“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.”
How later courts described this case
- “[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.”
- “[P]rison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. . .”
- deliberate indifference claim was cognizable where plaintiff alleged he was not being treated for ongoing pain associated with asthma and officer failed to take any action
- “[W]here . . . a claim is asserted against numerous officials who interacted with the plaintiff in different ways and at different times, [the district court must] analyze separately the conduct of each Defendant against the constitutional right allegedly violated.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID W. W. ADAMI, et al. : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. : No. 19-2187
:
COUNTY OF BUCKS, et al :
MEMORANDUM
Juan R. Sánchez, C.J. October 1, 2020
Plaintiffs David Adami and Heather Giglio bring this civil rights action on behalf of
Frederick Adami against, inter alia, Defendants Brian Kircher, Patrick Rooney, Steven Columbia,
C/O Knoneborg, Langston Mason, Timothy Ricci, and David Gresko (collectively, the Officers)—
seven individual corrections officers at Bucks County Correctional Facility (BCCF). Plaintiffs
claim the Officers violated Adami’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs while he was being held at BCCF, which resulted in his
death due to opiate withdrawal. The Officers have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against them
for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting they are
entitled to qualified immunity. The Court will grant the motion in part and dismiss Plaintiffs’
claims against Officers Knoneborg, Mason, Ricci, and Gresko, without prejudice and with leave
to amend. The Court will deny the motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim against Officers Kircher,
Rooney, and Columbia.
BACKGROUND1
On the morning of January 27, 2018, Adami was arrested for possession of drug
paraphernalia after being found asleep in his car. After he was processed by police, he was taken
to BCCF around 6:00 a.m. because of an outstanding bench warrant. Adami was “booked” in at
BCCF at 7:28 a.m.
At 10:35 a.m., Nurse Dunfee at BCCF conducted a screening of Adami, during which
Adami informed Nurse Dunfee he had an opioid addiction and he used twenty bags of heroin per
day. He further informed Nurse Dunfee he used multiple bags of heroin the day before, and he was
presently experiencing chills and vomiting. Nurse Dunfee noted Adami was experiencing heroin
withdrawal. Adami was brought to his cell in Module A at 12:36 p.m. At that time, he was placed
on an “Inmate Monitor List,” indicating he was on watch for medical reasons. The Inmate Monitor
List required Adami be observed and evaluated every 15 minutes. As part of that requirement,
BCCF policy employed inmate monitors, referred to as “babysitters,” to check on inmates every
fifteen minutes. In addition, BCCF policy required corrections officers to observe and evaluate an
inmate on the Inmate Monitor List at least every 30 minutes.
Throughout his time in Module A, Adami was exhibiting symptoms of severe opiate
withdrawal, including frequent vomiting. Officer Ricci was assigned to Module A from Adami’s
arrival at 12:36 p.m. until 2:00 p.m. At 1:46 p.m., Nurse Dunfee entered orders for four
medications—Bentyl, Bismuth, Ondansetron, and Vistaril—for Adami, entered under prescriber
Dr. Gessner. Neither Nurse Dunfee nor Dr. Gessner examined Adami at that time.
1 In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept as true all factual allegations in the
complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Doe v. Univ.
of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Officers Rooney and Kircher relieved Officer Ricci at around 2:00 p.m., and were
responsible for Module A until 10:00 p.m. Adami remained in his cell from 2:45 p.m. until his
death the following morning. At 7:01 p.m., Nurse Wright administered the four medications
prescribed to Adami, three of which were provided orally. Nurse Trusty recorded vital signs for
Adami at 7:53 p.m., which included a blood pressure of 128/100 while standing and 130/96 while
sitting. No other record of Adami’s condition was recorded at that time. This was the final time
any medical personnel at BCCF saw Adami. During Officers Rooney and Kircher’s shift, Adami’s
cellmate attempted to tell Officers Rooney and Kircher about Adami’s condition, but they “blew
[him] off.”2 Compl. ¶ 76.
