Garza v. City of Salem

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

CHRISTOPHER GARZA, No. 3:22-cv-00721-HZ

an individual,

OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SALEM, an Oregon municipal

corporation; and OFFICER DAVID

BAKER, an individual,

Defendants.

Gregory Kafoury

Jason Kafoury

Mark Gillis McDougal

Adam Kiel

Kafoury & McDougal

411 SW 2nd Ave Ste 200

Portland, OR 97204

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Sebastian Tapia

City of Salem Legal Department

555 Liberty St SE Ste 225

Salem, OR 97301

Attorney for Defendants

HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge:

Defendants the City of Salem and Officer David Baker move for a new trial or, in the

alternative, to reduce the award of punitive damages against Defendant Baker on Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim and the award of compensatory damages against the City of Salem on

Plaintiff’s state-law false arrest claim. Def. Mot., ECF 123. For the following reasons, the Court

grants the motion in part and denies it in part.

BACKGROUND

The parties are familiar with the facts, and the Court will only address them briefly here.

On May 17, 2022, Plaintiff Christopher Garza sued Defendants, bringing claims for excessive

force and false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Baker, and state-law claims for

false arrest and battery against the City of Salem. Compl., ECF 1. The claims arose out of

Defendant Baker’s detention of Plaintiff at the tire shop where Plaintiff parked his trailer. The

Court granted summary judgment to Defendant Baker on the federal false arrest claim based on

qualified immunity, and the other three claims proceeded to trial. Trial was held from November

7-9, 2023. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on all three claims. ECF 97. It awarded

Plaintiff $150,000 in economic damages and $500,000 in noneconomic damages on his

excessive force and battery claims. Id. It awarded $2,000,000 in punitive damages against

Defendant Baker on the excessive force claim. Id. And it awarded $500,000 in noneconomic

damages on the state-law false arrest claim. Id. On December 14, 2023, the Court entered

judgment, allocating the compensatory damages jointly awarded on the excessive force and

battery claims to the excessive force claim as Plaintiff desired. ECF 105. See also ECF 104.

Defendants now timely move for a new trial, or in the alternative to reduce the award of punitive

damages and the award of damages on the false arrest claim.

STANDARDS

Under Rule 59, a district court has the discretion to grant a new trial “for any reason for

which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(a)(1)(A). Because “Rule 59 does not specify the grounds on which a motion for a new trial

may be granted,” courts are “bound by those grounds that have been historically recognized.”

Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has

previously held that “[t]he trial court may grant a new trial only if the verdict is contrary to the

clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a

miscarriage of justice.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted). A new trial may also be granted if “the damages are excessive.” Id.

Upon the Rule 59 motion of the party against whom a verdict has been returned,

the district court has the duty ... to weigh the evidence as [the court] saw it, and to

set aside the verdict of the jury, even though supported by substantial evidence,

where, in [the court’s] conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear

weight of the evidence.

Id. (internal quotations omitted). The authority to grant a new trial is “confided almost entirely to

the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court.” Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449

U.S. 33, 36 (1980).

DISCUSSION

I. New Trial

Defendants argue that a new trial should be granted based on arguments Plaintiff’s

counsel made during closing argument. Def. Mot. 6. During closing, counsel for Plaintiff stated:

Punitive damages is a different type of damage, and this is what you, as the

community, get to decide if you find excessive force. You get to say we can send a

message to the City of Salem, Officer Baker: We, as a community, aren’t okay with

this, we’re not okay that nobody investigated this.

Tapia Decl. Ex. 2 at 3 (Pl. Closing Arg. Tr.) 33:11-15, ECF 124. Defendants objected to the

argument, and the Court sustained the objection. Id. at 33:17-19.

In rebuttal closing, counsel for Plaintiff described the manner in which force was used

against Plaintiff and then stated:

That’s what Officer Baker did. He didn’t know he was being videotaped.

And now, you, the community, get an opportunity to let the community decide if

that’s what we’re going to allow our officers in our state to do.

