Opinion

Barton v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Court
District Court, D. Oregon
Filed
Oct 16, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.8%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

TUANANH B.,1

Plaintiff, Civ. No: 3:22-cv-01497-MC

v. OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

_____________________________

MCSHANE, Judge:

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits. This court has

jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

Plaintiff alleges that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by (1) improperly

rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, and (2) failing to include all of Plaintiff’s

supported limitations in the RFC. Because the Commissioner’s decision is based on proper legal

standards and supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

1 In the interest of privacy, this Opinion and Order uses only the first name and the initial of the

last name of the non-governmental party.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for benefits on November 8, 2019, alleging disability since February 25,

2018. Tr. 51-52, 179-83. Her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 69, 90.

Plaintiff appeared before the Honorable John Michaelsen on September 10, 2021. Tr. 37-60. ALJ

Michaelsen denied Plaintiff’s claim on October 8, 2021. Tr. 22-36. Plaintiff sought review from

the Appeals Council and was denied, rendering the ALJ’s decision final. Pl.’s Br. at 2, ECF No.

11. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.

Plaintiff is 59 years old and was 53 as of the amended alleged onset date. See Tr. 182.

Plaintiff has a high school diploma and completed two years of college. Tr. 213. Plaintiff has

past relevant work experience as an electrical assembler. Tr. 31. On February 25, 2018, Plaintiff

was injured in a car accident, and she alleges disability from her injuries. Pl.’s Br. At 2.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges disability from injuring multiple vertebrae in her neck, resulting in

chronic neck pain, right arm pain and weakness, intermittent numbness in her right hand, and

reduced range of motion in her neck. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The reviewing court shall affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the decision is based on

proper legal standards and the legal findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).

“Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Hill

v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980

(9th Cir. 1997)). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, we review the administrative

record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the

ALJ’s conclusion. Davis v. Heckler, 868 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1989). “If the evidence can

reasonably support either affirming or reversing, ‘the reviewing court may not substitute its

judgment’ for that of the Commissioner.” Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 740 F.3d

519, 523 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1996)).

DISCUSSION

The Social Security Administration utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation to determine

whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4) (2012). The burden

of proof rests on the claimant for steps one through four, and on the Commissioner for step five.

Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d

1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)). At step five, the Commissioner’s burden is to demonstrate that the

claimant can make an adjustment to other work existing in significant numbers in the national

economy after considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education,

and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the Commissioner fails to meet this

burden, then the claimant is considered disabled. Id. If, however, the Commissioner proves that

the claimant is able to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national

economy, the claimant is not disabled. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54.

The ALJ determined Plaintiff’s only severe impairment was “history of cervical DDD

with s/p discectomy and fusion.” Tr. 27. As noted, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by improperly

rejecting: (1) her subjective symptom testimony; and (2) failing to include all of her supported

limitations in the RFC.

Plaintiff first contends the ALJ erred in discounting her subjective statements about the

limiting effects of her symptoms including chronic pain, radiculopathy, numbness, weakness,

and tingling in her lower extremities. To determine whether a claimant’s testimony about

subjective pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ performs a two-stage analysis. Trevizo v.

Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. First, the claimant must

produce objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be

expected to produce the symptoms alleged. Treichler v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d

1090; 1102 (9th Cir. 2014); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). Second,

absent affirmative evidence that the claimant is malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear

and convincing reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the

symptoms. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.

2007). The ALJ must make findings that are sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to

conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony. Brown-Hunter v.

Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit demands more than a summary of

the medical evidence and generic, high-level reasons why a claimant’s allegations conflict with

that evidence. Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit “requires

the ALJ to specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible and . . . explain

what evidence undermines that testimony.” Id.; Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494.

Clear and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant’s testimony “include conflicting

medical evidence, effective medical treatment, medical noncompliance, inconsistencies in the

claimant’s testimony or between her testimony and her conduct, daily activities inconsistent with

the alleged symptoms, and testimony from physicians and third parties about the nature, severity

and effect of the symptoms” about which the claimant complains. Bowers v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-

583-SI, 2012 WL 2401642, at *9 (D. Or. June 25, 2012) (citing Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040);

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013).

In some circumstances, an ALJ may reject subjective complaints where the claimant's

“statements at her hearing do not comport with objective medical evidence in her medical

record.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009). However,

especially in the mental health context, an ALJ may not cherry-pick isolated instances of

favorable psychological symptoms when the record as a whole reflects long-standing

psychological disability. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1164; see also Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d

995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). Moreover, a lack of objective evidence may not be the sole basis for

rejecting a claimant's subjective complaints. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th

Cir. 2001)

The record demonstrates Plaintiff’s primary concern was her residual pain, radiculopathy,

and numbness related to a prior motor vehicle accident. Tr. 52-54. At the hearing before the ALJ,

Plaintiff testified that a motor vehicle accident caused a neck injury that led to a cervical

discectomy and anterior cervical discectomy and fusion (ACDF). Tr. 52-54. Plaintiff reported

that she continues to experience pain and numbness in her neck, feet, and hands. Tr. 53, 61, 73,

80, 99. She testified that her pain radiates down her neck to her feet and hands, causing her to

have trouble typing. Tr. 53. Additionally, she stated that she is only able to walk very slowly

given that her feet are often in pain or numb. Tr. 54. In her function report, Plaintiff indicated

that she slowly walks three quarters of a mile every day. Tr. 230, 232. Plaintiff also alleged she

could not bend, kneel, or sit for prolonged amounts of time. Tr. 54. Plaintiff asserts that her

symptoms only marginally improved with treatment and that she had intolerable side effects

from gabapentin. Pl.’s Br. 7.

