WILLIAMS v. PIEDMONT AIRLINES INC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAMONTE F. WILLIAMS :

: No. 20-cv-2925-JMY

vs. :

:

PIEDMONT AIRLINES, INC., and :

DAVID ZAVALA. :

Memorandum

Younge, J. August 18, 2022

Currently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by the Defendants, Piedmont Airlines, Inc. (hereafter “Piedmont”) and

David Zavala. (Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 16.) The Court finds this matter appropriate for

resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7.1(f). For the reasons set forth

below, the Court will grant the Defendants’ Motion and dismiss the Complaint. Plaintiff will be

provided with thirty days to file an amended complaint.

I. Summary of Relevant Procedural and Factual Background:

On November 11, 2019, Williams filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“Charge EEOC”). (Charge of Discrimination No. 530-

2019-06119 (“Charge”), Reply to Response to MTD, Ex. 1, ECF No. 20-1.) The EEOC

dismissed the Charge on March 9, 2020, and Williams filed this lawsuit on June 9, 2020.

Williams sued Piedmont and David Zavala alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Pennsylvania

Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). (Complaint page 1; ECF No. 1.) Williams asserts that he was

subject to “unequal terms and conditions of employment” and “retaliation,” and that Piedmont

“failed to stop harassment.” (Id. page 3.) Regarding his retaliation claim, Mr. Williams alleges

that he “was retaliated against for” (1) “filing an EEOC Complaint against Piedmont,” (2)

“complaining about racial discrimination towards African-Americans in reference to hiring and

firing,” and for (3) stating that “African-Americans are hired into mid-level management

[positions] at a far lower rate than Hispanics.” (Id. page 3.)

To support these allegations, Williams asserts the following factual averments. Without

providing a specific date, Mr. Williams alleges he “represented employee Marcus Murray [who]

was scheduled for termination.” (Id. page 6.) In the course of Williams’ representation of his

colleague, who was African-American, he allegedly “explained to Manager Claudia Sales that

there were Hispanic employees [who] had accumulated far more attendance points than Mr.

Murray but remained employees of the company.” (Id.) Williams then alleges, “[t]he following

week my employee flight benefits were deactivated due to a corporate investigation.” Williams

avers “corporate security” told him he “did not violate the company’s travel policy”, but that his

“flight benefits [were inactivated] due to a corporate investigation.” (Id. page 6.) Williams

asserts that his flight benefits remain inactive, but that the investigation concluded at an

unspecified date in 2019. (Id. page 6.)

Williams also describes a purported dispute that he had with a Ramp Department

Manager identified in the Complaint as David Zavala. (Id. page 7.) The purported dispute

related to a written warning Williams received for poor performance which was, according to

Williams, overturned through the system board grievance process. (Id.) Williams avers, “David

Zavala attempted to persuade me that the write-up was not overturned by the system board by

disclosing to me a fictitious email that stated the write-up was upheld by the system board.”

Williams goes on to allege that David Zavala, “attempted to alter the results of [his] system

board hearing” by trying to persuade him that the system board had not, in fact, overturned his

performance write-up. Williams alleges that Mr. Zavala “admitted to the so called mistake once

[Mr. Williams] reminded him” of the “union letter that proves the system board overturned the

disciplinary action brought against [Williams].” (Id. page 7.)

Williams goes on to allege “several employees and union members were told they are not

allowed to speak or contact [Williams] because he had complained about racial discrimination,”

and that Piedmont and the Union worked in conjunction to prevent Williams from representing

his nephew, Brandon Williams, in grievance proceedings. (Id. page 7-8.) Finally, Williams

avers that his nephew was “terminated for alleged violations of the company’s travel policy,”

after Williams complained that Piedmont discriminated against African-Americans. (Id.)

Williams specifically avers, “My nephew Brandon Williams was also targeted for termination

after I complained of racial discrimination against African-Americans . . . Brandon was unjustly

terminated for alleged violations of the company’s travel policy.” (Complaint page 7-8.)