You have a lot of power in your hands, community. I’m going to – we’ll see

what you guys decide.

Tapia Decl. Ex. 2 at 4 (Pl. Rebuttal Closing Arg. Tr.) 41:16-21.

“Generally, misconduct by trial counsel results in a new trial if the ‘flavor of misconduct

sufficiently permeate[s] an entire proceeding to provide conviction that the jury was influenced

by passion and prejudice in reaching its verdict.’” Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174,

1192 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kehr v. Smith Barney, 736 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1994)).

In evaluating the likelihood of prejudice from the comments, we should consider

the totality of circumstances, including the nature of the comments, their frequency,

their possible relevancy to the real issues before the jury, the manner in which the

parties and the court treated the comments, the strength of the case, and the verdict

itself.

Id. at 1193 (internal quotations omitted).

Defendants point out that Plaintiff only ever sought punitive damages against Defendant

Baker, and the Court granted Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude calls to action. Def. Mot.

2-3. They argue that “[t]he amount of the award was likely based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s attempt

to cause the jury to believe that a punitive award needed to be large enough to get Salem Police

Department’s attention, even though Plaintiff pled and understood that the punitive award was

for Officer David Baker’s conduct.” Id. at 6. And they state that Plaintiff should have known that

the City had no duty to pay for a punitive damage award, but the jury would not have known

this. Id. Defendants state, “No reasonable juror would believe that a city police officer would be

able to pay a punitive award of two million dollars.” Id. Defendants conclude that “the jury was

misled to believe that the punitive award was against the Salem Police Department for failing to

investigate Officer Baker’s use of force rather than focusing on Officer Baker’s conduct as an

individual.” Id.

Plaintiff concedes that counsel’s reference to sending a message to the City of Salem was

improper, but states that it was a brief mistake, noting that it “was immediately followed by a

reference to Officer Baker,” and that Defendants’ objection to the reference was sustained. Pl.

Resp. 3-4, ECF 128. Plaintiff also argues that it was proper to state that the “community” had the

opportunity to decide what should happen, and to reference a failure to investigate the incident.

Id. at 4. Plaintiff points to his expert’s testimony that Defendant Baker’s 20 use of force reports

in seven months was “a lot” to show that the evidence supported a large award of punitive

damages based on Defendant Baker’s conduct. Id. Finally, Plaintiff observes that Defendants

submitted no evidence of Defendant Baker’s wealth, and that the jury instructions and verdict

form specified that punitive damages could be assessed only against Defendant Baker. Id. at 4-5.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants have not shown an adequate basis for a

new trial. While counsel’s reference to sending a message to the City of Salem was improper, the

reference was not significant enough to permeate the trial with misconduct. Counsel for

Defendants objected to the reference, the Court immediately sustained the objection, and closing

argument proceeded. In rebuttal closing, counsel for Plaintiff focused his argument on Defendant

Baker’s conduct. These circumstances do not support a finding that the trial was permeated with

misconduct. See Hemmings, 285 F.3d at 1194-95 (holding that plaintiff’s counsel’s improper

comments about prior lawsuits against the defendant during closing argument did not justify a

new trial because the reference was isolated and the plaintiffs had a strong case).

Defendants’ argument also relies on suppositions not supported by the record. As

Plaintiffs point out and Defendants concede on reply, there was no evidence in the record about

Defendant Baker’s ability to pay an award of punitive damages. Def. Reply 6, ECF 130. Nor was

there evidence of whether the City would be obligated to pay the award on his behalf. There is

no reason to conclude that the jury considered those factors in reaching its verdict. Finally, the

evidence in the record included a video of the incident, testimony from Plaintiff and other

witnesses about how the incident affected him, and evidence of damage to Plaintiff’s shoulder

that would require surgery. The Court is not left with the conviction that the reference to sending

a message to the City, rather than Defendant Baker, led to the large award of punitive damages.

Defendants have not shown that they are entitled to a new trial.

