“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, [and] undisputedly authentic documents if the complaint’s claims are based upon these documents.”
How later courts described this case
- “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, [and] undisputedly authentic documents if the complaint’s claims are based upon these documents.”
- finding that whether a procedural due process right against malicious prosecution exists remains “an unsettled question.”
- “To determine whether the right is clearly established, we look at the state of the law when the [investigation] occurred.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONALD MICHAEL OUTLAW, : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, :
JEFFREY PIREE and HOWARD :
PETERMAN, in their individual capacities, :
Defendants. : NO. 21-1290
MEMORANDUM
KENNEY, J. August 6, 2021
Donald Outlaw served nearly sixteen years in prison after he was wrongfully convicted of
Jamal Kelly’s September 2000 murder. He brings this action against the City of Philadelphia, and
two individuals, the Philadelphia Police Department detectives who investigated Jamal Kelly’s
murder, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania law. Mr. Outlaw alleges Defendants acted in
concert to fabricate evidence, coerce witnesses to provide false statements, withhold exculpatory
evidence, and other misconduct, leading to his 2004 conviction. Mr. Outlaw maintained his
innocence through a lengthy appeals process and subsequent investigation. In January 2019, after
the prosecution turned over the Philadelphia Police Department Homicide Unit’s case file, which
contained previously withheld exculpatory information, Mr. Outlaw’s conviction was vacated.
After sixteen years in prison, Mr. Outlaw was exonerated.
In his six-count complaint, Mr. Outlaw seeks recompense for, inter alia, his 25-year loss
of freedom, loss of his youth, pain and suffering, deprivation of his familial relationships, and other
injuries and damages. Defendants now ask us to partially dismiss Mr. Outlaw’s complaint,
permitting his remaining claims to proceed to discovery. Defendants argue they are entitled to
qualified immunity from liability and that Mr. Outlaw’s Monell omnibus claim fails to the extent
it relies on violations of rights we determine were not “clearly established” during the relevant
period.
I. BACKGROUND1
Jamal Kelly was shot on September 4, 2000. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 15. Defendants Jeffrey
Piree (“Piree”) and Howard Peterman (“Peterman”) (collectively “the Detective Defendants”)
were the Homicide Unit detectives assigned to investigate the murder. When the Detective
Defendants began their investigation on September 4, 2000, an individual told them that Jamal
Kelly said “Shank did it” before he died. Id. ¶¶ 12,13, 15. Piree and Peterman understood “Shank”
to refer to Derick (“Shank”) Alston, Kelly’s drug supplier with whom he had a violent dispute
before his death. Id. ¶¶ 15, 28. A witness told the Detective Defendants that she saw Kelly and
Alston arguing the day of Kelly’s shooting and again moments before gunshots were fired. Id. ¶
16. Another witness told the Detective Defendants that Plaintiff Donald Outlaw (“Outlaw”) did
not commit Jamal Kelly’s murder. Id. ¶ 28.
Piree and Peterman questioned Derick Alston, who told them he did not know the shooter’s
identity and that he had been with Charles Paladino at the time of the murder. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The
detectives then questioned Paladino, who told them he did not know the identity of Jamal Kelly’s
shooter either. Id. ¶ 18.
When Piree again questioned Paladino in 2001, Paladino gave a different account; he told
Piree he had seen Outlaw in front of his house the night of the murder and that another man, Llamar
Rodgers, told him Outlaw was Kelly’s killer. Id. ¶ 19. A few months later, the Detective
1 We “accept as true all allegations in plaintiff’s complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from them, and construe[] them in a light most favorable to the non-movant.” Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 882
F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010)). We
draw the following facts from the Complaint. See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (“In
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, [and] undisputedly authentic documents if the complaint’s claims are based upon these
documents.”).
Defendants questioned Paladino again, who for the first time, claimed he saw Outlaw threaten
Kelly before the shooting. Id. ¶ 20. The next time the Detective Defendants questioned Paladino,
he claimed that Outlaw intimidated him to dissuade him from testifying. Id. ¶ 21.