II. Legal Standard:

The motion to dismiss standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is set

forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). After Iqbal, it is clear that “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to

defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive dismissal, ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Tatis v. Allied Interstate,

LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Facial plausibility is

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678). Instead, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Our Court of Appeals requires us to

apply a three-step analysis under a 12(b)(6) motion: (1) “[the district court] must tak[e] note of

the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim;” (2) “it should identify allegations that,

‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth;’” and, (3)

“[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and

then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Connelly v. Lane

Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).

When a motion to dismiss is granted, the court must decide whether to grant leave to

amend. The Third Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and, thus, leave to amend

should be freely granted. See, e.g., Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2000); Dole v.

Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 486 (3d Cir. 1990). However, a court need not grant leave to

amend when it would be an exercise in futility. City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset

Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 879 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Leave to amend is properly denied if

amendment would be futile, i.e., if the proposed complaint could not ‘withstand a renewed

motion to dismiss.’”) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan. Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d

Cir. 1988)); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir.

1997) (recognizing that denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where the

pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment would be futile).

III. Discussion:

Legal theories based on retaliation, racial discrimination, and hostile work environment

brought by Williams under Title VII and the PHRA will be addressed by the Court from the

standpoint that the analysis is identical under Title VII and the PHRA. In the Third Circuit,

“[c]laims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with Title VII claims.” See Lazard v.

All Restore, LLC, No. 19-6040, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59200, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2021)

(quoting Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 406 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also Weston v.

Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The proper analysis under Title VII and

the PHRA is identical, as Pennsylvania courts have construed the protections of the two acts

interchangeably.”).

The Court will also apply an identical approach when analyzing Williams’ claims based

on a legal theory of disability discrimination under the ADA and the PHRA because, “[t]he

analytical framework used to evaluate a disability discrimination claim under the PHRA is

effectively indistinguishable from that under the ADA, thus allowing courts to dispose of both

ADA and PHRA claims on the same grounds.” Bialko v. Quaker Oats Co., 434 F. App’x 139,

141-42 n.5 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2002)).

The Court will only vary its analysis when addressing the retaliation claim brought against David

Zavala in his individual personal capacity. As to David Zavala’s individual liability, the Court

will focus only on claims brought pursuant to the PHRA.

A. Allegations in the Complaint Fail to Establish a Retaliation Claim under Title VII

or the PHRA:

Title VII prohibits “employers from retaliating against employees for complaining about

discrimination and harassment in the work place.” Young v. City of Philadelphia Police Dep’t,

651 F. App’x 90, 95 (3d Cir. 2016). To succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish

“(1) [he] engaged in [a protected] activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action

against [him]; and (3) there was a causal connection between [his] participation in the protected

activity and the adverse employment action.” Id.

“To establish the requisite causal connection a plaintiff usually must prove either (1) an

unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly

retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”

Oden v. SEPTA, 137 F. Supp. 3d 778, 791 (E.D. Pa. 2015). Other evidence may also support a

causal link. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280–81 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Although

timing and ongoing antagonism have often been the basis for the causal link, our case law clearly

has allowed a plaintiff to substantiate a causal connection for purposes of the prima facie case

through other types of circumstantial evidence that support the inference. For example, a

plaintiff may establish the connection by showing that the employer gave inconsistent reasons

for terminating the employee . . . Moreover, we have been willing to explore the record in search

of evidence, and our caselaw has set forth no limits on what we have been willing to consider.”).

Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that the

temporal proximity was unduly suggestive where the plaintiff was terminated seven days after

she engaged in protected activity); Stocker v. Green, Tweed & Co., Inc., No. 18-4503, 2020 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 137364, at *52 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2020) (“Although there is no bright line rule as to

what constitutes unduly suggestive temporal proximity, the temporal proximity [of one week] is

in the realm of what this Court and others have found sufficient at the prima facie stage.”); see

also Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 188–89 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that

ten days was sufficient to establish a causal link).

