Saula v. City of Newport

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

SEAN SAULA, 6:21-cv-01648-AA

OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF NEWPORT, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________________

AIKEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Sean Saula was arrested on charges of unlawful possession of heroin

and methamphetamine. Plaintiff brings this action against the City of Newport and

Detective Jon Humphreys (“Defendants”) for wrongful arrest under state and federal

law. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (“Mot.”) ECF

No. 26. For the reasons explained, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party “shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2019). The moving party bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet this burden, the party asserting that a

fact cannot be genuinely disputed must support that assertion with admissible

evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

If the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,

the nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in the complaint to demonstrate

a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A party cannot defeat a summary

judgment motion by relying on the allegations set forth in the complaint, unsupported

conjecture, or conclusory statements. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 343 F.3d

1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment thus should be entered against “a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The court views the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982). All reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue

of fact should be resolved against the moving party. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429,

432 (9th Cir. 1976)

BACKGROUND

In Newport, Oregon on November 19, 2019, police officers of the Newport Police

Department stopped Andrew Forcier for a traffic violation. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8. Forcier

told police that he had methamphetamine in his car. Id. ¶ 9. Mid-stop, Detective

Jon Humphreys arrived on scene. During questioning, Forcier told Humphreys that

he had stolen the meth from a man named Lonnie Larson at plaintiff’s house. Id. ¶¶

10, 12. Forcier explained that he and Larson had been hanging out at plaintiff’s house

in the basement, and that Larson brought over a backpack containing a quarter

pound of meth and a large amount of heroin. Id. ¶ 11; Stabler Decl., Ex. 2 at 10, ECF

No. 28. Humphreys asked Forcier to return to the house to confirm that Larson was

still there. Forcier complied and confirmed Larson’s presence.

Humphreys then wrote an affidavit and sought a search warrant for plaintiff’s

residence and for Larson. Humphrey’s affidavit specified that Humphreys had

“probable cause to believe” there was evidence of the crimes of “possession of a

controlled substance,” “delivery of a controlled substance,” and “manufacture of a

controlled substance” at plaintiff’s house. Stabler Decl., Ex. 2 at 2. The affidavit

described the residence as one divided into three separate living quarters and

requested authorization to search the entire residence. Id. at 2-3, 9.

Lincoln County Circuit Court Judge Sheryl Bachart issued the warrant. Id. at

1. Before Humphreys could execute the warrant, officers surveilling plaintiff’s house

spotted Larson leaving on foot and could not apprehend him. Humphreys proceeded

with the warrant to search the premises because he believed the drugs were still

inside and worried that the occupants had been warned about the impending search

and would destroy potential evidence. Humphreys Decl., ¶ 7.

When police arrived, plaintiff was in the yard working on a car. Resp. at 3,

ECF No. 34. Inside the house were five adults and a 15-year-old, who was plaintiff’s

girlfriend’s son. Officers searched the entire residence, including plaintiff’s living

area on the top floor of the house. Humphreys Decl. ¶¶ 11-13. In the basement and

common area, officers found drug use paraphernalia and usable amounts of meth and

heroin. Compl. ¶ 20. In plaintiff’s living area, Humphreys found a syringe, baggies,

a piece of foil with burnt residue on it, and a plastic container holding a white

crystalline residue. Id ¶ 9; Stabler Decl., Ex. 3. Detective Humphreys arrested

plaintiff and he was charged with four counts: Count 1: Unlawful Possession of

Heroin, ORS 475.854; Count 2: Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine, ORS

475.894; Count 3: Frequenting a Place Where Controlled Substances are Used, ORS

167.222; Count 4: Child Neglect in The First Degree, ORS 163.547. Compl. ¶ 24.

After plaintiff’s arrest, Humphreys submitted a Probable Cause Affidavit,

specifying the factual basis for the crimes plaintiff committed. Stabler Decl., Ex. 4.

