BROWN v. SMITH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WES LEE BROWN, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

NO. 23-0780-KSM

v.

BERKS COUNTY JAIL, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J. August 14, 2023

Pro Se Plaintiff Wes Lee Brown brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, asserting claims against Berks County Jail officials. The Court previously granted Brown

in forma pauperis status and dismissed his original Complaint without prejudice. (Doc. Nos. 6,

7.) Presently before the Court is Brown’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 9.) For the following

reasons, the Court dismisses Amended Complaint in part under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for

failure to state a claim. The Court directs service of the Complaint against Defendants Stephanie

Smith and Jessica Collins for the claims discussed below.

I. BACKGROUND

In his initial Complaint, filed on February 21, 2023, Brown brought claims against the

following: (1) Berks County Jail; (2) Berks County; (3) Jeffrey Smith, the Warden of Berks

County Jail; (4) Stephanie Smith, the Deputy Warden of Berks County Jail; (5) Jessica Collins,

the Director of Treatment at Berks County Jail; and (6) Hanna Long, Law Librarian. (Doc. No. 2

at 2–3, 5.)1 He alleged that he was exposed to black mold in the showers and dirty standing

1 The Court adopts the pagination supplied to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.

water on the floor of his cell while housed in the disciplinary unit. (Id. at 3–6, 8.) He also

alleged damages from a “dirty” ventilation system, that he was denied access to the law library,

and that he was retaliated against for filing a grievance. (Id.)

In a May 9, 2023 Memorandum and Order, the Court granted Brown leave to proceed in

forma pauperis and dismissed his Complaint in part following screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. See Brown v. Berks Cnty. Jail, No. 23-0780, 2023

WL 3324676, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2023). The Court dismissed Brown’s claims against the

Berks County Jail, his official capacity claims against the individually-named Berks County Jail

employees, and all claims against Berks County because jails are not subject to liability under

§ 1983 and because Brown failed to allege a basis for municipal liability.2 Brown, 2023 WL

3324676, at *3–4. The Court also dismissed Brown’s claims based on unsanitary housing

conditions at the Berks County Jail because he did “not tie any of his allegations regarding the

black mold, standing water in his cell, or ventilation system to specific conduct by any named

Defendant.” Id. at *5. Brown’s First Amendment “access to courts” claim, based on allegations

that he was denied access to the law library and denied assistance with legal copies and mailings,

was also dismissed; the Court concluded that Brown failed to allege that he suffered an “actual

injury.” Id. at *5–6. The Court did, however, conclude that Brown stated a plausible retaliation

claim against Defendant Collins.3 Id. at *6.

2 Brown appears to have abandoned all municipal liability claims which could be asserted under Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). He does not name Berks County as a defendant in his

Amended Complaint, nor does he assert any official capacity claims against the individually named Berks

County Prison Defendants. As the Court previously explained in its May 9 Memorandum, to the extent

Brown’s Amended Complaint could be understood to name the Berks County Jail as a defendant, the jail

is not a “person” subject to liability in this case. Brown, 2023 WL 3324676, at *3.

3 The Court advised Plaintiff that he could pursue his claim against Defendant Collins without filing an

Amended Complaint, but that if he did choose to file an Amended Complaint, he would need to reallege

the claims against Defendant Collins if he wished to proceed. (See Doc. No. 7.)

On June 26, 2023, Brown filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 9.) He names the

following Defendants: (1) Jeffrey Smith; (2) Stephanie Smith; (3) Jessica Collins; and (4) Hanna

Long. (Id. at 2–3.) Brown lodges similar claims regarding the conditions at the Berks County

Jail as he did in his original Complaint. Specifically, Brown alleges that he encountered black

mold in the showers in the disciplinary unit, or the D-block, where he stayed for a 13-day period

day period from October 21, 2022 to November 3, 2022. (Id. at 13, 15.) The black mold

allegedly caused Brown to suffer headaches, nausea, and loss of appetite. (Id. at 15, 19.) Brown

states that he complained “numerous” block officers about the mold. (Id. at 13.) Brown also

alleges that a leaking sink and toilet in his cell on the D-block caused “dirty standing water.” (Id.

at 13, 14.) Brown states that he complained about the standing water to nurses and block officers

“but they all just laughed” at him and told him to deal with it. (Id. at 19.) Brown alleges that

exposure to the dirty water caused him to suffer headaches, nausea, and a lack of appetite. (Id.)

