fed. App’x

150, 155–56 (3d Cir. 2015). This is especially so when a court’s order does not require

the prosecutor to exercise any discretion, leaving him with “little more than a

‘ministerial function to perform.’” Id. at 155 (citing Odd, 538 F.3d at 214) (noting there

are “few circumstances under which we would consider the act of disobeying a court

order or directive to be advocative”). If compliance with the court order involved

judgments about whether evidence was exculpatory, relevant or otherwise privileged,

then Sax may still be entitled to absolute immunity. But if the court order was simply

a “judicially mandated task” devoid of any discretion, then he will not be entitled to

absolute immunity. Munchinski v. Solomon, 747 Fed. App’x 52, 60 (3d Cir. 2018).

While all existing claims against Gallagher and Sax are dismissed with prejudice,

Natividad will be allowed one final amendment to allege Sax defied court orders during

post-conviction proceedings.

IV

Raley, Dougherty and Mee move to dismiss Count II, arguing the complaint is

not specific enough to state a civil rights conspiracy. To state such a claim, Natividad

must allege facts sufficient to show: (1) two or more persons conspired to deprive him of

his constitutional rights; (2) one or more of the conspirators performed any overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) the overt act injured Natividad in his person or

property or deprived him of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, with

the added gloss under § 1983 that the conspirators acted under the color of state law.

Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 293–94 (3d Cir. 2018).

A conspiracy requires a “meeting of the minds.” Startzell v. City of Phila., 533

F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). Absent direct proof, the agreement can be inferred from

circumstantial evidence. Klein v. Madison, 374 F. Supp.3d 389, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

(quoting Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 295) (circumstantial evidence to support a civil rights

conspiracy "may include that the alleged conspirators did or said something to create

an understanding, the approximate time when the agreement was made, the specific

parties to the agreement, the period of the conspiracy, or the object of the conspiracy").

In the context of a § 1983 conspiracy among police officers, agreement may manifest as

conversations between officers about the incident, allegedly distorted stories that

emerged, an awareness of conflicting stories and irregularities in the series of official

investigations into the incident. Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 295.

Accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most

favorable to Natividad, the amended complaint plausibly alleges a civil rights

conspiracy. All defendant officers were assigned to the squad responsible for the

Campbell case, (Am. Compl. ¶ 27), and Natividad alleges conflicting accounts and

irregularities in the investigation that could indicate a concerted activity to suppress

facts, fabricate evidence and deny Natividad a fair trial. For instance, the complaint

alleges numerous statements from witnesses inculpating Rob as Campbell’s killer. (Id.

¶¶ 16–22). But these conflicting accounts were suppressed, suggesting the officers

engaged in concerted activity to hide evidence implicating another suspect. (Id. ¶ 83).

In another instance, Natividad notes irregularities in the investigation suggesting a

concerted effort to manufacture a case against him, namely, that during the PCRA

proceedings in 2016, Dougherty threatened McCullough’s son and presented a

fabricated written annotation of his conversation with McCullough despite stating no

notes were taken during a brief conversation at McCullough’s home. (Id. ¶ 37).

Natividad also adequately pleads the overt act and injury requirements. He contends

the Defendants’ intimidated witnesses, fabricated evidence and manufactured a case

against him that denied him a fair trial. (Id. ¶ 84(a)–(e)).

Furthermore, where substantive § 1983 claims are permitted to proceed, the

conspiracy claim may as well. Thorpe v. City of Phila., No. 19-5094, 2020 WL 5217396,

at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2020) (citing Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep't of Law &

Pub. Safety, 411 F.3d 427, 446 (3d Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Dique v.

N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 2010)); Thomas v. City of Phila., 290 F.

Supp.3d 371, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (permitting a civil rights conspiracy claim to survive a

motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged facts to plausibly suggest that an officer

contributed to a false story about a murder). Here, the officers do not move to dismiss

Count I, which is the constitutional claim upon which the conspiracy claim is

predicated.

While the complaint’s allegations about the specific agreement are not

extensively detailed, Natividad is not required to prove his case in the complaint. See

Smith v. Washington Area Humane Society, 19-1672, 2020 WL 6364762, at *8 (W.D. Pa.

