The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
__________________________________________
CHARLES THOMAS, JR., :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : Civil No. 5:20-cv-01457-JMG
:
JUSTIN LIGUORI et al., :
Defendants. :
__________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GALLAGHER, J. July 13, 2022
I. OVERVIEW
This is a civil rights action between Plaintiff Charles Thomas, Jr., the City of Easton, and
five City of Easton police officers. Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to an unlawful arrest and
excessive force. He has filed charges under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the city and the
officers. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that
follow, the Court grants the Motion in part and denies it in part.
II. BACKGROUND
On March 17, 2018, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Plaintiff had a physical encounter with
several City of Easton police officers at a local WAWA convenience store. Plaintiff’s Statement
of Facts ¶¶ 17, 21, ECF No. 69-3 (“PSOF”); Defendants’ Statement of Facts ¶¶ 17, 19-27, ECF
No. 66 (“DSOF”). During the encounter, Plaintiff sustained serious injuries that required
emergency medical treatment. PSOF ¶¶ 35, 37-38; DSOF ¶¶ 37-40. The police officers state that
none of them saw how Plaintiff got injured but they surmise he hit his head on the brick wall of
the WAWA. DSOF ¶ 30. Plaintiff has no recollection of the incident. PSOF ¶ 46, 48; DSOF ¶ 48.
WAWA has no surveillance camera that indicated how Plaintiff’s injuries occurred and no
witnesses to the incident could be located. PSOF ¶¶ 52, 53; DSOF ¶¶ 52, 53.
Plaintiff was subsequently charged criminally and found guilty of resisting arrest,
disorderly conduct, and public drunkenness by a judge and jury at the Northampton County Court
of Common Pleas. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 42, ECF No. 60 (“Complaint”). Plaintiff
appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania which vacated his convictions concluding “the
officers lacked probable cause to arrest [Plaintiff],” and “the evidence was insufficient to support
all the crimes charged and tried.” Complaint ¶ 45; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 8-9, No. 931 EDA
2020 (Pa. Sup. Ct. July 28, 2021).
Based on these events, Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 Complaint. Defendants move for
summary judgment.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is properly granted when there is “no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
Facts are material if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 954 F.3d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute as to those facts is genuine
if the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “We view all the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
The party moving for summary judgment must first “identify [] those portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). In response,
the nonmoving party must “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. at 324. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position
will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
[nonmovant].” Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff claims his constitutional rights were violated by the City of Easton and five City
of Easton police officers. He brings Section 1983 claims under four theories – “excessive force,”
“false arrest,” “malicious prosecution,” and “municipal liability.” Complaint ¶¶ 51-79. He also
alleges assault and battery under state law. Id.
A. Section 1983 Claims
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person acting under color of state law
who subjects a person or causes a person to be subjected ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Vega v. Tekoh, No. 21-499, 2022
WL 2251304, at *4 (U.S. June 23, 2022). “To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that some person has deprived him of a federal right ... and that the person
who deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750
F.3d 273, 290 (3d Cir. 2014).
1. Excessive Force
Plaintiff first claims he was subjected to excessive force by the City of Easton Police
Officers Liguori, Cornelius, and Lollis. Complaint ¶¶ 51-56.
“Police officers are privileged to commit battery pursuant to a lawful arrest, but the
privilege is negated by the use of excessive force.” Groman v. Twp. Of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628,
634 (3d. Cir. 1995). Under Section 1983, the use of excessive force to effect an arrest violates a
suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights and must be judged by reference to the Fourth Amendment’s
“reasonableness” standard. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989). Under this
standard, the officers’ actions must be “objectively reasonable” considering the facts and
circumstances confronting them.1 Id.; see also Patrick v. Moorman, 536 F. App’x 255, 258 (3d
Cir. 2013).
Defendants argue they used reasonable force against Plaintiff and were “merely trying to
restrain Plaintiff for their safety as well as his own.” Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment 17, ECF No. 66 (“MSJ”). But, they argue, this Court need not reach that determination
because their version of the incident is uncontradicted - as Plaintiff has no memory of the incident
and no video or witnesses exist. MSJ 17; DSOF ¶¶ 52, 53. However, Plaintiff brings evidence. The
paramedic on the scene reported, during his treatment of Plaintiff, “the moment Plaintiff regained
consciousness [during transport] he said the ‘police did this to me - the police assaulted me.’”2
PSOF § 41; Paramedic/EMT Report, JA001070, JA001072, ECF No. 67-8 Exh. 28 (“Par./EMT.