To demonstrate causation with only the timing of the protected activity and adverse

action, “the temporal proximity must be immediate.” Blakney v. City of Phila., No. 12-6300,

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77925, at *11 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2013), aff’d, 559 F. App’x. 183 (3d Cir.

2014) (“The Third Circuit has suggested that a temporal proximity of two days is sufficient to

establish causation, [] whereas a temporal proximity of ten days is sufficient to establish

causation only when accompanied by other evidence of wrongdoing.”) If temporal proximity is

not unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive, there must be further evidence to substantiate a

causal connection. McCloud v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 391, 401-02 (E.D. Pa.

2008) (granting summary judgment on a retaliation claim). Such evidence includes: (1) “a

pattern of antagonism”; (2) “inconsistencies in the employer’s reasons for acting”; or (3) “other

facts that show retaliatory animus.” Id; see also Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108,

114 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[when] the temporal proximity is not so close as to be unduly suggestive . . .

timing plus other evidence may be an appropriate test.”).

In the Complaint, Williams alleges that he engaged in two protected activities that give

rise to his retaliation claim. He cites to the fact that he filed an EEOC Charge of discrimination,

and the fact that he complained about racial discrimination at Piedmont. In his Complaint,

Williams alleges:

I was retaliated against for filing an EEOC [Charge] against Piedmont Airlines in

Philadelphia, PA and for complaining about racial discrimination towards African

Americans in reference to hiring and firing of African-American employees at

Piedmont Airlines in Philadelphia, PA. I was retaliated against by Piedmont

Airlines for stating that African-Americans are hired in to mid-level management

position[s] at a far lower rate than Hispanics despite the fact that a majority of the

workforce is African-American.

(Complaint page 1.) Despite Williams’ claim that he complained about the disparity in African-

American representation in mid-level management positions, the Complaint is devoid of any

specific factual allegations to develop this purported claim. In regard to complaints about racial

discrimination, the Complaint merely references a conversation that Williams had with Claudia

Sales. Williams avers that when representing a black colleague “Mr. Murray” in an alleged

termination hearing, Williams “explained to Manager Claudia Sales that there were Hispanic

employees [who] had accumulated far more attendance [infractions] than Mr. Murray, but

remained employees of the company.” (Complaint page 6.)

Williams then identifies five separate incidents which the Court will assume Williams is

offering as purported examples of adverse employment actions that were taken against him.

First, Williams alleges that Piedmont deactivated his flight benefits “due to a corporate

investigation.” Williams then appears to make reference to the grievance system established

under the Rail Road Labor Act, and an instance when he received a warning letter for poor job

performance which he fought through the grievance system and ultimately had overturned.

Williams avers that, thereafter, a Department Manager named David Zavala allegedly

“attempted to persuade [Williams] that the write-up was not overturned by the system board.”

Williams also claims that Piedmont instructed employees not to speak with him, and that both

Piedmont and his Union worked in conjunction to prevent him from representing his nephew

Brandon Williams in his grievance hearing—presumably under the Railway Labor Act.

(Complaint page 7-8.) Finally, Williams references the fact that his nephew, who also

purportedly worked at Piedmont, was terminated. (Complaint page 8.)

A.1. Claim of Retaliation for Filing an EEOC Charge:

With regards to Williams’ claim for retaliation for filing an EEOC Charge, the Complaint

fails to establish a causal connection between any purported adverse employment action and the

filing of the EEOC Charge. Williams filed the EEOC Charge on November 11, 2019.1 He

alleges that Piedmont deactivated his flight benefits in September 2019. Piedmont deactivated

Williams’ flight benefits two months before he filed the EEOC Charge; therefore, he cannot

1 Williams’ EEOC Charge is a public record that the Court may consider in ruling on the motion to dismiss.

Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 777, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 579 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[U]ner

the applicable legal standard we may consider the EEOC charge and related EEOC document . . . either as

undisputed documents reference in the complaint or central to the plaintiff’s claim, or as information which is a

matter of public record.”).

