BLACKWELL v. LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

__________________________________________

NICOLE BLACKWELL, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : Civil No. 5:22-cv-03360-JMG

:

LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK, :

Defendant. :

__________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GALLAGHER, J. January 23, 2023

I. OVERVIEW

Federal Courts have no province to question the validity, quality, or character of an

individual’s religious beliefs. Pursuit of religious liberty is among the oldest, most essential

cornerstones of American democracy. In recognizing the right of an individual to assert a federal

claim of religious discrimination against their former employer, it is this “very concept of ordered

liberty” that requires courts to decide a “most delicate question”—not of whether a plaintiff’s

religious beliefs are reasonable, ethical, or well-founded—but only whether those beliefs are

indeed religious. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981).

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to sufficiently plead that her sincerely held beliefs in

conflict with Defendant’s COVID-19 nasal swab testing requirement are religious in nature, the

Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice.

II. BACKGROUND

a. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

On August 22, 2022, Plaintiff, Nicole Blackwell, a nurse, filed a complaint alleging she

was unlawfully terminated by her former employer, Defendant Lehigh Valley Health Network

(“Complaint”). See Complaint (ECF No. 1). On October 19, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to

Dismiss the Complaint (“Motion”). See ECF No. 7. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition on

November 2, 2022 (“Response”). See ECF No. 8. Defendant hired Plaintiff as a Registered Nurse

in May 2011. Compl. at ¶ 11. On August 24, 2021, Defendant issued a COVID-19 vaccine mandate

for all staff. Id. at ¶ 32. On September 7, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a written religious

accommodation request, stating:

I sincerely believe that injection with medical therapy which was derived from

aborted fetal cells during the testing process [] and foreign [mRNA] is unholy and

defiles the relationship I have with [G]od. I am a committed vegetarian and do not

eat meat due to my spiritual beliefs. I cannot receive any treatment that contains

derived cells and [mRNA] per my religious beliefs and philosophical beliefs.

Id. at ¶ 43; pg. 12. Plaintiff stated that her religious beliefs in opposition to COVID-19 vaccination

are rooted in her stance as a “[l]ife long anti-abortion advocate,” her confirmation into the United

Church of Christ at age 13, and her “[b]eliefs that many religious leaders are being pressured to

turn away from [G]od and accept mRNA developed over the last several years.” Id. at pg. 13. On

September 15, 2021, Defendant granted Plaintiff’s religious accommodation request and offered

her the opportunity to submit to “regular COVID-19 screening tests” in lieu of vaccination. Id. at

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains multiple paragraphs numbered as 1. This citation refers to the

numbered paragraph 1 appearing on Page 2 of the Complaint.

2 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains multiple paragraphs numbered as 3. This citation refers to the

numbered paragraph 3 appearing on Page 3 of the Complaint.

3 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains multiple paragraphs numbered as 4. This citation refers to the

numbered paragraph 1 appearing on Page 3 of the Complaint.

¶ 5. At that time, Defendant did not specify “the nature or modality” of the COVID-19 tests. Id.

Plaintiff interpreted this “regular COVID-19 screening tests” requirement to mean “a ‘self-

screening’ wherein she had to take her temperature at home and respond to a written questionnaire

concerning any symptoms at home before reporting to work.” Id.

Around November 15, 2021, Defendant informed Plaintiff she was required to take

biweekly COVID-19 tests via nasal swab in the presence of her manager. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges

this amounted to a change in the terms of her religious accommodation. Id. Plaintiff objected to

the nasal swab testing, advising Defendant that “observance of her religious beliefs forbids

insertion of an unwanted foreign objection into her body.” Id. As an alternative, Plaintiff requested

she be permitted to take a saliva test. Id.

Despite Plaintiff’s offer to take a saliva test instead of nasal swab testing, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant failed to engage in any interactive process concerning the same, and Defendant did

not advise her to submit another religious accommodation request form. Id. On November 19,

2021, Defendant suspended Plaintiff without pay. Id.