Finally, Brown complained about the “dirty ventilation system” on the M-block and that dust and

particles periodically blew out of the vent into his cell. (Id. at 13, 16.) He was allegedly told by

prison staff members that the vent filters are never cleaned or changed. (Id. at 13.) Brown

complained to Defendant Stephanie Smith and to maintenance personnel about the ventilation

but they “brushed it off and ignored the issue.” (Id. at 17, 20.) Brown alleges that the ventilation

system caused him to suffer headaches and breathing difficulties. (Id. at 20.)

Brown also alleges that Defendant Jessica Collins denied him access to the law library

and denied his request for assistance in making legal copies and mailing documents to the

courthouse. (Id. at 14, 17.) Brown claims that had he been helped, he would have been able to

“fight [his charge] ‘pro se’ and hav[e] his criminal charges dismissed. (Id. at 20–21.) According

to Brown, he was instead “forced to plead ‘no contest’ and serve nine months because [he] was

unable to proceed ‘pro se.’” (Id. at 20–21.)

Brown also alleges that he filed a grievance after the Treatment Department refused to

place him on a list of approved workers at the jail. (Id. at 14, 18.) After filing the grievance,

Brown was given a “Class I Misconduct” by Collins in retaliation for “interfering with staff” by

filing the grievance. (Id.) As a punishment for the misconduct write-up, Brown was sent to the

“hole” for 15 days and then to the maximum-security block for 30 days. (Id. at 18.)

Based on these allegations, Brown asserts constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983 and

seeks money damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As Brown is proceeding in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which

requires the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a

complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard

applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher

v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether

the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). “At this

early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as

true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that]

complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’”

Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d

768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

As Brown is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8

F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d

Cir. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

Brown asserts claims for violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the

vehicle by which constitutional claims may be brought in federal court. “To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting

under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “A defendant in a civil rights

action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.” See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845

F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). As set forth below, Brown has stated a claim against Defendant

Stephanie Smith for a Fourteenth Amendment violation (based on his dirty ventilation system

allegations) and Brown has also stated a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant

Jessica Collins. The Amended Complaint will be served for a responsive pleading against these

defendants. The remaining balance of Brown’s claims, however, are dismissed.

A. Black Mold and Dirty Standing Water Claims

As the Court explained in its May 9 Memorandum, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment governs claims challenging conditions of confinement raised by pretrial

detainees.”4 Brown, 2023 WL 3324676, at *4 (citing Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d

Cir. 2005)). To establish a basis for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, a prisoner must allege

that his conditions of confinement amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538

(1979). Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and subjective

components. Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007). The objective component

4 Brown was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events alleged in the Amended Complaint.

requires an inquiry into whether “the deprivation [was] sufficiently serious” and the subjective

component asks whether “the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]” Id.

(citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). In general, a prisoner must assert that prison

officials acted with deliberate indifference, meaning that they consciously disregarded a serious

risk to the detainee’s health or safety. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298–99; see also Wilson v. Burks,

423 F. App’x 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“‘[T]he official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial harm exists, and he must also draw

that inference.’” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994))).

Brown’s claims based on his exposure to black mold and dirty standing water on the

disciplinary unit were dismissed from Brown’s original Complaint because Brown failed to “tie

any of his allegations regarding the black mold [and] standing water in his cell . . . to specific

conduct by any named Defendant.” Brown, 2023 WL 3324676, at *5. Despite the Court’s

caution and permission to Brown to amend his claims, Brown has again failed to allege that any

individually-named Defendant had actual knowledge or was otherwise aware of the alleged

unsanitary conditions. Rather, Brown states only that on numerous occasions he complained to

nurses or to block officers about the conditions and that despite his complaints, the issues were

not remedied. Brown does not specifically identify any named Defendant to whom he

complained. This is not sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Lawal v. McDonald, 546 F.

App’x 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding that the plaintiff’s collective use of the word

“Defendants” failed to adequately plead which specific defendant engaged in the specific

conduct alleged by the plaintiff); see also Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d

366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)).

Accordingly, Brown’s Fourteenth Amendment claims based on his exposure to black mold and

dirty standing water will be dismissed.