establish a causal connection between the alleged adverse action – the deactivation – and the

protected activity of filing an EEOC Charge. Williams equally fails to establish a causal

connection between the EEOC Charge and: the purported disagreement he had with David

Zavala; the alleged fact coworkers were told not to speak to Williams; the alleged fact that he

was prevented from representing his nephew during grievance proceedings and the termination

of his nephew. In his Complaint, Williams fails to provide dates for when these incidents –

alleged adverse employment actions – occurred, and he fails to plead any other facts to causally

connected these events to his EEOC Charge. Therefore, his claim based on a theory of

retaliation is factually unsupported. Williams’ retaliation claim fails because he has not pled fact

to evaluate the issue of temporal proximity or causation in relationship to the filing of the EEOC

Charge and any adverse action by Piedmont. Blakney v. City of Philadelphia, No. 12-6300, 2013

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77925, at *14-15 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2013, aff’d, 559 F. App’x 183 (3d Cir.

2014) (granting motion to dismiss retaliation claim despite allegations that the adverse action

occurred after the complaint because of no facts to suggest immediacy for causation).

A.2. Claim of Retaliation for Comments Made to Claudia Sales:

Williams equally fails to establish a causal connection between any purported adverse

employment action and the comments that he allegedly made to Claudia Sales; therefore, his

retaliation claim based on comments to Claudia Sales fails.

In the Complaint, Williams avers that he had a discussion with a manager named Claudia

Sales in which he accused Piedmont of racial discrimination. Williams alleges that this

discussion occurred while he was representing a coworker during a grievance proceeding.

Williams further alleges that the following week his flight benefits were deactivated. However,

Williams own allegations undercut his ability to establish a causal connection between his flight

benefits being cut and his conversation with Ms. Sales because in the Complaint he alleges that

his benefits were cut “due to a corporate investigation.” (Complaint page 6.) Williams further

omits key facts from the Complaint that appear in his EEOC Charge of Discrimination. (EEOC

Charge page 3-4.) Williams omits allegations that the deactivation of flight benefits applied to

numerous employees and was done in relationship to a corporate fraud investigation. (Id.) As

alleged in his EEOC Charge, corporate security accused numerous employees of selling their

flight benefits. (EEOC Charge page 4.) Thus, it would appear to the Court that the deactivation

of flight benefits occurred in relationship to a fraud investigation that had nothing to do with any

comment that Williams made to Ms. Sales.

Williams further fails to establish temporal proximity or any fact to support a causal

connection between his discussion with Ms. Sales and: the purported disagreement he had with

David Zavala; the alleged fact coworkers were told not to speak to Williams; the alleged fact that

he was prevented from representing his nephew during grievance proceedings; and the

termination of his nephew. In his Complaint, Williams fails to provide dates for when these

incidents – alleged adverse employment actions – occurred. Therefore, he has failed to plead

facts to support his retaliation claim. Williams’ retaliation claim fails because he has not pled

fact to evaluate the issue of temporal proximity or causation in relationship to his conversation

with Ms. Sales and any adverse employment action. Blakney v. City of Philadelphia, No. 12-

6300, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77925, at *14-15 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2013, aff’d, 559 F. App’x 183

(3d Cir. 2014) (granting motion to dismiss retaliation claim despite allegation that the adverse

action occurred after the complaint because of no facts to suggest immediacy for causation).

B. Allegations in the Complaint Fail to Establish a Claim for Race Discrimination

under Title VII or the PHRA:

The Complaint fails to set forth facts to satisfy the necessary elements of a claim for

racial discrimination—disparate treatment. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination

based on disparate treatment under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a

protected class; (2) he is qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment

action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. See Jones v. Sch.

Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410–11 (3d Cir. 1999); Glenn v. Raymour & Flanigan, 832 F.

Supp. 2d 539, 548 (E.D. Pa. 2011).

