BROWN v. FRIEL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BLANCHE A. BROWN : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. : No. 16-1819

:

POLICE CHIEF JOSEPH FRIEL :

IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL :

CAPACITY, et al. :

MEMORANDUM

Juan R. Sánchez, C.J. April 10, 2020

Pro se Plaintiff Blanche A. Brown alleged Defendants Police Chief Joseph Friel, Judge

Grover Koon, Valley Township Police Department, Valley Township Manager/Administrator, and

Valley Township and Governing Board/Supervisors improperly charged her with harassment. The

Court dismissed Judge Koon from the case, granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining

defendants, and denied Brown’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Brown now asks the Court

to reconsider its decision to grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, alleging errors of

law and fact. She also seeks relief from the order denying her summary judgment motion, alleging

fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by Defendants. The Court will deny the motion for

reconsideration because it did not make any mistakes of law or fact when granting summary

judgment. The Court will also deny the motion for relief because Defendants did not fraudulently

prevent Brown from litigating her case.

BACKGROUND

In April 2014, Brown and her half-brother each complained to the Valley Township police

about harassing communications from the other. The police instructed both Brown and her half-

brother to stop communicating with each other. The police then issued two citations to Brown for

harassment because they believed she failed to comply with that instruction. Over the next several

months, Brown continued to complain to police that her half-brother was stalking, harassing, and

threatening her, and the police continued to respond and investigate her complaints. In September

2014, the two harassment citations against Brown were withdrawn, and she was never punished

or fined for these citations.

On April 4, 2016, Brown filed this case alleging the Police Department’s response to her

complaints and the two harassment citations against her violated her civil rights. Two months later,

Brown filed an Amended Complaint alleging twenty-five causes of action, including violations of

her constitutional rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, violations of 42

U.S.C. § 1983, and common law claims for conspiracy, negligence, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. In January 2017, Brown filed a motion to compel discovery. While that motion

was pending, Defendants moved for summary judgment on January 24, 2017. A few weeks later,

the Court granted in part Brown’s motion to compel. After the Court granted Brown two extensions

to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, she filed her response as well as a cross-

motion for summary judgment on March 1, 2017. After hearing oral argument on both summary

judgment motions, the Court denied Brown’s motion and granted Defendants’ motion. Brown then

filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Brown also filed a motion for relief

from the Court’s order denying her motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b).

DISCUSSION

The Court will deny both motions. The Court will deny the motion for reconsideration

because the Court did not make any errors of law or fact. The Court will also deny the motion for

relief because Brown has not produced clear and convincing evidence of fraud, and she was not

prevented from litigating her case. The Court will address each motion in turn.

A motion for reconsideration is meant “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present

newly discovered evidence.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). A party seeking

reconsideration under Rule 59(e) must show at least one of the following: “(1) an intervening

change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the

court granted the motion . . .; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent

manifest injustice.” In re Vehicle Carrier Servs. Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 71, 87 (3d Cir. 2017)

(quoting Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Only the third basis, a need to prevent a clear

error of law or fact or prevent manifest injustice, is relevant here.

The Court did not make a mistake of law or fact in granting Defendants’ summary

judgment motion, nor did the Court’s decision on that motion create a manifest injustice. The Court

wrote a lengthy memorandum opinion explaining why summary judgment was warranted on all

twenty-five of Brown’s claims. This memorandum addressed not only Brown’s claims as pleaded,

but also several alternative possible theories of her case. In making its decision, the Court reviewed

evidence submitted by both parties. See Mem. 1 n.2, Aug. 26, 2019, ECF No. 143. This included

the evidence filed by Brown that was attached to her opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment

motion. Id. The Court also articulated the appropriate legal standard and viewed the evidence in

the light most favorable to Brown. See id. at 7-8.

Brown attempts to point to several errors in the Court’s opinion, but her arguments are

meritless. As an initial matter, Brown repeats many arguments the Court already rejected in its

memorandum, and the Court will not readdress those arguments here. See, e.g., Taksir v. Vanguard

Grp., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 3d 539, 544 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“[M]otions for . . . reconsideration should

be granted sparingly and may not be used to rehash arguments which have already been briefed by

the parties and considered and decided by the Court.” (internal citations omitted; alterations in

original)); see also Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[M]otions [for

reconsideration] are not to be used as an opportunity to relitigate the case”). For example, Brown

claims her First Amendment rights were violated but the Court addressed this issue when it denied

her motion to amend her complaint to include First Amendment claims. See Mem. 28 n.24, Aug.

26, 2019, ECF No. 143. Brown also attempts to reargue whether Defendants had probable cause

for her harassment citations, which was also addressed in detail in the Court’s memorandum on

Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Id. at 11 n.11.

Brown’s motion for reconsideration is also based on several misunderstandings concerning

the Court’s legal analysis. For example, Brown argues the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort

Claims Act (PSTCA) does not apply to her federal law claims, but the Court applied this act to

Brown’s state tort law claims. See id. at 33-34. She also argues that the Court improperly

interpreted her Monell claims as based on respondeat superior, but the Court denied her Monell

claims because she failed to present evidence of any constitutional violations. Id. at 26-27. The

Court merely mentioned respondeat superior to note that this was not a basis for liability. See id.

at 10 n.10. Brown also argues the Court improperly adopted Defendant’s version of the facts rather

than deferring to her allegations. However, at the summary judgment stage, the Court must base

its decision on evidence, such as documents produced in discovery, deposition testimony, or sworn

affidavits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The Court cannot merely credit Brown’s unsupported

assertions when the evidence contradicts those assertions. See Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd.

of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 193 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]t summary judgment a non-moving party may not

rest on mere allegations.”).