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of [her] symptoms, her allegations are not substantiated or supported by the

medical record.” Tr. 30. The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because they

conflicted with her reported improvement with treatment and the objective medical evidence in

the record. Id.

Regarding Plaintiff’s improvement with treatment, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff

was prescribed medication, including voltaren and gabapentin to treat her symptoms. Id. The

ALJ also discussed how Plaintiff pursued additional “conservative treatment options” including

steroid injections, physical therapy, and chiropractic care. Id. The ALJ cited physical therapy

records from December 2018 and November 2019 where Plaintiff reported that her pain,

stiffness, radiculopathy, and ability to rotate her head had improved with physical therapy

treatment. Tr. 30 (citing Tr. 545, 650). Plaintiff also reported her symptoms were improving

significantly with physical therapy and exercise on multiple occasions. Tr. 450-52, 528, 540,

542, 545, 547, 551, 562, 650, 657, 671-72, 675, 678, 901, 910, 925, 931, 939. Throughout the

course of her physical therapy treatment, treatment notes continuously document that “[Plaintiff]

demonstrates good potential to achieve established goals to address documented impairments by

participating in skilled physical therapy.” Tr. 541, 546, 547, 549, 550. The ALJ therefore

provided clear and convincing reasons to discount Plaintiff's testimony as to the severity of her

symptoms given her improvement with treatment.

Regarding the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff alleged that she is unable to bend,

kneel, sit, or stand for prolonged periods of time, and that she can only walk very slowly due to

pain. Tr. 29 (citing Tr. 54). However, the ALJ discussed that physical examination findings

showed that Plaintiff exhibited normal sensation, normal range of motion, non-antalgic gait, and

the ability to heel and toe walk. Tr. 30 citing (Tr. 489, 493-94, 510-511 528, 653, 904). The ALJ

cited multiple x-rays, MRI scans, and other diagnostic imaging that showed mostly mild

findings. Tr. 30. Specifically, the ALJ cited diagnostic imaging from April 13, 2018 that revealed

degenerative changes with mild spinal canal, moderate right and mild left neuroforaminal

narrowing at C6-7. Tr. 474. He also cited x-rays of Plaintiff’s cervical spine that revealed stable

mild degenerative disc disease and mild multifocal facet joint arthropathy. Tr. 496, 515. Plaintiff

also denied trouble walking multiple times at medical examinations. Tr. 536, 584, 646, 666, 714,

896, 921, 980.

Because the ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for finding Plaintiff

less-than credible regarding the extent of her limitations, the ALJ did not err in discounting

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding those limitations. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

2009) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,1282 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to include any upper extremity limitations in her

RFC. Pl.’s Br. 9. Plaintiff further asserts that failing to include any upper extremity limitations is

harmful error because her past relevant work as an electronic assembler requires frequent

reaching, handling, and fingering. Id.

In formulating an RFC, the ALJ must consider all medically determinable impairments,

including those that are not “severe,” and evaluate “all of the relevant medical and other

evidence,” including the claimant's testimony. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; SSR 96-

8p. However, only limitations supported by substantial evidence must be incorporated into the

RFC and, by extension, the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert. Osenbrock v.

Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163–65 (9th Cir. 2001).

As explained above, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff's symptom testimony because

it was unsubstantiated by the evidence. Plaintiff reported that Ibuprofen and voltaren were

controlling her pain symptoms in her upper extremities without side effects. Tr. 509. The state

agency consultants did not assess any reaching or manipulative limitations due to their findings

that plaintiff had normal fine finger movements and normal arm swing on physical examination.

Tr. 65, 68, 79, 86. Additionally, no other physicians assessed that Plaintiff has functional

limitations with respect to her arm and hand extremities.

Further, despite the lack of evidence supporting Plaintiff's gastrointestinal issues, the ALJ

still limited Plaintiff to perform light work with lower extremity limitations including no more

than frequent balancing, stooping, crouching, crawling, or kneeling. Tr. 29. Plaintiff does not cite

to anything supporting Plaintiff's additional suggested upper extremity limitations. Because

Plaintiff's upper extremity limitations were not supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did

not err in construing Plaintiff's RFC. See Dawn Jeanette Z. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:19-CV-

00423-BR, 2020 WL 1172695, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2020), aff’d sub nom. Zul v. Kijakazi, No.

20-35404, 2021 WL 5298595 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2021) (affirmed ALJ’s light RFC with no

reaching limitation was supported by substantial evidence because the reviewing physician

opined that Plaintiff could perform light work without any reaching limitations, Plaintiff's

extremities did not show any gross joint abnormalities, she had full range of motion of the arms,

and she could move all four extremities with normal strength and sensation).

CONCLUSION

The ALJ’s decision is free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence. The

Commissioner’s final decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 16th day of October, 2023.

_______/s/ Michael J. McShane________

Michael McShane

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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