The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IRWIN ORLANDO CRUTCHFIELD
Petitioner,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-3323
PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD,
et al.
Respondents.
ORDER
Petitioner has filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a detainer that
was lodged against him by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the “Board”).1 The
Court referred this case to Magistrate Judge Timothy R. Rice for the purpose of issuing a report
and recommendation (“R&R”). Ultimately, the R&R recommended that the petition be dismissed
with prejudice as untimely and meritless.2 Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R, to which
no response has been filed.3 For the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules Petitioner’s
objections and adopts the R&R in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
The background facts and procedural history set forth in the R&R are incorporated
herein, but the Court will restate the facts that are relevant to this petition. On June 5, 2003,
Petitioner pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and
1 Fed. Habeas Pet. [Doc. No. 13]. As the R&R correctly noted, although Petitioner is in federal custody, he
properly filed a § 2254 petition to challenge the detainer related to his state custodial sentence. See Maleng v. Cook,
490 U.S. 488, 493 (1989).
2 R&R [Doc. No. 32].
3 Objections to R&R [Doc. No. 35].
the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate of 3-6 years of incarceration.4 On December 12,
2006, Petitioner was released on parole.5
On April 11, 2008, state authorities arrested Petitioner for technical parole violations
following a search of his home, and he was eventually charged with drug and gun-related
offenses.6 On April 17, 2008, the Board notified Petitioner that he was being charged with a
parole violation and that it intended to hold a preliminary and detention hearing.7 Petitioner
waived his right to a hearing and requested that his violation hearing be continued pending the
disposition of his outstanding criminal charges.8
On December 16, 2008, Petitioner was indicted in this Court for drug-trafficking and
gun-related charges in connection with the search of his home.9 Shortly thereafter, the state court
granted the prosecution’s motion to nolle pros the state charges against Petitioner.10 On
December 31, 2008, the Board notified Petitioner that it granted his request to continue his
violation hearing, but that it would detain him pending the disposition of his new criminal
charges.11 It further noted that it would schedule a violation hearing when Petitioner advised the
Board “in writing” that he was “prepared to proceed.”12
4 Commonwealth v. Crutchfield, CP-46-CR-0001651-2003 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Montgomery Cnty.), Dkt. at 2;
Fed. Habeas Pet. [Doc. No. 13] at ECF pages 4-5.
5 Board Answer Ex. B [Doc. No. 18-1].
6 Board Answer Ex. C [Doc. No. 18-1]; Board Answer Ex. E [Doc. No. 18-1].
7 Board Answer Ex. F [Doc. No. 18-1].
8 Board Answer Ex. G [Doc. No. 18-1]; Board Answer Ex. H [Doc. No. 18-1].
9 See United States v. Crutchfield, Case No. 08-cr-746 [Doc. No. 1] (E.D. Pa.).
10 Board Resp. Opp’n Ex. 4 [Doc. No. 30].
11 Board Answer Ex. J [Doc. No. 18-1].
12 Board Answer Ex. J [Doc. No. 18-1].
Petitioner was released from prison on January 30, 2009, which was the maximum
sentence date on his original sentence.13 On April 29, 2009, the Board issued an administrative
action stemming from the April 2008 search of Petitioner’s home, declaring him “delinquent for
control purposes effective 4/11/2008.”14 On February 16, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to 240
months of incarceration after pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon.15
On April 21, 2010, the Board relodged its warrant as a detainer against Petitioner with the
Federal Bureau of Prisons.16 Petitioner requested that the Board remove the detainer in April
2015, when he claims that his case manager first informed him of the detainer.17 That same
month, the Board rejected Petitioner’s request and notified him that it would hold a revocation
hearing when he became available.18 In December 2017, Petitioner contends that the public
defender’s office informed him of the Board’s April 29, 2009 administrative action.19 On March
21, 2018, Petitioner again sought removal of the detainer or to resume his violation hearing.20
13 Board Answer Ex. K [Doc. No. 18-1]; Board Answer Ex. A [Doc. No. 18-1].
14 Board Answer Ex. L [Doc. No. 18-1].
15 See United States v. Crutchfield, Crim. No. 08-746 [Doc. Nos. 29, 36] (E.D. Pa.).
16 Board Answer Ex. O [Doc. No. 18-1].
17 Reply to Board Answer [Doc. No. 22] ¶ 24; Resp. to Commonwealth Answer [Doc. No. 31] ¶ 28; Habeas
Pet. Ex. C [Doc. No. 2].