On November 23, 2021, Plaintiff sent an e-mail to Defendant “express[ing] [her] beliefs”

regarding “invasive” COVID-19 “testing.” Id. at ¶ 9; pg. 21. Plaintiff’s e-mail states that if

Defendant “wishes to protect staff and patients from possible infections, then it should be

acknowledged that weekly [COVID-19] testing should be required for all staff” because “a

growing body of peer-reviewed research is demonstrating that covid vaccinated people are just as

likely to contract and spread this illness.” Id. Plaintiff’s e-mail then cites to a medical journal article

to support the proposition that “[t]here is increasing evidence that vaccinated individuals continue

to have a relevant role in [COVID-19] transmission.” Id. Plaintiff’s e-mail states that Plaintiff is

“willing to abide by reasonable accommodations that do not discriminate against me for my

religious beliefs.” Id.

On December 6, 2021 Plaintiff sent another email to Defendant asking whether “there has

been any progress on the consideration of using saliva tests or religious exemptions for the nasal

swab?” Id. at ¶ 10; pg. 23.

That same day, “[r]ather than receive a response to these lines of inquiry,” Plaintiff’s

employment was terminated by Defendant. Id. at ¶ 10.

Plaintiff also alleges that, in October 2021, Defendant issued an influenza vaccine mandate

for all staff. Id. at ¶ 6. On October 26, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a written religious accommodation

request for the influenza vaccine, indicating that “while she had received vaccines in the past,

including the influenza vaccine, her religious beliefs changed since the last time she received an

influenza vaccine and that for her to do so again would violate said beliefs.” Id. Specifically,

Plaintiff’s written religious accommodation request states:

[I] [h]ave [] religious beliefs over the past years that have changed numerous

aspects of my life and impact what I can allow in my body because this impacts my

relationship with [G]od. I have given up meat, supplements, medications. I have a

bona fide religious and philosophical disagreement with flu vaccines, abortion, and

consumption of meat.

Id. at pg. 16. On October 29, 2021, Defendant denied Plaintiff’s accommodation request. Id. at ¶

7. In so doing, Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to engage in any interactive process with Plaintiff.

Id. “However,” the Complaint avers, “Defendant took no adverse employment action against

[Plaintiff] immediately following its denial of the influenza vaccine religious accommodation

request.” Id.

Plaintiff also claims, separately from her allegations of employment discrimination, that,

“Plaintiff performed numerous hours of work over the final 2+ years of her employment from

which Defendant benefitted, but for which she was uncompensated.” Id. at ¶ 24. Beginning on

January 1, 2019, Plaintiff alleges Defendant began requiring nursing staff, including Plaintiff, to

routinely perform uncompensated work. Id. First, Plaintiff alleges that upon arriving to work their

shift, nursing staff were not permitted to “badge-in” for purposes of compensation calculations

until either 7 a.m. or 7 p.m., “depending on whether they were working the day or night shift.” Id.

Yet, Plaintiff alleges, Defendant required nursing staff to begin working their shifts prior to 7 a.m.

or 7 p.m. anyway, resulting in staff having to perform uncompensated work. Id. Second, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant required nursing staff to “badge-out” for a mandatory 30-minute lunch

break each shift. Id. In practice, however, Plaintiff continued to work during this 30-minute period

of uncompensated time because “Plaintiff could not safely perform her professional

responsibilities as a nurse if she had to take a 30-minute break without placing her patients at risk.”

Id.

Plaintiff’s Complaint brings four counts. Count One alleges Defendant’s conduct

constitutes unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964. Id. at pg. 6. Count Two brings a related state law claim, alleging Defendant’s conduct

constitutes unlawful employment discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Rights

act. Id. at pg. 7.

4 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains multiple paragraphs numbered as 2. This citation refers to the

numbered paragraph 2 appearing on Pages 2-3 of the Complaint.