II. Remittitur

In the alternative, Defendants move to reduce the punitive damages award and the award

of noneconomic damages for the false arrest claim. Def. Mot. 1-2. The Court concludes that

Defendants are entitled to a reduction of the punitive damages award but not the damages award

on the false arrest claim.

A. Punitive Damages on Excessive Force Claim

A new trial may be granted if “an award of damages is grossly excessive or monstrous,

clearly not supported by the evidence, or only based on speculation or guesswork, and gives rise

to an inference that passion and prejudice tainted the jury’s finding of liability.” Snyder v.

Freight, Const., Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Loc. No. 287, 175 F.3d 680, 689 (9th

Cir. 1999), amended, No. 96-15267, 1999 WL 34967384 (9th Cir. June 3, 1999) (internal

quotations and citation omitted). The court “should determine whether a punitive damage award

exceeds the amount necessary to accomplish the goals of punishment and deterrence in deciding

whether it is grossly excessive.” Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1258 (9th Cir. 1993). The

Due Process Clause “‘prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a

tortfeasor.’” S. Union Co. v. Irvin, 563 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)). To determine whether an award of

punitive damages is grossly excessive, the Supreme Court

has pointed to three guideposts: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the

defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm

suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference

between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties

authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”

Id. (quoting 538 U.S. at 418). The first guidepost is the most important. Id.

If the court determines that the damages are grossly excessive, it must give the party

awarded those damages “the option of either accepting the remittitur of the punitive damage

award or a new trial on that issue.” Morgan, 997 F.2d at 1258-59. The court must review the

evidence of damages in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Seymour v. Summa Vista

Cinema, Inc., 809 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1987).

The jury awarded Plaintiff $650,000 in compensatory damages on his excessive force

claim: $150,000 in economic damages and $500,000 in noneconomic damages. It awarded

Plaintiff $2 million in punitive damages. Thus, the ratio between punitive and compensatory

damages was approximately 3:1. Defendants initially suggest that the ratio was 13:1 because

they include only the economic damages in their calculations. Def. Mot. 8-9. But the

noneconomic damages are also compensatory. Defendants concede on reply that the ratio here is

3:1. Def. Reply 5.

The Ninth Circuit found a 3:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages acceptable in

Southern Union. 563 F.3d at 792. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found few indicia of

reprehensibility: harm “was not to some poor struggling person; it was inflicted upon a very

large company”; “the harm was not physical”; the company “was not financially vulnerable”;

and “the incident was isolated.” Id. at 791-92. Here, in contrast, the evidence at trial showed that

Plaintiff was unarmed and was not violating any laws and yet was detained by Defendant Baker,

who placed him in handcuffs. Plaintiff testified that Defendant Baker wrenched his arms and

punched him while he was detaining him, and that he felt insulted and frightened by the

encounter. The evidence indicated that Plaintiff faced past and future medical bills from injury to

his shoulder sustained in the incident and that he would require surgery. As Plaintiff argues, the

jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant Baker acted in a manner intended to inflict

pain. Pl. Resp. 2-3. The evidence supported a finding that Defendant Baker’s conduct was

reprehensible.

On the other hand, Defendant Baker did have reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiff, and

Plaintiff was uncooperative with Defendant Baker’s attempts to investigate. And Plaintiff

improperly relies on his use-of-force expert’s testimony that Defendant Baker had a history of

use-of-force reports. See Pl. Resp. 3; McDougal Decl. Ex. 1 at 2 (Direct Exam. of Adam

Bercovici Tr.) 14:8-21, ECF 129. There was no evidence in the record about the circumstances

underlying those reports, the degree of force used, or whether it was found to be justified. The

testimony improperly invited the jury to speculate about Defendant Baker’s past use of force.

This evidence does not properly support a finding of reprehensibility. The degree of

reprehensibility here was greater than in a case such as Southern Union, but it was not of the

highest order.

