Tapley v. Locals 302 & 612 of the International Union of Operating Engineers-Employers Construction Industry Retirement Plan

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES TAPLEY; MICHAEL CHAPMAN, No. 11-35220

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

D.C. No.

v. 3:10-cv-00033-

HRH

LOCALS 302 AND 612 OF THE

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF

OPERATING ENGINEERS-EMPLOYERS OPINION

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

RETIREMENT PLAN,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

H. Russel Holland, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 5, 2012—Seattle, Washington

Filed September 6, 2013

Before: William A. Fletcher and Raymond C. Fisher,

Circuit Judges, and Raymond J. Dearie, District Judge*

Opinion by Judge Dearie

*

The Honorable Raymond J. Dearie, Senior United States District Judge

for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

2 TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612

SUMMARY**

ERISA

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment

upholding ERISA pension plan trustees’ decisions that two

plan members were precluded from working certain post-

retirement jobs if they wanted to collect retirement benefits.

The panel held that the trustees abused their discretion by

failing reasonably to interpret ERISA plan language defining

post-retirement service that precluded the receipt of

retirement benefits.

COUNSEL

Michael Flanigan, Walther & Flanigan, Anchorage, Alaska,

for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Catherine A. Rothwell (argued) and Frank J. Morales,

McKenzie Rothwell Barlow & Korpi, P.S., Seattle,

Washington, for Defendant-Appellee.

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612 3

OPINION

DEARIE, Senior District Judge:

James Tapley and Michael Chapman appeal a judgment

of the district court upholding the interpretation of plan

language by the Trustees of their pension plan. The Trustees

determined that appellants’ respective post-retirement jobs as

a traffic flagger and snow plow operator fell into the same

“job classification” as their former union jobs as skilled

mechanics. On that basis, each appellant was precluded from

working his job if he wanted to collect retirement benefits.

Tapley and Chapman brought suit against the Trustees under

the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., alleging that the

Trustees’ interpretation of plan language was an abuse of

discretion. The district court affirmed the Trustees’

decisions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are largely undisputed. Appellants

James Tapley (“Tapley”) and Michael Chapman

(“Chapman”) spent the bulk of their careers working as

skilled mechanics and members of the International Union of

Operating Engineers (“the Union”) in Alaska. Tapley worked

as a heavy duty mechanic, station mechanic, fabricator, and

welder from approximately 1979 to 2001. Chapman worked

as a service oiler, mechanic, fabricator, and welder from

approximately 1984 to 2001. Their respective employers

made contributions to Locals 302 and 612 of the International

Union of Operating Engineers-Employers Construction

Industry Retirement Plan (“the Plan”), a multi-employer,

4 TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612

collectively bargained pension plan as defined by ERISA,

29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A).

The Plan permits participants to take early retirement if

they have “attained age 52 and completed ten or more years

of Credited Service.” The Plan also permits early and

normal-age retirees to work while receiving retirement

income as long as they “completely refrain from Post-

Retirement Service of 51 or more hours during any calendar

month.”1 Section 6.06 of the Plan defines “Post-Retirement

Service” as all employment that is:

(a) within the geographic area covered by the

Plan which for purposes of this Section shall

consist of all of the State of Alaska and the

State of Washington;

(b) in a job classification in which the

Participant was employed while in Covered

Employment, whether or not such

employment is under the terms of a Collective

Bargaining Agreement or written Contribution

Agreement or in a supervisory capacity over

such job classification; and

(c) in the industry in which the Individual

Employers participate (any business activity

1

The Plan also stipulates that a participant seeking to retire early must

refrain from any work with an employer contributing to the fund. Beyond

that, the Plan makes distinctions solely with respect to the age at which

employees are eligible for early and normal retirement and how income

is calculated in each case.

TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612 5

of the type engaged in by the Individual

Employers maintaining the Plan).

If a retiree works the proscribed number of hours in “Post-

Retirement Service,” retirement benefits are temporarily

suspended.