The Complaint fails to set forth facts to establish that Williams was subject to an adverse

employment action; therefore, he fails to establish a claim for racial discrimination—disparate

treatment. An adverse employment action in the context of a disparate treatment claim is “a

significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment

with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in

benefits.” Reynolds v. Dep’t of Army, 439 F. App’x 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Burlington

Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); see also Tucker v. Merk & Co., 131 F. App’x.

852, 855 (3d Cir. 2005) (“A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic

harm.”). The Complaint filed in this action is devoid of any mention of an adverse employment

action. There is no allegation that Williams was subject to termination, promotion denial or

reassignment. He merely alleges that his “employee flight benefits were deactivated due to

[a] corporate investigation”.

In the Complaint, Williams provides no context surrounding the deactivation of his flight

benefits. He also fails to define or explain what flight benefits are and what he was entitled to

under the flight benefits program. Therefore, it is impossible for the Court to evaluate whether

the deactivation of flight benefits constitutes a “significant change in benefits” which could be

interpreted as an adverse employment action. However, even if Williams had properly pled his

claim, it is unlikely that the deactivation of flight benefits would constitute an adverse

employment action in the context of a disparate treatment discrimination claim. Tucker, 131 F.

App’x. at 855-856 (finding as a matter of law that despite employer’s policy of compensating

employees for education credits, it was not an adverse action for the employer to refuse to pay

for plaintiff’s MBA credits); Clayton v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Welfare, 304 F. App’x. 104, 106-

07 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding changing work schedule, moving mailbox, denying bonus, removing

furniture from office, not to be adverse actions); Mihalko v. Potter, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

24825, at *2, 6, 18, 53 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2003) (denying a request for time-off and directing

other employees not to speak to plaintiff are not adverse actions).

Assuming arguendo, that the deactivation of Williams’ flight benefits was an adverse

employment action, his claim for disparate treatment still fails because he pled no facts to

establish that the deactivation of flight benefits occurred under circumstances that give rise to an

inference of discrimination—the fourth element of a claim under Title VII. Williams simply

alleges that he is an African-American male and that his “flight benefits were deactivated due to

[a] corporate investigation.” (Complaint page 6.) Beyond this barebones allegation, Williams

does nothing to develop his claim. For example, Williams’ Complaint is devoid of any

allegation that similarly situated members of a different class of individuals were permitted to

retain their flight benefits—or any allegation of that nature.

Given the fact that Williams fails to allege he suffered an adverse employment action or

that circumstances exist which give rise to inference of discrimination, the Complaint will be

dismissed without prejudice.

C. Allegations in the Complaint Fail to Establish a Hostile Work Environment

Claim under Title VII or the PHRA:

In the Complaint, Williams asserts that he was subject to discrimination because

Piedmont “fail[ed] to stop harassment.” (Complaint page 3.) However, the Complaint is devoid

of any alleged facts to establish that Williams was subjected to a hostile work environment. The

Complaint fails to set forth facts to satisfy the necessary elements of a hostile work environment

claim under Title VII or the PHRA.

“To establish a racially hostile work environment, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) [he]

suffered intentional discrimination because of [his] race; (2) the discrimination was severe or

pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the employee; (4) it would have

detrimentally affected a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) a basis for employer

liability is present. Griffin v. Harrisburg Prop. Servs., Inc., 421 F. App’x. 204, 207 (3d Cir.

2011). When evaluating a hostile work environment claim, “[a court must] consider the totality

of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether

it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere [an] offense utterance; and whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Miller v. Thomas Jefferson

Univ. Hosp., 565 F. App’x. 88, 93 (3d Cir. 2014).

In the Complaint, Williams identifies five separate incidents which the Court will assume

Williams is offering as purported examples of harassment in support of his hostile work

environment claim. First, Williams alleges that Piedmont deactivated his flight benefits “due to

a corporate investigation.” Williams then appears to make reference to the grievance system

established under the Rail Road Labor Act, and an instance when he received a warning letter for

poor job performance which he fought through the grievance system and ultimately had

overturned. Williams claims that, thereafter, a Department Manager named David Zavala

allegedly “attempted to persuade [Williams] that the write up was not overturned by the system

board.” Williams also claims that Piedmont instructed employees not to speak with him, and

that both Piedmont and his Union worked in conjunction to prevent him from representing his

nephew in a grievance hearing. (Complaint page 6-7.) Finally, he alleges his nephew was

terminated. (Complaint page 8.)