On November 17, 2019, a Lincoln County Circuit Court Judge determined that

probable cause existed for plaintiff’s arrest. Id

During Plaintiff’s arraignment, the state court addressed Plaintiff’s custody

status and bail. Stabler Decl., Ex. 7, 2:17-3:17. The attorney representing plaintiff

at the arraignment moved for plaintiff’s release. Id. at 3:11-14. Lincoln County’s

pretrial release services recommended plaintiff’s release from custody. Stabler Decl.,

Ex. 8; Ex. 7, 3:4-6. The prosecution deferred to the court’s discretion and took no

position on plaintiff’s release. Stabler Decl., Ex. 7, 3:8-10. The court, on its own

motion, set plaintiff’s security at $100,000. Stabler Decl., Ex. 6; Ex. 7, 3:15-17.

Humphreys was not present at the release hearing and had no role in the court’s

decision to increase security to $100,000. Stabler Decl., Ex. 1, 143:7-11; Humphreys

Decl., ¶ 18. Plaintiff moved to suppress the search of his residence stemming from

the execution of the search warrant.

On December 23, 2019, Plaintiff fired his attorney, requesting a new one from

the court. The court allowed Plaintiff’s attorney to withdraw and could not find a

new attorney for Plaintiff for a few weeks. Stabler Decl., Ex. 1, 144:18-145:3; Ex. 13.

The court postponed the trial date because of the withdrawal to give the new attorney

a chance to get up to speed. Stabler Decl., Ex. 16. That resulted in Plaintiff’s custody

extended until February 24, 2020. On that date, the prosecution reported that they

were not prepared to proceed to trial, or on the motions to suppress that plaintiff filed.

Stabler Decl., Ex. 17. Accordingly, the court ordered Plaintiff’s release from custody.

Id. Plaintiff was in custody for 104 days and was released from jail on February 27,

2020.

On June 17, 2020, the court heard Plaintiff’s motion to suppress. Stabler Decl.,

Ex. 18. On July 23, 2020, Lincoln County Judge Thomas Branford granted Plaintiff’s

motion to suppress, ruling that the search warrant was based on probable cause but

was overbroadly executed. Stabler Decl., Ex. 19. Judge Branford noted “the search

warrant in this case does not violate the particularity requirement of Article I, section

9 [of the Oregon Constitution]. It was the execution of the search warrant that

transgressed the Article I, section 9 rights of [Plaintiff].” Id. at 23.

Judge Branford further found that “[Humphreys] had probable cause for a

search warrant to search Larson's person and backpack, but only in the basement of

the house.” Id. at 30. Judge Branford held that upon learning that Larson had left

the residence, Humphreys “should have composed an amended affidavit seeking a

new search warrant.” Id. at 31.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brought this action alleging “wrongful arrest” and “false

imprisonment” under common law. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 34. Plaintiff also brings a claim

under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for violating his rights under the Fourth Amendment to be

free from unreasonable seizure. Id. ¶ 38. In his remaining claim for relief, plaintiff

asserts that Humphreys was a final policymaker and that he is liable to plaintiff

under § 1983 based on Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658

(1978).

I. Wrongful Arrest and False Imprisonment

In his first two claims for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Humphreys (1)

wrongfully arrested and (2) falsely imprisoned him based on the search of plaintiff’s

living area, in which plaintiff claims Humphreys never found meth or heroin. Compl.

¶¶ 32, 33, 35-36.

Under Oregon law, “wrongful arrest” and “false imprisonment” are

synonymous and interchangeable titles for a single tort claim. Hiber v. Creditors

Collection Serv. of Lincoln Cnty., Inc., 154 Or App 408, 413 (1998). Courts in this

District also recognizes that “wrongful arrest and wrongful imprisonment have the

same elements under Oregon law.” See Wagoner v. City of Portland, 2017 WL

2369399, at *5 (D. Or. May 31, 2017). Thus, the Court analyzes these two claims

together.

Claims for wrongful arrest contain four elements: (1) defendant must confine

plaintiff; (2) defendant must intend the act that causes the confinement; (3) plaintiff

must be aware of the confinement; and (4) the confinement must be unlawful. Fossen

v. Clackamas County, 271 Or App 842, 847 (2015). To prevail on a claim for wrongful

arrest, “it is fundamental that the arrest must have been a false arrest, i.e., one made

without legal authority. If the arrest was lawful, then it was privileged.” Napier v.