18 Habeas Pet. Ex. C [Doc. No. 2].
19 Objections to R&R [Doc. No. 35] ¶ 35; Resp’t Answer Ex. L [Doc. No. 18-1].
20 Reply to Board Answer Ex. L [Doc. No. 22].
On June 25, 2018, Petitioner filed a mandamus petition in the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.21 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s appeal on July 6, 2020 for failure to perfect.22
On June 16, 2020, Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus petition with the state trial
court, arguing that the Board unlawfully issued the detainer.23 The petition was forwarded to this
Court.24 On July 14, 2020, this Court ordered Petitioner to submit his claims on the standard 28
U.S.C. § 2254 form if he intended to file a federal habeas petition.25 On August 3, 2020 and
September 10, 2020, Petitioner refiled his habeas petition with the trial court, which was
forwarded to this Court.26 On October 13, 2020, the Court ordered the Clerk of this Court to send
copies of his habeas petitions to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, the Montgomery County District Attorney, and the
Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General.27 The Court also ordered the Commonwealth to report
the status of any proceedings in the state court and that Petitioner’s federal case be stayed
pending such status reports.28
On December 1, 2020, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in this Court, arguing that
the Board violated his right to due process by failing to provide him with a timely revocation
hearing.29 He also filed a motion to lift the stay in his case and excuse any failure to exhaust his
21 Crutchfield v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 457 MD 2018 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), Dkt. at 2-3.
22 Crutchfield v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 457 MD 2018 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), Dkt. at 3.
23 See Habeas Pet. [Doc. No. 2].
24 Habeas Pet. [Doc. No. 2] at ECF page 15; Mem. Op. [Doc. No. 9] at 1.
25 Order of July 14, 2020 [Doc. No. 4].
26 Am. Habeas Pet. [Doc. No. 5] at ECF page 17; Am. Habeas Pet. [Doc. No. 7] at ECF page 16.
27 Order of Oct. 13, 2020 [Doc. No. 10].
28 Order of Oct. 13, 2020 [Doc. No. 10].
29 Fed. Habeas Pet. [Doc. No. 13] at 8, 18. Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition using the standard 28
U.S.C. § 2254 form provided to him by this Court. The R&R also refers to the other petitions, which were filed in
claims based on the state court’s failure to accept his habeas petition, which was granted by the
Honorable Timothy R. Rice.30
II. DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), habeas
petitions filed by state prisoners are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.31 The limitations
period begins to run on the latest of several dates, including “the date on which the factual
predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.”32 Further, a petitioner must show that the vital facts underlying their claim could
not have been known earlier.33
The United States Supreme Court has held that the statutory limitations under the
AEDPA are also subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances.34 A petitioner must
show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way.”35 A petitioner must pursue all their rights diligently, not only
the habeas petition.36 The Third Circuit has found that equitable tolling may be appropriate if
(1) the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff has in some extraordinary
way been prevented from asserting their rights; (3) the plaintiff has timely asserted their rights
the standard form, as the operative petition in this case. Nevertheless, in addressing the timeliness of Petitioner’s
request for habeas relief, the Court uses the filing date of his first petition filed in state court on June 16, 2020, and
not the date of his federal petition filed on December 1, 2020.
30 Mot. Lift Stay [Doc. No. 11]; Order of Feb. 26, 2021 [Doc. No. 21].
31 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
32 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 659 (3rd Cir. 2005).
33 McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 2007).
34 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010).
35 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citation omitted).