Officer Columbia relieved Officers Rooney and Kircher around 10:00 p.m., taking over
responsibility for Module A until 6:00 a.m. the following morning. When Officer Columbia went
on break, Officer Knoneborg was responsible for Module A. During Officer Columbia’s shift,
Adami’s condition continued to worsen. Adami defecated and urinated on himself, and he
continued vomiting throughout the night. Adami complained of severe withdrawal symptoms and
that no medications had helped him.3 Despite this, none of the guards on duty that night, including
Officer Columbia, noted having any conversations with Adami. Further, Officer Columbia did not
observe Adami at least every 30 minutes as required by BCCF policy for inmates on the Inmate
Monitor List. At 3:10 a.m., Officer Mason arrived at Module A for unannounced rounds, though
2 Given the chronological nature of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Court infers Plaintiffs’ allegation
that Adami’s cellmate “attempted to tell the . . . guards on Housing Module A about [Adami’s]
condition, but they ‘blew him off,’” refers to Officers Rooney and Kircher, the only officers
identified as being responsible for Module A during this time. See Compl. ¶¶ 71, 76.
3 As with Officers Rooney and Kircher, the Court infers this refers to Officer Columbia, the only
officer identified as being responsible for Module A during this time. Compl. ¶¶ 78, 80.
he only spoke to the guards at the desk and did not observe Adami. At no point overnight did any
of the Officers communicate with medical personnel regarding Adami’s complaints or condition.
At 6:00 a.m., Officers Ricci and Gresko relieved Officer Columbia and assumed
responsibility for Module A. At 6:35 a.m., Officer Ricci noticed Adami was lying in his cell with
his eyes open. Officer Ricci entered the cell, and an emergency was called. Additional guards and
medical staff arrived and began performing CPR on Adami. Adami was transported to Doylestown
Hospital, where he was declared dead at 7:35 a.m. Adami’s cause of death was determined to be
“Sudden Death due to Opiate Withdrawal.” Compl. ¶ 94. Adami’s death marked the third inmate
death due to heroin withdrawal at BCCF in the last four years.
Plaintiffs filed this case on May 20, 2019, asserting, inter alia, a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the Officers for violating Adami’s Fourteenth Amendment right by acting with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs (Count I). The Officers filed the instant motion
to dismiss on July 9, 2019, asserting a qualified immunity defense. The Court heard argument on
the motion on September 25, 2019.
DISCUSSION
The Court will deny the motion with respect to Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia
because Plaintiffs have pleaded facts that would support a claim of deliberate indifference, and the
Officers are not entitled to immunity at this stage. The Court will grant the motion with respect to
Officers Knoneborg, Mason, Ricci, and Gresko because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded
they acted with deliberate indifference to Adami’s serious medical need. However, the Court will
grant Plaintiffs’ leave to file an Amended Complaint because the deficiencies within Plaintiffs’
Complaint are factual and Plaintiffs have not previously had the opportunity to amend their
Complaint.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “does not need detailed
factual allegations” if it contains something “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But the plausibility standard “require[s] a pleading to show
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Constr.
Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). “A facially plausible claim is one that permits a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Doe v. Univ. of the
Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
The Officers assert Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim should be dismissed because
they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Immunity questions should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (quotations and citation omitted). However, because qualified
immunity is an affirmative defense, it will only attach on at the motion to dismiss stage “when the
immunity is established on the face of the complaint.” Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d
Cir. 2001). At the motion to dismiss stage, courts “look only to the complaint to see whether there
is any set of facts plaintiff can prove that would support a denial of immunity.” Kulwicki v.
Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
In evaluating whether qualified immunity attaches, courts employ a two-pronged analysis:
(1) “whether the facts that [the] plaintiff has alleged . . . make out a violation of a constitutional
right,” and (2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of [the] defendant’s
alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. For a constitutional right to be clearly established,
“[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). A court
must assess qualified immunity “in the context of each individual defendant’s specific conduct.”
Griffin-El v. Beard, 411 F. App’x 517, 519 (3d Cir. 2011).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia violated
Adami’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care under § 1983 and his right to
adequate medical care was clearly established at the time of the misconduct. Conversely, Plaintiffs
have not sufficiently pleaded Officers Knoneborg, Mason, Ricci, and Gresko violated Adami’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care under § 1983 and Count I will therefore be
dismissed against these Defendants. The Court first turns to Officers Kircher, Rooney, and
Columbia.
First, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia
violated Adami’s Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care under § 1983. Section 1983
“provides a cause of action against ‘every person who,’ under color of state law, ‘subjects, or
causes to be subjected,’ another person to a deprivation of a federally protected right.” Barkes v.
First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). To maintain a cause of action
under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A prisoner’s right to adequate medical care arises under the Eighth Amendment, which
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment secures the same right to adequate medical care for pretrial detainees as the Eighth
Amendment provides for convicted prisoners. See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663,
668 (3d Cir. 1988). “[P]rison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act deliberately
indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs by ‘intentionally denying or delaying access to
medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.’” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv.,
850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-5 (1976)). To
sustain a deliberate indifference claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective
showing that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs and (2) an
objective showing that those needs were serious.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted) (alteration
in original). The same standard applies to a deliberate indifference claim brought by a pretrial
detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d
575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003).
The Officers concede Adami’s medical needs were serious. Hr’g Tr. 9:10-13, Sept. 25,
2019, ECF No. 44. The Officers’ motion therefore turns on whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently
pleaded the Officers were deliberately indifferent to Adami’s medical needs, and whether the right
at issue was clearly established. Prison officials can be deliberately indifferent when they (1) deny
reasonable requests for medical treatment, (2) refuse to provide medical care when they know it’s
needed, (3) delay medical treatment for non-medical reasons, or (4) prevent an inmate from
receiving recommended treatment for serious medical needs. Pearson, 850 F.3d at 538. However,
4 Plaintiffs plead violations of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because Adami was
a pretrial detainee at all relevant times, the § 1983 claim is properly based on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is evaluated under “the same standard used to
evaluate similar claims brought under the Eighth Amendment.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003).
non-medical prison officials cannot be deliberately indifferent “when the prisoner is under the care
of medical experts and the official does not have a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that
prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at
543 (quotations, and citations omitted). Relatedly, non-medical prison officials cannot be
considered deliberately indifferent “simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical
complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor.” Durmer v.
O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia acted with
deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs allege Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia were all
obligated to observe Adami every 30 minutes because Adami was on the Inmate Monitor List for
heroin withdrawal. Compl. ¶ 67. Throughout his time at Module A, Adami was exhibiting
symptoms of opiate withdrawal, such as frequent vomiting. Id. ¶ 68. During Officers Rooney and
Kircher’s shift, Plaintiffs allege Adami’s cellmate notified the officers about Adami’s worsening
condition, but they ignored him. Id. ¶ 76. During Officer Columbia’s shift, Plaintiffs allege Adami
himself complained that his withdrawal symptoms were getting worse and his medications were
not working, but he was ignored. Id. ¶ 80. By that time, Adami had defecated and urinated on
himself, and continued vomiting throughout the night. Id. ¶ 79. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege Officer
Columbia failed to observe Adami every 30 minutes, which was explicitly required by BCCF
policy for an inmate on medical watch. Id. ¶ 83. Taken together, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient
facts to state a plausible claim that Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia were deliberately
indifferent to Adami’s serious medical needs. See Koukos v. Chester Cnty., No. 16-4602, 2017
WL 511634, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2017) (holding plaintiff’s allegations that officers did not act
after observing him sweating and shaking and after he requested to be taken to the infirmary to be
treated for opiate withdrawal were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).
Relying on the Third Circuit’s decision in Pearson v. Prison Health Services, the Officers
argue Adami “was under continuing medical care from the morning that he arrived at the BCCF,”
and “[t]here is nothing in the Complaint to plausibly suggest that any of [the Officers] had a reason
to believe that medical personnel were mistreating or not treating Adami.” Mot. to Dismiss 6-7,
ECF No. 13. This argument falls short for two reasons. First, accepting all facts in the Complaint
as true, Adami was by no means “under continuing medical care.” Rather, he had three isolated
interactions with three different nurses: when he first arrived at BCCF (and prior to him ever
entering Module A); when Nurse Wright administered his medication at 7:01 p.m.; and when
Nurse Trusty checked his vitals at 7:53 p.m. Compl. ¶¶ 46, 73, 74. Throughout his time at BCCF,
Adami remained housed with the general prison population, under the Officers’ supervision. Id.