On September 4, 2003, Outlaw was arrested for Jamal Kelly’s murder. Id. at ¶ 22. At
Outlaw’s preliminary hearing, Paladino denied that he was offered leniency in exchange for
testimony against Outlaw. Id. ¶ 22–23. The trial went forward based on Paladino’s testimony. Id.
¶ 23.
At trial, several witnesses recanted previous statements implicating Outlaw. Id. ¶ 25.
“Shank” Alston testified that he never implicated Outlaw and told the jury that he signed a false
statement so the police would stop taking him into custody. Id. Llamar Rodgers testified that he
never told police that he overheard Outlaw make any incriminating statements about Kelly’s
shooting. Id. He also testified that he signed his statement without reading it after an eight-hour
interrogation. Id. Paladino testified that the detectives physically coerced him to fabricate his
allegations against Outlaw. Id. Another witness, Eric Lee, testified that previous statements
identifying Outlaw as the shooter were false, and that he told prosecutors the statement the
detectives took from him was false. Id. All four witnesses’ recanted statements were read to the
jury, and Outlaw was convicted of first-degree murder and other offenses. Id. He was sentenced
to life in prison without parole. Id. ¶ 26.
A lengthy appellate process and investigation ensued. Id. ¶ 27. In May 2018, the
prosecution turned over the Homicide Unit’s file, which contained previously withheld
exculpatory information. Id. ¶ 28. Specifically, the file contained the Detective Defendants’
contemporaneous handwritten notes indicating that a man named Jerome Grant had confessed to
Jamal Kelly’s murder. Id. The notes also exposed that the detectives knew “Shank” Alston had
previously sold Kelly illegal drugs. Id. Finally, the handwritten notes demonstrated that Piree and
Peterman knew that “Shank” Alston was the likely owner of a gold Honda Accord seen driving
away from the murder scene. Id.
The Homicide Unit’s Kelly file contained further evidence undermining Outlaw’s guilt. It
contained a letter Paladino wrote to Peterman revealing that Paladino received a reward for
implicating Outlaw and expected to be released from custody. Id. In his letter, Paladino promised
he would not testify that he was provided any type of reward or incentive to implicate Outlaw. Id.
On appeal, Paladino testified that the detectives physically coerced him into implicating
Outlaw and promised leniency in his own case for testimony against Outlaw. Id. ¶ 29. Peterman
instructed Paladino to lie about parts of his statement, threatened that he would be charged with
murder, and physically assaulted him to obtain his statements against Outlaw. Id.
On January 29, 2019, based on the revelations that favorable material evidence was
withheld in violation of Outlaw’s constitutional rights, the Honorable Diana Anhalt vacated his
conviction. Id. ¶ 29. The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office Conviction Integrity Unit then
reviewed the case and Outlaw’s claims of innocence, and recommended the court enter a nolle
prosequi. On December 29, 2020, Outlaw was exonerated. Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
On March 17, 2021, Outlaw filed his complaint. See ECF No. 1. He alleges he was
convicted of Kelly’s murder because of Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct, which included
fabricating evidence, coercing witnesses to provide false statements, withholding exculpatory
evidence, and other misconduct. Id. ¶ 34. Outlaw further alleges the Philadelphia Police
Department (“PPD”) had a pervasive pattern, practice and custom of committing unconstitutional
misconduct in homicide investigations, dating back to the 1970s, which resulted in the wrongful
convictions of over ten other individuals. Id. ¶¶ 36, 46 (listing 13 convictions later resulting in
exonerations). Piree’s misconduct alone resulted in three later exonerations. Id. ¶ 45. Finally,
Outlaw alleges the City of Philadelphia was deliberately indifferent to the PPD’s pattern, practice
and custom of violating the constitutional rights of criminal suspects and others. Id. ¶ 49.
