Darmody v. Clatsop County

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

DANNETTE MARIE DARMODY, Case No. 3:21-cv-01261-IM

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF

THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM SHAWN OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING

DARMODY, IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

Plaintiff, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

CLATSOP COUNTY, an Oregon county;

THOMAS J. BERGIN, an individual;

MATTHEW D. PHILLIPS, an individual;

TESSY D. WORKMAN, an individual;

THOMAS J. TEAGUE, an individual;

JOSEPH M. CLEARY, an individual;

KYLE K. BUSH, an individual; ALYCIA A.

PITTS, an individual; DAVID C.

HILLARD, an individual; AARON W.

PARKS, an individual; TRACY J.

MAURER, LPN, an individual; THOMAS

S. DUNCAN, M.D., an

individual,

Defendants.

Aaron R. Tillmann, Tillmann Law, LLC, 101 SW Main Street, Suite 1905, Portland, OR 97204.

Attorney for Plaintiff.

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Kenneth S. Montoya, Montoya Law LLC, 350 Mission Street SE, Suite 202, Salem, OR 97302.

Attorney for Defendants.

IMMERGUT, District Judge.

Before this Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“MPSJ”), ECF

68. This case involves the medical treatment Plaintiff William Shawn Darmody received at

Clatsop County Jail after being injured during transport.1 Plaintiff brings claims of state-law

negligence against Clatsop County and eleven individual Defendants,2 as well as claims under

the Eighth Amendment against Defendant Tracy J. Maurer, a nurse at Clatsop County Jail, and

Defendant Aaron W. Parks, a sergeant at Clatsop County Jail.3 First Amended Complaint, ECF

57 ¶¶ 57–114. For purposes of this Motion, Defendants Parks and Maurer seek summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against them.

As explained below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Defendant Parks is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against

him because there are no genuine disputes of fact regarding whether Defendant Parks acted with

conscious disregard to an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. The undisputed facts

establish that Defendant Parks was not subjectively aware of the excessive risk Plaintiff faced.

1 Mr. Darmody has since passed away, and Dannette Marie Darmody represents his estate

in this action. For ease of understanding, this Opinion refers to Mr. Darmody as “Plaintiff.”

2 The parties agree that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to the state-law

negligence claim against all Defendants. Defendants do not seek summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s negligence claim, see MPSJ, ECF 68 at 2, and this Court does not consider that claim

in this Opinion and Order.

3 According to Defendants’ instant Motion, Plaintiff “agree[d] to dismiss Claims 1, 2, 3,

6, and 7” from the First Amended Complaint, which alleged Eighth Amendment violations

against Defendants Workman, Cleary, Bush, Duncan, Bergin and Clatsop County. See MPSJ,

ECF 68 at 2. Given the parties’ agreement, those claims are DISMISSED.

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Alternatively, Defendant Parks is entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable official in

his position would not have been on notice that his conduct violated a clearly established right.

Defendant Parks is also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim

against him because there are no genuine issues of fact regarding Defendant Parks’s personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. And as with the Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendant Parks as an individual, Defendant Parks is entitled to qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim.

On the other hand, Defendants’ Motion is denied as to Defendant Maurer. Considering

the undisputed facts, and resolving disputes of fact in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could

conclude that Defendant Maurer acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff and the

serious medical risk he faced. Further, any reasonable official in Defendant Maurer’s position

would have been on notice that her alleged conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights;

Defendant Maurer is not entitled to qualified immunity.

BACKGROUND

On August 29, 2019, Plaintiff was taken into custody at the Marion County Transport

Hub by Defendant Tessy D. Workman of the Clatsop County Sheriff’s Office. Joint Statement of

Agreed Upon and Undisputed Facts (“Undisputed Facts”), ECF 66 at 18 ¶ P2. Defendant

Workman transported Plaintiff and one other inmate from the Marion County Transport Hub to

the Clatsop County Jail. Id.; see also Pick Up Video, ECF 72-1 at 00:28–01:50; Unloading

Transport Video, ECF 72-2 at 01:06–02:13. During the transport, Defendant Workman suddenly

applied the brakes in order to avoid a collision with another vehicle. Undisputed Facts, ECF 66 at

18 ¶ P8. This action caused Plaintiff, who was lying down on one of the benches in the back of

the transport vehicle, to fall off the bench and onto the floor. Id. Plaintiff reported to Deputy

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Workman that he had injured his neck and knees as a result of the fall and was unable to turn

around to speak to her. Id. at 18 ¶¶ P9, P12.

Upon arrival at the Clatsop County Jail, Plaintiff required assistance exiting the transport

vehicle and moving into the booking area. See Unloading Transport Video, ECF 72-2 at 01:11–

02:35; see also Undisputed Facts, ECF 66 at 19 ¶ P34. As Defendant Workman’s body camera

footage shows, Plaintiff was yelling out in pain and unable to stand up or walk without

assistance. See Unloading Transport Video, ECF 72-2 at 01:11–02:35. Once inside the booking

area, jail staff provided Plaintiff with a wheelchair and a walker for mobility assistance.

Undisputed Facts, ECF 66 at 19 ¶ P35.

Defendant Workman reported the transport incident and Plaintiff’s injury to Defendant

Parks, who was the on-duty jail sergeant. Id. at 18 ¶ P15. Defendant Parks did not speak to

anyone other than Defendant Workman about Plaintiff, and Defendant Parks did not himself

observe Plaintiff’s condition. Id. at 20 ¶¶ P49–53; see also id. at 21 ¶ D11.

Defendant Workman also reported the transport incident and Plaintiff’s injury to

Defendant Maurer. Id. at 18 ¶ P17. Upon being informed of the transport incident and Plaintiff’s

injury, Defendant Maurer told Defendant Workman that she would speak with the jail’s medical

director, Defendant Thomas Duncan, M.D., to determine how to proceed. Id. at 18 ¶ P19. During

Plaintiff’s booking process, Defendant Maurer spoke with Plaintiff and conducted a physical

assessment. Id. at 19 ¶¶ P31–34. Defendant Maurer knew that Plaintiff had been provided with a

wheelchair and a walker for mobility assistance. Id. at 19 ¶¶ P35–36. Plaintiff told Defendant

Maurer that his back was “totally out,” that he “needed a lot of help” getting into the booking

area, and that he “could not stand up on [his] own right now,” to which Defendant Maurer asked,

“Because of the roll off the bench?” Id. at 19 ¶ P34. Plaintiff replied, “Yes ma’am.” Id.

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Defendant Maurer testified that she spoke with Defendant Duncan regarding Plaintiff, but

she does not recall what was said during that conversation. Tracy Maurer Deposition (“Maurer

Dep.”), ECF 69-1 at 23:25–26:25. Defendant Duncan does not recall speaking to Defendant

Maurer regarding Plaintiff. Thomas Duncan Deposition (“Duncan Dep.”), ECF 69-3 at 33:21–

34:19. Defendant Duncan has no notes or other documentation memorializing any conversation

with Defendant Maurer regarding Plaintiff. Undisputed Facts, ECF 66 at 19 ¶ P24. Defendant

Duncan never spoke to nor had any contact with Plaintiff. Id. at 19 ¶ P25. The parties dispute

whether Defendant Maurer called Defendant Duncan, id. at 21 ¶ 1, and Plaintiff maintains that

there is no evidence in the relevant phone records that a call was made to Defendant Duncan

after Plaintiff’s arrival on August 29, id. at 19 ¶¶ P26–30.

Defendants cannot identify the individual who made the decision to medically clear

Plaintiff for admission to the Clatsop County Jail. Id. at 20 ¶ P41. Defendant Maurer was

charged with the responsibility for medically clearing Plaintiff, but she did not do so. Id. at 20

¶ P42. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff was “examined by a qualified medical professional

prior to his being lodged” at the jail on August 29, id. at 22 ¶ 3, and whether he was ever

“medically cleared for admission” to the jail on August 29, id. at 22 ¶ 2. Plaintiff was housed in

Cell 52, id. at 20 ¶ P43, which is a single administrative segregation cell equipped and used for

medical observation, see id. at 20 ¶ P44; see also Aaron Parks Deposition (“Parks Dep.”), ECF

69-5 at 16:15–17:8; Maurer Dep., ECF 69-1 at 56:3–18. Defendants cannot identify the

individual who made the decision to house Plaintiff in Cell 52. Undisputed Facts, ECF 66 at 20

¶ P45. Although it is typically the jail shift supervisor, in conjunction with on-duty staff, who

makes the decision to house an individual in Cell 52, Defendant Parks does not know why

Plaintiff was housed there. Id. at 20 ¶¶ P47–48

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Five days after he arrived, Plaintiff was released from Clatsop County Jail. Id. at 20

¶ P54. The day after being released, Plaintiff went to the Emergency Department at Oregon

Health Science University in Portland, complaining of low back pain, numbness, and urinary

incontinence. Id. at 20 ¶¶ P55–56. He was diagnosed with lumbar stenosis and Cauda Equina

Syndrome. Id. at 20 ¶ P57. The next day, on September 5, 2019, Plaintiff underwent inferior L3,

complete L4, and superior L5 laminectomy and L3-4 and L4-5 medial facetectomies. Id. at 20

¶ P58. After eight days in the hospital, Plaintiff was discharged. Id. at 20 ¶ P59.

Over the following three-and-a-half years, until his death in March 2023 from a condition

unrelated to this incident, Plaintiff suffered from saddle anesthesia, urinary incontinence, and

sexual dysfunction. Id. at 21 ¶¶ P60–65. The parties dispute whether prompt medical

intervention would have altered Plaintiff’s prognosis for recovery of his neurological functions.

Id. at 22 ¶¶ 4–6.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

A party is entitled to summary judgment if the “movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the

non-movant’s favor. Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir.

2001).

Although “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of

legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a

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motion for summary judgment,” the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

[non-movant’s] position [is] insufficient.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252

(1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Qualified Immunity

In evaluating whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, a court considers

whether (1) the state actor’s conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01

(2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). “While the constitutional

violation prong concerns the reasonableness of the officer’s mistake of fact, the clearly

established prong concerns the reasonableness of the officer’s mistake of law.” Torres v. City of

Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2011). Either question may be addressed first, and if the

answer to either is “no,” then the state actor cannot be held liable for damages. See Pearson, 555

U.S. at 236. The “qualified immunity analysis remains objective even when the constitutional

claim at issue involves subjective elements.” See Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d

657, 674 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not

to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” City and County of San Francisco

v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 613 (2015) (citations omitted). “The dispositive question is whether

the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12

(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742

(2011)). As the “Court explained decades ago, the clearly established law must be

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‘particularized’ to the facts of the case. Otherwise, ‘[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule

of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation

of extremely abstract rights.’” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (alteration in original)

(citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987)). The Court

does “not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory

or constitutional question beyond debate.” al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claims. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.

Const. amend. VIII. A prison official’s “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment because it constitutes “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). “This is true

whether the indifference is manifested by prison [healthcare providers] in their response to the

prisoner’s needs or by prison [officials] in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical

care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104–05 (footnotes

omitted).

For inadequate medical care to violate the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must prove

two elements: (1) “the existence of a serious medical need,” that is, a condition that left untreated

“could result in further significant injury or cause the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”;

and (2) the prison official’s “deliberate indifference” to that need. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d

1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The first element is

objective, and generally is satisfied by a showing that the plaintiff’s medical need is sufficiently

“serious” such that the “failure to treat [the] condition could result in further significant injury or

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the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.

2014) (en banc) (citation omitted).

The second element is subjective, and it is “satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or

failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the

indifference.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). This is a

formidable standard, akin to criminal recklessness: the official must “know[] of and disregard[]

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 839–40

(1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (explaining that, because “only the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment,” the evidence must

show the defendant acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” (internal quotation marks,

emphasis, and citations omitted)). Thus, “mere malpractice, or even gross negligence,” may be

inexcusable, but they do not amount to deliberate indifference. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“Medical malpractice does not

become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”); Wilhelm v. Rotman,

680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062,

1081 (9th Cir. 2013).

Whether a defendant charged with violating rights protected by the Eighth Amendment

has the requisite knowledge is “a question of fact.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Intentional

ignorance of an obvious risk is not a defense to deliberate indifference. Id. When the risk is not

obvious, the requisite knowledge may be inferred from evidence showing that the defendant

refused to verify underlying facts or declined to confirm inferences that he strongly suspected to

be true. Id. at 842 & n.8. Prison officials will not be liable if they demonstrate “that they did not

know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were

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therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit

unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Id. at 844;

see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1078 (requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate

“that the risk was obvious or provide other circumstantial or direct evidence that the prison

officials were aware of the substantial risk” to defeat summary judgment); Thomas v. Ponder,

611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that subjective awareness “may be satisfied if the

inmate shows that the risk posed by the deprivation is obvious” (citation omitted)).

A. Defendant Parks

Defendant Parks is entitled to summary judgment, both as an individual and as a

supervisor, on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against him. Defendant Parks has

demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to his subjective awareness of a

substantial risk to Plaintiff. Further, there is an absence of disputed facts as to the personal

involvement of Defendant Parks as a supervisor in any constitutional violations suffered by

Plaintiff. Alternatively, Defendant Parks is entitled to qualified immunity on the individual and

supervisory liability claims. Given the existing case law, a reasonable officer in Defendant

Parks’s place would not have been on notice that his conduct violated clearly established law.

1. Individual Liability

a. Constitutional Violation

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish Defendant Parks’s subjective awareness

of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety.4 MPSJ, ECF 68 at 6. “At most, Plaintiff can

4 Defendants frame this argument as addressing Plaintiff’s ability “to establish even the

objective component of the Eighth Amendment standard that [Defendant] Parks had the requisite

knowledge of an ‘excessive risk’ to [Plaintiff’s] health and safety,” MPSJ, ECF 68 at 6, but this

misunderstands the test for deliberate indifference. The objective component requires “[t]he

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

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demonstrate [Defendant] Parks knew [Plaintiff] was injured during transport. But Plaintiff lacks

any evidence that [Defendant] Parks knew the nature or extent of [Plaintiff’s] injury . . . .” Id.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant Parks “act[ed] with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind,” and instead that that Plaintiff showed nothing more than an

“inadvertent failure” on the part of Defendant Parks. Id. Defendants argue that this is not enough

to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Id.

The undisputed evidence shows only that Defendant Parks knew that Plaintiff had been

injured during transport. Undisputed Facts, ECF 66 at 18 ¶¶ P15–16. Plaintiff offers no evidence

that Defendant Parks was informed about the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries. Defendant

Parks did not observe Plaintiff, nor speak with anyone other than Defendant Workman about the

transport incident. Id. at 19 ¶ P37, 20 ¶¶ P49–53. During his deposition, Defendant Parks

testified that Defendant Workman told him that “she had a report to write” because “there was a

situation with the vehicle and an individual, an inmate, got hurt.” Parks Dep., ECF 69-5 at 14:4–

6.

Alongside Defendant Parks’s specific knowledge relating to Plaintiff, Plaintiff also points

to Defendant Parks’s general knowledge of the jail’s policy that inmates who are involved in

motor vehicle accidents prior to arriving at the jail are sent to the hospital before being booked.

See Resp., ECF 69 at 21–22. But awareness of that policy does not impute to Defendant Parks

the necessary knowledge of this accident, this injury, and this individual. Defendant Parks’s

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller,

104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). Defendants do not appear to contest that Plaintiff presented

a serious medical need, and so this Court considers the objective component established.

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familiarity with this policy does not provide sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that he

appreciated the serious medical risk Plaintiff faced.

Plaintiff identifies one dispute of fact that he argues would establish Defendant Parks’s

subjective awareness of the risk to Plaintiff’s health if the jury resolved the dispute in Plaintiff’s

favor. Plaintiff contends that because Cell 52 is sometimes used as a medical observation cell,

and because the shift supervisor generally places inmates in Cell 52, and because Defendant

Parks was the shift supervisor when Plaintiff was placed in Cell 52, then a jury could infer that

Defendant Parks placed Plaintiff in Cell 52 and therefore was aware of Plaintiff’s condition. To

defeat summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must introduce some significant probative

evidence tending to support the complaint. Summary judgment may be granted if the evidence is

merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative.” Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127

F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Given the

undisputed evidence in the record, this possible inference is not enough to raise a genuine issue

of fact and defeat summary judgment.

Plaintiff has not shown a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant Parks

knew of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Without establishing this

subjective knowledge, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Parks cannot

survive summary judgment.

b. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that Defendant Parks is entitled to qualified immunity because “no

similar case law exists that would place [Defendant] Parks on notice that he would violate

[Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights based on the facts and circumstances known to him at the time.”

MPSJ, ECF 68 at 8. Plaintiff responds that Defendant Parks is not entitled to qualified immunity

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“because [Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 1995)] states that the Eighth Amendment rights

in the prison medical context are clearly established.” Resp., ECF 69 at 30.

Kelley does not place the constitutionality of Defendant Parks’s conduct beyond debate.

In Kelley, contractors were working on a prison’s air supply ducts. 60 F.3d at 665. The plaintiff

informed prison officials that fumes were entering his cell and asked to be let out. Id. The

officials did not let him out, even after he stated that the fumes were killing him. Id. at 665–66.

The plaintiff eventually lost consciousness. Id. at 666. The facts here are distinguishable. Even

viewing the record in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant Parks did not encounter the direct, emergent

medical situation faced by the officials in Kelley. Nor has this Court located binding precedent

that would place the constitutionality of Defendant Parks’s conduct beyond debate.

Defendant Parks is entitled to qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to

a reasonable correctional officer knowing what he knew, even viewed in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and Defendant Parks’s conduct

in response to that risk was deliberately indifferent.

2. Supervisory Liability

In addition to the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Parks as an individual,

Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Parks as a supervisor. To

establish liability against a supervisor, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating (1) the

supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Hansen

v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.

2011) (“[W]hen a supervisor is found liable based on deliberate indifference, the supervisor is

being held liable for his or her own culpable action or inaction, not held vicariously liable for the

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culpable action or inaction of his or her subordinates.”). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Parks personally participated in the constitutional violation. See Resp., ECF 69 at 27.

Defendants argue that “[t]here is nothing in the record to demonstrate that [Defendant]

Parks knew anything of the nature and extent of [Plaintiff’s] injuries such that he even knew

[Plaintiff] needed medical care.” MPSJ, ECF 68 at 11. Without such knowledge, Defendants

contend, Defendant Parks could not have acted with the intent to wantonly inflict pain on

Plaintiff. Id. Additionally, Defendants argue that Defendant Parks is entitled to summary

judgment on this claim because “Plaintiff is incapable of demonstrating that [Defendant] Parks

had any knowledge of deficient actions on the part of others,” and without this knowledge

Plaintiff cannot show that “[Defendant] Parks knowingly refused to stop actions by others which

he knew, or should have known, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. Plaintiff responds

that Defendant Parks is liable “in his supervisory capacity for the same reasons that he is liable in

his individual capacity as articulated above because the facts demonstrate that he ‘participated

in’ the violation of [Plaintiff’s] rights.” Resp., ECF 69 at 27.

As articulated above, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has not identified disputes of fact

that, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to relief against Defendant Parks in his individual

capacity for the Eighth Amendment claim. The same reasoning applies to Plaintiff’s supervisory

liability claim against Defendant Parks—even viewing the record in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff

has not identified evidence or inferences from which a reasonable jury could conclude that

Defendant Parks personally participated in his capacity as a supervisor in the deprivation of

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.

Further, Defendant Parks is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s supervisory

liability claim. See Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that a

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defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on a supervisor liability claim). Plaintiff has not

identified, nor has this Court located, case law that places the constitutionality of Defendant

Parks’s conduct as a supervisor beyond debate.

B. Defendant Maurer

1. Eighth Amendment Violation

According to Defendant Maurer “Plaintiff’s claims against [her] . . . amount to nothing

more than an assertion that she provided deficient care to [Plaintiff],” which does not establish

the culpable mental state necessary for a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment. MPSJ, ECF 68 at 9. At most, Defendants contend, Defendant Maurer’s conduct

was “medical malpractice.” Id.; see also id. (“Plaintiff has not alleged that Nurse Maurer failed

to provide him with any medical care, but that she failed to provide him with ‘adequate medical

care.’”).

In response, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Maurer was subjectively aware of the

medical risk he faced, and that she failed to provide Plaintiff with sufficient medical care. To

establish Defendant Maurer’s subjective awareness, Plaintiff points to the recording of him

descending from the transportation vehicle, which depicts him doubled over, exclaiming in pain,

and apologizing for his inability to move unassisted. Defendant Maurer examined Plaintiff

shortly after the events in that video. Plaintiff points to the Inmate Medical Screening form for

Plaintiff which was marked “other serious pain, back pain.” Plaintiff points to Defendant

Maurer’s awareness that Plaintiff was provided with a wheelchair and walker to assist with his

mobility. Plaintiff points to Defendant Maurer’s direct interactions with Plaintiff, during which

he informed her that his back was out and he was unable to stand up without help. Given these

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facts, and resolving all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could conclude that

Defendant Maurer was subjectively aware of the serious medical risk Plaintiff faced.

A jury could also conclude that, faced with this risk, Defendant Maurer effectively denied

or delayed Plaintiff medical care for his back injury through her acts and omissions. Resolving

disputes of fact in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant Maurer did not contact the jail’s medical director,

Defendant Duncan, to alert him about Plaintiff’s condition and seek his guidance. Rather, it

appears that Defendant Maurer continued providing Plaintiff with medications that had been

provided by a previous facility—blood pressure medication and acetaminophen. It does not

appear that Defendant Maurer provided Defendant anything additional for his pain, nor that she

referred Plaintiff to someone competent to diagnose and treat his injury. It is undisputed that

Defendant Maurer was the individual responsible for medically clearing Plaintiff when he

arrived at the jail, and it is also undisputed that Defendants “cannot identify the individual who

made the decision to medically clear” Plaintiff for admission to the jail. Undisputed Facts, ECF

66 at 20 ¶¶ P41–42. Drawing reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could

conclude that Defendant Maurer did nothing to address Plaintiff’s acute injury resulting from the

transport incident, and that this inaction amounted to a denial or delay of medical care in the face

of a serious risk to Plaintiff’s health.

A reasonable jury could also find that this constitutional deprivation harmed Plaintiff—

had he been diagnosed and received medical intervention sooner, he may have recovered

neurological function. See Undisputed Facts, ECF 66 at 22 ¶¶ 5–6. Courts within the Ninth

Circuit have held that similar delays of medical care can create a triable issue of fact, especially

when the delay caused lasting damage. See, e.g., Jett, 439 F.3d at 1094–95, 1097 (concluding

that a nearly two-month wait for a doctor and nineteen-month delay before seeing a hand

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specialist, as well as the complete failure to set and cast the inmate’s badly fractured thumb,

during which it “healed improperly,” created a triable issue on deliberate indifference); Hunt v.

Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200–01 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that a “delay of more than three

months” before offering dental care to repair plaintiff’s “bleeding gums, breaking teeth and . . .

inability to eat properly,” resulting in “severe pain and . . . permanent damage to his teeth,”

created a triable issue on deliberate indifference); Schafer v. Curry, No. 08–1881 RMW, 2009

WL 1562957, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (seven-day delay in treating broken foot).

Defendant Maurer is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim against her. At the very least, there are issues of fact a jury must resolve regarding whether

Defendant Maurer acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s serious medical need and,

if so, whether that constitutional violation resulted in harm to Plaintiff.

2. Qualified Immunity

For Defendant Maurer, Defendants “incorporate their arguments for qualified immunity

as set forth” for Defendants Parks.” MPSJ, ECF 68 at 10. Defendants assert that “no similar case

law . . . exists that would place [Defendant] Maurer on notice that she would violate [Plaintiff’s]

rights based on the facts and circumstances known to her at the time.” Id. In response, Plaintiff

points this Court to Ninth Circuit case law establishing that “prison officials are deliberately

indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when they ‘deny, delay, or intentionally

interfere with medical treatment.’” Resp., ECF 69 at 6 (quoting Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131); id. at

29 (citing Kelley, 60 F.3d 664).

In addressing qualified immunity, a court should “use its ‘full knowledge of its own [and

other relevant] precedents.’” Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (alteration in original)

(quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 n.9 (1984)); see also Gordon v. County of Orange,

PAGE 17 – OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

6 F.4th 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2021). Along with the cases cited by Plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit’s

precedents have held that with respect to prisoner medical claims, the right at issue should be

defined as a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to officials who are not deliberately indifferent

to serious medical needs. See Stewart v. Aranas, 32 F.4th 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[I]t has

been established that ‘deny[ing], delay[ing], or intentionally interfer[ing] with medical treatment’

can violate the constitution.” (quoting Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066)). And relevant for the facts of

this case, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “at a minimum, medical personnel at jail facilities

are required to screen pretrial detainees for critical medical needs. Thus, at the time of the

incident, [the plaintiff] had a clearly established constitutional right to have a proper medical

screen conducted to ensure the medically appropriate protocol was initiated.” Gordon, 6 F.4th at

971 (footnote omitted) (discussing cases published in 1990, 2002, and 2012).

Here, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and resolving disputes in

his favor, Plaintiff presented at the jail with a critical medical need. As corroborated by

Defendant Workman, the transport vehicle had been involved in a traffic incident. As the video

shows, Plaintiff’s knees were bloodied by his fall, he was unable to stand upright, and he

required the assistance of two correctional officers and eventually a wheelchair and walker to

move around the jail. Plaintiff had the right to be properly screened, but instead, again resolving

disputes in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant Maurer claimed to contact the medical director but did

not, nor did she provide any medical care to Plaintiff for this acute injury.

Resolving all inferences and disputes in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant Maurer violated

Plaintiff’s clearly established right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. A reasonable

official knowing what Defendant Maurer knew—that Plaintiff had been injured during transport,

that he could not stand up without assistance, that he was provided with a wheelchair and a

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walker for mobility assistance, and that he reported experiencing intense pain—would likewise

know that Defendant Maurer’s actions and inactions were constitutionally deficient. Defendant

Maurer is not entitled to qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF 68, is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. Defendant Parks is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim against him because there are no genuine disputes of fact regarding whether

Defendant Parks acted with conscious disregard to an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or

safety. Alternatively, Defendant Parks is entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable

official in his position would not have been on notice that his conduct violated a clearly

established right. Defendant Parks is also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

supervisory liability claim against him because there are no genuine issues of fact regarding

Defendant Parks’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. And as with the

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Parks as an individual, Defendant Parks is entitled

to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim.

On the other hand, Defendants’ Motion is denied as to Defendant Maurer. Considering

the undisputed facts, and resolving disputes of fact in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could

conclude that Defendant Maurer acted with deliberate indifference toward the serious medical

risk Plaintiff faced. Further, any reasonable official in Defendant Maurer’s position would have

been on notice that her alleged conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; Defendant

Maurer is not entitled to qualified immunity.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 1st day of March, 2024.

/s/ Karin J. Immergut

Karin J. Immergut

United States District Judge

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