The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEREK WAYNE JACKSON : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. :
:
MS. JULIE FAULKNER, Montgomery :
County District Courts, MR. JOHN N. :
GRADEL, Montgomery County :
District Courts, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF :
THE TREASURY, Bureau of the :
Fiscal Service, MONTGOMERY :
COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNIES (sic) :
OFFICES and MONTGOMERY COUNTY :
COURTS OF THE COMMON PLEAS : NO. 20-3547
MEMORANDUM
Savage, J. October 15, 2020
Derek Wayne Jackson, an inmate at SCI-Greene, brings this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 based upon alleged constitutional violations stemming from his murder
conviction and subsequent imprisonment. He seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Because it appears that he is not capable of paying the fees to commence this civil
action, we shall grant him leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons,
we shall dismiss his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state
a claim.
Factual Allegations
In 2006, Jackson was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses in the
Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, and sentenced to life
imprisonment.1 He unsuccessfully appealed and petitioned for post-conviction relief.2 In
2013, Jackson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his convictions. That
petition is currently pending before another judge of this Court.3
Here, Jackson names as defendants the Montgomery County District Attorney’s
Office, Juliet Faulkner, John N. Gradel, the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas,
and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. He alleges that he was “wrongfully convicted
of . . . first degree murder with additional charges that are also wrongfully convicted of
without merit or the burden of proof.”4 He contends that he was convicted based on
perjury and falsified documents.5 Jackson seeks “immediate release from [his] criminal
charges” and $1,500 for each day of wrongful incarceration.6
Standard of Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), we must dismiss the Complaint if it fails
to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999),
which means the complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
1 See Commonwealth v. Jackson, CP-46-CR-0003616-2005 (C.P. Montgomery Co.).
2 See id.
3 See Jackson v. Coleman, Civ. A. No. 13-5932 (E.D. Pa.).
4 Compl. at 3 (Doc. No. 2). We adopt the pagination supplied by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing system.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 5.
(2009) (quotations omitted). “[M]ere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Id. Because
Jackson is proceeding pro se, we construe his allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att’y Gen.,
655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).
Discussion
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jackson must allege facts which, if
proven, would establish that: (1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States; and (2) the person depriving him of that right acted under
color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Miller v.
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Accepting the facts alleged
in the complaint as true and drawing all inferences from them in favor of Jackson, we
conclude that he has not stated a plausible claim against the defendants.
Jackson may not request release from imprisonment in a § 1983 action based on
allegations that his convictions are unconstitutional. “[W]hen a state prisoner is
challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks
is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that
imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Therefore, because Jackson is limited to pursuing
these claims in his pending habeas proceeding, this action must be dismissed. See
Jackson v. Coleman, Civ. A. No. 13-5932 (E.D. Pa.).
Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a plaintiff is barred from bringing
a constitutional claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment in his favor would
demonstrate or imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction. Id. at 486–87; see
also Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 2016).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that to recover damages under § 1983 for false
arrest or false imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish that the underlying disposition or
sentence “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question
by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 512 U.S. at
486–87. If granting the relief sought in the plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint would necessitate
finding that the state court conviction or sentence was invalid, it must be dismissed. Id.
at 487.
To determine whether a claim is barred by Heck, we engage in a two-part inquiry.
We first determine whether the plaintiff's conviction has been overturned or
invalidated. Id. at 486–87. If so, the inquiry ends and the claim is not barred. If not, we
ask “whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487. If it would, the claim is barred.
Because his conviction has not been reversed, vacated, or otherwise invalidated,
Jackson may not pursue his damages claim for unconstitutional imprisonment because
success would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions. Thus, the Heck doctrine
bars Jackson’s § 1983 claims.
Jackson also brings suit against the prosecutors in his case. A prosecutor enjoys
absolute immunity from liability for actions taken in connection with judicial proceedings.
Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted), aff’d sub. nom.,
Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2011). This generally means activities
conducted in court, such as presenting evidence or legal arguments. Giuffre v. Bissell,
31 F.3d 1241, 1251 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)).
Prosecutorial activities outside the courtroom receive the same protection only if they are
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Van de Kamp v.
Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).
Absolute immunity from § 1983 claims attaches to the prosecutor’s decision to
initiate a prosecution. Id. (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424). Administrative or investigative
actions, on the other hand, are only protected by qualified immunity, id. at 342 (citing
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, n. 33), unless the actions “relate directly to the conduct of a
criminal trial.” Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 334 (citing Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344). A
prosecutor’s behavior that is totally unrelated to the prosecutorial role or exceeds the
scope of his authority is similarly unprotected by absolute immunity. Kulwicki v. Dawson,
969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 346 (3d Cir.
1989)).
In determining whether the prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity, we take
into account what function the prosecutor was performing. Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at
342 (citation omitted). This inquiry requires us to analyze the conduct forming the basis
for the plaintiff’s cause of action. Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 332 (citation omitted). Although
the Third Circuit has “rejected bright-line rules that would treat the timing of the
prosecutor’s action (e.g. pre- or post-indictment), or its location (i.e. in- or out-of-court),
as dispositive,” Odd, 538 F.3d at 210, certain actions clearly serve the prosecutorial
function, entitling the prosecutor to absolute immunity.
Jackson complains about the prosecutor’s conduct at his trial. Thus, Jackson’s
claims against the prosecutor must be dismissed.
Jackson has not stated any basis for municipal liability against the Montgomery
County District Attorney’s Office, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978), nor has he explained how the U.S. Department of the Treasury could be held
legally responsible for his conviction and imprisonment. Hence, his claims against the
District Attorney’s Office and the Department of the Treasury must be dismissed.
Conclusion
We shall grant Jackson leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his
Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Jackson
will not be given leave to file an amended complaint because he cannot cure the defects
in his complaint.