¶ 72. Second, Adami and his cellmate’s complaints to Module A officers during the shifts of
Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia regarding Adami’s worsening condition allegedly
occurred after Adami’s final interaction with the nurses, when he clearly was not receiving any
additional care or treatment. Id. ¶¶ 76, 80.
Given the facts alleged, the Officers were never put in a position where they had to second-
guess treatment decisions by medical personnel. Rather, the inmate whom they were obligated to
monitor every 30 minutes out of concerns for his health exhibited increasingly deleterious
symptoms, directly complained of those worsening symptoms, and the Officers made no effort to
notify medical personnel. These facts are sufficient to state a plausible claim that Officers Kircher,
Rooney, and Columbia acted with deliberate indifference by denying Adami’s reasonable requests
for medical treatment and refusing to alert medical personnel. See Gravley v. Tretinik, 414 F.
App’x 391, 394 (3d Cir. 2011) (deliberate indifference claim was cognizable where plaintiff
alleged he was not being treated for ongoing pain associated with asthma and officer failed to take
any action). Whether the officers in fact had sufficient knowledge to render them deliberately
indifferent “is a determination that should be made when the record is more complete” with respect
to what the officers knew about Adami’s condition, what they observed, what specifically Adami
and his cellmate said to which officer, and what the officers understood regarding Adami’s
treatment. Koukos, 2017 WL 511634, at *6. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have
sufficiently pleaded a Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care claim under § 1983
against Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia and, therefore, plead a violation of his
constitutional rights sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
Next, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that Adami’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
adequate medical care was clearly established at the time of Officers Kircher, Rooney, and
Columbia’s alleged misconduct. “A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that
every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Kane v.
Barger, 902 F.3d 185, 194 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).
In determining whether a right is clearly established, “the Court must consider whether existing
precedent [has] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Michtavi v. Scism,
808 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2015) (quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in original). There
does not need to be a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established. Kane, 902 F.3d at
194. Rather, the right must have “‘a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent.’” Id.
(quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)).
The Officers define the right at issue as whether “correctional officers could be held liable
for failing to treat and monitor an inmate receiving medical care for withdrawal symptoms, absent
a reason to believe that the inmate was in distress.” Mot. to Dismiss 12, ECF No. 13. Setting aside
that Plaintiffs have pleaded Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia had reason to believe Adami
was in distress, the Officers’ definition is far too narrow. In defining the right, “it need not be the
case that the exact conduct has previously been held unlawful so long as the contours of the right
are sufficiently clear.” Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 450 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotations and
citation omitted); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“[O]fficials can still be on
notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.”). The
appropriate question is whether Adami had a clearly established right to adequate medical
treatment for his withdrawal symptoms—a serious medical need.
An inmate’s right to treatment for serious medical needs is beyond question. Estelle, 429
U.S. at 104. Third Circuit case law establishes that prison officials violate that right when they
deny reasonable requests for treatment. See, e.g., Pearson, 850 F.3d at 534 (“[P]rison officials
violate the Eighth Amendment when they act deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious
medical needs. . .”); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (citing Estelle as having clearly
established that prison officials cannot be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s existing serious
medical needs). Therefore, Adami’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical treatment
was clearly established at the time of Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia’s alleged
misconduct.
Having found Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia
violated Adami’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care under § 1983 and his
right to adequate medical care was clearly established at the time of the misconduct, the Court
finds Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia are not entitled to qualified immunity on the face
of the Complaint. See Leveto, 258 F.3d at 161. The Officer’s motion will be denied as to these
Defendants.5
Turning to Officers Knoneborg, Mason, Ricci, and Gresko, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently
pleaded these Defendants violated Adami’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care
under § 1983 and Count I will therefore be dismissed against them. Like Officers Kircher, Rooney,
and Columbia, the issue here turns on whether the Complaint adequately pleads that Officers
Knoneborg, Mason, Ricci, and Gresko engaged in deliberate indifference. The Court finds it does
not.