Outlaw brings a six-count complaint against Defendants asserting the following claims:
malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I); due
process violations (Count II); civil rights conspiracy (Count III); failure to intervene (Count IV);
an omnibus Monell claim (Count V); and malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law (Count
VI). Defendants move to dismiss Counts I, II, and IV based on the detectives’ qualified immunity,
and Count V, Outlaw’s Monell claim.2 See Def. Br., ECF No. 9. Outlaw filed a response brief on
June 7, 2021, and Defendants filed a reply on June 14, 2021.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Zuber v. Boscov’s, 871 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir.
2017) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
2 Defendants challenge Count I to the extent it alleges a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment but concede the
viability of Count I under the Fourth Amendment. Defendants do not challenge Count II’s fabrication of evidence
claim, nor do they challenge Count III, which asserts a civil conspiracy claim, or Count VI, which asserts a
malicious prosecution claim under Pennsylvania law. Defendants challenge Count V to the extent it relies on claims
otherwise dismissed. As Defendants’ Motion does not challenge Count III or Count VI, we will not address either
claim. Counts III and VI proceed to discovery.
Our Court of Appeals requires us to apply a three-step analysis under a 12(b)(6) motion:
(1) we “must ‘tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim;’ ” (2) we
“should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth;’ ” and, (3) “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
for relief.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 675).
We are to permit “a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable
or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to partially dismiss Outlaw’s complaint. Defendants seek dismissal of
Count I—in part—arguing that our Court of Appeals has not yet clarified whether a malicious
prosecution claim may be grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment. They seek dismissal of Count
II, to the extent it alleges withholding of evidence and inadequate investigation due process claims,
and dismissal of Count IV, Outlaw’s failure to intervene claim asserting that they are entitled to
qualified immunity. Finally, Defendants ask us to dismiss Outlaw’s omnibus Monell claim, to the
extent the City’s liability is predicated on claims we otherwise dismiss.
The judge-created defense of qualified immunity shields officers from suit for monetary
damages under § 1983 unless “the official violated a ... constitutional right,” and “the right was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Weimer v. County. of Fayette,
Pennsylvania, 972 F.3d 177, 190 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735
(2011)); see also Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 392 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (“Qualified
immunity has served as a shield for [ ] officers, protecting them from accountability.”). As the
defense provides “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” we must resolve
whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity “at the earliest possible stage of the
litigation.” George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Clinton County,
544 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2008). “[Q]ualified immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only
when the immunity is established on the face of the complaint.” Martin-McFarlane v. City of
Phila., 299 F. Supp. 3d 658, 668 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285,
291 (3d Cir. 2006). The defendant bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to qualified
immunity. Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2011).
We resolve claims of qualified immunity using a two-step sequence: first, we must
determine whether the facts “make out a violation of a constitutional right;” second, we must
decide whether this right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). We may begin with either prong. Id. at 236. A right is
clearly established when it is so evident that “every reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing is unlawful.” HIRA Educ. Servs. N. Am. v. Augustine, 991 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2021)
(citations omitted). Qualified immunity shields officers from responsibility for having such an
understanding unless existing precedent has “placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).3 The Supreme Court requires us to define
the clearly established right with a “high degree of specificity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby,
138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (citation omitted). “The legal principle established in a precedential
case must ‘clearly prohibit the offic[ial’s] conduct in the particular circumstances before him.’”
HIRA Educ. Servs. N. Am., 991 F.3d 190–191 (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct 577, 581).
3 Whether binding Court of Appeals precedents constitute “clearly established” law has not yet been confirmed by
the Supreme Court. See City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam) (“Assuming
without deciding that a court of appeals decision may constitute clearly established law for purposes of qualified
immunity…”)
Outlaw concedes his Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claim may not proceed
under current law and that he therefore cannot overcome Defendants’ qualified immunity defense.