1 To make that determination, courts look to a number of factors including: (1) the severity
of the crime; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others; (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest; (4) the duration of
the action; (5) whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest; (6) the possibility
that the suspect might be armed, and; (7) the number of persons with whom the officer must
contend at one time. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 22 (1985); see also Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. at 396; Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997).
2 Plaintiff raised this issue in his Statement of Undisputed Facts. PSOF §§ 39, 41.
Defendants raised no objection to admissibility and the Court sees a potential path to
admissibility, including as an “excited utterance” or “statement made for medical diagnosis.” See
FRE R. 803(2), 803(4)(A).
Report”). The paramedic also reported he found it “very odd that … all of the Easton police officers
refused to answer any of my questions.” PSOF ¶ 39; Par/EMT Report J001069. Plaintiff’s expert
witness, Dr. McRae, also contends that Plaintiff’s injuries did not happen as described by the
officers. Dr. McRae’s Report 12-15, ECF No. 67-6 – Exh. 27. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that
the officers each gave conflicting accounts of the incident in their depositions and court
testimonies. Id. at ¶ 46.
Considering the injuries suffered by Plaintiff, the statements of the attending paramedic,
Plaintiff’s expert witness’s contentions, and the alleged conflicting reports of the police officers,
and taking Plaintiff’s facts in the light most favorable to him, as we must, the Court finds enough
of a factual dispute to survive summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
2. False Arrest
Plaintiff next claims he was subject to false arrest by Officers Liguori, Cornelius, and
Lollis. Complaint ¶¶ 65-69. “To assess claims of false arrest, the court must determine whether the
arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the
offense.” Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017). The test for an arrest
without probable cause is objective, based on whether the facts and circumstances available to the
officers at the moment of arrest were enough to warrant a reasonable person to believe that the
plaintiff had committed or was committing an offense. See Snell v. City of York, 564 F.3d 659,
671 (3d Cir. 2009). Further, the Fourth Amendment is a limitation upon police conduct even if the
officers stop short of a “technical arrest” and their action does not culminate in an “arrest” in
traditional terminology. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). “Whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has “seized” that person.” Id. at
16.
Defendants argue there was no “arrest” and, even if there was, they had probable cause for
the arrest. MSJ 6, 10-11. They contend “the prosecutor’s office, the magisterial district judge, and
the criminal court judge all agreed with [their] conclusion that there was probable cause to file
charges.” 3 Id. at 11. Plaintiff argues the opposite, maintaining he was arrested - i.e., he was
“seized” and prevented from walking away. Plaintiff’s Memo in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment 11, ECF No. 69-2 (“Memo”). He contends that “the officers testified
during their depositions and the entire criminal trial that their intent was to arrest him,” and were
thwarted “only because he had to be transported by ambulance to the hospital.”4 Memo 3, 11.
Plaintiff maintains the finding of probable cause in the earlier criminal case was not based on the
totality of evidence the Superior Court later used to vacate his criminal charges. Memo 3-5.
Additionally, he notes the paramedic on the scene reported that Plaintiff cried out multiple times
during transport to the hospital “the police assaulted me.” PSOF §41.
Considering the foregoing, and taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there
exists sufficient factual dispute to send to the factfinder the question of whether Plaintiff was
arrested and the cause supporting such arrest.
3 See Commonwealth v. Thomas, CP-48-CR-01855-2018 (N.C.C.P. March 11, 2020).
4 See Liguori Depo. Exh. 7 JA000080 71:17-19 ECF No. 67-2 (“So, at that time, I decided
to make an arrest and I wanted to put him in handcuffs, take him into custody.”); “He was told he
was under arrest and to put his hands behind his back.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 931 EDA
2020 at * 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 28, 2021) (quoting Officer Liguori trial testimony.).
3. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff next brings a malicious prosecution claim against Officers Liguori, Cornelius,
Lollis, Ocetnik, and Herncane. Complaint ¶¶ 70-75. “To prevail in a Section 1983 malicious
prosecution action, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2)
the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without
probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the
plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept
of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d
599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005) citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).
Defendants challenge prongs one, three, and five. MSJ 13-14.
First, Defendants argue Officers Cornelius, Lollis, Ocetnik, and Herncane did not
personally take part in initiating a criminal proceeding against Plaintiff. Id. at 13. The defendant(s)
on a malicious prosecution claim must have personally initiated criminal proceedings against the
plaintiff. See Piazza v. Lakkis, 2012 WL 2007112, at *12 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
Officers Cornelius, Lollis, Ocetnik, and Herncane did not initiate criminal proceedings
against Plaintiff. See Police Cr. Compl. JA 00128-JA001287, ECF No. 67-7 Exh. 31. Indeed,
Plaintiff concedes that only Officer Liguori signed the original Affidavit for the Criminal
Complaint. Memo 10. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment to Officers Cornelius,
Lollis, Ocetnik, and Herncane on the malicious prosecution claim. See Bishop v. Upper Darby
Police Dep’t, No. 15-CV-6069, 2021 WL 4818272, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2021) (Summary
judgment was granted to the three defendants who did not initiate criminal proceedings against
Plaintiff.).