Count Three alleges Defendant violated the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection

law by compelling Plaintiff to perform uncompensated work before her shifts and during her lunch

breaks. Id. at pg. 8.

Count Four of Plaintiff’s Complaint for Unjust Enrichment alleges Defendant has “become

unjustly enriched by improperly terminating Plaintiff to avoid its financial obligations to her, and

for its failure to justly compensate her for all work she performed prior to her termination, and

failing to disgorge said gains(s).” Id. at 9.

b. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety (“Motion”) on

October 19, 2022. See ECF No. 7. Defendant contends this Court should dismiss Count One,

Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, because Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead that she holds a sincerely held

religious belief conflicting with Defendant’s required bi-weekly COVID-19 testing by way of a

nasal swab. Id. at pg. 7-8. To the extent Plaintiff alleges religious discrimination related to the

influenza vaccine, Defendant argues this too must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege she

sustained an adverse employment action for not receiving the influenza vaccine. Id. at pg. 12.

Defendant contends this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims: Counts Two, Three,

and Four, because they are state law claims related to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim. Id. at pg. 13.

Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion on November 2, 2022

(“Response”). See ECF No. 8. Plaintiff’s Response first contends that to the extent Defendant

seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice, Defendant improperly seeks summary

judgment. Id. at pg. 4. Next, Plaintiff contends her beliefs are religious, and that Defendant

recognized Plaintiff’s beliefs were religious when Defendant granted Plaintiff’s request for an

exemption from being vaccinated for COVID-19. Id. at pg. 9. Thereafter, Plaintiff claims,

Defendant “unilaterally imposed a new work requirement of Plaintiff based upon her unvaccinated

status that conflicted with the same – the requirement that an object must now be inserted into her

body against her will in the form of a nasal swab COVID-19 test.” Id. Plaintiff claims “that she

immediately apprised Defendant of the conflict between her religious beliefs and the nasal swab

testing requirement, and proposed an alternate reasonable accommodation in the form of a saliva

test.” Id. at pg. 10. Plaintiff claims Defendant’s refusal to engage in the required “interactive

process” with Plaintiff after she “raised her faith-based objection to the nasal swab requirement”

is “indicative of an intention to discriminate against any employee who expresses a sincerely held

religious belief[] against the unwanted invasion of their God-given bodies under a disparate impact

theory.” Id. at pg. 11.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court is “not compelled to accept

unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Wheeler v. Wheeler, 639 Fed. Appx. 147, 149 (3d. Cir. 2016) (quoting Morrow v.

Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013)). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must

consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well

as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.”

Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).

IV. ANALYSIS

a. Count One is Dismissed Without Prejudice: Because Plaintiff Fails to Plead

Her Belief Conflicting With Defendant’s COVID-19 Testing Requirement is

Religious, Plaintiff has Failed to Plead a Violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964

Count One of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964. Compl. at pg. 6. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s…religion.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). The term “religion” is defined to include “all aspects of religious observance and

practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably

accommodate to an employee’s…religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the

conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, an employee

must show: (1) they “held a sincere religious belief that conflicted with a job requirement,” (2)

they informed their employer of the conflict, and (3) they were “disciplined for failing to comply

with the conflicting requirement.” Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 877 F.3d 487, 490 (3d Cir.

2017). To survive a motion to dismiss, an employee need not “establish each element” of this test,

but rather, “simply allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will

uncover proof of their claims.” Finkbeiner v. Geisinger Clinic, No. 4:21-cv-01903, 2022 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 154512 at *9 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2022) (quoting Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d

780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016)).

Here, Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead the first prong of her prima

facie religious discrimination claim because, under the Third Circuit’s test established in Africa v.

Commw. of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), Plaintiff’s objection to biweekly COVID-19 testing

by way of a nasal swab on the grounds “that observance of her religious beliefs forbids insertion

of an unwanted foreign object[] into her body” is not a religious belief under law. See Defendant’s

Motion, ECF No. 7 at pg. 8.

