STOKES v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIE STOKES : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff :

: NO. 22-0338

v. :

:

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al. :

Defendants :

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. JANUARY 23, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Willie Stokes (“Stokes”), who was recently exonerated after serving thirty-seven

years in prison, commenced this civil action against several defendants, including the Estate of

Detective Lawrence Gerrard (“Detective Gerrard”) and the City of Philadelphia (the “City”)

(collectively, “Defendants”).1 In his complaint, Stokes asserts various civil rights claims against,

inter alia, Detective Gerrard and the City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims

premised on these Defendants’ role in Stokes’ wrongful conviction. [ECF 1].

Before the Court is Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), seeking the dismissal of specific claims at Count III (civil rights

conspiracy) and Count V (deprivation of liberty without due process and denial of a fair trial), and

the Monell claims at Counts IV and VI. [ECF 17]. In his response, Stokes opposes most of the

1 In addition to Detective Gerrard and the City, the named defendants include Nicole Brongo Kiwa

Nicole Ford, as Executrix of the Estate of Detective Ernest Gilbert (“Detective Gilbert”); Assistant District

Attorney John DiDonato, Esquire (“ADA DiDonato”); and Assistant District Attorney Robert Marano,

Esquire (“ADA Marano”).

By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 9, 2022, this Court granted, in part, and denied,

in part, ADA DiDonato’s motion to dismiss the claims against him. [ECF 24, 25]. By Memorandum

Opinion and Order dated October 31, 2022, this Court granted, in part, and denied, in part, ADA Marano’s

motion to dismiss the claims against him. [ECF 27, 28].

arguments in the motion. [ECF 21].2 The issues raised in the motion have been fully briefed and

are ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ motion is granted, in part,

and denied, in part.

BACKGROUND

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the

complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The facts relevant to the underlying

motion to dismiss are summarized as follows:3

Plaintiff Willie Stokes is a sixty-year-old former prisoner who was recently

exonerated of the 1980 murder of Leslie Campbell. His conviction occurred in

August 1984. Stokes was incarcerated for over thirty-seven years. Stokes’

conviction resulted from the solicitation of false testimony from prisoner Franklin

Lee (“Lee”) by Detectives Gerrard and Gilbert, and from the use of that false

testimony at trial by ADAs Marano and DiDonato.

Lee’s False Testimony and Stokes’ Prosecution

In 1984, Lee was arrested on homicide and rape charges. While being held

on these charges, Lee was brought to the Police Administration Building to meet

with Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”) Detectives Gerrard and Gilbert, who

were investigating Campbell’s cold case file. During their meeting, Detectives

Gerrard and Gilbert told Lee that they were investigating unsolved homicide cases

and would return the favor if Lee helped them out. Initially, Lee told Detectives

Gerrard and Gilbert that he did not know anything about Stokes’ involvement in

Campbell’s murder. Sometime later, the Detectives instructed Lee to fabricate a

false statement that Lee had heard Stokes boasting about getting away with

Campbell’s murder. In exchange for the false testimony, Detectives Gerrard and

Gilbert offered Lee leniency in his sentence. The Detectives also offered to bring

women to Lee who would provide him with drugs and sex. If Lee refused to testify

as instructed, Detectives Gerrard and Gilbert threatened to arrange for a harsher

sentence. Lee agreed to the deal.

True to their promise, the Detectives brought Lee’s then-girlfriend to an

empty police interrogation room to have sex with him. When she refused to return

2 This Court has also considered the reply of Detective Gerrard and the City. [ECF 23].

3 These facts are drawn from Stokes’ complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, [ECF 1], as well

as matters of public record from Stokes’ habeas proceedings, Stokes v. Lamas, No. 20-cv-2192 (E.D. Pa.).

for another visit, the Detectives brought in another woman to have sex with Lee in

an interrogation room.

Consistent with the arrangement, Lee, at Stokes’ May 1984 preliminary

hearing, testified that he had overheard Stokes boasting about the murder of

Campbell. However, at Stokes’ trial on August 20, 1984, Lee refused to repeat his

accusation against Stokes and, instead, recanted his earlier testimony. Nonetheless,

ADA DiDonato presented Lee’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial and urged

the jury to accept Lee’s preliminary testimony as true. On August 21, 1984, the

jury convicted Stokes of murder in the first degree. Stokes was later sentenced to

life in prison, without parole.

