STAGLIANO v. COLL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GREGORY STAGLIANO, : CIVIL ACTION

: NO. 21-4936

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

JUDGE MICHAEL COLL, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

M E M O R A N D U M

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J. April 5, 2022

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Gregory Stagliano (“Plaintiff”) brings

claims under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary and injunctive relief against: (1)

Mary Mann, the former Assistant District Attorney of Delaware

County, (2) Michelle Deery, an investigator of Delaware County’s

Criminal Investigation Division, (3) Katayoun Copeland, the

former District Attorney of Delaware County, (4) William Judge,

the former Deputy District Attorney of Delaware County, (5)

Judge John Whelan, in his capacity as the former Assistant

District Attorney of Delaware County,1 (6) the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, (7) the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of

1 Judge Whelan is a current judge on the Court of Common Pleas of

Delaware County.

Health and Human Services, (8) Teresa Miller, the current

Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, (9)

Jessica Keith, the Executive Director of Norristown State

Hospital, (10) Patrick Marano, counsel for Norristown State

Hospital, (11) Judge Michael Coll, a judge on the Delaware

County Court of Common Pleas, (12) Judge James Bradley, a judge

on the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, (13) the Delaware

County Board of Judges, (14) the County of Delaware, and (15)

The GEO Group, Inc.,2 a corporation that operates George W. Hill

Correctional Facility (collectively, “Defendants”).

Defendants have filed several motions to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint.3 For the following reasons, Defendants’

motions will be granted.

II. BACKGROUND

For over 30 years, Plaintiff was a practicing attorney in

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and in New Jersey. Plaintiff

alleges that he was diagnosed with reflex sympathetic dystrophy

and, as a result, was put on medication that affected his memory

and his ability to practice law. The Pennsylvania Disciplinary

2 Though this defendant is listed in the docket as “Geo, Inc.” the formal

name of the entity is The GEO Group, Inc.

3 All Defendants have moved to dismiss except the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania. Defendant has failed to serve the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

so it will be dismissed for lack of prosecution. Even if the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania had been served, Plaintiff’s claims against it would be barred

by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Board (the “Board”) then filed complaints against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that the Board’s complaints related to issues

with Plaintiff’s management of client “[t]rust account[s].”

Compl. ¶ 19. According to Plaintiff’s allegations, the Board

eventually placed Plaintiff on medical inactive status, closed

his practice, and requested that a conservator oversee

Plaintiff’s remaining cases. According to Plaintiff, the

“prosecutor” from the Board sent letters to the Delaware County

District Attorney’s Office alleging Plaintiff was a “thief.” Id.

at ¶¶ 25, 26.

Public record reveals that the Delaware County District

Attorney’s Office filed criminal charges against Plaintiff.4 The

public docket shows Plaintiff was charged in two separate

actions. In one action, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.

Stagliano, CP-23-CR-0000871-2019, Plaintiff was charged with one

count of theft by unlawful taking in violation 18 Pa. Cons.

Stat. § 3921, two counts of forgery in violation of 18 Pa. Cons.

Stat. § 4101, and one count of insurance fraud in violation of

4 The Court may rely on public record at the motion to dismiss stage. See

In deciding either a facial Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court

limits its inquiry to the facts alleged in the complaint, documents that are

attached to, integral to, or explicitly relied upon in the complaint, and

matters of public record. See Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d

347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[A] facial [Rule 12(b)(1)] attack calls for a

district court to apply the same standard of review it would use in

considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)”); In re Asbestos Prods.

Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 n.7 (3d Cir. 2016) (regarding Rule

12(b)(6)); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998

F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (regarding Rule 12(b)(6)).

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4117. In the other action, Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania v. Stagliano, CP-23-CR-0005215-2017, Plaintiff was

charged with nine counts of unlawful taking in violation of 18

Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3921, nine counts of theft by deception in

violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3922, nine counts of receiving

stolen property in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3925, nine

counts of theft of services in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §

3926, nine counts of embezzlement in violation of 18 Pa. Cons.

Stat. § 3927, and one count of unauthorized practice of law in

violation of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2524. Plaintiff’s underlying

criminal prosecution is ongoing.

At one point, the criminal actions against Plaintiff were

transferred to Judge Coll on the Mental Health Court of Delaware

County, who ordered Plaintiff to undergo testing and treatment

at Norristown State Hospital to assess Plaintiff’s competency to

stand trial.