Sheridan, 24 Or App 761, 765 (1976).

The existence of probable cause renders an arrest lawful. Miller v. Columbia

County, 282 Or. App. 348, 355 (2016). An arrest is lawful “if an officer has probable

cause to believe that a person has committed a felony or a misdemeanor.” Id. (citing

ORS 133.310(1)(b).) “Thus, by rendering an arrest lawful, the existence of probable

cause necessarily defeats a claim of false arrest.” Miller, 282 Or App at 355.

It is a court’s duty to determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest.

Id; see also Gustafson v. Payless Drug Stores, 269 Or. 354, 358 (1974) (“It is the court’s

function, not the jury’s function, to determine the issue of probable cause.”) In

addition, “if a person is arrested for two or more offenses simultaneously, probable

cause for one charge is a complete defense to an action of false arrest.” LeRoy v. Witt,

12 Or App 629, 631 (1973). Likewise, if an officer gives an invalid reason for an arrest,

but the officer has probable cause for a different, valid reason for making the arrest,

this will be a defense to false arrest. Bacon v. City of Tigard, 81 Or App 147, 150

(1986). “An officer has probable cause to make an arrest if the officer subjectively

believes that a crime has been committed and the officer’s subjective belief is

objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Miller, 282 Or. App. at 357 (citing

State v Miller, 345 Or. 176, 184 (2008)).

Here, whether Defendants’ conduct satisfies the first three elements of

wrongful arrest is not in dispute—there is no question that Plaintiff was arrested.

The only issue disputed is whether the arrest was justified as lawful.

Defendants present evidence that plaintiff was arrested for three criminal

offenses: Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine, Frequenting a Place Where

Controlled Substances are Used, and Endangering the Welfare of a Minor.

At the time of plaintiff’s arrest, Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine was

a Class A Misdemeanor or Class C Felony under ORS 475.894. This offense is a Class

A Misdemeanor if the “person knowingly or intentionally possess[es]

methamphetamine.” ORS 475.894(1)-(2). Possession under the statute becomes a

Class C Felony if “the person possesses a useable quantity of methamphetamine, and

at the time of the possession, the person has a prior felony conviction.” ORS

475.894(1)-(2)(b)(A)(i); see also ORS 161.015(9) (defining “possession”). Possession

can be actual or constructive. State v. Sherman, 270 Or App 459, 461 (2015).

Constructive possession requires proof that a suspect exercised control over, or had

the right to control, the contraband. State v. Bauer, 128 Or App 598, 601 (1994).

“Evidence that the contraband is found in quarters owned or occupied by the

defendant is sufficient to allow the inference that he controls or has the right to

control its contents, even though others may be present and may share control

jointly.” State v. Nehl, 19 Or App 590, 592 (1974).

Summarizing the above principles, to demonstrate as a matter of law that

Humphreys had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for a misdemeanor level of unlawful

possession, Defendants must show that Humphreys reasonably believed that

Plaintiff was intentionally or knowingly in possession of methamphetamine. To

arrest Plaintiff for felony possession, defendants must show that Humphreys

reasonably believed that plaintiff was in possession of a useable quantity of

methamphetamine, and, at the time, had a prior felony.

The evidence presented in the parties’ briefing, declarations, and exhibits is

that Humphreys found what he reasonably believed to be evidence of

methamphetamine and methamphetamine use paraphernalia in plaintiff’s bedroom.

See Humphreys Decl., ¶ 13; Stabler Decl., Ex. 3 (reports from the scene that, during

protective sweep, Humphreys saw used syringes; empty baggies like those used to

store drugs; a piece of foil containing a burnt substance Humphreys believed to be

heroin; and a plastic container with white crystalline substance appearing to be

methamphetamine).

Humphreys’ discovery of this evidence is more than sufficient to support an

objectively reasonable belief that plaintiff had “physical possession” or otherwise

exercised “dominion or control over” the methamphetamine located in plaintiff’s

bedroom. Bauer, 128 Or App at 601. Evidence that Humphreys found

methamphetamine in plaintiff’s bedroom supports a reasonable inference that

plaintiff was in possession of it, exercised control over it, or had the right to exercise

control over it.