See ECF No. 11 at 3 n.1. Accordingly, we will dismiss Count I to the extent Outlaw asserts Count
I under the Fourteenth Amendment because we agree that the right is not clearly established. See
Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 382 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (finding that whether a
procedural due process right against malicious prosecution exists remains “an unsettled
question.”). We will discuss the remaining challenges to Counts II, IV, and V individually.
A. Withholding of evidence and inadequate investigation (Count II)
Count II alleges due process violations arising out of “fabricating evidence, withholding
material exculpatory and impeachment evidence, and deliberately failing to conduct a
constitutionally adequate investigation.” Compl. ¶¶ 64–69. Defendants argue that Count II asserts
several claims that are each subject to “proof of different elements.” Def. Br., ECF No. 9 at 5.
Defendants challenge the withholding of evidence and failing to conduct a constitutionally
adequate investigation components of Count II, arguing they are entitled to qualified immunity
and dismissal of the claims because neither right was clearly established between 2000 and 2004.
Id. Defendants correctly declined to seek dismissal of Outlaw’s fabrication of evidence claim
based on a qualified immunity defense. See Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 293 (3d. Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation omitted) (“We emphatically reject the notion that due process of law permits
the police to frame suspects. Indeed, we think it self-evident that a police officer’s fabrication and
forwarding to prosecutors of known false evidence works an unacceptable corruption of the truth-
seeking function of the trial process.”). We will address whether Count II’s withholding of
evidence and inadequate investigation claims survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in turn.
i. Withholding of material exculpatory and impeachment evidence
Outlaw argues the Detective Defendants violated his rights by withholding material
exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Compl. ¶ 65. Defendants argue Outlaw’s asserted right
was not clearly established during the relevant period, and that we must dismiss this theory. If the
Detective Defendants’ obligation to turn over “information regarding the true circumstances of
Jamal Kelly’s murder…information regarding other viable suspects, [and] other exculpatory
statements” was not “clearly established” between 2000 and 2004, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity on Outlaw’s withholding of evidence theory.
Prosecutors’ obligation to turn over favorable evidence to an accused has been clearly
established since the Supreme Court 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In
Brady, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s failure to provide the accused with
exculpatory evidence upon request “violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87.
Prosecutors’ obligation to disclose information to the accused extends to information possessed by
the police investigators working on the case. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421–22 (1995).
Outlaw argues here that Brady’s mandates applied to the Defendant Detectives at the time
of his investigation and prosecution. Pl. Br., ECF No. 11 at 11–16. Other Courts of Appeals
recognized that police officers could be liable under § 1983 for failing to turn over favorable
evidence to the prosecutor during the relevant period. See McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554,
1567 (11th Cir.1996), amended 101 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir.1996); Walker v. City of New York, 974
F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir.1992); Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1559 (5th Cir.1988). “Even in
2000, [our] Court [of Appeals] was only able to assume that police officers ‘have an affirmative
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to an accused…’” Gibson v. Superintendent of NJ Dep’t of
L. & Pub. Safety-Div. of State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 444 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Smith v. Holtz,
210 F.3d 186, 197 n. 14 (3d Cir.2000)) (emphasis in original). Not until 2005—the year after
Outlaw’s conviction—did our Court of Appeals conclude that a § 1983 claim could be asserted
against police officers under Brady. See Gibson, 411 F.3d at 443. Assuming our Court of Appeals’
decision in Gibson is clearly established law, see City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct.
500, 503 (2019), we are obligated to follow precedent and find that Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity because Outlaw’s asserted right was not clearly established at the time of his
investigation and prosecution.
Outlaw urges us to disregard the cases Defendants cite where our sister courts apply Gibson
in finding that a right to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence was not clearly established until
2005. See ECF No. 11 at 15 (citing Gilyard v. Dusak, No. 16-cv-2986, 2018 WL 2144183, *4–5
(E.D. Pa. May 8, 2018) (Kearney, J.); and Lewis v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19-cv-2847, 2020
WL 1683451, *8-10 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2020) (Baylson, J.). First, Outlaw argues, our sister courts’
“conclusions about the precise year in which this Circuit established an extension of Brady
obligations to police officers is merely dicta and factually distinguishable from this instant case.”