The Supreme Court has explained that “[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial,

then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of

the due process guarantee.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.1 The compensatory damages on the

excessive force claim were $650,000, an amount the Court deems substantial in this case.

Further, $500,000 of those damages were for noneconomic harm. The evidence at trial

supporting an award of noneconomic damages was testimony from Plaintiff and others that

Defendant Baker’s conduct caused him emotional distress. The Supreme Court has explained

that compensatory damages for emotional distress serve one of the purposes of punitive

damages, which is to condemn conduct that causes outrage and humiliation. 538 U.S. at 426.

This further suggests that the award of punitive damages is excessive. In sum, the first two

guideposts support a reduction of the punitive damages in this case.

For the third guidepost, Defendants first rely on several cases with claims for battery or

excessive force, all of which involve the actions of police officers responding to protests. Def.

Mot. 9-10. They state that the cases “involved an officer’s use of a weapon, and none resulted in

a punitive award.” Id. at 9. The Court concludes that the cases are not useful here because this

case did not involve a protest or circumstances similar to a protest, which requires officers to

respond to rapidly changing circumstances in large crowds of people. The appropriate use of

1 Plaintiff argues that the guideline ratios set by the Supreme Court are irrelevant when the

plaintiff suffers physical injury. Pl. Resp. 5 (citing Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 344

Or. 232, 260 (2008)). Plaintiff is incorrect. See Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 997 F.3d 941, 975

(9th Cir. 2021) (considering the 1:1 ratio guideline in a case with over $5 million in

compensatory damages and concluding that a higher ratio was justified because the defendant

corporation’s product gave the plaintiff cancer, and the defendant intentionally downplayed calls

to test the carcinogenic risks of the product).

force—and, by extension, the egregiousness of excessive use of force—at a protest is not a guide

for this situation. Defendants also rely on a state-law case in which the plaintiff was awarded

$50,000 in punitive damages on a false arrest claim, and ask that the Court reduce the award of

punitive damages in this case to $50,000. Def. Mot. 9, 11. That case is not a useful guide either

because the claims were brought under state law in state court. Federal law governs the award of

punitive damages here. On the other hand, as Defendants point out, Plaintiffs cite no cases

upholding a similar award of punitive damages on comparable facts. Def. Reply 5.

The Court concludes that comparison to other cases indicates that the award of punitive

damages is excessive. In Binkovich v. Barthelemy, the Ninth Circuit reinstated the award of

punitive damages on an excessive force claim against a police officer who pushed the plaintiff

against a wall and then swept his legs out from under him without warning. 672 F. App’x 648,

650-51 (9th Cir. 2016). The level of reprehensibility of that conduct is comparable to the level of

reprehensibility in this case. The jury in Binkovich awarded the plaintiff $45,000 in

compensatory damages and $45,000 in punitive damages. Verdict, Binkovich v. Barthelmy, No.

5:11-cv-03774-EJD. In Hunter v. City of Federal Way, the Ninth Circuit upheld the award of

punitive damages on an excessive force claim against a police officer who placed the plaintiff in

a chokehold while arresting him for trespassing after the plaintiff cooperated with the officer’s

orders. 806 F. App’x 518, 521-22 (9th Cir. 2020). That case presents somewhat more

reprehensible facts than the case before this Court. The jury awarded the plaintiff in Hunter

$40,000 in compensatory damages and $600,000 in punitive damages. Verdict, Hunter v. City of

Fed. Way, No. 2:16-cv-01445-MJP. The district court reduced the award of punitive damages to

$360,000. Order, ECF 143, Hunter v. City of Fed. Way, No. 2:16-cv-01445-MJP. The Ninth

Circuit affirmed. 806 F. App’x at 521-22. These cases support a reduction of the punitive

damages award, but not to the $50,000 Defendants initially request.

On reply, Defendants suggest in the alternative that the third guidepost be evaluated by

considering the maximum criminal penalties authorized for comparable misconduct. Def. Reply

5-6. The Supreme Court has indicated that legislative judgments about the appropriate sanctions

for the conduct at issue should be accorded “substantial deference.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.

Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). Defendants suggest that Assault in

the Third Degree under Oregon law is the applicable criminal standard. Def. Reply 6. They state

that the associated maximum fine is $125,000. Id. (citing O.R.S. 163.165). Defendants raised this

argument for the first time on reply, and Plaintiff had no opportunity to respond. The Court

declines to address the argument.

The Court concludes that the award of $2 million in punitive damages is grossly

excessive. Given the degree of reprehensibility of Defendant Baker’s conduct and the amount

and nature of the compensatory damages awarded on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, a punitive

damages award greater than $650,000 is inconsistent with due process. A larger award exceeds

the amount necessary to achieve the goals of punishment and deterrence. On reply, Defendants

request a reduction of the award to $650,000, rather than the $50,000 they previously advocated.

Def. Reply 7. The Court grants Defendants’ modified motion to reduce the punitive damages

award, and reduces the award to $650,000. Plaintiff must either agree to remit the punitive

damages in excess of $650,000 or request a new trial on punitive damages. The Court will give

Plaintiff fourteen days to notify the Court in writing of his election.

//

//

B. Damages on False Arrest Claim

Plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages on his state-law false arrest claim. State

law governs the determination of whether the damages award was excessive. See Browning-

Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278-79 (1989) (so holding

for an award of punitive damages on a state-law claim); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518

U.S. 415, 419, 435 n.18 (1996) (so holding for review of compensatory damages). Whether the

award is excessive is a matter of state law. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279 (declining to craft

federal common law on excessiveness). The district court should apply state standards of review

in evaluating the size of the jury’s award of compensatory damages if applying the federal

standard of review would result in substantial variations between state and federal money

judgments. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419, 430 (holding that federal district court should apply

stricter standard of review of jury awards prescribed by New York statute on state-law claim

rather than the federal standard on excessiveness of jury awards).

The jury awarded Plaintiff $500,000 in damages on his state-law false arrest claim, all of

which were noneconomic damages. Under Oregon law, noneconomic damages may be awarded

to compensate the plaintiff for “injury to his feelings, mental anguish, humiliation, and the

like[.]” Busch v. McInnis Waste Sys., Inc., 366 Or. 628, 645, 468 P.3d 419 (2020) (internal

quotations omitted). The Oregon Constitution limits a court’s discretion to reduce an award of

damages: “[n]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this state,

unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict.” Or. Const. art.

VII, § 3. The Oregon Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to provide that Oregon courts

cannot declare that the evidence does not support the verdict simply because the verdict is too

large. Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 187 Or. 89, 104, 210 P.2d 461 (Or. 1949), overruled in part on

other grounds by Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 320 Or. 544, 888 P.2d 8 (1995); Trebelhorn v.

Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC, 372 Or. 27, 34 (2024). Because the application of the federal

standard rather than the Oregon standard is likely to result in substantial variations in money

judgments, the Oregon provision is substantive and should be applied, consistent with Gasperini.

Therefore, the award of damages on Plaintiff’s false arrest claim is excessive only if no evidence

in the record supports the verdict.2 Accord VanValkenburg v. Oregon Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:14-

CV-00916-MO, 2017 WL 532950, at *5 (D. Or. Feb. 8, 2017); Allison v. Smoot Enterprises Inc.,

No. 2:17-CV-01598-SU, 2019 WL 5095779, at *7 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2019) (following

VanValkenburg).

Defendants state that the award on the false arrest claim “appears to be duplicative of the

award for unlawful force” and “is excessive compared to any recent, similar jury verdict,

amounting to forty times the closest comparable case.” Def. Mot. 2. Defendants argue that the

award is duplicative because the jury awarded the same amount of noneconomic damages on the

battery and false arrest claims. Def. Reply 3-4. The Court declines to find the award duplicative.