Next, regarding prong three and the issue of probable cause, Defendants again maintain
Officer Liguori had probable cause to initiate the criminal proceeding. MSJ 10. And Plaintiff again
counters, “the finding [of the criminal court] was not based on the totality of the evidence” and,
“more importantly, the Superior Court opinion nullifies [those trial] findings.” 5 Memo 5.
Similarly, regarding prong five, Defendants again contend Plaintiff did not suffer a
deprivation of liberty because he was not arrested and never imprisoned. MSJ 15. Plaintiff counters
that although he was not officially arrested, he was seized as per the testimony of three officers
and denied his liberty by being subjected to restrictive pretrial conditions, urine sampling, and
three years of monitoring. Memo 11.
As with the challenge to the false arrest claim, the Courts finds there is a material factual
dispute as to probable cause to arrest. Further, because “pretrial custody and some onerous types
of pretrial, non-custodial restrictions constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure,” there is sufficient
evidence to move forward with Plaintiff’s claim of malicious prosecution and summary judgment
will be denied on this claim as to Officer Liguori. See DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d
599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005).
4. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff next asserts a Section 1983 claim against the City of Easton for municipal liability.
Complaint ¶¶ 76-79. A claim of municipal liability under Section 1983 may proceed in two ways
- a plaintiff may allege that: (1) a municipality’s unconstitutional policy or custom led to his or her
5 See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 931 EDA 2020 at *9 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 28, 2021)
(“Therefore, Appellant was subjected to an unlawful arrest and his conviction for resisting arrest
cannot stand. Appellant therefore is entitled to have his convictions for both disorderly conduct
and resisting arrest vacated.”).
injuries and/or that; (2) a municipality failed to supervise, train, or discipline their employee(s)
and said failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those affected. See
Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff appears to be pursuing both avenues. First, he alleges the “City of Easton failed
to develop or developed policies or procedures with total disregard to Plaintiff’s rights.” Complaint
¶ 77. Second, he alleges the City of Easton’s failure to properly train and supervise the individual
officers has promoted a conscious disregard for the use of police powers. Id. at ¶ 78.
When a municipality is sued under Section 1983, the plaintiff is required to show that the
challenged acts were performed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs
of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). The policy or custom need not be an
express rule, rather, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to show that the discriminatory conduct is so
persistent and widespread, so permanent and well settled, as to constitute a custom or usage with
the force of law. See Spruill v. School District of Phila. 569 F. Supp 3d 253, 263 (E.D. Pa. 2021).
Further, it is generally held that a single incident involving the use of excessive force by a police
officer is insufficient to support a finding of an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom. See
City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 841 (1985); see also Lawson v. City of Phila. 2018 WL
925012 at * 4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2018). The “single incident” rule also applies when liability is
premised on failure to train or discipline. Id.
Defendants maintain that “Plaintiff’s assertions . . . fall far short of the evidence required
to support his Monell claim against the city.” MTD 24. The Court agrees. Plaintiff fails to cite any
specific relevant evidence to support his claim. For example, to support his first policy claim, he
points to the Internal Investigation Report conducted by Officer Herncane which notes the “actions
taken were within the guidelines.” Memo 17. He uses the roundabout logic that because the Chief
of Police signed off on the report, and the report included alleged excessive force – the City’s
official policy must be to allow excessive force. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff makes no mention of
any evidence to support his false arrest or malicious prosecution claims against the city. Further,
if Plaintiff is trying to prove a pervasive custom or usage of excessive force, false arrest, or
malicious imprisonment, he fails there as well by pointing only to the current incident.
Plaintiff then argues that the City’s failure to discipline the officers after the Superior Court
vacated his charges demonstrates deliberate indifference and “systemic failure.” Memo 21. This
argument fares no better. Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof
that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action. See Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs. of Bryan Cty. Okl., 520 U.S. at 410. Failure to adequately screen, train [or discipline]
municipal employees can ordinarily be considered deliberate indifference only where the failure
has caused a pattern of violations. Id.; see also Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d
Cir. 2000). Also, for a municipality to be liable, “the identified deficiency in a training[,
supervision, or discipline] program must be closely related to the ultimate injury, which means the
plaintiff must prove that the deficiency in training[, supervision, or discipline] actually caused the
constitutional violation at issue.” Logan v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.
