COLEMAN v. PARKING VIOLATIONS BRANCH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AHMAD J. COLEMAN, :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : Case No. 2:21-cv-1251-JDW

:

PARKING VIOLATIONS BRANCH, et al. :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

Ahmad Coleman got a $51 parking ticket for parking his car in a crosswalk.

He wants more than $330 million in damages from the Philadelphia Parking

Authority for PPA’s efforts to collect on the ticket. In a pro se complaint, Mr. Coleman

asserts claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Truth In Lending

Act, and the Sherman Antitrust Act, but his Complaint does not state a viable claim,

for several reasons. Because nothing Mr. Coleman could do would cure the flaws in

his Complaint, the Court will dismiss his claims with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 2, 2020, Mr. Coleman got a parking ticket for parking his car in

a crosswalk on the 1300 block of North 16th Street in Philadelphia. The ticket was

for $51. He did not pay, so on February 18, 2021, the Philadelphia Parking Authority

sent Mr. Coleman a “Notice Of Potential Booting And Towing,” which imposed an

additional $65 in penalties and fees, meaning Mr. Coleman owed $116.

On March 8, 2021, Mr. Coleman prepared a notarized letter, arguing that PPA

violated several provisions in the FDCPA and the Sherman Antitrust Act. Mr.

Coleman sent his letter to PPA with an invoice, also dated March 8, 2021, for

$110,010,000 in damages for the violations that he asserted. When PPA did not

immediately pay his invoice, Mr. Coleman filed this action four days later, on March

12, 2021. His pro se Complaint named the PPA’s Parking Violations Branch and the

PPA itself as defendants.

On April 26, 2021, Mr. Coleman filed an Amended Complaint, adding the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a defendant. In his Amended Complaint, Mr.

Coleman references provisions of the FDCPA, TILA, and the Sherman Act. He claims

that when PPA issued him a ticket, it and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

became “debt collectors. . .in direct violation of the FDCPA by using False [sic], unfair,

misleading, and deceptive means to collect this alleged debt.” (ECF No. 6 at 9). He

also claims that PPA never had consent to contact him and is in violation of TILA,

and he charges PPA with identity theft. Additionally, Mr. Coleman alleges an

unspecified violation of the Sherman Act.

The Commonwealth moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. PPA moved to dismiss the Amended

Complaint for failure to state a claim. Mr. Coleman filed a response on June 3, 2021,

which he characterizes as a “Motion to Deny” PPA’s Motion. His response does not

address the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity arguments. Nor does he make any

substantive arguments about the merits of his claims. He just points to his notarized

letter as a basis for his claims without any analysis of their viability.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court must determine whether the

complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Because Mr. Coleman is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his allegations

liberally. See Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).

A court may also dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) can present a factual or

facial challenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Gould

Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). When reviewing a

facial attack, a court must only consider the allegations or documents referenced in

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id.

District courts may dismiss a complaint with prejudice when leave to amend

would be futile. “‘Futility’ means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,

114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). A district court may apply the same standard of

sufficiency as found in Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b). Id. at 1434-35. Amendment of the

current complaint would be futile because of a failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Furthermore, amendment would be futile under the standard

for pleading with particularity for “fraud and mistake” in Rule 9(b).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment grants states immunity from suit in federal courts.

See U.S. Const. amend. XI. “[T]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which

deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum

Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996). The Commonwealth is a state, and it has

not waived its immunity. Nor has Congress abrogated its immunity. Mr. Coleman

does not argue otherwise. The Court will therefore dismiss the claims against the

Commonwealth with prejudice.

B. Failure to State a Claim

1. FDCPA

“To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he or

she is a consumer who was harmed by violations of the FDCPA; (2) that the ‘debt’

arose out of a transaction entered into primarily for personal, family, or household

purposes; (3) that the defendant collecting the debt is a ‘debt collector,’ and (4) that

the defendant violated, by act or omission, a provision of the FDCPA.” Pressley v.

Capital One, 415 F. Supp. 3d 509, 512-13 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (quoting Johns v. Northland

Grp., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 590, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2014)). Mr. Coleman’s FDCPA claim fails

for at least two reasons.

First, Mr. Coleman’s debt to PPA was not a “transaction.” Congress’s use of

the term “transaction” demonstrates that Congress intended the FDCPA to apply

only to consensual matters, which will almost always arise from an express or implied

contract. “[A] fine does not stem from a consensual transaction and thus is not a debt

under the FDCPA.” Gulley v. Markoff & Krasny, 664 F.3d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 2011).

Second, PPA is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. The statute defines

“debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce

or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any

debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts

owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis

added). PPA is not a “business,” its principal purpose is not the collection of debts,

and it attempts to collect its own debts, not the debts of someone else. It therefore

does not qualify as a debt collector.

Because Mr. Coleman has not pled either of these elements of an FDCPA claim,

the Court need not determine whether PPA’s conduct violated any provision of the

FDCPA. In addition, because Mr. Coleman cannot cure these failings by amending

his pleading, the Court will dismiss the FDCPA claims with prejudice.

2. TILA

TILA regulates “the relationship between lenders and consumers ... by

requiring certain disclosures regarding loan terms and arrangements.” McCutcheon

v. America’s Servicing Co., 560 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir.2009); see also Chase Bank USA,

N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 198, 131 S.Ct. 871, 178 L.Ed.2d 716 (2011) (“Congress

passed TILA to promote consumers’ informed use of credit by requiring meaningful

disclosure of credit terms....”). PPA did not lend to Mr. Coleman. TILA therefore does

not apply to PPA’s effort to collect on the ticket it issued to him. Mr. Coleman cannot

cure that failure by amending his complaint, so the Court will dismiss his TILA

claims with prejudice.

3. Sherman Act

To prevail on claims arising under 15 U.S.C. §1, a plaintiff must allege (1) an

agreement (2) to restrain trade unreasonably.” Lifewatch Serv., Inc. v. Highmark, Inc.

902 F.3d 323, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2018). The ticket that PPA issued to Mr. Coleman was

not “trade;” it was the exercise of the government’s police power. It is therefore

outside the scope of conduct that the Sherman Act regulates. Mr. Coleman cannot

cure that failing with an amended pleading. The Court will therefore dismiss his

Sherman Act claim with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

Mr. Coleman has not stated a viable claim against the Commonwealth or the

PPA. He cannot fix the flaws with an amended complaint because they are not fixable.

The Court will therefore dismiss his claims with prejudice. An appropriate Order

follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joshua D. Wolson

JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.

June 4, 2021