B. Dirty Ventilation System Claims

Brown also asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the alleged dirty ventilation

system he endured on the M-block. Brown alleges that the vent filters were never cleaned or

changed and that he suffered physical harm—headaches and difficulty breathing—due to the

dust and particles that blew from the vents into his cell. Unlike his claims based on black mold

and dirty standing water, Brown has tied his alleged constitutional harm from the ventilation

system to a named Defendant. He states that despite his complaints about the ventilation system

to Defendant Stephanie Smith, the issue was ignored. Based on these allegations, and at this

early stage of the litigation, this claim will be served for a responsive pleading against Defendant

Stephanie Smith.

C. Access-to-Courts Claim

Brown against asserts an access-to-courts claim based on allegations that he was denied

reasonable access to the law library and refused assistance in making copies or mailing

documents. The inability of pretrial detainees to access legal resources such as the law library is

analyzed as an access-to-courts claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Prater v.

City of Philadelphia, 542 F. App’x 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also Monroe v.

Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,

prisoners retain a right of access to the courts.”). To state a claim for denial of access to courts, a

plaintiff must show that he “suffered ‘an actual injury’ because of his alleged inability to access

the prison library.” Prater, 542 F. App’x at 137 (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349

(1996)). A detainee states an actual injury by alleging “that a ‘nonfrivolous’ and ‘arguable’

claim was lost because of the denial of access to the courts.” Tinsley v. Giorla, 369 F. App’x

378, 381 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Sanders v. Rose, 576 F. App’x 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]o

sufficiently plead an access-to-courts claim . . . a non-prisoner must plead that ‘official acts . . .

may allegedly have caused the loss . . . of a meritorious case.’” (quoting Christopher v. Harbury,

536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002)).

Brown fails to state a plausible access-to-courts claim because he again does not allege an

actual injury. He states only that had he been provided law library access and provided

assistance with legal copies and mailing documents, he would have been able to proceed pro se

and have his criminal charges dismissed. Such vague and generalized allegations are too

speculative to allege that he lost a nonfrivolous or arguable claim. See Prater, 542 F. App’x at

137 (affirming denial of access-to-courts claim where the pretrial detainee had “not offered any

other explanation of how his inability to access the library affected his criminal proceedings”);

Diaz v. Holder, 532 F. App’x 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of access-

to-courts claims where plaintiff failed to tie alleged deficiencies in library to harm in underlying

action). In any event, Brown concedes that he was represented by a public defender. (See Doc.

No. 9 at 14.) Brown cannot state a plausible claim for denial of access to courts if he was

represented by counsel during his criminal case. Prater, 542 F. App’x at 137 n.4; see also Diaz,

532 F. App’x at 63; Roman v. Union Cty. Jail, No. 16-1049, 2017 WL 498715, at *5 (D.N.J.

Feb. 7, 2017) (denying access-to-courts claim for pretrial detainee to the extent the plaintiff was

represented by counsel in his criminal proceedings); Hurdle v. Dantos, No. 20-5595, 2020 WL

6747293, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2020) (denying claim for access to legal research in part

because the pretrial detainee was represented by counsel). Accordingly, Brown’s access to

court’s claim will be dismissed.

D. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Brown again asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Jessica

Collins. To state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege that: (1)

he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to

deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the

constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action.

See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d

Cir. 2003). The timing of the allegedly retaliatory behavior relative to the constitutionally

protected conduct may establish a causal link between the two for purposes of establishing

motivation. See Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016). A prisoner’s filing of a

grievance constitutes constitutionally protected conduct. See id.

Brown alleges that Collins retaliated against him by filing a misconduct report against

him in response to Brown’s filing of a grievance. The misconduct caused Brown to be placed in

the “hole” and subsequently on the maximum-security block. Brown has again sufficiently

alleged that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that Collins retaliated against

him for filing that grievance. See Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530–31 (“Mitchell’s allegation that he

was falsely charged with misconduct in retaliation for filing complaints against Officer Wilson

implicates conduct protected by the First Amendment.”). Accordingly, this claim will be served

on Collins for a responsive pleading.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Brown’s Amended Complaint in part.

The Court directs service of Brown’s Amended Complaint so that he may proceed on his claim

against Defendant Stephanie Smith based on the ventilation system and his First Amendment

retaliation claim against Defendant Jessica Collins. The remaining claims alleged in the

Amended Complaint will be dismissed.5 An appropriate Order follows.

5 Since Brown was given an opportunity to amend the defects in these claims and was unable to do so, the

Court concludes that further attempts to amend would be futile. Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver &

Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (amendment by pro se litigant would be futile when

litigant “already had two chances to tell his story”).