The Plan does not define the term “job classification” or

otherwise clarify what would be suitable post-retirement

employment. This obvious ambiguity in Plan language is the

focus of this appeal. Tapley and Chapman each found jobs

with the State of Alaska Department of Transportation

(“DOT”) that they believed would allow them to continue

working without sacrificing retirement income. But in both

cases, the Trustees found that appellants’ DOT jobs were in

the same “job classification” as their union positions

(hereinafter “Covered Employment”) and were therefore

“Post-Retirement Service.”

A. James Tapley

Tapley applied to retire early, at age 52, after more than

20 years in Covered Employment as a heavy duty mechanic.

At the time of his application for retirement in July 2007, he

was working for the State of Alaska as a “light duty”

mechanic—a transition to cars and trucks from his Covered

Employment focus on heavy duty machinery. After an

administrative hearing, the Trustees denied his request for

early retirement benefits. As a result, Tapley abandoned

mechanic work entirely and commenced early retirement on

August 1, 2008.

A few months later, Tapley was offered a three-week

temporary job with the State of Alaska as a “traffic

6 TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612

flagger”— work he described as “holding a sign” and

“directing traffic.” He sought a determination from the

Trustees as to whether the flagger position was considered

“Post-Retirement Service” under the Plan, but passed up the

job when his request went unanswered for several weeks.

When another flagger opportunity arose in April 2009,

Tapley accepted the position and began working for fewer

than 51 hours per month while he awaited the Trustees’

approval. In late April 2009, the Trust Administration Office

informed him that the flagger job was also considered Post-

Retirement Service because it is “in the Industry.” Once

again, Tapley discontinued work and appealed the Trustees’

decision.

The Trustees held a hearing on August 18, 2009. Tapley

was represented in person, by counsel, and testified

telephonically. Following the appeal, the Trustees issued a

written decision explaining their finding that Tapley’s DOT

job is in the same “job classification” as his Covered

Employment.

B. Michael Chapman

Chapman took a different approach to early retirement.

Rather than pre-emptively requesting the Trustees’ approval,

he transitioned to his DOT job as a “snow plow operator” and

worked for more than six years in that capacity before

applying for early retirement benefits in December 2007, at

age 52. The job description Chapman provided listed duties

such as snow and ice removal; responsibility for highway

safety equipment (e.g., signs, guardrails), drainage, and traffic

control; clearing debris and brush; and patching potholes.

TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612 7

On February 13, 2008, the Trust Administration Office

informed Chapman that the snow plow operator job was Post-

Retirement Service. Chapman conceded that the jobs were in

the same “geography” and “industry,” but appealed the

Trustees’ determination that the jobs were in the same “job

classification.” The Trustees held a hearing on March 17,

2009, and issued a written decision on April 8, 2009,

reaffirming their original determination.

C. The Trustees’ Interpretation

Although Tapley’s and Chapman’s appeals were based on

different underlying facts and decided separately, the Trustees

employed essentially the same investigative and interpretive

processes to reach the same outcome. Because the Plan did

not define the term “job classification,” the Trustees

acknowledged their “independent obligation to determine [its]

meaning and application.” In both cases, the Trustees

declined to “adopt a particular definition.” Instead, they

offered two explanations for why Tapley’s and Chapman’s

DOT jobs fell within the same “job classification” as their

past Covered Employment.

The Trustees’ first interpretation looked to the Master

Labor Agreement, the Union employment contract. Although

flagger and snow plow operator were not listed anywhere in

the Agreement, the Trustees grouped appellants’ DOT jobs

and Covered Employment into the single generic class of

“operating engineers,” a term borrowed from one of the five

“Wage and Classification” groups in the Agreement. The

district court readily rejected the approach as unreasonable,

and the issue has been abandoned on appeal.

8 TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612

This appeal focuses on the Trustees’ second

interpretation, which the district court upheld as reasonable.

There, the Trustees employed a “duties and skills” test

comparing appellants’ Covered Employment and post-

retirement jobs. They reviewed submitted job descriptions

and dispatch cards documenting daily assignments. They

also took appellants’ testimony. From this information, the

Trustees identified similarities between the jobs in terms of

duties, skills, and general competencies.

In Tapley’s case, the Trustees looked to the State-

provided “Request for Referral” form, which classifies his

DOT position not as a “flagger,” but as an “Equipment

Operator” “wage grade 58.” The enclosed job description

included many duties beyond “flagging traffic”:

Grounds maintenance, brush cutting, flagging,

raking, shoveling and general labor[.] Simple

or routine maintenance with hand and power

tools, drives 1 ton pick-up trucks[.] Sets up

signs for traffic control and prepares the

equipment for the crew.

The Trustees also requested clarification on the duty

“prepares the equipment for the crew,” which they learned

refers to pre-trip inspections involving checking oil, tires, and

lights, and loading tar blocks, cones, signs, and stands.

Ultimately, the Trustees concluded that the duties and

skills Tapley required as a flagger were similar or analogous

to those required in his Covered Employment as a skilled

mechanic. They observed that as a skilled mechanic, Tapley

had duties and skills related to equipment operation—the

broader career area to which the DOT assigned the flagger

TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612 9

job. Specifically, they noted that as a mechanic and welder,

Tapley sometimes operated equipment in order to move it

into position for servicing, and drove a service truck to carry

tools, parts, and lubricants. They also emphasized that

Tapley was qualified to operate certain equipment, though he

did so only once, on a failed dispatch to operate a backhoe.

Likewise, when reviewing Tapley’s flagger job, the Trustees

looked for any duties and skills comparable to the repair and

maintenance of heavy duty machinery that Tapley performed

as a mechanic. They listed “examples of duties” for all “Sub-

Journey” level employees at Tapley’s wage grade, such as

“checking oil, tires and lights,” “operating a pick-up truck

and other vehicles and basic equipment such as a sander or

grader,” and performing “ground maintenance.” On that

basis, and without elaboration, the Trustees concluded that

the two jobs were in the same “job classification.”

The Trustees employed the same analysis in Chapman’s

case, though with some fidelity to the duties and skills

actually performed and used. But as in Tapley’s appeal, the

Trustees concluded that Chapman was working within the

same “job classification” for the DOT based on similar,

though incidental, duties and skills. For example, they found

Chapman’s duties as a mechanic—performing preventative

maintenance on heavy machinery— to be “similar” to the

routine maintenance necessary to operate a snow plow, such

as “checking tires, fluid and oil levels, and brakes” prior to

operation. They also pointed to the DOT listed

“competencies,” which require general knowledge of

equipment functions. The Trustees compared Chapman’s

duties as a snow plow operator to the operation of machinery

required of him as a skilled mechanic, when he would

occasionally move equipment for servicing. They also noted

that Chapman “drove a truck” in both positions.

10 TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612

D. Procedural History

Tapley and Chapman jointly filed this action in the United

States District Court of Alaska pursuant to 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3) seeking to overturn the Trustees’

decisions. Following a trial on the record, the district court

upheld the Trustees’ use of a “duties and skills” test as

reasonable. The district court also affirmed the Trustees’

decisions with respect to Tapley and Chapman, observing that

“[t]he Trustees found numerous skills and duties that were the

same for each job,” which is a “reasonable basis for the

Trustees’ conclusion” that the positions were in the same “job

classification.”

The district court also denied appellants’ motion to

compel the production of documents related to the “Post-

Retirement Service” of another union mechanic. Tapley and

Chapman allege that the other mechanic collected early

retirement benefits while working more than 51 hours per

month as a commercial fuel truck driver.

II. DISCUSSION

A.

Where an ERISA Plan grants “discretionary authority to

determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of

the plan,” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.

101, 115 (1989), “a plan administrator’s interpretation of a

plan” is reviewed for abuse of discretion, Canseco v. Constr.

Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 93 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir.

1996). We review the district court’s application of this

standard de novo. Saffle v. Sierra Pac. Power Co. Bargaining

TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612 11

Unit Long Term Disability Income Plan, 85 F.3d 455, 458

(9th Cir. 1996).

We equate the abuse of discretion standard with “arbitrary

and capricious” review. Canseco, 93 F.3d at 605. Under this

standard, the Trustees’ interpretation of Plan language is

entitled to a high level of deference and will not be disturbed

unless it is “not grounded on any reasonable basis.” Oster v.

Barco of Cal. Emps.’ Ret. Plan, 869 F.2d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir.

1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Deference is

particularly weighty where, as here, the Plan “confers broad

power on the administrators to determine eligibility for

benefits under the plan,” and the interpreted language is

ambiguous. Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 654 F.2d

650, 655 (9th Cir. 1981). “[T]he [T]rustees’ interpretation

need not be the one this court would have reached, but only

an interpretation which has rational justifications.” Id.

The Court’s review of the Trustees’ interpretation is not

without bite, however: “a deferential standard of review does

not mean that the plan administrator will prevail on the

merits.” Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1651

(2010). When reviewing interpretive challenges for abuse of

discretion, the Court closely reads contested terms and

“appl[ies] contract principles derived from state law[,] . . .

guided by the policies expressed in ERISA and other federal

labor laws.” Richardson v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel

Corp., 112 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1997). The Trustees abuse

their discretion where they “construe provisions of [a] plan in

a way that clearly conflicts with the plain language” of the

Plan, Johnson v. Trustees of W. Conf. of Teamsters Pension

Trust Fund, 879 F.2d 651, 654 (9th Cir. 1989), “render[s]

nugatory” other provisions of the Plan, Richardson, 112 F.3d

at 985, or “lacks any rational nexus to the primary purpose”

12 TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612

of the Plan, Burditt v. W. Growers Pension Plan, 636 F. Supp.

1491, 1498 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d, 818 F.2d 698 (9th Cir.

1987) (per curiam).

We begin our inquiry with the plain language of the Plan,

interpreting it “in an ordinary and popular sense as would a

person of average intelligence and experience.” Gilliam v.

Nev. Power Co., 488 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007)

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The term

“job classification” is clearly ambiguous; it is neither defined

nor mentioned elsewhere in the Plan, and, not surprisingly,

we have not seen the same language in any other plan that has

received judicial scrutiny.2

Although we agree with the district court that it is

reasonable to interpret the term “job classification” to mean

more than “job title,” this observation does not resolve the

2

The term “job classification” is neither used nor defined in ERISA.

While it is employed sporadically in ERISA’s regulations, more often than

not the term is qualified—unhelpfully for our purposes—by the additional

terms, “reasonably defined.” See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b-3(e)(6)

(“Crediting of service under this paragraph must be done consistently with

respect to all employees within the same job classifications, reasonably

defined.” (emphasis added)); id. § 2530.200b-3(f)(3)(i) (in assessing

equivalencies based on earnings for employees “without a regular work

schedule,” plan may look to “average hours worked by the employee . . .

provided that the basis so used is consistently applied to all employees

within the same job classifications, reasonably defined” (emphasis

added)); cf. Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 744

(2004) (“[ERISA] does not explicitly define ‘early retirement benefit.’”).

The regulation’s definition of “trade or craft” does include the following

language: “[T]he determination whether a particular job classification, job

description or industrial occupation constitutes or is included in a trade or

craft shall be based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”

29 C.F.R. § 2530.203-3(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).

TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612 13

dispute. The plain language of the Plan imposes another clear

constraint: “job classification” under Section 6.06(b) must be

less encompassing than “industry” under Section 6.06(c),

which refers to the broader types of business activities

engaged in by the employers maintaining the Plan. An

interpretation that conflates the two terms conflicts with the

plain language of the Plan by rendering the term “job

classification” nugatory. See Richardson, 112 F.3d at 985

(“Each provision in an agreement should be construed

consistently with the entire document such that no provision

is rendered nugatory.”); Brown v. S. Cal. IBEW-NECA Trust

Funds, 588 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a

plan administrator abuses its discretion if its “interpretation

of the Plan creates a much broader category of prohibited

activities than is supported by the plain language of the

Plan”).

The Trustees’ expansive interpretation of the term “job

classification” does just that. By construing the language to

preclude appellants from retiring to unskilled jobs entailing

roadside work, the Trustees effectively re-write the plan to

“sweep within its ambit an overly broad range of ‘skills.’”

Eisenrich v. Minneapolis Retail Meat Cutters & Food

Handlers Pension Plan, 544 F. Supp. 2d 848, 857 (D. Minn.

