BROWN v. YOUNGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JASON L. BROWN, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-4499

:

UNITED STATES JUDGE JOHN :

MILTON YOUNGE, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

PAPPERT, J. November 16, 2023

Pro se Plaintiff Jason L. Brown sued United States District Judge John Milton

Younge over how Judge Younge handled Brown’s employment discrimination case.

(ECF No. 2.) Brown also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 1.)

For the following reasons, the Court will grant Brown leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss his Complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

I1

On August 11, 2022, Brown filed an employment discrimination complaint

against the Delaware River Port Authority. Brown v. Delaware River Port Auth., E.D.

Pa. Civ. A. No. 22-3199 (ECF No. 1). Judge Younge was assigned to the case and

1 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from the Complaint. The Court also

takes judicial notice of the docket for the lawsuit underlying Brown’s claims. See Buck v.

Hampton Twp., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). The Court adopts the pagination supplied

by CM/ECF.

eventually dismissed Brown’s claims with prejudice. He also denied a motion Brown

filed seeking his recusal. Id. (ECF Nos. 39, 40, 48, 49).

Brown’s Complaint here alleges that Judge Younge’s dismissal of his

employment discrimination case and failure to recuse himself amounted to a

constitutional violation. (Compl. at 3.) He also faults Judge Younge for failing to refer

the case to a Magistrate Judge or appoint an attorney. (Id.) Accordingly, Brown asks

the Court to “rule such dismissal is unconstitutional” and award him $400,000 in

damages. (Id. at 4.)

II

The Court grants Brown leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears

that he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if, among other

things, it is frivolous. A complaint is subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as

frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 325 (1989). It is legally baseless if “based on an indisputably meritless legal

theory,” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995), and factually

baseless “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly

incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Because Brown is proceeding

pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333,

339 (3d Cir. 2011).

III

Brown’s Complaint is legally baseless. “The structure of the federal courts does

not allow one judge of a district court to rule directly on the legality of another district

judge’s judicial acts . . . .” Smith v. Meyers, 843 F. Supp. 2d 499, 505 (D. Del. 2012). To

the extent Brown seeks review of Judge Younge’s dismissal of his claims, he had the

option of filing a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit. That he declined to pursue an appeal does not entitle him to bring a separate

civil action for review of his employment discrimination case. See Carter v. All Dist.

Fed. Judges, 415 F. App’x 363, 365 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“To the extent

[plaintiff’s] allegations reflect her disagreement with the resolution of her previous

cases, the proper vehicle for raising such a challenge is to file an appeal in those cases,

not bring a new action.”).

In any event, judges are entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims

that are based on acts or omissions taken in their judicial capacity so long as they do

not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.

349, 355-56 (1978); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam);

Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act is taken in a

judge’s judicial capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v.

Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Since it is apparent that Brown’s

claims are based on Judge Younge’s handling of Brown’s employment discrimination

case, Judge Younge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Martinez v. United

States, 838 F. App’x 662, 664 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“We have suggested that

federal judges may be immune to claims for injunctive relief, and, in any event, the

prior judicial decisions that Martinez complains about either were or could have been

the subject of appellate review.” (internal citations omitted)); Soto v. Sleet, 458 F. App’x

89, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (finding that the district court properly dismissed

claims by a pro se litigant brought against a federal district judge as legally frivolous on

the basis of judicial immunity where the judge acted in the course of ruling on a

motion); see also Carter, 415 F. App’x at 364-65 (affirming dismissal of pro se litigant’s

claims against “‘All District Federal Judges’” – to the extent her claims were “even

intelligible” – on the basis that they consisted of merely vague and conclusory

accusations and did not include facts to establish that her claims fall within the narrow

exceptions to judicial immunity).

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Brown leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss his Complaint with prejudice as legally frivolous pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). As the Complaint is frivolous and the defects are incurable,

Brown will not be given leave to amend. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.