Oct. 29, 2020). Pre-discovery, it is difficult to plead facts regarding the mindset of

alleged conspirators, their communications and any meeting of the minds. See id. Still,

he has put Raley, Dougherty and Mee on notice, and the civil rights conspiracy claim

may go forward.

V

Finally, the City moves to dismiss Count III, the municipal liability claim,

arguing the claim is overbroad and insufficiently focused because it does not link

previous wrongs to the constitutional violations that occurred here.

Municipalities, like individuals, can be liable under § 1983 for violating a

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,

690–91 (1978). A § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two ways: (1) an

unconstitutional policy or custom led to plaintiff’s injuries, or (2) plaintiff’s injuries

were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that “reflects a deliberate or

conscious choice.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019). Municipal liability

under § 1983 is “generally not amenable to resolution at the pleading stage, as it

requires a plaintiff to plead facts outside his or her personal knowledge.” 3909 Realty

LLC v. City of Phila., No. 21-030, 2021 WL 2342929, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2021).

Natividad brings his claim under the “policy or custom” theory. (Am. Compl. ¶¶

86–93). To prevail, Natividad must point to “an official proclamation, policy or edict by

a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy on the relevant

subject,” or “a given course of conduct so well-settled and permanent as to virtually

constitute law.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105–06. “[I]t is not necessary for a plaintiff to

establish affirmative acts: ‘deliberate indifference, lack of compliance and failure to

adhere to . . . standards’ may also constitute custom.” Swainson v. City of Phila., No.

22-2163, 2023 WL 144283, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2023). The plaintiff must also show

proximate cause or a “plausible nexus . . . between the municipality’s custom and the

specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d

845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990). Proximate cause may exist where the “occurrence of the

specific violation was made reasonably probable by permitted continuation of the

custom,” or the municipality failed to act after being put on notice of a constitutional

deficiency. Id.

Here, the amended complaint alleges a custom of widespread constitutional

deprivations in homicide investigations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57–60(a)–(o)). Natividad

specifically describes repeated instances of alleged manipulation of evidence, (id. ¶

60(a)–(b)), supplying information to witnesses and witness intimidation, (id. ¶ 60(a)–

(k)), and concealing/suppressing exculpatory evidence. (Id. ¶ 60(l)–(o)). He even

references past, similar misconduct by Defendants Raley, Dougherty and Mee. In a

1991 case, Raley allegedly provided a witness with a pre-written statement. (Id. ¶

60(a)). In a 1997 case, Mee purportedly threatened a witness into recanting his

confession. (Id. ¶ 60(b)). And in 2003, Dougherty allegedly coerced witnesses,

manipulated evidence, and supplied witnesses with false information. (Id. ¶ 60(c)).

While some of the facts alleged in the amended complaint are distinguishable from the

present case, “the breadth of misconduct which they represent is highly relevant to the

existence of the City’s custom of acquiescence in PPD’s allegedly unconstitutional

actions.” See Alicea v. City of Phila., No. 22-3437, 2022 WL 17477143, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa.

Dec. 6, 2022) (quoting Forrest, 930 F.3d at 109) (“[T]he sheer volume of complaints . . .

reasonably shows the City was aware of the misbehavior yet made a deliberate choice

to allow it to continue.”).

Finally, the alleged deprivation of Natividad’s Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process and a fair trial was “made reasonably probable by permitted continuation

of the custom.” See Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850. He alleges the City—over many years—

permitted police detectives to withhold exculpatory evidence and intimidate witnesses.

He claims that same conduct precipitated his conviction, and that is enough to survive

a motion to dismiss. See Alicea, 2022 WL 17477143, at *6 (finding the plaintiff had pled

a nexus between the policy or custom and the deprivation of rights he suffered because

“the City permitted the PPD to violate rights by, for example failing to turn over

exculpatory evidence, the individual defendants failed to turn over evidence tending to

show [the plaintiff’s] innocence, and [the plaintiff] was wrongfully convicted”).

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.