On August 29, 1984, ADAs Marano and DiDonato drafted a criminal

complaint against Lee averring that Lee had made a false statement under oath. Lee

was subsequently charged with perjury for knowingly making a false statement at

the preliminary hearing. On January 14, 1985, Lee pleaded guilty to the perjury

charge and received the maximum sentence. Stokes remained unaware of Lee’s

perjury prosecution until 2015.

Stokes’ Habeas Proceedings and Exoneration

In 2015, Stokes learned of Lee’s 1985 perjury conviction and obtained

copies of Lee’s criminal complaint, charging document, and criminal docket report.

On March 23, 2020, Stokes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Magistrate

Judge Carol Sandra Moore Wells held a hearing on November 9, 2021, in which

Lee testified that he had been coerced into making the false statement against

Stokes.

On December 22, 2021, Magistrate Judge Moore Wells issued a Report and

Recommendation, recommending that Stokes’ habeas petition be granted, finding,

inter alia, that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s failure to disclose exculpatory

information regarding Lee’s perjury charge and subsequent conviction violated

Stokes’ rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). On December 30,

2021, the Honorable Timothy J. Savage approved and adopted the Report and

Recommendation. Stokes’ conviction was vacated, and the prosecution’s request

for nolle prosequi on all charges was granted on January 27, 2022.

“Sex for Lies” Scheme by PPD Detectives

According to the complaint, Lee was just one of several jailhouse

informants who were offered leniency, sex, and drugs by PPD detectives in

exchange for false testimony. The false testimony secured by the detectives

resulted in the wrongful convictions of at least twenty people. For example,

Detectives Gerrard, Gilbert, and four other unnamed detectives promised one

detainee, Emanuel Clait, a short sentence and sexual encounters with four women

in exchange for providing false testimony against Williams Franklin and Major

Tillery. Franklin and Tillery were ultimately convicted of a 1976 murder and were

sentenced to life imprisonment. Detectives Gerrard and Gilbert offered a similar

deal to Charles Atwell, whose girlfriend visited him eight times to have sex with

him in police interrogation rooms.

These practices by PPD detectives date back to the 1970s and continued

beyond the 1984 investigation of Campbell’s murder. These practices were also

detailed in 1977–78 Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting by the Philadelphia Inquirer

and became the subject of government investigations, complaints by lawyers and

civilians, litigation, and internal police investigations, including the 39th District

Corruption Scandal.

According to the complaint, the 39th District Corruption Scandal involved

misconduct very similar to that involving Lee and Stokes. Specifically, the scandal

exposed that PPD officers in the Homicide Unit routinely withheld exculpatory

evidence, used physical abuse and coercive interrogation tactics, and produced false

allegations. Investigations into the corruption in the 39th District led to a consent

decree issued in the federal matter of NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, as well as

widespread reforms and limitations on certain investigative practices and policies.

At least three other federal lawsuits during the 1980s led to similar orders enjoining

the PPD from engaging in unlawful practices. In addition to the consent decree,

three other federal lawsuits resulted in court orders enjoining the PPD from

engaging in the above-detailed practices.

In one state-court criminal appeal, Commonwealth v. Lester, 572 A.2d 694,

695 (1990), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that the appellant therein had

shown that Detectives Gerrard and Gilbert—incidentally, the same detectives

involved in the instant matter—facilitated sexual rendezvous with his wife and

other women to induce his cooperation and confession. The court reversed and

remanded the matter for a new trial. The events at issue in Lester occurred around

late 1983 or early 1984—the same time of Stokes’ prosecution.

According to the complaint, the PPD’s Internal Affairs Division’s

disciplinary mechanisms did not impose meaningful discipline and/or remedies for

the conduct detailed above.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “must accept all of the complaint’s

well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,

578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). The court must determine “whether the facts alleged in the

complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. at 211

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The complaint must do more than merely allege the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief; it must “show such an entitlement with its facts.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more

than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—

‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a))

(alterations in original). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not

suffice.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570.