Plaintiff brings this action against several current and

former prosecutors of the Office of the District Attorney of

Delaware County and two judges challenging rulings in the

underlying criminal proceedings. Plaintiff also brings section

1983 claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the

Commonwealth Department of Human Services, and related

individuals regarding the evaluation and treatment Plaintiff

received at Norristown State Hospital. Finally, Plaintiff brings

section 1983 claims against the Delaware County Board of Judges,

the County of Delaware, and the County’s prison provider, The

GEO Group, Inc., alleging that the prison’s conditions violated

Plaintiff’s rights. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claims against them. Defendants’ arguments will be addressed

herein.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to

state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing such a

motion, the Court is “required to accept as true all allegations

in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

from [the allegations] after construing them in the light most

favorable to the non-movant.” Conard v. Pa. State Police, 902

F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild,

O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994)).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Regardless, the Court has an obligation to liberally construe a

pro-se litigant’s pleadings. Higgs v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 655

F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court will “apply the relevant

legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name

it.” Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th, 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing

Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir.

2013)). The “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts

in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (citing Mala, 704

F.3d at 243). An unrepresented litigant, however, “cannot flout

procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply

to all other litigants.” Id. (citing Mala, 704 F.3d at 243).

IV. DISCUSSION

Motions to dismiss have been filed by Mary Mann, Michelle

Deery, Katayoun Copeland, William Judge, and Judge Whelan

(collectively, the “Prosecutorial Defendants”), the Pennsylvania

Department of Human Services, Secretary Teresa D. Miller,

Jessica Keith, and Patrick Marano (collectively, the “DHS

Defendants”), Judge Michael Coll and Judge James Bradley

(collectively, the “Judicial Defendants”), and the Delaware

County Board of Judges, the County of Delaware, and The GEO

Group, Inc. (collectively, the “County Defendants”). The motions

filed by each group of defendants will be addressed in turn.5

5 Mann and Deery jointly filed a motion to dismiss, while Copeland,

Judge, and Whelan separately filed a motion to dismiss. Because the arguments

in both motions overlap, they will be discussed together.

The County of Delaware filed its motion jointly with Copeland, Judge,

and Whelan, while the Delaware County Board of Judges filed its motion

jointly with Judges Coll and Bradley. Because the claims against the County

of Delaware and the Delaware County Board of Judges are related, the

arguments made by these defendants will be discussed together as well.

Though Plaintiff was formally a practicing attorney, he is

currently inactive so the Court will apply the pro se standard

and liberally construe Plaintiff’s allegations.

A. The Prosecutorial Defendants

Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Katayoun Copeland in her capacity as the former District

Attorney of Delaware County (Counts IV, IX, X), Mary Mann in her

capacity as the former District Attorney of Delaware County

(Count IV, X), William Judge in his capacity as the Delaware

County Deputy District Attorney (Counts IV, X), the Honorable

John Whelan in his capacity as the former District Attorney of

Delaware County (Counts IV, IX, X), and Michelle Deery in her

capacity as the investigator for Delaware County’s Criminal

Investigation Division (Counts IV, X). Defendants Mann and Deery

have filed a joint motion separately from Defendants Copeland,

Judge, and Whelan. Because Defendants Mann and Deery’s arguments

overlap with the arguments submitted by the remaining

Prosecutorial Defendants, both motions will be addressed herein.

During the course of the underlying criminal proceedings,

Plaintiff (as the defendant in those actions) filed motions to

be found incompetent to stand trial. The cases were transferred

to Judge Coll on Delaware County’s Mental Health Court. Judge

Coll was designated to determine whether Plaintiff was competent

to stand trial. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Copeland,

Mann, Judge, and Whelan violated Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and

section 19836 by wrongfully causing Plaintiff’s case to be

transferred to Judge Coll, by causing Plaintiff to become

illegally incarcerated at George W. Hill Correctional Facility,7

and by failing to have Plaintiff treated at the Norristown State

Hospital.

Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendants Copeland

and Whelan allowed Plaintiff to be illegally incarcerated,

ignored requests from Plaintiff, and allowed improper

proceedings to occur before Judge Coll. Compl. ¶¶ 215, 216.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Copeland allowed “rampant

illegalities perpetrated upon [Plaintiff] by Defendant Coll” to

continue, and that Defendant Copeland “had the ability to put an

end to this horrible affair but she failed and refused to do

so.” Id. ¶¶ 211-212. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mann

intentionally tried to intimidate witnesses, failed to look into

the various allegations, exaggerated the amount of money in

6 Defendant Mann appears to read Plaintiff’s complaint as arising under

the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Plaintiff’s complaint does not

read as an ADA claim, but even if Plaintiff intended to bring a claim under

the ADA against Defendant Mann, the Court would not need to consider the

claim. As explained below, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Mann will be

dismissed because Defendant Mann is entitled to prosecutorial immunity.

7 The public dockets reveal Plaintiff was incarcerated pending the

assessment of his competency.

controversy, directed Plaintiff’s case to a Mental Health Court

to take advantage of Plaintiff, and encouraged Judge Coll to

unethically proceed with a competency hearing, among other

conduct. Id. ¶ 228. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Deery

pressured “victims” to participate in Plaintiff’s prosecution,

which resulted in “manipulated allegations that have continued

to slander and maliciously prosecute Plaintiff.” Id. ¶¶ 221,

223. Finally, Plaintiff broadly alleges that all Prosecutorial

Defendants “engaged in outrageous, persistent prosecutorial

misconduct for over five years now which has served to

permanently deprive Plaintiff of any ability for a fair trial.”

Id. ¶ 220.

As explained below, the Prosecutorial Defendants’ dismissal

is warranted because they are immune from prosecution.

1. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

The Prosecutorial Defendants contend that absolute

prosecutorial immunity prevents Plaintiff from pursuing his

claims against them. “The employee of an attorney, including the

employee or agent of a prosecutor, is also granted absolute

immunity from [section 1983] suits where the function of the

employee and the judicial process are closely allied.” Moore v.

Middlesex Cty. Prosecutors Office, 503 F. App’x 108, 109 (3d

Cir. 2012) (citing Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 206 (3d Cir.

1975)).

If the prosecutor’s actions were intertwined with advocacy,

and “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process,” then absolute immunity applies. Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Tindell v.

Pennsylvania, 398 F. App’x 696, 698 (3d Cir. 2010) (“It is well

established that prosecutors sued under § 1983 enjoy absolute

immunity for their conduct in initiating a prosecution and in

presenting the State’s case.”) (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted); Waits, 516 F.2d at 206 (“The federal courts have

recognized that where the function of an attorney’s employee and

the judicial process are closely allied, immunity will be

granted, whereas if such function is not directly related to the

court’s decision-making activities, such immunity may not be

available.”).

However, there is “a difference between the advocate’s role

in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares

for trial, on the one hand, and the detective’s role in

searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him

probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the

other hand.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).

Thus, “[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions

normally performed by a detective or police officer,” they are

no longer engaging in the role of an advocate and so “it is

neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act,

immunity should protect the one and not the other.” Id.

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,

“[t]he court must ascertain just what conduct forms the basis

for the plaintiff’s cause of action,” and “then determine what

function (prosecutorial, administrative, investigative, or

something else entirely) that act served.” Schneyder v. Smith,

653 F.3d 313, 332 (3d Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff’s claims are premised on the Prosecutorial

Defendants’ involvement in the underlying proceedings before

Judge Coll. Per Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendants Mann,

Copeland, Judge, and Whelan were engaged in their roles as

prosecutorial advocates by assessing the charges against

Plaintiff and by presenting the Commonwealth’s case before Judge

Coll on the Mental Health Court. Accordingly, Defendants Mann,

Copeland, Judge, and Whelan are shielded by prosecutorial

immunity here.

Similarly, Defendant Deery is deemed to have prosecutorial

immunity. As noted, Defendant Deery was an investigator in the

District Attorney’s Office. Generally, “[t]he employee of an

attorney, including the employee or agent of a prosecutor, is

also granted absolute immunity from [section 1983] suits where

the function of the employee and the judicial process are

closely allied.” Moore, 503 Fed. App’x at 109 (citing Waits, 516

F.2d at 206). Here, because, per Plaintiff’s allegations,

Defendant Deery’s actions related to interviewing witnesses and

assisting the District Attorney’s Office with the prosecution of

the case, prosecutorial immunity also extends to Defendant

Deery. See also Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1414, 1416

(3d Cir. 1991) (noting prosecutorial immunity extends to “the

preparation necessary to present a case” and the “obtaining,

reviewing, and evaluation of evidence.”).

Plaintiff, in response, argues that the prosecution was

“farcical,” because Plaintiff was prosecuted for “theft” without

basis. Because Plaintiff’s allegations relate to the

Prosecutorial Defendants in their roles as advocates, absolute

prosecutorial immunity applies.8

2. Qualified Prosecutorial Immunity

The Prosecutorial Defendants contend that even if absolute

prosecutorial immunity does not apply, qualified prosecutorial

immunity applies. The doctrine of qualified immunity gives

“government officials breathing room to make reasonable but

mistaken judgments by protect[ing] all but the plainly

8 It is not clear whether Plaintiff also intended to allege that the

Prosecutorial Defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to infringe upon

Plaintiff’s civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Regardless, it is

immaterial whether Plaintiff may have intended to assert a claim

under section 1985 “because the relevant absolute immunity analysis is the

same for § 1983 and § 1985 claims.” Segers v. Williams, 12 F. Supp. 3d 734,

738 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (first citing Waits, 516 F.2d at 205, then citing

Patterson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 08–2140, 2009 WL 1259968, at *9 (E.D.

Pa. May 1, 2009)); see also Patterson, 2009 WL 12599681, at *9 (“The doctrine

of absolute prosecutorial immunity precludes conspiracy-based claims as

well.”).

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Bryan v.

United States, 913 F.3d 356, 362 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing City &

Cty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 609

(2015)). “[A] prosecutor will be shielded from liability if his

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Reitz v. Cty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 146-47 (3d Cir.

1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, even when liberally construed, Plaintiff’s

allegations do not suggest that he suffered any clear

constitutional violations at the hands of the Prosecutorial

Defendants. Plaintiff’s allegations amount to general misgivings

regarding the proceedings before Judge Coll. Accordingly, even

if absolute immunity did not apply to the Prosecutorial

Defendants, qualified immunity would apply.9

9 Even if the Court were to find that absolute or qualified prosecutorial

immunity does not apply, the case would otherwise be dismissed pursuant to

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), because the principles of federalism

require the Court to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal

proceedings. Younger provides that a Court should abstain from interfering

with state judicial proceedings where “(1) there are ongoing state

proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate

important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate

opportunity to raise federal claims.” Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 131

(3d Cir. 2009) (applying Younger).

Here, the requirements for Younger abstention are clearly met. First,

the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are still ongoing in state court.

Second, the state proceedings implicate the interests of enforcing the

Commonwealth’s criminal laws. See Scott v. Tonkin, No. 20-5412, 2020 WL

7240447, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2020) (Robreno, J.). Finally, Plaintiff will

have an adequate opportunity to “to raise federal constitutional defenses to

[his] prosecution” in state court. Jaffery v. Atlantic Cty. Prosecutor’s

Office, 695 F. App’x 38, 41 (3d Cir. 2017).

B. The DHS Defendants

The DHS Defendants, which include Defendants Pennsylvania

Department of Human Services, Secretary Teresa D. Miller,

Jessica Keith, and Patrick Marano, became involved in the

underlying proceedings after Judge Coll ordered that Plaintiff

be evaluated at the Norristown State Hospital (“NSH”). NSH is

operated by DHS, which employs Teresa Miller as the Secretary of

DHS, Jessica Keith as the Executive Director of NSH, and Patrick

Marano as legal counsel for NSH and Defendant Keith. The DHS

Defendants have not played a role in the prosecution of

Plaintiff.

In light of the competency proceedings before Judge Coll,

NSH produced a report on Plaintiff’s condition. Plaintiff

alleges that pursuant to section 1983, the actions of the DHS

employees were unlawful because the report had been altered and

the report contained an opinion that NSH could not assist

Plaintiff (Counts VI, VII). Plaintiff also alleges that DHS

violated Plaintiff’s rights under section 1983 because it “has

done nothing to ensure that procedures and practices have been

implemented to insure [sic] that any criminal defendant

identified as [i]ncompetent and incarcerated for transfer to a

state hospital is immediately placed in line for transfer.”

Compl. ¶ 186.

The DHS Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims should be

dismissed because they are barred by Eleventh Amendment

immunity. “[S]uits against unconsenting [s]tates” are barred

by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity unless a state has

waived its immunity. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284

(2011) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,

54 (1996)). “Where a state agency or department is named as

defendant, that too is considered a suit against a state which

is barred by the [E]leventh [A]mendment.” Geis v. Bd. of Educ.

of Parsippany–Troy Hills, Morris Cty., 774 F.2d 575, 580 (3d

Cir. 1985) (citing Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs.

v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147 (1981)). This also

applies to suits against employees of the state or the state’s

agencies when the suit is brought against those employees in

their official capacities. See Randolph v. Wetzel, 987 F. Supp.

2d 605, 613 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (Robreno, J.).

“[A] plaintiff other than the United States or a state may

not sue a state in federal court without the latter state’s

consent unless Congress abrogates the state’s Eleventh Amendment

immunity pursuant to a constitutional provision granting

Congress that power.” Chittister v. Dep’t of Comm. & Economic

Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 2020). Pennsylvania and its

agencies have withheld consent to lawsuits brought under section

1983. See, e.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (“Nothing

contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the

immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts

guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States.”); 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310 (“[T]he Commonwealth,

and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their

duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official

immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General

Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.”).

However, there are limited exceptions to a state’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Pursuant to Ex Parte Young, courts may

“provide only prospective, equitable relief to enjoin state

actors from ongoing violations of federal law.” Oliver v. Servs.

Emps. Int’l Union Local 668, 418 F. Supp. 3d 93, 99 (E.D. Pa.

2019); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979)

(“[A] federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may

enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the

requirements of federal law.”) (emphasis added). “In determining

whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh

Amendment bar to a suit, a court need only conduct a

straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an

ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly

characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (alteration in original)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff seeks damages from the DHS Defendants for

alleged past violations of constitutional rights but does not

seek prospective relief. To the extent the complaint even

alleges a violation of a federal right,10 the complaint does not

seek relief for an ongoing or future violation. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claims against DHS and the DHS Defendants in their

official capacities will be dismissed.11

C. The Judicial Defendants

Plaintiff appears to bring a claim for monetary relief

pursuant to section 1983 against the Judicial Defendants, as

well as a claim for injunctive relief against Defendant Judge

Coll. These will be addressed in turn.

1. Section 1983

10 Plaintiff’s complaint, even when liberally construed, fails to allege

that the DHS Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

11 The DHS Defendants note that Defendant Miller has been named in her

official capacity as the Secretary of DHS, but it is unclear whether

Plaintiff intended to sue Defendants Keith and Marano in their official

capacities. Regardless, even if Plaintiff sought to sue Defendants Keith and

Marano in their individual capacities, Plaintiff’s claims against these

defendants would still fail.

To bring a claim under section 1983 against individuals, the “plaintiff

must demonstrate [th]e defendant’s ‘personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs’ . . . . by describing the defendant’s participation in or actual

knowledge of an acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga v. N.J.

Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Regardless of whether

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges “wrongful” conduct, Plaintiff does not allege

that Defendants Keith and Marano were personally involved with any of the

alleged acts, i.e., in providing an unlawful report and evaluation of

Plaintiff. Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendants Keith and Marano “have

conspired to deny Plaintiff any possibility of a fair trial.” Compl. ¶ 199.

Accordingly, the complaint will be dismissed against Defendants Keith and

Marano to the extent Plaintiff intended to sue them in their individual

capacities.

Plaintiff brings claims against Judicial Defendants Judge

Michael Coll (Counts I, VIII) and Judge James Bradley (Counts

II, VIII) alleging that the Judicial Defendants violated his

Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights. Though Plaintiff’s

complaint is a bit difficult to decipher, Plaintiff appears to

allege that the Judicial Defendants engaged in misconduct when

presiding over aspects of the underlying criminal proceedings.

The public dockets reveal that the underlying criminal

proceedings were transferred to Judge Coll so that Judge Coll

could review Plaintiff’s motions to be declared incompetent to

stand trial. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Coll scheduled a sham

competency hearing12 and wrongfully denied Plaintiff’s motion for

recusal. Compl. ¶ 170. The public dockets reveal that after

Judge Coll reviewed Plaintiff’s motions, the cases were

transferred to Judge Bradley. Plaintiff alleges that Judge

Bradley later denied subsequent motions to be found incompetent

and “decided to protect Norristown State at Plaintiff’s

expense.” Compl. ¶¶ 112, 114. Though Plaintiff does not specify

whether he intended to sue Judges Coll and Bradley in their

judicial or individual capacities, because Plaintiff’s

allegations relate to actions taken by Judges Coll and Bradley

that are in the scope of their judicial duties, the Court

12 The public dockets reveal that Judge Coll initially found Plaintiff

incompetent to stand trial but that ruling was later reversed. Judge Bradley

later denied subsequent motions to be found incompetent to stand trial.

construes Plaintiff’s allegations as suing Judges Cole and

Bradley in their judicial capacities only.