Id. Second, Outlaw argues that our sister courts gave “improper weight” to Gibson’s citation to
the footnote in Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d at 197 n. 14 (emphasis added) (“assum[ing] for the
purposes of this appeal” that Brady obligations extended to investigating police officers). Id.
Although our sister courts’ decisions are not binding on us, we are persuaded by their
analyses. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n. 7 (2011) (quoting 18 J. Moore et al.,
Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.02[1] [d], p. 134–26 (3d ed.2011)) (“A decision of a federal district
court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district,
or even upon the same judge in a different case.”). That the alleged rights violations in Gilyard
and Lewis occurred from 1997 to 1998 and in 1997, respectively, does not make those cases
“factually distinguishable.” The proximity in time of the violations to precedent that places “the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate” has no bearing on whether a right is clearly
established. See Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2017) (“To determine whether
the right is clearly established, we look at the state of the law when the [investigation] occurred.”).
Defendant Detectives’ evidence withholding was not a “constitutional question beyond debate,”
between 2000 and 2004, just as it was not “beyond debate” in 1997 or 1998.
Finally, we disagree with Outlaw’s argument that our sister courts gave improper weight
to Gibson’s citation of the Smith v. Holtz footnote. In Smith, decided in 2000, our Court of Appeals
declined to recognize that police officers may be liable under § 1983 for withholding exculpatory
information when presented with the opportunity. See Gibson, 411 F.3d at 444. It instead opted to
“assume for the purposes of this appeal” that such a right existed. Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d at 197
n. 14. We are required to “apply the law as stated by the Supreme Court,” Jamison, 476 F. Supp.
3d at 392, and it directs us to identify the clearly established law at the time of Outlaw’s
investigation and prosecution. We do not think the Court of Appeals’ assumption—which it
expressly limited to the case before it—created clearly established law as the Supreme Court or
our Court of Appeals define “clearly established.” Defendants are thus entitled to qualified
immunity on Outlaw’s claim that they withheld exculpatory evidence.
ii. Inadequate investigation
Outlaw’s Count II also asserts that the Detective Defendants violated his rights by failing
to conduct a constitutionally adequate investigation. Compl. ¶ 67. Defendants urge us to dismiss
this claim because no cause of action arising out of an inadequate police investigation exists. See
ECF No. 9 at 11.
“There is ‘no constitutional right to a police investigation.’” Thomas v. City of
Philadelphia, 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 386 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Whitehead v. City of Phila., No.
13-2167, 2014 WL 657486, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2014)). In his response, Outlaw acknowledges
that the law consists of “musings about the existence of such a right.” ECF No. 11 at 16. Thus,
even if such a right exists, the murkiness of the law makes clear that the right is not clearly
established today, nor was it clearly established between 2000 and 2004. Accordingly, we find that
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
741 (2011).
As Judge Pratter observed in Thomas, even without this “failure to investigate” component
to Count II, the Defendant Detectives’ alleged conduct remains at issue in Outlaw’s other claims.
See Thomas, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 386. For example, the investigation-related allegations are captured
in Outlaw’s malicious prosecution claim (Count I) which asserts the Detective Defendants
prosecuted Outlaw knowing full well no probable cause existed.
B. Failure to Intervene (Count IV)
Outlaw’s Count IV Plaintiff asserts a failure to intervene claim, alleging that Defendants
declined to intervene “to prevent [Outlaw’s] false arrest, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment and deprivation of liberty…” Compl. ¶ 75. Defendants argue failure to intervene
cases arise almost exclusively in excessive force cases, and that no failure to intervene cause of
action exists in the context in which Outlaw asserts it. Thus, Defendants argue, they are entitled to
qualified immunity and we should dismiss Count IV. We agree.
