Jean v. CITY OF PHILA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALLRICH JEAN, : CIVIL ACTION

: NO. 22-433

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

M E M O R A N D U M

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J. May 23, 2022

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Allrich Jean, as administrator of the estate of

his son, Armani Faison, brings this wrongful death and survival

action against Defendants the City of Philadelphia (the “City”),

Warden Michelle Farrell, Warden Nancy Gianetta, Prison

Commissioner Blanche Carney, and three John Doe corrections

officers (collectively “Defendants”).

The City moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence

as stated in Count III of the Complaint. After holding oral

argument, the Court granted the motion and dismissed Count III

with prejudice. This memorandum provides the Court’s reasoning

for granting the motion.

II. BACKGROUND1

On or about March 24, 2021, Armani Faison was arrested for

shoplifting. He was sent to Curran-Fromhold Correctional

Facility (“CFCF”) after being unable to post bail. Upon his

admission, Faison underwent a mental health evaluation. The

social worker who performed the evaluation found that Faison was

engaging in “[b]izarre [b]ehaviors, which may aggravate others

putting his safety in danger.” Compl. at ¶ 26, ECF No. 1.

Despite concerns about Faison’s mental health, CFCF staff placed

him in a cell with an inmate named Kevin Massey.

The Complaint alleges that just hours before Faison was

placed into a cell with Massey, Massey had sexually assaulted

his prior cellmate. In response to the reported sexual assault,

Defendants simply moved Massey’s prior cellmate out of the cell

and replaced him with Faison.

At approximately midnight on March 27, 2021, the lights to

the cellblock were shut off. After the lights were shut off,

witnesses reported hearing screaming from the cell housing

Faison and Massey. The Complaint alleges Faison was raped and

murdered by Massey in an assault lasting several hours.

Throughout the duration of the assault, Faison repeatedly

screamed for help, called for the guard, and banged on his cell

1 The facts alleged in the Complaint and asserted herein are accepted as

true and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

door. Other inmates also reported banging on their cell doors

and yelling for the guards. When a corrections officer finally

arrived to check the cell block at approximately 7:38 a.m. the

next morning, he found Faison unresponsive in the cell.

Plaintiff alleges that a corrections officer (referred to

in the Complaint as “C.O. John Doe #1”) had been assigned to

monitor the cell block that night but was reassigned to a

different area by a different officer (“C.O. John Doe #2”). As a

result, the cell block was left completely unattended during the

time the assault occurred.

The Complaint alleges that the Philadelphia Department of

Prisons, which controls CFCF, has displayed a consistent and

systemic failure to maintain proper staffing practices, which

has resulted in an increase of inmate deaths directly related to

a lack of supervision. The Complaint sets forth a number of

facts to support that allegation, including a quote from the

City Controller, the conclusions of a report containing self-

reported data, and a variety of statistics and observations from

city officials. The Complaint also cites two similar lawsuits

related to inadequate prison conditions, numerous reports that

indicate that staffing was inadequate, statements from inmates,

and seven prior incidents of inmates suffering death or serious

injury due to unsafe prison conditions.

On February 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint.

Under the umbrella of the Pennsylvania statutes governing

wrongful death and survival actions, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 8301 and

8302, the Complaint brings three counts: (I) a Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process claim against all Defendants;

(II) a Fourteenth Amendment municipal liability claim against

the City; and (III) a negligence claim against the City.

The City subsequently moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s

negligence claim against it. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court granted the motion.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). When considering such a motion, the Court must “accept

as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” DeBenedictis v.

Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 215 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting

Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir.

1989)).

To withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.” Id. Although a plaintiff is

entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, a

plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not entitled to deference, and

the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 286 (1986).

The pleadings must contain sufficient factual allegations

so as to state a facially plausible claim for relief. See, e.g.,

Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d

Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court

limits its inquiry to the facts alleged in the complaint and its

attachments, matters of public record, and undisputedly

authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon

these documents. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &

Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994); Pension Benefit

Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196

(3d Cir. 1993).

IV. DISCUSSION

The City argues that it is immune from Plaintiff’s

negligence claim because the claim does not fall within any of

the exceptions to its governmental immunity as enumerated in the

Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541, et

seq. (the “PSTCA”).

The PSTCA governs the extent to which political

subdivisions, like the City, may be held liable in tort. Section

8542(b) lists nine categories of “negligent acts” which, if

committed by a local agency or agency employee, may subject the

local agency to liability. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(a)-(b). The ninth

category, which is relevant to the present motion, encompasses

sexual abuse and imposes liability for “conduct which

constitutes an offense enumerated under section 5551(7)

(relating to no limitation applicable) if the injuries to the

plaintiff were caused by actions or omissions of the local

agency which constitute negligence.” Id. at § 8542(b)(9).

Section 5551(7), explicitly referenced in the sexual abuse

exception, provides as follows:

An offense under any of the following provisions of 18

Pa.C.S. (relating to crimes and offenses), or a

conspiracy or solicitation to commit an offense under

any of the following provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. if the

offense results from the conspiracy or solicitation,

if the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of

the offense:

Section 3011(b) (relating to trafficking in

individuals).

Section 3012 (relating to involuntary servitude) as it

relates to sexual servitude.

Section 3121 (relating to rape).

Section 3122.1 (relating to statutory sexual assault).

Section 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse).

Section 3124.1 (relating to sexual assault).

Section 3124.2 (relating to institutional sexual

assault).

Section 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent

assault).

Section 4302 (relating to incest).

42 Pa. C.S. § 5551(7) (emphasis added).

Because the sexual abuse exception explicitly applies in

the case of conduct constituting “an offense enumerated under

section 5551(7),” 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(b)(9), and section 5551(7)

is limited to offenses in which “the victim was under eighteen

years of age at the time of the offense,” id. at § 5551(7), the

City maintains the sexual abuse exception likewise only applies

when the victim of the abuse was a minor. And because Armani

Faison was not a minor2 at the time of the sexual abuse at issue

2 Though the Complaint does not specify Faison’s age at the time of his

death, publicly available records show that he was thirty-five years old. See

Dean, Mensah M., Philadelphia prison inmate being questioned in his

cellmate’s sexual assault and death, source says, The Philadelphia Inquirer,

(Mar 29, 2021), available at https://www.inquirer.com/news/inmate-death-

prison-philadelphia-armani-faison-shawn-hawes--20210329.html (last viewed

Mar. 23, 2022).

here, the City argues that Plaintiff’s negligence claim is

barred.

Plaintiff makes two arguments in opposition. First, he

argues that the plain language of the PSTCA’s sexual abuse

exception does not limit the exception to victims under

eighteen. And second, he argues that the City’s interpretation

of the exception violates the equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. As explained more fully below, neither

argument is supported by the relevant law.

A. Plain Language of the Statute

Plaintiff first argues that because the sexual abuse

exception refers to conduct constituting “an offense enumerated

under section 5551(7),” id. at § 8542(b)(9), it should be

interpreted to apply only to the list of offenses contained

within section 5551(7) and not the preceding qualifier that for

the offense to fall under the section, the victim of those

offenses must be under 18 years of age.

Plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of the sexual abuse

exception is not a plain reading of the statute. The age

qualifier that Plaintiff attempts to omit from section 5551(7)

is essential to what constitutes an “offense” under that

section. The commission of a sexual assault in violation of

section 3124.1, for example, only constitutes an “an offense

enumerated under section 5551(7)” if the victim is under 18

years of age at the time of the offense. Id. The Court

accordingly finds that under the plain language of the statute,

the sexual assault exception to governmental immunity, as stated

in section 8542(b)(9) of the PSTCA, only applies when the victim

was under eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged

sexual assault.