Plaintiff does not dispute that those items were found in his room,1 therefore,

Defendants’ evidence shows that Humphreys had probable cause to believe Plaintiff

committed the crime of Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine at the

misdemeanor level. In addition, that Humphreys objectively believed that the

methamphetamine found constituted a usable quantity, and that Plaintiff was a

convicted felon.

Defendants have thus produced evidence that Humphreys had probable cause

to believe Plaintiff committed this crime at the felony level. The fact that the evidence

seized was later suppressed in Plaintiff’s criminal proceeding does not change this

analysis. This is because the exclusionary rule does not apply in proceedings brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lingo v. City of Salem, 832 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2016).

(See also Crockett v. City of Gresham, No. 3:18-CV-00800-HZ, 2019 WL 2011045, at

*5 (D. Or. May 3, 2019) (“There is no dispute of fact that at the time of the arrest

[defendant] had probable cause to believe that plaintiff had violated Oregon law . . .

The fact that the initial stop was unlawful does not bear on this analysis.”).

1 Plaintiff’s assertion amounts to an admission that he committed the crime of

Unlawful Possession of a Schedule III Controlled Substance on November 15, 2019,

in violation of ORS 475.752(3)(c)(d). Plaintiff admitted that the syringes located in

his living area were used to ingest (illegal anabolic) steroids and Plaintiff admitted

using this illicit substance inside his residence. Stabler Decl., Ex. 1, 90:1-9. Anabolic

steroids are classified as Schedule III controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 802(41) &

812(c). Thus, Plaintiff’s admitted possession and use of anabolic steroids is an

admission of his violation of both state and federal law. Even if Plaintiff’s admission

is construed as a disingenuous explanation for the syringes and methamphetamine

paraphernalia located in his living area, it still amounts to circumstantial evidence

of Plaintiff’s culpability and mens rea regarding the other criminal activity Detective

Humphreys believed Plaintiff was responsible for.

Defendants also submit evidence of probable cause to believe that Plaintiff

committed the crime of Endangering the Welfare of a Minor, relating to the 15-year-

old child (Caleb Sherman) living at Plaintiff’s residence. Stabler Decl., Ex. 1, 60:18-

61:5; Humphreys Decl., ¶ 11. Further, that Humphreys had probable cause to believe

that Plaintiff committed the offense of Frequenting a Place Where Controlled

Substances are Used under ORS 167.222, where he kept, maintained, or frequented

a place while knowingly permitting persons to use controlled substances in that place.

Stabler Decl., Ex. 4; Stabler Decl., Ex. 2, p. 10. Plaintiff produces no evidence to the

contrary on these claims.

On any of these theories, the record demonstrates that Defendants had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and Plaintiff has not met his burden to produce any

evidence that creates a dispute of fact. Therefore, Defendants are granted summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s first and second claim.

II. Unlawful Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment; 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In his third claim, Plaintiff alleges that the City of Newport and Detective

Humphreys were unreasonable when they seized Plaintiff “because the search

warrant that was issued for the search of the entire residence of 305 SW 9th Street in

Newport, Oregon, although [Forcier] informed [Humphreys] that he only saw

methamphetamines and heroin in the main level living area, and in the basement

living area only.” Compl. ¶ 38. Alternatively, Plaintiff alleges that “illegal contraband

was never found in Plaintiff’s individual living space.” Id.

Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim does

not allege an unlawful search. Mot at 21. Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claim

that he was unlawfully seized fails as a matter of law because Humphreys is entitled

to qualified immunity and no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because, as

explained above, Humphreys had probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest. Id.

A. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal citations omitted). “Qualified

immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but

mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (internal

citations omitted). “[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be

held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the

‘objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed considering the legal rules that

were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 639 (1987).

In the context of search warrants, “where the alleged Fourth Amendment

violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral

magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in

an objectively reasonable manner.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546

(2012) (internal citations omitted). The “shield of immunity otherwise conferred by

the warrant, will be lost, for example, where the warrant was based on an affidavit

so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence

entirely unreasonable.” Id. at 547 (internal citations omitted).