Relying on Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002), Outlaw argues that Smith
supports the proposition that a “fail[ure] or refus[al] to intervene when a constitutional violation
such as an unprovoked beating takes place in his presence” is only one example of a constitutional
violation for which a police officer can be liable under § 1983. See ECF No. 11 at 18 (quoting
Smith, 293 F.3d at 350) (emphasis added by Plaintiff). Outlaw argues that Smith, and the Eleventh,
Eighth, and Seventh Circuit cases that Smith cites, support imposing a responsibility on the
Detective Defendants to have understood that failing to intervene in Outlaw’s false arrest,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and deprivation of liberty was a violation of his
constitutional rights. See HIRA Educ. Servs. N. Am., 991 F.3d at 190. However, our sister court
recently rejected a similar argument, explaining that this argument invites courts to define clearly
established law “‘at a high level of generality,’ which the Supreme Court has longed instructed
courts not to do.” Thorpe v. City of Phila., No. CV 19-5094, 2020 WL 5217396, at *10 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 1, 2020) (quoting Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018)).
We will decline Outlaw’s invitation to take impermissible liberties in defining the asserted
right. As neither our independent research nor Outlaw’s briefing identified any cases from our
Court of Appeals finding that fabrication, withholding of evidence, and failing to conduct a
“constitutionally sound investigation” would establish a duty to intervene, we find that Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity on Count IV and will dismiss the claim.
C. Omnibus Monell Claim(Count V)
In Count V, Outlaw asserts a Monell claim, seeking to hold the Defendant City of
Philadelphia liable for its “policy, practice or custom of unconstitutional misconduct in homicide
and other criminal investigations” Compl. ¶ 79. Defendants argue that Outlaw cannot sustain a
municipal liability claim for any alleged violations of rights not clearly established. Defendants
thus seek dismissal of Count V to the extent the Monell claim is predicated on Count I’s Fourteenth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim, Count II’s withholding of evidence and inadequate
investigation claims, and Count IV’s failure to intervene claim. As we discussed, Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity on each, and we agree with Defendants that the City of Philadelphia
cannot be liable for rights not clearly established.
For the City of Philadelphia to be liable under § 1983, Outlaw must identify “must
“identify a municipal policy or custom that amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
people with whom the police come into contact.” Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d
235, 244 (3d Cir. 2004). Deliberate indifference “is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof
that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). While our Court of Appeals
has not addressed the issue, our sister courts, relying on other Court of Appeals decisions, have
held municipalities cannot be deliberately indifferent to rights that are not clearly established. See
Lewis v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 19-2847, 2020 WL 1683451, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2020)
(collecting Court of Appeals decisions holding that a municipality cannot be liable for rights not
clearly established); Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 379 F. Supp. 3d 420, 435 (E.D. Pa. 2019);
Thomas, 290 F.Supp.3d at 387.
We join our sister courts in holding that a right that is not clearly established cannot support
municipal liability. Accordingly, the City of Philadelphia will not be liable for Outlaw’s claims for
Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution; withholding of material exculpatory evidence;
conducting a constitutionally inadequate investigation; or his failure to intervene claim. Outlaw’s
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution and his fabrication of evidence claims may proceed
against the City of Philadelphia and he may obtain discovery on these claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss. We will
dismiss Count I to the extent it relies on the Fourteenth Amendment, and Count II to the extent it
relies on a withholding of evidence and failure to conduct a constitutionally adequate investigation
theories. We will dismiss Count IV’s failure to intervene claim, and will dismiss Count V to the
extent it relies on alleged violations of rights not clearly established at the time of Outlaw’s
investigation and prosecution. We will dismiss these claims without prejudice, permitting Outlaw
to reassert these claims should there be a change in the law on qualified immunity.
/s/ Chad F. Kenney
__________________________________
CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE