Opinion

FUENTES v. JIFFY LUBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Court
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 16, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.0%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VICTOR FUENTES,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

No. 18-5174

v.

JIFFY LUBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Defendant.

March 15, 2023 Anita B. Brody, J.

MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Oscar Jimenez (“Jimenez”) seeks to intervene as of right in this action against Defendant

Jiffy Lube International, Inc. (“Jiffy Lube”) for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. See Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 94. In this action, current and former

employees of Jiffy Lube franchises bring claims against Jiffy Lube for harms arising from Jiffy

Lube’s use of “no-poach clauses” in its employment agreements. Victor Fuentes (“Fuentes”), the

class representative, has reached a Proposed Settlement with Jiffy Lube on behalf of himself and

other current and former employees of Jiffy Lube locations in the Philadelphia-Wilmington-

Camden metropolitan area. See Motion for Approval of Settlement and for Certification of the

Proposed Settlement Class, ECF No. 90. The Proposed Settlement does not include Jiffy Lube

employees from outside that geographic region. Jimenez, a former employee of a Jiffy Lube

location in California, asserts that intervention is warranted as of right because Fuentes is no

longer an adequate representative of his interest. For the following reasons, I will grant the

motion to intervene.

II. DISCUSSION

Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:

(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene

who: . . . (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of

the action and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair

or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately

represent that interest.

When the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) are met, courts must allow intervention as of

right. The Third Circuit has held that Rule 24(a)(2) has four requirements a proposed intervenor

must satisfy: “(1) the application for intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient

interest in the litigation; (3) the interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical matter, by the

disposition of the action; and (4) the interest is not adequately represented by an existing party in

the litigation.” In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 314 (3d Cir. 2005). District courts must

be generous and flexible when deciding whether to allow intervention in class actions. See

Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 970-72 (3d Cir. 1998); Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d

592, 597 (3d Cir. 1987).

In this instance, Jimenez meets the requirements to intervene as of right. First, Jimenez’s

motion is timely because he moved to intervene promptly after he learned from the filing of the

Proposed Settlement on behalf of the smaller-than-original class that his interest was not being

represented. See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 881-82 (6th Cir. 2000);

In re Discovery Zone Sec. Litig., 181 F.R.D. 582, 589 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Next, Jimenez has

demonstrated a sufficient interest specific to him that may be affected or impaired by the

disposition of this action because he was a member of the class as pled in both the original

Complaint and First Amended Complaint. See Complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶ 74; First Amended

Complaint, ECF No. 53 ¶ 79; see also In re Cmty. Bank, 418 F.3d at 314; Benjamin ex rel. Yock

v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 701 F.3d 938, 951 (3d Cir. 2012). Finally, Jimenez has shown that his

interest is not adequately represented in this action because Fuentes seeks to certify a class that

no longer includes Jimenez, and therefore is not giving attention to Jimenez’s interest. See

Pennsylvania v. President United States of Am.., 888 F.3d 52, 60 (3d Cir. 2018); 7C Charles

Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d §

1909 (2022).

Accordingly, Jimenez meets the requirements for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2).1

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, I will grant the motion to intervene.

s/Anita B. Brody

________________________

ANITA B. BRODY, J.

Copies VIA ECF

1 In the alternative, Jimenez seeks permissive leave to intervene. Under Rule 24(b)(1)(B) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the court may permit anyone to intervene who . . . (B) has a

claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Rule

24(b)(3), in turn, provides that “[i]n exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the

intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” See

also McKay v. Heyison, 614 F.2d 899, 906 (3d Cir. 1980). I find that Jimenez’s claims share with

the main action a common question of law or fact, and that allowing him to intervene will not

cause undue delay or prejudice to the existing parties. Accordingly, I find that even if

intervention as of right were not warranted, Jimenez would meet the requirements for permissive

leave to intervene.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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