The threshold for establishing an exception to this “shield of immunity” is a

high one, because:

In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the

magistrate's probable-cause determination because it is the

magistrate's responsibility to determine whether the officer's

allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant

comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment.

It is a sound presumption that the magistrate is more qualified

than the police officer to make a probable cause determination,

and it goes without saying that where a magistrate acts

mistakenly in issuing a warrant but within the range of

professional competence of a magistrate, the officer who

requested the warrant cannot be held liable.

Id. at 547-58 (internal citations and formatting omitted).

In this case, Defendants show that Humphreys applied for and obtained a

search warrant for the entire residence at 305 SW 9th Street. Stabler Decl., Ex. 2 at

1-3. In doing so, Humphreys specified that the residence contained three living areas

and noted Plaintiff resided in the upstairs living area. Id. at 9. Humphreys’ search

warrant affidavit stated the information learned from Forcier, which corroborated

Humphreys’ information about the existence of “heavy drug activity at 305 SW 9th

Street for several months.” Id.

The record shows that the information contained in the search warrant

affidavit, combined with Humphreys’ training and experience, set forth a factual

basis sufficient to demonstrate that Detective Humphreys acted in an objectively

reasonable manner in applying for and executing the search warrant.

As noted above, the state trial court ruled that “the search warrant in this case

does not violate the particularity requirement of Article I, section 9 [of the Oregon

Constitution],” but that the execution of the search warrant “transgressed the Article

I, section 9 rights of [Plaintiff].” Stabler Decl., Ex. 19 at 23.

Plaintiff does not supply evidence to support a conclusion that Humphreys

relied on a warrant that was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render

official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547-

48. As the state trial court found, Larson’s presence in the house, combined with

Humphreys’ other knowledge, provided probable cause to search Plaintiff’s individual

area. Plaintiff presents no facts or allegations showing that Judge Bachart’s issuance

of the search warrant exceeded her professional competence. As a result, Humphreys,

as “the officer who requested the warrant cannot be held liable.” Id., at 547-48.

Defendants supply evidence of a search warrant affidavit notating that

Humphreys had probable cause not limited solely to Larson. The search warrant

authorized the search of Plaintiff’s entire residence. Stabler Decl., Ex. 2, at 1-3. This

was because Humphreys had long suspected Plaintiff’s residence was the source of

heavy drug trafficking activity. Stabler Decl., Ex. 2 at 9. Thus, even though

Humphreys knew Larson departed from Plaintiff’s residence, Humphreys still had

probable cause to believe Plaintiff’s residence contained evidence of criminal activity

and Humphreys still had a valid search warrant authorizing the search of Plaintiff’s

residence. Humphreys Decl., ¶ 7; Stabler Decl., ¶ 2. Accordingly, Defendants have

met their burden to show that Humphreys reasonably relied on the warrant, issued

by a neutral magistrate, when searching and seizing persons or property under the

warrant and is entitled to qualified immunity.

B. Probable Cause

In addition, as discussed above, Defendants provide ample evidence of probable

cause to arrest Plaintiff. “Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless arrest

requires probable cause.” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007).

Probable cause to arrest exists “when officers have knowledge or reasonably

trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe

that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.” Id.

(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).

“Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be

drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.”

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (citations omitted). The officer's

“subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which

the known facts provide probable cause.” Id. at 153; see also United States v. Buckner,

179 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Probable cause exists when, under the totality of

the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have

concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had committed a

crime.”) Generally, probable cause for an arrest “may be satisfied by an indictment

returned by a grand jury.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (citing Gerstein

v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 (1975).)

Claims for false arrest focus on the validity of the arrest, not on the validity of

each individual charge. See Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990)

(noting that, because the defendant officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff

for one charge, the arrest was not unconstitutional even if the officer lacked probable

cause for another charge). The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a

claim for wrongful arrest. See Hutchinson v. Grant, 796 F.2d 288, 290 (9th Cir. 1986)

(“a police officer has immunity if he arrests with probable cause”); Cabrera v.

Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1988) (“To prevail on his section 1983

claim for false arrest ... [the plaintiff] would have to demonstrate that there was no

probable cause to arrest him.”).

The analysis discussing probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest is discussed above.