App’x 628, 633 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Doe v. Luzerne Cty., 660 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2011)).
Given this stringent standard of fault, Plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to
support a Monell failure to discipline claim. First, Plaintiff does not provide evidence supporting
his conclusory allegation that a deficiency existed. Further, although Plaintiff speaks of faulty
“department procedure” and “systemic failure,” he presents no evidence of any prior disciplinary
infractions of the involved officers or any other officers. Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged a
specific relevant fact to show this deficiency actually caused the constitutional violations at issue.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to identify record evidence that could allow a reasonable
jury to find in his favor on the municipal liability theory. Therefore, the theory of Monell liability
fails and summary judgement will be granted for Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim.
5. Qualified Immunity
Defendants maintain that “at a minimum, they are entitled to qualified immunity.” MTD
18. “Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). As an affirmative defense,
the burden of establishing qualified immunity falls on the official claiming it. See Burns v. Pa.
Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2011). In resolving questions of qualified immunity at
summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the facts, taken in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party show the officer’s conduct violated a federal right and
(2) whether the right in question was clearly established at the time of the violation. See Tolan v.
Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-656 (2014). Courts are free to address the two elements in whichever
order they deem appropriate. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014).
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because, among other things,
“Plaintiff has no evidence to suggest [the officers] used any force, other than the force to try to
restrain Plaintiff, or that [the officers] intentionally caused [Plaintiff’s] head to make contact with
the corner of the brick wall.” MSJ 21. But, as discussed, Plaintiff does present evidence sufficient
at this stage to dispute Defendants’ version of events, including the paramedic’s report that
Plaintiff exclaimed multiple times he was assaulted by the officers, and his expert witness’s report
that additional force was required to produce Plaintiff’s head injury. The Court must accept this
evidence as true. This undermines Defendants’ qualified immunity argument and prevents the
Court from making a determination on qualified immunity at this stage of the proceeding
6. Official Immunity on the State Law Claims
Finally, Defendants maintain they should be granted official immunity for Plaintiff’s state
claims of assault and battery. MSJ 26. State officials are granted official immunity under 42
Pa.C.S.A §§ 8501–8564. Under Pennsylvania law, Plaintiff is subject to substantially the same
level of protection as under federal law. See DeVatt v. Lohenitz, 338 F. Supp. 2d 588, 598 (E.D.
Pa. 2004).
In order to be protected by official immunity the claim asserted must arise from or be
reasonably related to the duties of the employee, the actions must not constitute a crime, fraud,
malice, or willful misconduct, and the conduct of the employee must be authorized by law, or the
official reasonably believed the conduct was authorized by law, or the act of the employee was
within the policy making discretion granted to that employee. Pa. C.S.A. § 8546; see also Devatt,
338 F. Supp. 2d at 599-600.
Defendants argue they are entitled to official immunity because “there is no evidence they
committed a crime, acted with malice, or engaged in willful misconduct.” MSJ 28. However, as
discussed above, Plaintiff does present evidence to dispute Defendants’ version of events,
including his expert witness’s statements and the attending paramedic’s report.
Again, we must accept this evidence as true. And, again, this undermines Defendants’
official immunity argument and prevents the Court from deciding on official immunity on the state
law claims at this stage of the proceedings.
7. State Law Claims
Although Defendants do not present a specific argument pertaining to Plaintiff’s state law
claims, outside of their request for official immunity, the Court shall briefly review these claims
in the interest of completeness.
Plaintiff brings the state law claims of assault and battery against Defendants. Complaint
¶¶ 57-64. Although “[a] police officer may use reasonable force to prevent interference with the
exercise of his authority or the performance of his duty,” he nevertheless “may be held liable for
assault and battery when a jury determines that the force used in making an arrest is unnecessary
or excessive.” Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994). “The
reasonableness of the force used in making the arrest determines whether the police officer's
conduct constitutes an assault and battery.” Id.; see also Boyden v. Twp. of Upper Darby, 5 F.
Supp.3d 731, 744 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
The Court has already concluded that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
Defendants’ use of force was objectively unreasonable based on Plaintiff’s expert witness’s
contentions, the statements of the attending paramedic, and the alleged conflicting reports of the
police officers.
Accordingly, summary judgment will be denied for the state law claims of assault and
battery.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for Counts
One, Two, Three, and Four of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. We also deny summary
judgment for Count Five as to Officer Liguori.
We grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for Count Six of Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint and for Count Five as to Officers Cornelius, Lollis, Ocetnik, and Herncane.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ John M. Gallagher
JOHN M. GALLAGHER
United States District Court Judge