2008), aff’d in relevant part, 574 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2009).

Not only does this interpretation give the Trustees the power

to preclude post-retirement employment within the

construction industry, but the record suggests that they

intended to do so. On July 17, 2008, a pension representative

wrote to Tapley, “Benefit payments will resume whenever

you either stop working entirely for the State of Alaska or

begin working in a new position that is not in the Industry.”

Then again, on April 20, 2009, the Trustees informed Tapley,

“it has been determined that your proposed work as a flagger

14 TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612

/ equipment operator for the State of Alaska would be

considered in the Industry. For this reason, your request to

perform any of this work while collecting retirement benefits

is denied.” This construction of Plan terms conflicts with the

plain language, renders the term “job classification”

meaningless, and contravenes the purpose of the Plan.

Tapley’s case illustrates the problem. His Covered

Employment as a skilled mechanic was a far cry from his

DOT position as a “flagger” or road crew worker—both

based on the type of duties performed and the level of skill

required. Yet the Trustees ignored these fundamental

differences and chose instead to emphasize any “similar” and

“analogous” duties, skills, and general competencies—many

of which were listed in broad job abstracts—without properly

considering how incidental they were, how seldom the duties

were performed, or whether the skills Tapley developed

during the many years of Covered Employment were ever

used or required at all.

In fact, Tapley did not engage in “flagging” or other

roadside work in Covered Employment as a skilled mechanic.

It was only in anticipation of early retirement that he

completed additional training through the State of Alaska to

obtain a “flagger card.” Upon close review of the record, it

appears that the only overlap between the positions in terms

of ongoing duties is driving a service truck and the associated

routine maintenance, such as checking oil, tires, and lights.

This modest overlap is far from meaningful considering how

different the positions are in actual practice. According to

Tapley’s testimony, his main duty, flagging, consisted of

“holding [a] sign” and “directing traffic.” Even when we

consider the other duties listed in the broader job description,

the essential nature of the job remains roadside work,

TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612 15

involving “the more routine, non-specialized and repetitive

tasks that do not require the more specialized skills.” To

preclude Tapley from doing such basic work on the basis of

insignificant and incidental similarities between jobs would

effectively preclude him from working in the industry,

contrary to the Plan’s express provisions.

The Trustees used the same flawed approach in

Chapman’s case, extracting what they perceived as similar

duties and skills. Essentially, Chapman sought to transition

from a skilled mechanic and service oiler to a snow plow

operator, involving snow and ice removal, roadside work, and

operation of some heavy-duty equipment. While the DOT

classified the job as an “operator / laborer,” it is undisputed

that this position did not require Chapman to repair

machinery—his primary role as a Union mechanic—or utilize

any of the special skills he acquired during his 17 years of

Covered Employment. Rather than acknowledging this

significant difference in core skills used for each job, the

Trustees chose instead to note that, in his Covered

Employment, Chapman sometimes operated equipment when

he had to move it for servicing. The Trustees also gave great

weight to the existence of a few overlapping duties, without

considering the mundane and incidental nature of the tasks

compared to the different core skills Chapman used for each

position. For example, as in Tapley’s case, the Trustees

stressed that Chapman “drove a truck” in both positions.

They also concluded that his “preventative maintenance”

duties as a snow plower—including “checking tires, fluid and

oil levels, and brakes”—meant that he “performed . . . duties

and used similar skills as a mechanic and service oiler.”

Again, we do not find this overlap between jobs to be

meaningful. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any post-Union

16 TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612

jobs in the construction industry that do not require at least

some “similar” or “incidental” duties and skills.

Eisenrich is instructive and persuasive. See Eisenrich v.

Minneapolis Retail Meat Cutters & Food Handlers Pension

Plan, 544 F. Supp. 2d 848 (D. Minn. 2008), aff’d in relevant

part, 574 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2009). Eisenrich was a meat

cutter seeking to retire as a sales development associate

(“SDA”) for a baked-goods company. Id. at 852–53. His

plan permitted post-retirement work in the same industry as

long as the new job was not in the same “trade or craft” and

“geographic area.” Id. at 851. The trustees equated the two

positions based on the shared “generally applicable skill” of

“merchandising,” including product rotation, inventory, and

ordering. Id. at 852, 855–56. The district court found this

interpretation to be unreasonable because it would preclude

Eisenrich from taking almost any job in food retail—an

industry where merchandising plays an integral role. Id. at

856–57.