The Judicial Defendants argue that judicial immunity bars

Plaintiff’s claims. “The Supreme Court long has recognized that

judges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary

damages arising from their judicial acts.” Gallas v. Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). The

Third Circuit has provided that courts “must engage in a two-

part inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is

applicable.” Id. “First, a judge is not immune from liability

for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s

judicial capacity.” Id. (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11

(1991)). “Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though

judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12).

With regard to the first factor, the court must

“[determine] whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one

relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a

function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations

of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his

judicial capacity.” Id. at 768-69 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations involve

actions taken by Judges Coll and Bradley while they were

presiding over Plaintiff’s underlying criminal proceedings.

The second factor requires the Court to distinguish between

acts in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction, which do not

enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, and acts that are

merely in excess of jurisdiction, which do enjoy that

protection.” Id. at 769 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Generally:

A distinction must be here observed between excess of

jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction

over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no

jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority

exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise

of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known

to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where

jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law

in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner

and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised

are generally as much questions for his determination as

any other questions involved in the case, although upon

the correctness of his determination in these

particulars the validity of his judgments may depend.

Id. (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n.6).

Additionally, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity

because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously,

or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to

liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all

jurisdiction.’” Id. (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57). Judicial

immunity applies even if a judge “has committed grave procedural

errors,” if a “judge has conducted a proceeding in an informal

and ex parte manner,” or if a “judge’s action is unfair or

controversial.” Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211

F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Here, even when liberally construed, Plaintiff’s complaint

does not include any allegations that Judges Coll and Bradley

were acting without jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s criminal

proceedings. Accordingly, even though Plaintiff contends that

Judges Coll and Bradley made improper rulings, judicial immunity

applies and the claims against the Judicial Defendants will be

dismissed.13

2. Injunctive Relief

Here, with respect to Judge Coll, Plaintiff requests that

the Court “issue an injunction requiring, at a minimum, the

assignment of an out of the county judge to further preside over

Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case and halting further

proceedings until these dispositive matters can be properly

adjudicated.” Compl. ¶ 107. Regardless of whether the Court

would have the power to grant this relief, judicial immunity

applies to requests for injunctive relief. Pursuant to the

Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110

Stat. 3847 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983

13 It is not clear whether Plaintiff intended to allege that the Judicial

Defendants were engaged in a conspiracy against Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. §

1985. As previously noted, this is immaterial because immunity is treated the

same with respect section 1983 and section 1985 claims. See supra note 6.

Further, even if judicial immunity did not apply, the case would be

barred by Younger. See supra note 7.

(2012)) (“FCIA”), “in any action brought against a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial

capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.”

Because Plaintiff “has not alleged that a declaratory

decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable,

and because the injunctive relief sought by [Plaintiff] does not

address the actions of [the Judge] other than in his judicial

capacity, his claim for injunctive relief is barred.” Azubuko v.

Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006).

D. The County Defendants

Plaintiff brings two Monell claims against the County of

Delaware and its prison provider, The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”).

Plaintiff also brings a Monell claim against the County of

Delaware and the Delaware County Board of Judges. Because these

claims are related, they will be addressed in turn below.

1. Monell Claims: The County of Delaware and GEO

Plaintiff brings two claims under section 1983 against GEO,

which served a municipal function by operating the George W.

Hill Correctional Facility where Plaintiff was incarcerated, and

the County of Delaware (Counts III, IV).14 Plaintiff makes vague

14 Plaintiff brings Count IV against John Does 1 through 5 as well. The

following arguments apply equally to John Does 1 through 5.

claims that he was incarcerated illegally and was denied

religious services, proper medical treatment, and access to the

law library. Plaintiff also alleges that political motives

incentivized Defendants GEO and the County of Delaware to

wrongfully incarcerate individuals so that GEO could turn a

profit.15

Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory

or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute “is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but [rather] a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred[.]” Baker v. McCollan, 443

U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Supreme Court in Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),

15 Defendants Geo and the County of Delaware have filed separate motions

to dismiss, but because their arguments overlap, both motions will be

addressed herein.

provided that municipalities may be subject to section 1983

claims in limited circumstances. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.

“Under Monell, a municipality . . . is not responsible for

the random acts of its employees based on respondeat superior,

but a municipality may be liable when an official policy,

custom, or deliberate indifference to the rights of its

citizens, causes an injury to a plaintiff.” Johnson v. City of

Phila., 397 F. Supp. 3d 692, 709 (E.D. Pa. 2019). To bring

a Monell claim, “a plaintiff must establish (1) that a

constitutionally-protected right has been violated, and (2) the

alleged violation resulted from municipal policy or custom, or

the deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens.” Id.

Here, Defendant GEO was a private company performing a

municipal function by operating the correctional facility. See,

e.g., Eckstrom v. Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., Inc., No. 19-782, 2019 WL

3804146, at *5 (E.D Pa. Aug. 12, 2019) (“The theory of municipal

liability applies to ‘private companies performing municipal

functions.’”) (quoting Smith v. Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., Inc., No. 18-

5299, 2019 WL 2089997, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2019)).

Defendants GEO and the County of Delaware contend that Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim under Monell.

First, Defendants GEO and the County of Delaware aver that

Plaintiff cannot meet the first requisite factor of a Monell

claim because Plaintiff has not alleged that they violated a

constitutionally-protected right. Here, the majority of

Plaintiff’s allegations amount to no more than complaints about

the manner in which GEO operated the correctional facility. For

example, Plaintiff alleges that a “private corporation runs it

with a pure profit motive,” that there is no library in the

facility even though GEO’s “literature specifically references

the existence of such a library,” that there is “no regular

access to any physical activity, to the gym or to recreational

activities,” that “[t]here are no toe or fingernail clippers

made available except two or three community pairs,” that “[i]n

April it was so cold that milk from breakfast remained drinkable

the next day,” that “[e]ach day certain limited hours are set

for inmates to be allowed out of their cells into the general

block area,” and that “[t]he prison does not even have basic

cable so virtually every day the antennae would go out on some

or all of the limited channels that were available thus denying

the inmates the very limited pleasure of watching a little

television,” among other similar allegations. Compl. ¶¶ 120,

122, 124, 125, 132, 134. These allegations are merely general

complaints about the prison facility and, alone, are

insufficient to state a basis for a constitutional violation.

Plaintiff, however, also seems to allege that he was denied

inadequate medical care by Defendant GEO. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant GEO prohibited Plaintiff from seeing a pain management

doctor for his reflex sympathetic dystrophy and failed to

provide “Plaintiff a minimum quantity of Ibuprofen to maintain

his anti-inflammatory status.” Id. ¶ 149. Plaintiff also alleges

that he developed an abscess in his tooth and requested to see a

doctor or dentist. Id. ¶ 151. Plaintiff alleges that he “was in

so much pain for the next few days” but “was given nothing for

the pain.” Id. ¶ 151. Plaintiff was not permitted to see a

doctor until he refused to voluntarily re-enter his cell, but

“[P]laintiff was sent down to medical and never even saw a

doctor or dentist.” Id. ¶ 152.

Plaintiff has the beginnings of a Monell claim for

inadequate medical care. However, to state a Monell claim for

inadequate medical care against a municipality or a corporation

acting under the color of state law, the plaintiff must still

establish that a policy or custom caused the plaintiff harm. See

Hasty v. Cty. of Montgomery, No. 12-4335, 2014 WL 830282, at *3

(E.D. Pa. March 4, 2014). Specifically, the plaintiff must

establish that “(1) the municipality had a policy or custom that

deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights; (2) the

municipality acted deliberately and was the moving force behind

the deprivation; and (3) the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by

the identified policy or custom.” Ekqunife v. City of Phila.,

245 F. Supp. 3d 660, 674 (E.D. Pa. 2017). Courts have emphasized

that, “to establish a municipal policy or custom, a plaintiff

must show that ‘through its deliberate conduct, the municipality

was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged.’” Id. (quoting

Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403,

(1997)) (emphasis in original).