It is not this Court’s authority to “question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices

of faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Hernandez v.

Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). Determination of whether Plaintiff’s beliefs are religious must

not “turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question.” Ambrose v.

Gabay Ent & Assocs., P.C., No. 12-5453, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115353 at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15,

2013) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)). “Courts

‘are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them ‘incomprehensible,’ because ‘religious

beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others.’” Id. at *10

(quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) then Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714).

This Court’s inquiry into whether Plaintiff has plausibly plead the first prong of her prima

facie religious discrimination claim is limited only “to determining whether the belief is (1)

‘sincerely held’ and (2) religious within the plaintiff’s ‘own scheme of things.’” Id. at *12 (quoting

Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970)). With respect to part one (1) of this inquiry, the

Court finds Plaintiff’s beliefs are sincerely held.

With respect to part two (2) of this inquiry, this Court is conscious that determining whether

Plaintiff’s beliefs are religious “presents a most delicate question.” Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662

F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981). However, “the very concept of ordered liberty” precludes this

Court from allowing any person “a blanket privilege ‘to make his own standards on matters of

conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.’” Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)).

In determining whether an employee’s beliefs are religious, the Third Circuit considers

three factors first articulated in Africa v. Pennsylvania: whether the beliefs (1) “address

fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters,” (2) are

“comprehensive in nature,” and (3) “are accompanied by certain formal and external signs.” Brown

v. Children’s Hosp. of Phila., 794 Fed. Appx. 226, 227 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Fallon v. Mercy

Catholic Med. Ctr. Of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 490 (3d Cir. 2017)). With respect to the first factor,

beliefs address “fundamental” and “ultimate” questions when they “consider and attempt to come

to terms with what could best be described as ‘ultimate’ questions-questions having to do with,

among other things, life and death, right and wrong, good and evil.” Africa, 662 F.2d at 1033. With

respect to the second factor, beliefs must be “comprehensive” to be religious – “a religion must

consist of something more than a number of isolated, unconnected ideas” indeed, a “religion is not

generally confined to one question or one moral teaching; it has a broader scope. It lays claim to

an ultimate and comprehensive ‘truth.’” Id. at 1035 (quoting Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209

(3d Cir. 1979)). As for the third factor, “in ascertaining whether a set of ideas should be classified

as a religion” courts look to “any formal, external, or surface signs that may be analogized to

accepted religions” such as “formal services, ceremonial functions, the existence of clergy,

structure and organization, efforts at propagation, observation of holidays and other similar

manifestations associated with the traditional religions.” Id. at 209.

“Claims of religious discrimination present a unique and difficult challenge for judges.”

Geerlings v. Tredyffrin/Easttown Sch. Dist., No. 21-cv-4024, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183966 at

*13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2021). While judges “are ill-equipped to examine the breadth and content

of an avowed religion…when an individual invokes the first amendment to shield himself or

herself from otherwise legitimate state regulation” courts “are required to make such uneasy

differentiations.” Id. (quoting Africa, 662 F.2d at 1031). Mindful of this difficult and uneasy task,

the Court is guided by relevant case law in this circuit.

In Fallon, an employee brought a claim for Title VII religious discrimination after he was

terminated for refusing to receive a flu vaccine. Fallon, 877 F.3d at 488. There, the employee did

“not belong to any religious organization” but held “strong personal beliefs, opposing the flu

vaccine.” Id. In his complaint, the employee laid out his beliefs, which consisted of statements and

quotes such as “[d]o not believe in anything simply because you have heard it” and “[b]ut after

observation and analysis, when you find that anything agrees with reason and is conducive to the

good and benefit of one and all, then accept it and live up to it.” Id. at 492. The employee believed

that “one should not harm their own body and…the flu vaccine may do more harm than good” and

“if he yielded to coercion and consented to the hospital[‘s] mandatory [flu vaccination] policy, he

would violate his conscience as to what is right and what is wrong.” Id. The district court dismissed

the employee’s claims with prejudice, and the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 493-94.

