BROWN v. CHASE AUTO - JPMORGAN CHASE BANK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAKEISHA S. BROWN, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-1473

:

CHASE AUTO – JPMORGAN :

CHASE BANK, et al. :

Defendants. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 15th day of May 2023, upon consideration of Plaintiff Lakeisha S.

Brown’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 5), and Complaint (ECF No. 2) it is

ORDERED that:

1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

2. The Complaint is DEEMED filed.

3. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons in the

Court’s Memorandum.

4. Brown may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this

Order. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended

complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state

the basis for Brown’s claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a

complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to

state a claim. When drafting her amended complaint, Brown should be mindful of the Court’s

reasons for dismissing the claims in her initial Complaint as explained in the Court’s

Memorandum. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until

so ORDERED by the Court.

5. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Brown a blank copy of this

Court’s current standard form to be used by a self-represented litigant filing a civil action bearing

the above-captioned civil action number. Brown may use this form to file her amended

complaint if she chooses to do so.1

6. If Brown does not wish to amend her Complaint and instead intends to stand on

her Complaint as originally pled, she may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of

the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order

dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall

include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir.

2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the

district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the

action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir.

1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the

district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable

claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district court

“expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the

dismissal of those claims”).

7. If Brown fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that

Brown intends to stand on her Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.2 See

1 This form is available on the Court’s website at

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents2/forms/forms-pro-se.

2 The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d

863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on

her complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint”

doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to

comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v.

Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be

inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective

complaint).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Chad F. Kenney

CHAD F. KENNEY, J.

Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis

is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as

would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend her complaint, leaving the case without an

operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)

(“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or

where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible,

a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc.,

292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis

factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the

matter impossible.” (citing cases)).