First, Plaintiffs identify Officer Knoneborg as the officer who “took over responsibility for
Housing Module A[] when [Officer] Columbia went on break.” Compl. ¶ 78. This is the first and
only time Plaintiffs reference any specific conduct by Officer Knoneborg. While Plaintiffs allege
Officer Columbia did not observe Adami every thirty minutes as required by BCCF policy, they
do not include Officer Knoneborg in the allegation. Id. ¶ 83. Plaintiffs next allege Officer Mason
arrived at Module A at 3:10 a.m. for “unannounced rounds.” Id. ¶ 85. However, according to
Plaintiffs, Officer Mason “did not do any rounding of Module A,” and instead spoke only to the
guards at the desk. Id. As pleaded, Officers Knoneborg and Mason entered Module A for one-off,
isolated purposes, and did not interact with or observe Adami. Absent allegations that Officers
Knoneborg and Mason were ever made aware of Adami’s serious medical need, let alone required
to observe Module A inmates on the Inmate Monitor List, the claims against them must be
dismissed. See Ward v. Lamanna, 334 F. App’x 487, 491 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[Prison] staff must ‘. . .
5 Despite filing an Answer to the Complaint, Defendant Bucks County argues, if the Officers are
dismissed from the case, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against Bucks County should also be dismissed.
Reply in Supp. 1, ECF No. 17. Because the Court will not dismiss all Officers from the case, the
Court does not reach this question.
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists . . . .’”) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1993)).
Finally, Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts which, taken as true, would plausibly show
deliberate indifference on the part of Officers Gresko and Ricci. Plaintiffs allege Officers Gresko
and Ricci began their shift at 6:00 a.m. Compl. ¶ 90. According to Plaintiffs, Officer Ricci then
found Adami lying on his bed with his eyes open at 6:35 a.m., and medical staff was in Adami’s
cell two minutes later. Id. at 91-92. Plaintiffs make no further allegations regarding Officers Ricci
and Gresko’s 6:00 a.m. shift, and there is nothing in the Complaint to suggest that either Officers
Ricci or Gresko otherwise interacted with Adami. At most, Plaintiffs have pleaded Officers Ricci
and Gresko were five minutes late in observing an inmate on the Inmate Monitor List, which the
Court finds does not rise to deliberate indifference. Officer Ricci was also the officer responsible
for Module A when Adami first arrived. However, like with Officer Ricci’s shift with Officer
Gresko, Plaintiffs do not allege either Adami or his cellmate complained to Officer Ricci during
his first shift, nor do Plaintiffs allege Officer Ricci failed to observe Adami as required by BCCF
policy. In fact, Plaintiffs make no allegation at all with respect to Officer Ricci’s actions during
his first shift. Accordingly, the § 1983 claims against Officers Knoneborg, Mason, Ricci, and
Gresko will be dismissed. See Griffin-El, 411 F. App’x at 519 (“[W]here . . . a claim is asserted
against numerous officials who interacted with the plaintiff in different ways and at different times,
[the district court must] analyze separately the conduct of each Defendant against the constitutional
right allegedly violated.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Having found the § 1983 claims against Officers Knoneborg, Mason, Ricci, and Gresko
fail as pleaded in the Complaint, the Court must consider whether to grant Plaintiffs leave to file
an amended complaint. A court may grant leave to amend a pleading under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(2). Rule 15(a)(2) instructs a court to “freely give leave [to amend] when justice
so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A court can deny leave to amend, however, when the
amendment would be futile. City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d
872, 878 (3d Cir. 2018). An amendment is futile when it “could not withstand a renewed motion
to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Because the deficiencies within Plaintiffs’ Complaint
are factual and Plaintiffs have not previously had the opportunity to amend their Complaint, the
Court grants Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies identified in
this Memorandum.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded deliberate indifference with
respect to Officers Ricci, Knoneborg, Mason, and Gresko, the Court will dismiss Count I as to
these Defendants, without prejudice and with leave to amend. Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
however, will be denied with respect to Officers Kircher, Rooney, and Columbia because Plaintiffs
have sufficiently pleaded their deliberate indifference claim against them and they are not entitled
to qualified immunity at this stage.
An appropriate order was previously issued on September 30, 2020.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Juan R. Sánchez
Juan R. Sánchez, C.J.