The jury was instructed on the distinct elements of a claim for false arrest under Oregon law, and

the verdict form separated the claim from Plaintiff’s claims for excessive force and battery.

Defendants point to no error in the jury instructions. The Court presumes that the jury followed

the instructions, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley, 556 U.S. 838, 841 (2009), and finds that the

presumption is not rebutted simply because the jury awarded the same amount of noneconomic

2 The Supreme Court has held that applying this standard to review an award of punitive

damages violates the Fourteenth Amendment protection against deprivation of property without

due process. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994). The Supreme Court’s due

process concerns are specific to punitive damages, which serve a different purpose from

compensatory damages. See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. Am. Coal. of

Life Activists, 422 F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 2005) (reviewing relevant caselaw).

damages on both the battery on false arrest claims. The arrest and the use of force represented

related but distinct noneconomic harms.

In arguing that the award of damages on the false arrest claim is excessive, Defendants

rely on comparison to another case. Def. Mot. 9. They state, “Among published jury awards over

the last five years, there was one jury verdict for noneconomic damages for an unlawful arrest,

substantially less than the award in this case.” Id. (citing Edwin Yang v. Brookfield Prop. Reit,

No. 18CV51536). In Yang, the plaintiff was awarded $12,500 in compensatory damages and

$50,000 in punitive damages on his battery claim; he was also awarded $12,500 in compensatory

damages and $50,000 in punitive damages on his false arrest claim. EDWIN YANG v.

BROOKFIELD PROPERTY REIT, INC. D/B/A PIONEER PLACE; UNIVERSAL

PROTECTION SERVICE, LP D/B/A ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, LP;

AND DAVID WEGMAN, 20 Or. Lit. Arb. Rpts. 65. The plaintiff was at a mall riding a

motorized skateboard when a security guard told him to stop; he complied, but the guard told

him to leave. Id. When the plaintiff asked why, the guard told him he was trespassing, then

grabbed the plaintiff’s arm and forced him to the ground. Id. Another guard tackled him and

restrained him, and he was handcuffed for about an hour sitting in a stairwell. Id. The plaintiff

was awarded $445 in past medical costs and did not claim future medical expenses. Id.

Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff was only handcuffed for about ten minutes,

whereas the plaintiff in Yang was handcuffed for about an hour. Def. Mot. 9. They argue that

Defendant Baker had a valid basis to investigate Plaintiff, that Plaintiff was uncooperative, and

that Plaintiff was released as soon as Defendant Baker confirmed his identity and his right to be

where he was. Def. Reply 2-3. They argue that in excluding the use of force during the arrest

from consideration, the damages for false arrest included placing Plaintiff in the patrol car for ten

minutes. Id. at 3. Defendants argue that damages on the false arrest claim should be reduced to

one dollar. Id. at 7.

The Court concludes that there is no basis to reduce the jury’s award on Plaintiff’s false

arrest claim under Oregon law. There is evidence in the record supporting an award of damages

for the emotional distress Plaintiff suffered when he was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car.

Plaintiff testified that he felt fear, anger, and humiliation from his experience. The Court agrees

with Defendants that the award is excessive under the federal standard.3 But Oregon law does

not permit a reduction of the jury’s verdict because the Court believes the award is excessive.

The Court cannot say that no evidence in the record supports the award. The Court therefore

denies Defendants’ motion for remittitur as to the damages award on the false arrest claim.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion for a New

Trial; Altering or Amending a Judgment [123]. Plaintiff is to notify the Court within fourteen

days whether he will accept remittitur of the punitive damages award or if he requests a new trial

on punitive damages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:__F__e_b_r_u_a_ry_ _2_2_,_ 2_0__2_4_____.

______________________________

MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ

United States District Judge

3 The jury’s verdict on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim covered the act of handcuffing Plaintiff

because that was when force was used. The verdict on the false arrest claim covered the distinct

harm of being placed in the patrol car for ten minutes while handcuffed. An award of $500,000

in noneconomic damages for that conduct is grossly excessive under the federal standard.