36 See LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005).
mistakenly in the wrong forum; (4) the plaintiff received inadequate notice of their right to file
suit; (5) a motion for appointment of counsel is pending; or (6) a court actively misled the
plaintiff into believing they had done everything required.37
Petitioner requested removal of the detainer in April 2015, when he claims his federal
case manager first notified him of the detainer. As explained in the R&R, assuming that this was
the first time Petitioner learned of the detainer, he was required to file his federal habeas petition
by April 2016. However, Petitioner did not file his habeas petition until 2020, over four years
later. Accordingly, his petition was untimely unless he can establish that he is entitled to
equitable tolling.
In his objections to the R&R, Petitioner argues that his claim did not arise until December
2017, when the public defender’s office informed him of the Board’s administrative action. He
admits that he learned of the detainer in April 2015 but argues that the detainer is merely
“collateral” to his claim.38 However, even if Petitioner’s claim arose in December 2017, the
deadline to file his federal habeas petition would have been December 2018. However, as
explained above, he did not file a petition until 2020.
The R&R concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling because he did
not exercise due diligence. The R&R reasoned that after the Board refused to remove the
detainer in April 2015, Petitioner waited almost three years to contact the Board again or initiate
any state court proceedings. Although Petitioner sought to file habeas petitions in state court in
2020, which were forwarded to this Court, those petitions were filed more than five years after
he learned of the detainer and the Board refused to remove it or hold a hearing.
37 Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
38 Objections to R&R [Doc. No. 35] at 9.
In his objections to the R&R, Petitioner argues that the limitations period should be tolled
between April 14, 2015, the date he learned of the detainer, through March 21, 2018, the date he
sought to remove the detainer and resume his violation hearing. Petitioner argues that he acted
with due diligence because he spent “months of trying to obtain any [Board] related information
from [his] trial counsel.”39 However, as the R&R explained, Petitioner made no efforts to follow
up with the Board directly after they denied his request to remove the detainer in 2015. Nor has
Petitioner shown that any extraordinary circumstances prevented him from timely filing his
petition. Therefore, the R&R correctly concluded that the petition is untimely and not subject to
equitable tolling.
B. The Merits
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(2), a petition for writ of habeas corpus “may be denied on
the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the
courts of the State.”40 The R&R correctly concluded that Petitioner’s claim also lacks merit.
The R&R rejected Petitioner’s argument that he should have “been afforded the
opportunity to continue his technical violation hearing” 41 either after the dismissal of his state
charges, after he was released from state custody, or when he was sentenced on federal charges.
As the R&R correctly reasoned, Petitioner does not claim that he was prepared to proceed with a
hearing at those times. Petitioner submits a letter to the Board dated March 21, 2018 requesting a
hearing, but this letter was sent more than eight years after he was released from state custody
and sentenced on federal charges.42
39 Objections to R&R [Doc. No. 35] at 9.
40 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(2).
41 Resp. to Commonwealth Answer [Doc. No. 31] at ¶ 10.
42 Reply to Board Answer [Doc. No. 22] ¶ 25; Reply to Board Answer Ex. L [Doc. No. 22].
Further, as the R&R reasoned, the Board “has no constitutional duty to provide petitioner
an adversary parole hearing until he is taken into custody as a parole violator by execution of the
warrant.”43 Indeed, “the loss of liberty as a parole violator does not occur until the parole
violator is taken into custody under the warrant.”44 To the extent that Petitioner argues that he
was denied a right to serve his parole violation sentence before his federal sentence and
participate in programming while serving his federal sentence, the R&R properly rejected this
argument: the Supreme Court held in Moody that the petitioner did not have a liberty interest in
the timing of his parole violation sentence because he could make those arguments at the
revocation hearing.45 Therefore, the R&R correctly concluded that Petitioner’s claims are
meritless.
III. ORDER
AND NOW, this 19th day of July 2023, upon careful and independent consideration of
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the related filings, and upon review of the R&R of
Magistrate Judge Timothy R. Rice, and the objections thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The Petitioner’s objections [Doc. No. 35] are OVERRULED;
2. The R&R [Doc. No. 32] is APPROVED as set forth herein; and
3. The Petition will be dismissed by separate Order.
It is so ORDERED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Cynthia M. Rufe
CYNTHIA M. RUFE, J.
43 Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976) (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 86-87.
45 Id. at 87.