Many of Brown’s objections to the Court’s decision stem from her belief that the summary

judgment memorandum was written by a biased magistrate judge. This is incorrect. No magistrate

judge was involved in this case. The summary judgment memorandum is the Court’s opinion. The

Court is also not biased against Brown. The Court granted Defendants’ motion because Defendants

were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, not because of any bias against Brown or in favor of

Defendants. Because the Court did not make any errors in its decision to grant summary judgment,

the Court will deny Brown’s motion for reconsideration of that decision.1

The Court will also deny Brown’s motion under Rule 60(b) for relief from the Court’s

order denying her summary judgment motion. As relevant here, Rule 60(b) allows a court to vacate

an order for “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).2 To be entitled to relief under this

provision, a party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the other party engaged

in fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct, and (2) this behavior prevented the moving party

from fully and fairly presenting her case. See Brown v. Pa. R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 522, 527 (3d Cir.

1960); Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1983).

1 To the extent that any of Brown’s arguments in favor of reconsideration are not addressed above,

the Court relies on its reasoning in its memorandum granting summary judgment.

2 Brown also mentions Rule 60(b)’s catchall provision which allows a court to vacate an order for

“any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). A court can grant relief under this

catch-all provision “only in extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme

and unexpected hardship would occur.” Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal

citation and quotations omitted). Aside from her fraud allegations, Brown does not point to any

extraordinary circumstances here. The Court will therefore address only Rule 60(b)’s fraud

provision and not its catchall provision.

Defendants did not fraudulently prevent Brown from litigating her case here. First, Brown

does not present clear and convincing evidence of any fraud or misconduct by Defendants. She

argues Defendants’ fraudulently refused to send her discovery, but there is no evidence of any

willful misconduct on Defendants’ part. Defendants began sending Brown discovery on December

2, 2017, several weeks before the discovery deadline. See Certificate of Service 1, Dec. 2, 2017,

ECF No. 56. While Defendants did send Brown some additional discovery in late January, this

discovery consisted of even-numbered pages omitted from a previously produced document. See

Certificate of Service 1, Jan. 27, 2017, ECF No. 78; Pl’s Mot. for Relief App. C., at 3, Sept. 25,

2019, ECF No. 146-4 (cover letter for January 27, 2017, production). There is no reason to believe

those pages were intentionally omitted from Defendants’ earlier productions; a much more likely

explanation is Defendants inadvertently photocopied only one side of a double-sided document.

Brown also argues Defendants fraudulently failed to send her their court filings, but this

argument is again undermined by the record. For example, Brown complains Defendants did not

mail a response to her motion to compel until January 25, 2017, but this was the deadline the Court

imposed for Defendants to respond to that motion. See Order 1, Jan. 20, 2017, ECF No. 71.

Defendants therefore had not filed their response until that date, so they could not have mailed it

to Brown any earlier. Brown also asserts Defendants fraudulently failed to send her their statement

of facts in support of their summary judgment motion, but Defendants filed a certificate of service

stating they mailed this document. Statement of Material Facts 6, Jan. 24, 2017, ECF No. 74. While

Brown may not have received the document, there is no proof that Defendants tried to hide it from

her. In fact, the document was publicly available because it was filed on the docket, which is how

Brown eventually discovered it. If Defendants intended to conceal this document from Brown,

they would not have filed it publicly.

Even if Brown were able to show Defendants willfully withheld documents from her, she

was not prevented from litigating her case as a result. Brown states she received Defendants’ last

document production in late January 2017. She therefore had over a month to incorporate that

production into her summary judgment motion, which was filed on March 1, 2017. She also had

another eight weeks after filing her motion to prepare for oral argument on the motion, which was

held in late April. The only document Brown allegedly did not receive until after she filed her

motion for summary judgment was Defendants five-page statement of material facts. However,

the information in this document was otherwise available to Brown because it was included in

Defendants’ memorandum in support of their summary judgment motion and in the exhibits

attached to that motion, both of which Brown admits she received. Therefore, Brown had all

relevant information, including all discovery, when she filed her motion for summary judgment.

Brown argues she was nonetheless prejudiced by Defendants’ discovery delays because

her motion for summary judgment was filed late. This argument is incorrect. The Court did not

deny Brown’s motion because it was untimely. The Court denied Brown’s because it was not

meritorious. When the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, it explained why

each of Brown’s claims failed as a matter of law. Brown was therefore not entitled to summary

judgment in her favor regardless of when she filed her motion, and Defendants’ alleged discovery

delays did not prevent her from litigating her case.

Brown has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that Defendants committed fraud

or that she was denied a full opportunity to litigate her case as a result. The Court will thus deny

her motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(3).3

3 In her motion, Brown also alludes to discovery sanctions and striking documents filed by

Defendants. To the extent these allusions constitute a separate request for relief, that relief is

denied. As explained above, Brown has not shown Defendants behaved improperly so no relief is

CONCLUSION

Because there were no mistakes of law or fact in the Court’s memorandum granting

Defendants summary judgment, the Court will deny Brown’s motion for reconsideration pursuant

to Rule 59(e). Because Brown did not present evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or other

misconduct, and she was not prevented from litigating her case, the Court will deny her motion for

relief pursuant to Rule 69(b)(3).

An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Juan R. Sánchez

Juan R. Sánchez, C.J.

warranted. Brown also appears to question the Court’s decision on her motion to compel. As she

did in that motion, Brown argues that Defendants document productions and responses to her

discovery requests were inadequate. The Court will not revisit these issues, which were resolved

in the Court’s order on Brown’s motion to compel.