B. Equal Protection

Plaintiff next argues that limiting the sexual abuse

exception to the City’s immunity under the PSTCA to offenses

involving minor victims would violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s

equal protection clause. “The Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons

similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler

v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).

When a challenged statute’s classification burdens a

fundamental right or “is drawn upon inherently suspect

distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,” courts are

instructed to conduct a strict scrutiny review. Connelly v.

Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013)

(quoting Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1266 (3d Cir. 1992)).

Classifications that neither employ a suspect classification nor

impinge upon a fundamental right “are ‘entitled to a presumption

of validity against attach under the Equal Protection Clause’”

and need only withstand rational basis review. Id. (quoting

Schumacher, 965 F.2d at 1269). The Supreme Court has instructed

that classifications based on age are permissible if they pass

rational basis review. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528

U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (“States may discriminate on the basis of age

without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age

classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate

state interest.”).

The parties disagree as the standard of review that should

be applied to the PSTCA’s sexual abuse exception. The City

argues that the exception represents an age classification that

limits the exception to those under eighteen, so it need only

pass rational basis review. Plaintiff argues that the Court

should conduct a strict scrutiny review of the exception because

it burdens the “fundamental right of access to courts.” Pl’s

Resp. at 7, ECF No. 13.3 The Court agrees with the City that

rational basis review is the correct standard.

3 Plaintiff also argues that the Court should interpret the sexual abuse

exception to allow claims of victims of any age based on the rule of

statutory construction that courts should construe statutes to avoid

interpretations that would raise “serious constitutional problems.” Edward J.

DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S.

568, 575 (1988). But this precept may not be applied when the avoidant

construction “is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Id. And in

enacting the sexual abuse exception, the Pennsylvania legislature made clear

that its intended purpose is to “waive sovereign immunity for public entities

guilty of covering up childhood sexual abuse.” PA. H.R. LEGIS. J., 203rd

While the right of access to courts is a “fundamental right

within the protection of the First Amendment,” Bounds v. Smith,

430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the cases cited in Plaintiff’s brief

are inapposite to the present matter. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at

828 (holding that the right of access to courts requires prison

authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of

meaningful legal papers); Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1453-54

(3d Cir. 1995) overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343 (1996) (holding that a prison’s pattern of opening a

prisoner’s properly marked incoming court mail outside his

presence impinged upon his fundamental rights to free speech and

court access). Plaintiff cites no case—and the Court is aware of

none—in which a state legislature’s grant of immunity from tort

claims to municipalities, and subsequent waiver of that immunity

for certain types of claims, was subject to strict scrutiny

review.

Furthermore, if Plaintiffs’ argument were correct, any

grant (and subsequent conditional waiver) of governmental

immunity by a state legislature would be subject to strict

Assy., Reg. Sess., at 510 (Apr. 10, 2019) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s

suggested interpretation runs clearly contrary to legislative intent.

Therefore, even if Plaintiff were correct that limiting the exception to

minor victims raises “serious constitutional problems,” the Court need not

consider whether Plaintiff’s alternative reading is favored by the doctrine

of constitutional avoidance.

scrutiny review as it would necessarily limit available tort

claims to one classification of potential plaintiffs over

another. But the Supreme Court has recognized that the state

legislature has “broad powers to control governmental tort

liability limited only by the rule it not act arbitrarily.”

Martinez v. State of California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.6 (1980).

The enactment of the PSTCA, and specifically the sexual abuse

exception to governmental immunity, was an exercise of the

Pennsylvania Legislature’s broad authority and cannot be

characterized as a burden on any fundamental right of access to

courts. The age classification in the sexual abuse exception is

therefore subject only to rational basis review.

The Court finds that the sexual abuse exception as stated

in the PSTCA passes rational basis review because it is

“rationally related” to the “legitimate state interest” of

holding municipal actors accountable when they negligently allow

sexual abuse of children to occur. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.

Plaintiff’s equal protection argument accordingly fails.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s negligence claim

against the City is barred by the City’s immunity under the

PSTCA.