The Third Circuit held the first two Africa factors were not satisfied because the

employee’s beliefs did not amount to “a comprehensive system of beliefs about fundamental or

ultimate matters.” Id. at 492. Instead, the court held, the employee applied “an isolated moral

teaching” to “not harm your own body” to come to the conclusion that the flu vaccine is morally

wrong.” Id. at 492. Moreover, the Court held this basis of refusal, “his concern that the flu vaccine

may do more harm than good…is a medical belief, not a religious one.” Id. Lastly, the Court held

that the employee’s beliefs did not satisfy the third Africa factor because the employee’s views

“are not manifested in formal and external signs, such as ‘formal services, ceremonial functions,

the existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, observation of holidays

and other similar manifestations associated with the traditional religions.’” Id. (quoting Malnak v.

Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979)).

An employee fails to state a Title VII religious discrimination claim if the employee’s

beliefs are “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical.” Fallon, 877 F.3d at 490 (quoting

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965)). In Brown, the Third Circuit again applied the

Africa factors to hold a former employee failed to state a Title VII religious discrimination claim

against her employer where her opposition to an employee vaccination requirement was “a medical

belief, not a religious one.” Brown, 794 Fed. Appx. at 227-28.

Particularly relevant to this Court’s analysis is the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s ruling

in Finkbeiner v. Geisinger Clinic, which concerned a remarkably similar set of facts to those at

issue here. In Finkbeiner, the plaintiff brought a Title VII religious discrimination claim against

her former employer after she was terminated for failing to comply with a workplace requirement

that all unvaccinated employees be tested biweekly for COVID-19. Finkbeiner v. Geisinger Clinic,

No. 4:21-cv-01903, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154512 at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2022).

The plaintiff sought a religious exemption from her employer’s testing requirement,

writing “I am a Christian and hold a sincere religious belief that I have a God given right to make

my own choices regarding what is good or bad for me. The Bible says that man has free will and

I am using my free will, granted to me by God, to reject the testing conditions placed on my

approved religious exemption.” Id. at *6. The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s Title VII claim and

held that her beliefs about testing were not religious because, “her belief that she has a ‘God given

right to make her own choices’—which, implicitly, her employer must unfailingly respect—would

amount to ‘a blanket privilege’ and a ‘limitless excuse for avoiding all unwanted obligations.’” Id.

at *10 (quoting Africa, 662 F.2d at 1031). “Though fungible enough to cover anything that

Finkbeiner trains it on, this belief” the court held, “is an ‘isolated moral teaching’…not a

comprehensive system of beliefs about fundamental or ultimate matters.” Id. (quoting Fallon, 877

F.3d at 492).

Importantly, an employee’s complaint must provide sufficient information about the nature

of the employee’s beliefs in order to state a claim for Title VII religious discrimination. In Addison,

the employee brought a Title VII religious discrimination claim against her former employer,

alleging she was discriminated against because of her “highly spiritual” nature. Addison v.

Amazon.com, Inc., No. 22-01071, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127642 at *12 (D. N.J. July 19, 2022).

Because the employee “fail[ed] to provide any additional information about the nature of her

beliefs” the court held “she cannot establish that she held sincere religious beliefs” and dismissed

the employee’s claim. Id. at *16.

By contrast, where a complaint pleads sufficient information to establish the nature of the

plaintiff’s religious beliefs, dismissal for failure to establish a sincerely held religious belief is

improper – as it is not for this Court to make “a scriptural determination” to the legitimacy or

quality of a plaintiff’s religious beliefs. Ambrose, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115353 at *16 (quoting

Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716).

In Kaite, the plaintiff, a school bus driver, brought a Title VII religious discrimination claim

against her former employer after she was terminated for refusing to be fingerprinted for a

background check. Kaite v. Altoona Student Transp., Inc., 296 F. Supp. 3d 736, 738 (W.D. Pa.