Williams’ hostile work environment claim is deficient because the Complaint is devoid of

alleged facts to demonstrate a relationship between these incidents and his race. See Acosta v.

East Penn Mfg. Co., No. 14-1859, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133240, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30,

2015) (granting summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim because the plaintiff

failed to plead facts to suggest that the “bullying” or “poor training” were “attributable to [the

plaintiff’s] race as required to satisfy the first prong of the hostile work environment.”); Miller,

565 F. App’x. at 93 (affirming order dismissing hostile work environment claim because twice

saying “you people” and stating someone should receive “psychiatric help” did not rise to the

level of severe and pervasive conduct.)

Williams’ hostile work environment claim is also insufficiently pled because the

Complaint is devoid of alleged facts to show that these isolated incidents were severe, frequent,

or threatening in nature such that they change the conditions of employment. See e.g., Acosta,

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133240, at *25 (granting summary judgment on a hostile work

environment claim because “isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to

discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.”); Jean-Louis v. RGIS

Inventory Specialists, LLC, No. 08-2662, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *30 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22,

2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s hostile work environment for failure to state a claim; plaintiff’s

allegation that her supervisor treated her poorly, without more, did not establish a racially hostile

work environment claim).

For these reasons, Williams’ hostile work environment claim will be dismissed without

prejudice.

D. Allegations in the Complaint Fail to Establish a Claim for Disability Discrimination

under the ADA or the PHRA:

The Complaint fails to set forth facts to satisfy the necessary elements of a claim for

disability discrimination under the ADA or PHRA. To establish a prima facie claim for

disability discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that (1) he is disabled within the meaning

of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or

without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise

adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Wilkie v. Luzerne Cty., 207 F. Supp.

3d 433, 436 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir.1996)). A plain

reading of the Complaint illustrates that Williams has failed to plead any facts to satisfy any of

the necessary elements of the tripartite test to establish a claim for disability discrimination. The

most troubling aspect of the disability discrimination claim advanced by Williams is the fact that

he fails to identify any disability from which he suffers from that affects a major life activity. To

survive a motion to dismiss claim under the ADA, “a plaintiff must allege facts which show [he]

has an impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity.” Nerosa v. Storecast

Merch. Corp., No. 02-440, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16210, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2002).

Therefore, Williams’ disability discrimination claim fails at the pleading stage.

E. Retaliation Claim Against David Zavala:

Williams also asserts what he characterizes as a retaliation claim against a manager

identified in the Complaint as David Zavala. (Opposition to Motion to Dismiss page 2, ECF No.

19.) Personal individual liability can attach under the PHRA. 43 P.S. § 955(e). However,

individual liability is usually limited to aiders and abettors who must be “active partners with the

principal in the intent to commit a wrongful act.” Destefano v. Henry Mitchell Co., No. 99-5501,

2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6073, at *7 (E.D. Pa. April 13, 2000) (citing Marks v. Bell Telephone Co.

of Pa., 331 A.2d 424, 428 (Pa. 1975)); see also Smith v. RB Distribution Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d

645, 665 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2020) (under the PHRA, individual defendants cannot be liable for

aiding and abetting discrimination without corporate liability for discrimination.).

Since Williams has failed to establish a primary violation by Piedmont, his claims against

David Zavala in his individual capacity will be dismissed without prejudice. Elmarakaby v.

Wyeth Pharm., Inc., No. 09-1784, 2015 WL 1456686 at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2015).

IV. Conclusion:

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted and the Complaint will

be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff will be granted thirty days to file an amended

complaint.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge

Judge John Milton Younge