Instead, the court endorsed a more holistic approach:

Eisenrich previously worked as a meat cutter;

he now delivers Pepperidge Farm crackers,

cookies, and baked goods to grocery stores.

Common sense dictates that this job is not in

the same “trade or craft” as Eisenrich’s prior

work as a meat cutter because he does not

primarily utilize skills learned over a

substantial period of time as a meat cutter,

notwithstanding that work as an SDA might

TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612 17

involve some “merchandising” of Pepperidge

Farm products.

Id. at 858 (emphasis added).

Common sense strongly suggests that a position flagging

traffic or plowing snow is not in the same “job classification”

as a skilled mechanic repairing heavy equipment utilizing

specialized skills acquired over a long career. These two

positions have little in common beyond basic skills widely

acquired through everyday experiences. The Trustees used

the same flawed approach as the trustees in Eisenrich,

emphasizing areas of overlap without regard to the core skills

and duties actually required and performed. Similarly, the

Trustees focused on abstract job descriptions that strayed far

from the reality of appellants’ jobs. For example, the record

does not support the claim that Tapley’s DOT job as a

“flagger” was anything more than what he described: a

position flagging traffic and doing basic roadside work. But

by categorizing the job as an “Equipment Operator” “wage

grade 58” and emphasizing broad competencies, the Trustees

made superficial connections between otherwise disparate

jobs.

Appellees deny that the Trustees’ interpretation is so

expansive. They argue that the Trustees “diligently and

comprehensively compared the skills and duties used by

Tapley and Chapman in Covered Employment to those

required for an Equipment Operator with the State of Alaska,

and there was material and significant overlap.” The record

simply fails to support such a contention. The record before

us fails to identify a single instance when the Trustees found

any overlapping skills or duties that were “material” or

“significant,” much less essential to the work performed.

18 TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612

Pension plan participants should be able to reasonably

rely on plan terms in planning their retirement. See Cent.

Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 743 (2004)

(“There is no doubt about the centrality of ERISA’s object of

protecting employees’ justified expectations of receiving the

benefits their employers promise them.”). Yet the Trustees’

vague standard for interpreting the term “job classification”

left Tapley and Chapman in the dark about what was

acceptable.

ERISA does not require the provision of benefits to early

retirees, but this Plan does. The availability of earned

retirement benefits cannot be frustrated by an untethered

interpretation of the Plan that takes away what the Plan was

designed to provide. Simply stated, what the Plan provides,

the Trustees may not take away. It is not for this Court to

proffer a reasonable interpretation of Plan language, but

instead to identify and reject any interpretation that is

arbitrary, misfocused and contrary to the intent of those

responsible for its terms. We must do so here. We are unable

to see how any sensible application of the skills and duties

test to the established facts can support the Trustees’

conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court

and return the matter to the Trustees for reevaluation of the

merits in a manner consistent with the court’s opinion.

B.

Our conclusion that the Trustees abused their discretion

makes it unnecessary to reach appellants’ contention that the

district court abused its discretion by denying their motion to

compel the production of documents related to the “Post-

TAPLEY V. LOCALS 302 AND 612 19

Retirement Employment” of Alvin Shampine, another retired

Local 302 mechanic. Appellants allege that the Trustees

permitted Shampine to transition from mechanic to

commercial fuel truck driver while still drawing his union

pension, implying that his post-retirement work was not

found to be in the same “job classification.” Tapley and

Chapman seek to compel this information as evidence of

inconsistent decisions by the Plan administrator. Our holding

that the Trustees abused their discretion obviates the need for

this discovery. We therefore decline to reach this issue.

That being said, we remand this matter to the Trustees on

an open record, giving appellants the opportunity to obtain

the information they seek and to include it in the

administrative record on remand.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is REVERSED.