2017). The plaintiff requested a religious accommodation, and informed her employer that she “is

a devout Christian” and that, “according to her sincerely held religious beliefs, the Book of

Revelation prohibits the ‘mark of the devil,’ which she believes includes fingerprinting, and that

she will not get into Heaven if she submits to fingerprinting.” Id. The court declined the

defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and held the plaintiff “alleged facts that give

rise to a plausible claim for religious discrimination” and “[a]t this early stage, nothing more is

required.” Id. at 742 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

In Ambrose, an employee brought a Title VII religious discrimination claim against her

former employer after allegedly being terminated for refusing to wear a name badge “that

contained a list of workplace rules under the heading ‘Our Ten Commandments.’” Ambrose, 2013

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115353 at *1. The employee “told management that wearing an altered 10

commandments around her neck offended her religious beliefs because they were not the Ten

Commandments proscribed by her religious Catholic faith.” Id. at *3 (internal quotations omitted).

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the employee’s objection to

wearing the badge “was a ‘personal preference’ that is not entitled to statutory protection because,

in their view, the badge had ‘absolutely nothing to do with religion.’” Id. at *7 (emphasis in

original).

Specifically, the defendants argued “there is no deeply held Roman Catholic belief that

prohibits or forbids adherents from wearing a name badge that characterizes secular guidelines as

‘Our 10 Commandments.’” Id. at *14. The court rejected this argument and held it could not, on a

motion to dismiss, “be an ‘arbiter of scriptural interpretation’ and determine whether the employee

“is misreading the tenants of her Roman Catholic faith.” Id. at *15 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at

716). “Not only is it inappropriate for a court to make a factual determination in a 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss,” the court held, “a scriptural determination is ‘not within the judicial function and

judicial competence.’” Id. at *16 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716).

Here, Plaintiff first averred that her sincerely held Christian religious beliefs conflicted

with Defendant’s requirement that all staff be vaccinated for COVID-19. Compl. at ¶ 45. In

support, Plaintiff attaches the religious accommodation request form she submitted to Defendant

on September 7, 2021. Id. at ¶ 46; pg. 11-13. Plaintiff’s request form states she has religious and

philosophical objections to COVID-19 vaccination, cites a bible passage, states that Plaintiff is a

member of the United Church of Christ and that Plaintiff believes taking the COVID-19 vaccine

would defile Plaintiff’s relationship with God insofar as the vaccine was “derived from aborted

fetal cells during the testing process” and contains “foreign [mRNA]” and “proteins that have the

potential to embed into our [G]od-given DNA.” Id. at pg. 11-13. Defendant granted this

accommodation request and permitted Plaintiff to submit to “regular COVID-19 screening tests’

in lieu of vaccination. Id. at ¶ 5.

Plaintiff again sought religious accommodation, this time from the testing requirement. Id.

at ¶ 8. Plaintiff told her supervisor she cannot submit to nasal swab testing because “observance

of her religious beliefs forbids insertion of an unwanted foreign object into her body,” and

requested permission to take a saliva test instead. Id. Plaintiff’s Complaint attaches a November

5 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains multiple paragraphs numbered as 4. This citation refers to the

numbered paragraph 1 appearing on Page 3 of the Complaint.

6 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains multiple paragraphs numbered as 4. This citation refers to the

numbered paragraph 1 appearing on Page 3 of the Complaint.

23, 2021 e-mail she sent to Defendant. Id. at pg. 21-22. Plaintiff’s e-mail does not elaborate any

further on the source or nature of her purported religious beliefs which prevent her from taking the

nasal swab COVID-19 tests. Id. at pg. 21-22. Rather, Plaintiff’s e-mail challenges the factual and

scientific basis for Defendant’s testing requirement, contending that COVID-19 testing is

“ineffective” and that vaccinated individuals “are just as likely to contract and spread” COVID-19

as unvaccinated individuals, and cites to a medical journal article as supporting evidence. Id. at pg.

21-22.