DISCUSSION

In the complaint, Stokes asserts claims against Detective Gerrard for malicious prosecution

in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count I), civil rights

conspiracy (Count III), deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denial of a fair trial

by fabricating evidence in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count V), and

malicious prosecution in violation of Pennsylvania state law (Count VII). Stokes also asserts two

Monell claims for municipal liability against the City (Counts IV and VI).4

4 Count II contains claims against ADA DiDonato and ADA Marano for deprivation of liberty

without due process of law and denial of a fair trial by fabricating and suppressing evidence in violation of

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In the underlying partial motion to dismiss, Defendants essentially argue that some portions

of Stokes’ claims against Detective Gerrard at Counts III and V should be dismissed on the basis

of his entitlement to qualified immunity and/or as time-barred.5 Defendants also argue that the

claims against the City at Counts IV and VI should be dismissed for failure to state plausible

Monell claims. The arguments with respect to each claim will each be addressed in turn.

Stokes’ Claim for Deprivation of Liberty Without Due Process of Law

Against Detective Gerrard (Count V)

At Count V of the complaint, Stokes asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 19836 claim for deprivation of

liberty without due process of law premised, in part, on Detective Gerrard’s alleged role in

withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady.7 In the motion to dismiss, Detective

Gerrard argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this conduct because Stokes

does not allege that Detective Gerrard violated a then “clearly established” constitutional right.

Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To

determine whether an officer is entitled to a qualifiedly immunity defense, a court must determine

5 Defendants do not move to dismiss Counts III and V in their entirety, nor do they move to dismiss

any portions of Counts I or VII.

6 Section 1983 provides an avenue for private citizens to seek civil remedies when they have been

deprived of their rights by a state official in violation of federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not

a source of substantive rights, but rather serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected

by federal law. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199,

1204 (3d Cir. 1996). For a viable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly show “a violation

of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Mark v.

Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)) (alteration omitted).

7 In the landmark decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the United States Supreme

Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good

faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87.

(1) whether the officer violated a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the right was clearly

established. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001). These questions can be addressed

in either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The court must view the facts “in

the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377

(2007). Officers seeking qualified immunity bear the burden of establishing their entitlement to

this affirmative defense. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Reedy v.

Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010)).

The term “clearly established” means that “at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was

sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is

unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (internal

quotations and citation omitted). For qualified immunity purposes, “clearly established rights are

derived either from binding Supreme Court and [the United States Court of Appeals for the] Third

Circuit [(the “Third Circuit”)] precedent or from a robust consensus of cases of persuasive

authority in the Courts of Appeals.” Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2018)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). In determining whether the alleged right was clearly

established at the relevant time, there does not need to be “a case on point, but existing precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 741 (2011). That is, the court must “conclude that the firmly settled state of the law,

established by a forceful body of persuasive precedent, would place a reasonable official on notice

that his actions obviously violated a clearly established constitutional right.” Spady v. Bethlehem

Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 639 (3d Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). However, the court must

keep in mind the Supreme Court’s repeated directives “not to define clearly established law at a

high level of generality” but, instead, conduct this analysis “in light of the specific context of the

case.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Detective Gerrard argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged

failure to disclose Brady material because the attachment of Brady obligations to police officers

was not clearly established in 1984, when the conduct underlying Stokes’ conviction occurred.

Stokes concedes that Detective Gerrard is entitled to qualified immunity on these claims to the

extent they are premised on Detective Gerrard’s failure to disclose Brady material to Stokes and

his attorneys. Based on the caselaw cited, this Court agrees. Though under current precedent,

police officers “may be liable under § 1983 for failure to disclose exculpatory information to the

prosecutor . . . ,” Lewis v. City of Phila., 2020 WL 1683451, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2020) (citing

Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of L. & Pub. Safety, 411 F.3d 427, 443 (3d Cir. 2005),

overruled on other grounds by Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2010)), this

constitutional obligation on the part of law enforcement officers “was not recognized” by the Third

Circuit until Gibson in 2005, id. Because the right to disclosure of Brady material by law

enforcement officers was not clearly established in 1984, Detective Gerrard is entitled to qualified

immunity for his failure to disclose exculpatory information to Stokes.

Nonetheless, Stokes argues that his claims against Detective Gerrard “are not solely

premised upon a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to Mr. Stokes and his attorneys but are

also premised upon a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the prosecutors.” (Stokes’ Resp.

in Opp., ECF 21, at p. 11). This argument is, however, unavailing. Gibson, the governing Third

Circuit authority that recognized that Brady obligates police officers to turn over exculpatory

evidence, involved a situation wherein the officer-defendants failed to disclose such information

to prosecutors. 411 F.3d at 442–43. The Gibson court expressly concluded that the officers were

entitled to qualified immunity because their obligation “to disclose information to the prosecutor

was not widely addressed” by the Third Circuit or the Supreme Court until at least 2000. See id.

Therefore, to the extent Stokes’ due process claim against Detective Gerrard is also premised on

Detective Gerrard’s alleged failure to turn over exculpatory information to the prosecutors, this

claim fails. Detective Gerrard is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion

to dismiss the portions of Count V premised on a failure to disclose exculpatory information is

granted, and said portions of Count V are dismissed.

Stokes’ Claim for Civil Rights Conspiracy

Against Detective Gerrard (Count III)

At Count III of the complaint, Stokes avers that Detective Gerrard conspired to violate his

civil rights under § 1983. Stokes premises these averments on, inter alia, Detective Gerrard’s

alleged role in the conspiracy to deprive Stokes of his rights, under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, false arrest, false imprisonment,

malicious prosecution, and deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Detective Gerrard

moves to dismiss this claim and proffers several arguments, each of which this Court will

addressed separately.

1. Withholding Exculpatory Evidence

Detective Gerrard moves to dismiss this conspiracy claim premised on Stokes’ allegations

that he withheld exculpatory information in violation of Brady. In the above discussion of Count

V, this Court concluded that Detective Gerrard is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to

Stokes’ claims that he (Detective Gerrard) withheld exculpatory information in violation of Brady,

as this was not a clearly established right in 1984. For the same reasons, Detective Gerrard is

entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Stokes’ conspiracy claim premised on these same

allegations. See Ippolito v. Aherne, 2015 WL 6447153, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2015) (stating that

an official who is immune from suit for a § 1983 violation is also immune from liability for a

conspiracy claim based on the same underlying conduct). Therefore, the conspiracy claim

premised on Detective Gerrard’s alleged Brady violation is dismissed.

2. Malicious Prosecution

Detective Gerrard also argues, and Stokes concedes, that Stokes’ malicious prosecution

conspiracy claim at Count III should be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, because a

malicious prosecution claim grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment is not clearly established

under current Third Circuit precedent. This Court agrees. See Thomas v. City of Phila., 290 F.

Supp. 3d 371, 382 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (granting qualified immunity to officials on Fourteenth

Amendment malicious prosecution claim and noting “[t]he Supreme Court has not yet articulated

such a right”); see also Lewis, 2020 WL 1683451, at *6–7 (granting qualified immunity on

Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claim amid “scattered legal landscape,” while

rejecting argument that claim was barred as a matter of law). In light of the caselaw and

concession, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Stokes’ malicious prosecution conspiracy claim at

Count III, to the extent it is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, is granted, and said claim is

dismissed.8

3. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, False Arrest, and False Imprisonment

As to Stokes’ claims of conspiracy to deprive him of his rights to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures, false arrest, and false imprisonment, Detective Gerrard argues that these

specific claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In his response, Stokes appears

8 As noted by Stokes in his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Count III of Stokes’ complaint

includes references to both the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments. To the extent Stokes’ malicious

prosecution conspiracy claim is grounded in the Fourth Amendment, such claim is unchallenged by

Defendants and, therefore, survives the motion to dismiss. See Thomas, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 379–83

(separately analyzing malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, denying

a motion to dismiss as to the former while granting as to the latter).

to concede that these claims are time-barred under the Fourth Amendment. (See Stokes’ Resp. in

Opp., ECF 21, at pp. 6, 12). However, Stokes contends that his false imprisonment conspiracy

claim grounded in the Fourteenth, rather than Fourth, Amendment is not time-barred. Stokes is,

however, mistaken.