“[T]the analysis of probable cause under Oregon law is the same as the analysis under

federal law.” Daley v. McKoy, No. 3:17-CV-00718-BR, 2018 WL 2470984, at *6 (D.

Or. May 31, 2018), aff'd, 773 F. App'x 387 (9th Cir. 2019). Under the federal standard,

Plaintiff’s claim for an unreasonable seizure resulting from an unlawful arrest is

defeated by the existence of probable cause for a single criminal offense. For the same

reasons as discussed under Plaintiff’s state law theory of liability, Defendants have

submitted evidence of probable cause which Plaintiff has not controverted.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is granted on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim.

III. Post-Arrest Detention

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable for false arrest

for his post-arrest detention at the Lincoln County Jail, Defendants point out Plaintiff

has not alleged that Humphreys, or the City, had any involvement in Plaintiff’s post-

arrest or arraignment detention. The record shows that Plaintiff’s post-arraignment

detention resulted from a series of decisions or rulings from the Lincoln County

Circuit Court, or from Plaintiff’s own actions of firing his lawyer and waiting the

prescribed time for a new appointment. Plaintiff presents no evidence that any law

was violated by his detention in the Lincoln County Jail.

IV. Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff claims the City of Newport is liable to Plaintiff under a theory of

respondeat superior. Compl. ¶ 28. Defendants assert that this claim fails as a matter

of law because Plaintiff does not allege any state-law claims implicating the City

under any theory of liability from his allegations against Humphreys. Mot. at 28.

Under Oregon law, the City is statutorily liable for the torts of its employees

or agents. ORS 30.265(1) & (2). Plaintiff does not allege any independent theory of

liability against the City. Therefore, the allegations against Humphreys are

Plaintiff’s only nexus of liability against the City. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s

state-law claims against Humphreys fail as a matter of law for several reasons. As a

result, Plaintiff’s state-law claims against the City fail for the same reasons. To the

extent Plaintiff asserts the City is liable under a respondeat superior theory for

Plaintiff’s federal law claim (aside from his Monell claim), the liability of a local

governing body, like the City, only arises when action under an official policy or

custom caused a constitutional tort, not on the basis of respondeat superior. Monell

v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Gillette v. Delmore, 979

F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff asserts a respondeat superior

claim against the City of Newport under federal law, this claim fails as a matter of

law.

V. Monell Claim; 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff alleges that Humphreys acted as a “lead detective” and thus a “final

policymaker” when he “made the ultimate decision to search” Plaintiff’s living space.

Compl. ¶¶ 39, 40. Defendants assert that this claim fails because no evidence

supports such a theory for liability. Mot. at 29.

“[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 cannot be founded on a theory of respondeat

superior.” Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003). Congress intended

to hold municipalities liable only when action under official municipal policy of some

nature caused a constitutional tort. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. A local government may

be responsible for a single decision by government policymakers under limited

circumstances.

When a decision to adopt a particular course of action is properly made by that

government's authorized decisionmakers, it represents an act of official government

“policy” as that term is commonly understood. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 481 (1986). Not every decision by a government official automatically

subjects the government to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Government liability

attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish

government policy related to the action ordered. Id. The fact that a particular official,

even a policymaking official, has discretion in the exercise of their functions does not,

without more, give rise to government liability based on an exercise of that discretion.

The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy

respecting such activity before the government entity can be held liable. See, id. at

482-83.

Plaintiff has not established liability under this theory. He has not shown that

Humphreys had “final policymaking authority” such that the challenged action itself

(Plaintiff’s arrest) “constituted an act of official government policy.” Trevino v. Gates,

99 F.3d 911, 920 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has not shown that Humphreys is a

government policy making official or that Humphreys has the responsibility for

establishing final government policy for the City. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s theory of

liability is untenable under the law and Defendants are granted summary judgment

on this claim.

CONCLUSION

Defendants have established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

ECF No. 26, is GRANTED as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. This case is dismissed

without prejudice. Judgment of dismissal shall be entered accordingly.

It is so ORDERED and DATED this 26th day of April 2024

_/_s_/_A_n_n_ _A_i_k_e_n__________

ANN AIKEN

United States District Judge