Plaintiff identifies as a member of the United Church of Christ and states that “observance

of her religious beliefs forbids insertion of an unwanted foreign object into her body.” Compl. at

¶ 8. Plaintiff fails to plead any additional information about the religious nature of her beliefs.7

Rather, the additional information provided in Plaintiff’s November 15, 2021 e-mail challenges

Defendant’s factual and scientific basis for imposing the testing requirement, which suggests the

basis for Plaintiff’s belief is “political, sociological, or philosophical” – and not religious. Fallon,

877 F.3d at 490 (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165 (1965)).

Moreover, application of the Africa factors further compels this Court to find that

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a claim of Title VII religious discrimination because, although

sincerely held, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that her applicable belief is religious. Under

the first two Africa factors, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff’s beliefs “address

fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters” and

7 Although Plaintiff’s Complaint and the attachments thereto provide far more substantial

information regarding nature of Plaintiff’s religious beliefs as applied to Defendant’s vaccination

requirement, these beliefs, which primarily concern Plaintiff’s religious opposition to abortion, are

not applicable to, and Plaintiff does not assert they apply to, Defendant’s biweekly COVID-19

nasal testing requirement.

whether they are “comprehensive in nature.” Brown, 794 Fed. Appx. at 227 (quoting Fallon, 877

F.3d at 490). Plaintiff identifies as a member of the United Church of Christ, which is a

comprehensive religion. However, Plaintiff’s belief against the “insertion of an unwanted foreign

object into her body” is more “an isolated moral teaching” as opposed to a “comprehensive system

of beliefs about fundamental or ultimate matters.” Compl. at ¶ 8 (emphasis added); Finkbeiner,

2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154512 at *10 (quoting Fallon, 877 F.3d at 492).

Plaintiff’s Complaint and the attachments thereto fail to plead any information as to the

nature of Plaintiff’s “religious beliefs” that “forbid[] insertion of an unwanted foreign object into

her body.” Compl. at ¶ 8 (emphasis added). As with the employee’s belief in Finkbeiner, Plaintiff’s

belief that she is forbidden from doing something Plaintiff herself deems “unwanted” is, absent

further pleading regarding the religious nature of the belief, akin to asserting “a blanket

privilege…for avoiding all unwanted obligations.” Finkbeiner, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154512 at

*10 (quoting Africa, 662 F.2d at 1031). Under Africa, this Court is precluded from allowing “any

[] person, a blanket privilege ‘to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society

as a whole has important interests.’” Africa, 662 F.2d at 1031 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16).

Under the third Africa factor, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff’s beliefs “are

accompanied by certain formal and external signs.” Brown, 794 Fed. Appx. at 227 (quoting Fallon,

877 F.3d at 490). Such formal and external signs certainly exist with respect to the United Church

of Christ. It is less clear that Plaintiff’s beliefs forbidding “insertion of an unwanted foreign object

into her body” are accompanied by such signs. Unlike in Ambrose, where the plaintiff’s objection

arose from her interpretation of and religious belief in the Ten Commandments, and in Kaite,

where the plaintiff’s objection arose from her interpretation of and religious belief in the Book of

Revelation’s prohibition on the ‘mark of the devil,’ Plaintiff fails to plead a religious source or

nature to her belief “forbid[ding] insertion of an unwanted foreign object into her body.” Compl.

at ¶ 8.

To survive a motion to dismiss a Title VII religious discrimination claim, a plaintiff must

“allege sufficient facts” that, if proven, would establish (1) they “held a sincere religious belief

that conflicted with a job requirement,” (2) they informed their employer of the conflict, and (3)

they were “disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.” Fallon, 877 F.3d

at 490. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint, as drafted, fails to allege sufficient information to claim

Plaintiff’s sincerely held belief conflicting with Defendant’s COVID-19 testing requirement is

religious, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim without prejudice.8

8 Plaintiff also fails to plead a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII arising out of

Plaintiff’s religious objection to Defendant’s flu vaccination requirement, because Plaintiff does

not allege that she was “disciplined for failing to comply with” Defendant’s flu vaccination

requirement. Fallon, 877 F.3d at 490. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint expressly states, “Defendant

took no adverse employment action against [Plaintiff] immediately following its denial of the

influenza vaccine religious accommodation request” and pleads that she was suspended and

ultimately terminated by Defendant only after requesting religious accommodation from

Defendant’s requirement that she test for COVID-19 via nasal swab. See Compl. at ¶ 7-10.