It is well-settled that the statute of limitations period for a § 1983 civil rights action is the

limitations period for personal injury torts in the state where the cause of action arose. Wallace v.

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). Undeniably, the

events giving rise to Stokes’ cause of action all occurred in Pennsylvania. Thus, Pennsylvania’s

two-year statute of limitations governing personal injury claims applies here to Stokes’ civil rights

claims.9 See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(1); Kach, 589 F.3d at 634; Garvin v. City of Phila., 354

F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003).10

While state law dictates the limitations period for a § 1983 claim, federal law governs the

determination as to when such a claim accrues. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. Generally, under

federal law, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the

plaintiff is aware—or should be aware—of the existence of and/or the source of an injury. Sameric

Corp. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); Sandutch v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254

(3d Cir. 1982). The limitations period for civil rights conspiracy claims under § 1983, such as

Stokes’ claims, “runs from each overt act causing damage.” Little v. City & Cnty. of Phila., 2008

9 All parties appear to agree that Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations applies to Stokes’ claims as

they cite to Pennsylvania law in their respective briefs.

10 While the statute of limitations is generally an affirmative defense that a defendant must plead in

an answer, a court may grant a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds “when the statute of

limitations defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d

Cir. 2017). Because the statute of limitations argument is an affirmative defense, the burden of establishing

its applicability rests upon the movant—here, Detective Gerrard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1); Bradford-

White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153, 1161 (3d Cir. 1989).

WL 2704579, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2008) (quoting Wells v. Rockefeller, 728 F.2d 209, 217 (3d

Cir. 1984)).

Stokes’ allegations regarding Detective Gerrard’s overt acts leading to the alleged false

arrest and imprisonment refer to conduct that occurred in 1984. These events were known to

Stokes. Thus, the two-year limitations period for Stokes’ § 1983 false arrest and imprisonment

conspiracy claims ended two years later, in 1986. See Wells, 728 F.2d at 217 (stating that civil

conspiracy claims accrue from the time of each overt act). Because Stokes did not bring these

claims until 2022, when he was finally released from custody, the claims are deemed time-barred.11

Nonetheless, Stokes contends that his false imprisonment conspiracy claim grounded in

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—rather than the Fourth—is not time-

barred. Stokes argues that this cause of action accrued on January 27, 2022, when his conviction

was vacated, because Fourteenth Amendment due process claims do not accrue at the same time

as Fourth Amendment claims. This argument is misplaced. Although Stokes remained

incarcerated from the time of his purported false arrest until his conviction was vacated, his Fourth

Amendment claim never turned into a due process claim. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S.

357, 137 S. Ct. 911, 918–19 (2017) (explaining that the fact that “[l]egal process has gone

forward . . . cannot extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim—or somehow . . . convert

that claim into one founded on the Due Process Clause”). In other words, Stokes’ false

imprisonment conspiracy claims premised on either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment theories

are one and the same. As this Court has concluded, the clock began running on Stokes’ false

11 As noted, Stokes appears to concede that his conspiracy claims for unreasonable search and seizure,

false arrest, and false imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment are time-barred. In a footnote, Stokes

indicates that he “disagrees that his claims are totally time-barred under the statute of limitations,” but he

provides no substantive legal argument to support this statement apart from his contention that his

Fourteenth Amendment conspiracy claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. (See Stokes’ Resp.

in Opp., ECF 21, at pp. 6, 12).

imprisonment conspiracy claim—whether grounded in the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment—in

1984. Because Stokes did not bring this claim until 2022, the claim is time-barred.

Stokes further argues that his false imprisonment conspiracy claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment is analogous to one for malicious prosecution—a claim that accrued when his

conviction was vacated in 2022. However, as explained above, it is not clearly established that

the Fourteenth Amendment protects a right against malicious prosecution. See Thomas, 290 F.

Supp. 3d at 382. Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from liability unless the alleged

conduct violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” See Harlow, 457 U.S. at

818. Thus, even assuming that Stokes’ false imprisonment conspiracy claim is analogous to a

Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution conspiracy claim, Detective Gerrard would be

entitled to qualified immunity for any such claim.

For the reasons set forth, the motion to dismiss the conspiracy claims at Count III based on

theories of unreasonable searches and seizures, false arrest, and false imprisonment is granted.

Accordingly, these claims are dismissed.

Stokes’ Claim Against the City for Failure to Train,

Supervise, and Discipline (Count IV)

At Count IV of the complaint, Stokes asserts a civil rights or Monell claim against the City

for failure to train, supervise, and discipline police officers. In its motion, Defendant City argues

that (1) Count IV should be dismissed because Stokes has not alleged any action or inaction by the

City showing deliberate indifference and (2) even if Stokes’ allegations are sufficient, the portions

of the claim based on alleged Brady violations should be dismissed because Stokes had no clearly

established right at the time.

To state a viable claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts

sufficient to plausibly show (1) a constitutional violation by a municipal actor (2) that was caused

by a municipal policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “[T]he

inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to

train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into

contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989).

To plead a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must ordinarily allege a “‘pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees’ [] ‘to demonstrate deliberate indifference.’”

Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). Deliberate indifference occurs if (1) “municipal supervisors had

contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or of a ‘prior pattern of similar incidents,’”

and (2) “the supervisors’ action or inaction somehow communicated approval of the offending

behavior.” Tobin v. Badamo, 78 F. App’x 217, 219 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Montgomery v. De

Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998)); see also Langweiler v. Borough of Newtown, 2010 WL

5393529, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2010) (citing C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 202 (3d

Cir. 2002) (en banc)).

Similarly, to plead a viable failure-to-supervise or failure-to-discipline claim, a plaintiff

must plead facts to show a failure to supervise or discipline that “reflects a policy of deliberate

indifference to constitutional rights.” Wiggs v. City of Phila., 2014 WL 772538, at *4 (E.D. Pa.

Feb. 27, 2014) (citing Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 126–27); see also Kirksey v. Ross, 372 F. Supp.

3d 256, 263 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (recognizing failure-to-discipline theory of Monell liability);

McDaniels v. City of Phila., 234 F. Supp. 3d 637, 644 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (same). For a failure-to-

discipline claim, the plaintiff “must identify a failure to provide specific [discipline] that has a

causal nexus with their injuries and must demonstrate that the absence of that specific [discipline]

can reasonably be said to reflect a deliberate indifference to whether the alleged constitutional

deprivations occurred.” Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997). Where the risk

to constitutional rights is not obvious from the nature of the activity, “deliberate indifference on

the part of the city policymakers to the need for” discipline may be inferred from “a pattern of

constitutional violations.” Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d Cir. 1989).

The plaintiff must show “both contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or

knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents and circumstances under which the supervisor’s

actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending

subordinate.” Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 127. “Constructive knowledge or a showing that a

policymaker ‘should have known’ about the pattern of constitutional misconduct is sufficient.”

Jackson v. Corizon Health, Inc., 2019 WL 4222599, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2019) (quoting Forrest

v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 109 (3d Cir. 2019)).

Here, the City argues that Stokes has failed to allege that the municipality was deliberately

indifferent to Stokes’ rights. The City’s argument is unpersuasive. Stokes’ complaint contains

pages of detailed allegations regarding PPD officers’ use of coercive practices to obtain false

statements and the withholding of exculpatory evidence, resulting in the wrongful convictions of

at least twenty people. Specifically, in the complaint, Stokes alleges that Detectives Gerrard and

Gilbert, along with at least four other detectives, allegedly engaged in “sex for lies” deals with

multiple detained informants, including Lee. Stokes also alleges that the PPD—specifically, its

Internal Affairs Division—failed to maintain disciplinary mechanisms to remedy these violations

and/or implement adequate training or supervision to prevent them. Taken together, these

allegations, accepted as true—as this Court must at this stage of the proceedings—demonstrate a

“pattern” of constitutional violations and circumstances under which the PPD supervisors’ inaction

could be found to have communicated approval. See Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 127.