Here, even when construed liberally, Plaintiff’s

allegations do not suggest that Defendants GEO and/or the County

of Delaware had a specific policy or custom that influenced the

medical treatment Plaintiff received. Plaintiff merely alleges

that because the Republican Party was, at the time of the

relevant events, in power in Delaware County, the County had a

policy of sending inmates, including Plaintiff, to prison, “in

the name of keeping [GEO] happy.” Compl. ¶¶ 145, 163. Plaintiff

alleges that as a result, the County of Delaware and GEO

illegally incarcerated Plaintiff and other inmates. See Compl. ¶

161 (“It is believed that it became the established policy or

practice of the County to first enter into the contract with

[GEO.] And then to continue the relationship for the economic

benefit of the local Republican party.”). However, this does

nothing to support a potential claim that Defendants GEO or the

County of Delaware had a policy that caused Plaintiff to receive

inadequate medical care. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim cannot

survive here. See Kane v. Chester Cnty. Dep’t of Children, Youth

and Families, 10 F. Supp. 3d 671, 688 (E.D. Pa. 2014)

(dismissing a Monell where the complaint “offer[ed] only bald

assertions that such policy or custom existed without any facts

to support that what happened . . . .”).16

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claims (Counts

III, IV) against Defendants GEO and the County of Delaware.

Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his Monell claim for

inadequate medical treatment.

2. Monell Claim: The County of Delaware and the Board

of Judges

Plaintiff appears to bring a similar claim against the

County of Delaware and the Board of Judges17 (Count V), alleging

16 Defendant notes that to the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim for

supervisory liability, Plaintiff has failed to do so. The Court agrees. To

allege a Monell theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must:

(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that

the supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing

custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or

procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3)

the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4)

the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling’s

violation resulted from the supervisor’s failure to employ that

supervisory practice or procedure.

Min v. Morris, 737 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting Brown v.

Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)). Here, Plaintiff has not

identified any specific supervisors or practices that the unidentified

supervisors failed to employ.

Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to allege that Defendants Geo

and the County of Delaware engaged in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of

his rights, that claim fails as well. To state a claim of conspiracy under

section 1983, “a plaintiff must establish (1)

the existence of a conspiracy involving state action; and (2) a deprivation

of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the

conspiracy.” Frompovicz v. Hissner, 434 F. Supp. 3d 269, 283 (E.D. Pa. 2020)

(quoting Rosembert v. Borough of E. Lansdowne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 631, 647 (E.D.

Pa. 2014)). Even when liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court

finds that Plaintiff has not made allegations to support either requirement.

17 Defendants the County of Delaware and the Delaware County Board of

Judges have filed separate motions to dismiss, but because their arguments

overlap, their motions will be addressed herein.

that it “was an established policy and practice of the County

and the Board of Judges of the County” to deprive Plaintiff of a

fair trial with a fair judge. Compl. ¶ 171.

Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails here as well. Even when

construed liberally, Plaintiff’s allegations do not suggest that

the County of Delaware or the Board of Judges violated a

specific constitutionally-protected right, or that a specific

policy caused the constitutional violation. See Johnson v. City

of Phila., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 709. Accordingly, the claim

against the County of Delaware and the Board of Judges will be

dismissed.

Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend this claim against

the County of Delaware. Plaintiff will not be granted leave to

amend the complaint against the Board of Judges. Because the

Board of Judges is part of the Delaware County Court of Common

Pleas, which is part of the Unified Judicial System of

Pennsylvania pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 301(4), Eleventh

Amendment immunity applies and the case against the Board of

Judges will be dismissed with prejudice.18 See supra section

IV.B.

18 The Board of Judges appears to argue that they are entitled to judicial

immunity. However, the only allegation with respect to the Board of Judges is

that the “the agents and representatives of the county conspired to deprive

Plaintiff of a fair trial with a fair judge and it is believed that this was

an established policy and practice of the County and the Board of Judges of

the County.” Compl. ¶ 171. Because it is not clear whether the Board of

Judges was acting in a judicial or in an administrative capacity from

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions will be

granted. Defendants Mary Mann, Michelle Deery, Katayoun

Copeland, William Judge, Judge Whelan, the Pennsylvania

Department of Human Services, Secretary Teresa D. Miller,

Jessica Keith, Patrick Marano, Judge Michael Coll, Judge James

Bradley, and the Delaware County Board of Judges will be

dismissed from this action with prejudice. Defendant will be

granted leave to amend his Monell claims against the County of

Delaware and The GEO Group, Inc.

Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court will decline to find that judicial

immunity applies to the Board of Judges at this time.