Moreover, Defendant’s Motion contends that Plaintiff “alleges no facts to support that her

termination had anything to do with her denial of a religious exemption from the influenza

vaccine.” See Defendant’s Motion at pg. 12. Neither Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) nor

Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 8) assert that Plaintiff was suspended, and ultimately terminated by

Defendant for her refusal to take the influenza vaccine.

Plaintiff’s Response contends that Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges sufficient facts to plead a cause of

action for religious discrimination under Title VII pursuant to three theories of liability: failure to

accommodate, disparate treatment, and retaliation. See Plaintiff’s Response at pg. 10 (ECF No. 8).

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead that her suspension and termination was due to a

sincerely held religious belief, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead a cause of action for religious

discrimination under Title VII pursuant to any of these theories of liability. See Wallace v. City of

Philadelphia, No. 06-4236, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42437 at *21 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2010) (“In the

Third Circuit, employees may rely on two different theories to establish a claim for religious

discrimination: ‘disparate treatment’ on account of religion, or ‘failure to accommodate’ religious

beliefs.”) (emphasis added) (citing Abramson v. William Paterson College of N.J., No. 1:19-cv-

1507, 260 F.3d 265, 281 (3d Cir. 2001)); Refat v. Franklin Fin. Servs. Corp., 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 117768 at *15 n.6 (M.D. Pa. June 24, 2021) (holding an employee fails to state a Title VII

b. Counts Two, Three, and Four are Dismissed Without Prejudice: The Court

Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s State Law

Claims

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a federal district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if the court “has dismissed all claims over which

it has original jurisdiction.” Because this Court dismisses Count One of Plaintiff’s Complaint,

brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 over which this Court held original federal

question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. See Diprato v. Bernstiel, No. 21-507, 2022

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11962 at *15 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2022) (after dismissing Title VII claim,

dismissing Plaintiffs’ state law claims as well, holding “[a]s this case is in the early stages of

litigation, there is no compelling reason to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

remaining state law claims.”); Goodwin v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., No. 96-cv-2301, 1996 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 15448 at *19 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1996) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

related state law claims after dismissing Title VII count, holding “retaining the state law claims

will not serve the court’s interest in fairness to the litigants. Because it is a relatively early stage in

this litigation, the decision to dismiss the state claims at this point will occur before substantial

expenditure of time, effort, and money by the parties in preparing the state claims for trial in federal

court.”).

Moreover, to the extent Counts Three and Four of Plaintiff’s Complaint bring state law

claims arising out of Defendant’s alleged policy of requiring employees to perform uncompensated

retaliation claim based on an employer’s denial of a religious accommodation request “because

‘merely requesting a religious accommodation is not the same as opposing the allegedly unlawful

denial of a religious accommodation’”) (emphasis added) (quoting EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health

Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018)).

work before scheduled shifts and during lunch breaks, these claims must be dismissed on the

additional grounds that the Court is without discretion to assert supplemental jurisdiction over

these claims because they are unrelated to Plaintiff’s Title VII religious discrimination claim, and

therefore “unrelated to a cause of action under federal law.” Pasquale v. Gen. Scis., Inc., No. 09-

1735, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38666 at *12 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2010). See also Lyon v. Whisman,

45 F.3d 758, 762-63 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that where “[t]he only link between” a plaintiff’s

federal and state law claim “is the general employer-employee relationship between the parties”

supplemental jurisdiction does not exist).

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice. An

appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John M. Gallagher

JOHN M. GALLAGHER

United States District Court Judge