Stokes also alleges that there were contemporaneous newspaper articles, government

investigations, and lawsuits as a result of these practices beginning around 1977 or 78, years before

the underlying facts in this case. These allegations—coupled with the allegations of widespread

coercion and fabrication of evidence by PPD detectives—plausibly show that City policymakers

were, at the very least, on constructive notice that PPD officers were repeatedly engaging in

unlawful conduct. See Hernandez v. Borough of Palisades Park Police Dep’t, 58 F. App’x 909,

913 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[C]onstructive knowledge may be evidenced by the fact that the practices

have been so widespread or flagrant that in the proper exercise of [their] official responsibilities

the [municipal policymakers] should have known of them.”) (citations omitted). Taking these

extensive allegations as true, as is required at this stage of the proceedings, this Court finds that

Stokes’ complaint plausibly states a Monell claim against the City for failure to train, supervise,

and/or discipline. As such, the motion to dismiss this claim on this basis is denied.

The City further argues that this Monell claim should be dismissed to the extent it is based

on the alleged withholding of exculpatory information, as Stokes’ right against this constitutional

violation was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. This Court agrees. While

the Third Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, “[s]everal courts of appeals have held that if a

right is not clearly established, a municipal entity cannot be deliberately indifferent to it.” Lewis,

2020 WL 1683451, at *12 (citing Bustillos v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 891 F.3d 214, 222 (5th

Cir. 2018); Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2017); Szabla v.

City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 393 (8th Cir. 2007); Young v. Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899,

904 (2d Cir. 1998)). This Court finds these decisions persuasive, as have other courts in this district

that have dismissed Monell claims where the constitutional right was not clearly established at the

time of the alleged conduct. See, e.g., Thomas, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 387 (dismissing Monell claims

based on theories of malicious prosecution, Brady violations, and failure to investigate as the

underlying rights were not clearly established in 1994); Lewis, 2020 WL 1683451, at *12

(dismissing similar claims based on conduct occurring in 1997); Ogrod v. City of Phila., 2022 WL

1093128, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2022) (dismissing municipal liability claim based on Brady

violations occurring in 1996).

As discussed above, the right against the withholding of exculpatory Brady information by

police officers was not a clearly established right in 1984. See Lewis, 2020 WL 1683451, at *9

(citing Gibson, 411 F.3d at 443). Because this specific right was not clearly established at the time

of the alleged conduct in this case, it is this Court’s opinion that it cannot form the basis of a claim

for municipal liability. Therefore, Stokes’ Monell claim at Count IV is dismissed to the extent it

is premised on the City’s involvement in the officers’ failure to disclose exculpatory information.

Stokes’ Claim Against the City for

Municipal Liability (Count VI)

Count VI of the complaint contains a § 1983 claim against the City premised on its alleged

unlawful policies or customs. Defendant City argues that the claim should be dismissed because

Stokes has not cited to an official policy, nor has he identified a municipal policymaker. The City

is mistaken.

To assert a plausible Monell claim based on a municipal policy or custom, the plaintiff

must allege facts showing that municipal policymakers established or maintained a policy or

custom that caused a municipal employee to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Monell, 436

U.S. at 694. The policy must be the “moving force” behind the constitutional tort. Id. Thus, the

plaintiff must allege facts showing an “affirmative link” or “plausible nexus” between the custom

or practice and the alleged constitutional violation. Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850–51

(3d Cir. 1990). The policy or custom must also exhibit deliberate indifference to the constitutional

rights of those it affects. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 972 (3d Cir. 1996).

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal

policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Berg v. Cnty. of

Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Customs

are ‘practices of state officials . . . so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law.’”

Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). “[C]ustom requires proof of knowledge and acquiescence

by the decisionmaker.” McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). In other

words, “a plaintiff must show that an official who has the power to make policy is responsible for

either the affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.”

Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850 (citation omitted). Widespread behavior by police officers does not

amount to a municipal custom unless there is “knowledge and acquiescence by the

decisionmaker.” McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658 (citation omitted).

Here, the City argues that Stokes’ allegations are insufficient to support a Monell claim

based on a municipal policy or custom because he does not cite to an official policy of the City.

However, in the complaint, Stokes has plausibly alleged that the City maintained unlawful

municipal customs, and included detailed allegations of PPD detectives fabricating false

statements using coercive practices, resulting in the wrongful convictions of numerous people over

multiple decades. Taking these allegations as true, this Court finds this pattern of unchecked

behavior by City employees constitutes a practice “so permanent and well settled as to virtually

constitute law.” Berg, 219 F.3d at 275 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Furthermore, Stokes

alleges that the City was aware of this unlawful custom through newspaper articles, government

investigations, and lawsuits as of 1977. Therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, these

allegations are sufficient to show that municipal policymakers had at least constructive knowledge

of the alleged unlawful customs and failed to act. See Hernandez, 58 F. App’x at 913.

The City also argues that Stokes’ Monell claim should be dismissed for failure to identify

a municipal policymaker responsible for his alleged injuries. This argument is also misplaced.

While a viable Monell claim based on an unlawful policy or custom must plausibly allege that an

official with policymaking power is responsible for or acquiesced to the policy or custom, the

notion that the plaintiff must “specifically identify” the responsible decisionmaker has been

rejected by the Third Circuit. See Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850 (“Practices ‘so permanent and well

settled as to have the force of law [are] ascribable to municipal decisionmakers.’”) (quoting Anela

v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1067 (3d Cir. 1986)) (other citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Indeed, courts in this district have concluded that a “wooden requirement” that

the plaintiff identify a municipal policymaker by name would be “out of step with the notion that

an indirect inference of policymaker awareness suffices at the pleading stage.” See, e.g., Jackson

v. Corizon Health, Inc., 2018 WL 3438756, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2018). As discussed, Stokes

has alleged an extensive pattern of constitutional violations by City employees and, at least,

constructive knowledge of these violations by the City. This knowledge is ascribable to City

policymakers due to its widespread, well settled nature. See Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850.

For the reasons set forth, this Court finds that Stokes’ complaint plausibly states a Monell

claim against the City based on a municipal policy or custom. As such, the motion to dismiss this

claim on the basis that Stokes has failed to cite a municipal policy or identify a specific municipal

policymaker is denied.

Lastly, the City also argues that Stokes’ claim should be dismissed to the extent it is

premised on the alleged withholding of exculpatory information, as Stokes’ right against this

constitutional violation was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. This Court

addressed a similar argument with respect to Stokes’ Monell claim for failure to train, supervise,

or discipline. For the same reasons indicated there, Stokes’ Monell claim here based on a

municipal policy or custom is dismissed to the extent it is premised on the City’s involvement in

officers’ failure to disclose exculpatory information.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis and reasons set forth, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, in

part, and denied, in part. In summary, this Court finds as follows:

(1) Stokes’ § 1983 claims against Detective Gerrard for civil rights conspiracy (Count III)

and denial of liberty without due process of law (Count V) premised on Detective Gerrard’s alleged

failure to disclose exculpatory information in violation of Brady are dismissed because Detective

Gerrard is entitled to qualified immunity, and Defendants’ motion is granted;

(2) Stokes’ § 1983 malicious prosecution conspiracy claim (Count III), to the extent that

claim is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only, is dismissed

because Detective Gerrard is entitled to a qualified immunity defense, and Defendants’ motion is

granted, in part;

(3) Stokes’ § 1983 conspiracy claims against Detective Gerrard (Count III) based on

theories of unreasonable searches and seizures, false arrest, and false imprisonment are dismissed

as barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and Defendants’ motion is granted;

(4) Stokes’ Monell claims against the City (Count IV and VI) are dismissed only to the

extent these claims are premised on the City’s involvement in officers’ failure to disclose

exculpatory information in violation of Brady, and Defendants’ motion is granted, in part; and

(5) Defendants’ motion is denied in all other respects.

An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion follows.

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.