“ORS 174.020 codifies - as it has for many years - the cardinal rule of statutory construction that a court shall pursue the intention of the legislature if possible.”
How later courts described this case
- “ORS 174.020 codifies - as it has for many years - the cardinal rule of statutory construction that a court shall pursue the intention of the legislature if possible.”
- “The familiar maxim ignorance of the law is no excuse typically holds true. Instead, . . . a defendant generally must know the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense even if he does not know that those facts give rise to [an offense].”
- statute criminalizing prompt payment violations shows “the policy involves a broad public interest, not merely the interest of the employee.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
JESSICA GESSELE, ASHLEY ORTIZ, No. 3:14-CV-01092-HZ
NICOLE GESSELE, TRICIA
TETRAULT, and CHRISTINA OPINION & ORDER
MAULDIN, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JACK IN THE BOX, INC., a corporation
of Delaware,
Defendant.
Jon M. Egan
240 6th Street
Lake Oswego, OR 97034-2931
(503) 697-3427
Jim W. Vogele
812 N.W. 17th Avenue
Portland, OR 97209
(503) 779-5415
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Douglas S. Parker
David P. R. Symes
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
1300 S.W. 5th Avenue
Suite 2050
Portland, OR 97201
1 - OPINION & ORDER
(503) 221-0309
Ian Maher
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
633 West 5th Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 443-4300
Attorneys for Defendant
HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Correct Verdict, ECF 394;
Defendant’s Motion to Reduce Unconstitutionally Excessive Damage Awards, ECF 397; and
Defendant’s Motion to Limit Prejudgment Interest for Delays Attributable to Plaintiffs, ECF 399.
For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Correct Verdict,
denies Defendant’s Motion to Reduce Unconstitutionally Excessive Damage Awards, and denies
Defendant’s Motion to Limit Prejudgment Interest for Delays Attributable to Plaintiffs.
BACKGROUND
Because the parties are familiar with the facts underlying this action, the Court sets out
only the facts that are relevant to the pending Motions.
Until September 30, 2011, Defendant Jack in the Box, Inc., owned and operated several
restaurants in Oregon. After September 30, 2011, Defendant did not own or operate any
restaurants in Oregon and did not have any Oregon employees.
Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant in its Oregon restaurants at various times.
Plaintiffs received their final paychecks from Defendant on the following dates:
Tricia Tetrault: July 11, 2008
Ashley Ortiz: December 26, 2008
Nicole Gessele: March 20, 2009
Jessica Gessele: November 23, 2009
2 - OPINION & ORDER
Christina Mauldin: March 30, 2010.
On August 13, 2010, Jessica Gessele, Ashley Ortiz, Nicole Gessele, and Tricia Tetrault
filed a putative class-action Complaint in this Court against Defendant Jack in the Box (Gessele
I, Case No. 3:10- CV-00960-BR)1 for violation of the minimum-wage and overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and various Oregon wage-
and-hour laws.
On May 16, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint in Gessele I in which
they added Christina Mauldin as a named Plaintiff.
After resolving various motions, United State District Court Judge Anna Brown
entered a Judgment on May 15, 2014, dismissing Gessele I without prejudice.
On June 10, 2014, Jessica Gessele, Ashley Ortiz, Nicole Gessele, Tricia Tetrault, and
Christina Mauldin, filed a putative class action against Jack in the Box in Multnomah County
Circuit Court (Gessele II) in which they alleged claims for violation of Oregon’s wage-and-hour
laws, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable and quasi-contractual claims for return of money.2
On July 9, 2014, Defendant removed Gessele II to this Court pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
On March 2, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Rule 23(b)(3) Class Certification.
On June 12, 2017, Judge Brown issued an Opinion and Order in which she granted
Plaintiffs’ Motions to Certify the Workers Benefit Fund (WBF) Class, to Certify the Shoe Class,
1 In Gessele I Ashley Ortiz proceeded as Ashley Gessele and Christina Mauldin
proceeded as Christina Luchau.
2 Plaintiffs also asserted claims under the FLSA, but those were dismissed by Judge
Brown before class certification.
3 - OPINION & ORDER
and to Certify the Franchise Transfer Class, and denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify the Unpaid
Break Class.
On November 13, 2019, Judge Brown granted in part and denied in part the parties’
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Relevant to the pending Motions, Judge Brown
concluded Defendant’s over-withholding of Plaintiffs’ WBF assessments was willful within the
meaning of Oregon Revised Statute § 652.150.
The matter was transferred to this Court on January 21, 2021.
On August 21, 2021, Defendant requested permission to file a motion for reconsideration
of Judge Brown’s summary-judgment willfulness finding related to Plaintiffs’ WBF claim. The
Court denied Defendant permission to file a motion for reconsideration of that issue.
On October 3, 2022, the Court held a pretrial conference at which it, among other things,
decertified the shoe-deduction class.
This matter was tried to a jury beginning October 17, 2022. On October 24, 2022, the
jury entered a Verdict in which it found, in pertinent part, that some WBF class members were
not paid minimum wages, not paid sufficient overtime, and/or received late payment of final
wages due to WBF over-withholding, that class members proved $5,307,589.60 in penalty wages
for the WBF class claim, that Defendant established each named Plaintiff authorized her shoe
deductions in writing, that named Plaintiffs were not entitled to statutory damages for shoe
deductions, and that named Plaintiffs proved they were entitled to certain penalty wages for
failure to pay minimum wages, overtime, or final wages on termination due to an improper shoe
deduction and/or WBF deduction.
On November 21, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Correct Verdict. On January 23,
4 - OPINION & ORDER
Defendant filed a Motion to Reduce Unconstitutionally Excessive Damage Awards and a Motion
to Limit Prejudgment Interest for Delays Attributable to Plaintiffs. The Court took those Motions
under advisement on January 4, 2023.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CORRECT VERDICT
Defendant moves to correct the Verdict pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a)
or (b)3 regarding any penalty wages awarded for Jason Diaz and for shoe deductions to the
named Plaintiffs. Defendant asserts there is no basis for any penalty wages attributable to Diaz to
be part of the Verdict because he settled his claims and is not a class member. Defendant also
asserts there no basis for the named Plaintiffs to be awarded penalty wages arising out of shoe
deductions because the jury found that all named Plaintiffs authorized the shoe deductions in
writing and, therefore, the shoe deductions did not violate the law.
I. Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 provides:
(a) Special Verdict.
(1) In General. The court may require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding on each issue of
fact.
* * *
(b) General Verdict with Answers to Written Questions.
(1) In General. The court may submit to the jury forms for a general
verdict, together with written questions on one or more issues of
fact that the jury must decide. The court must give the instructions
and explanations necessary to enable the jury to render a general
3 Plaintiffs do not address whether Rule 49(a) or (b) applies to the Verdict in this case.
5 - OPINION & ORDER
verdict and answer the questions in writing, and must direct the
jury to do both.
* * *
(3) Answers Inconsistent with the Verdict. When the answers are
consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the
general verdict, the court may:
(A) approve, for entry under Rule 58, an appropriate judgment
according to the answers, notwithstanding the general
verdict.
“Special verdicts and general verdicts with special interrogatories both consist of a list of
questions calling for the jury to make findings of fact.” Embroidery Indus., Inc. v. Brasking, Inc.,
60 F. App'x 111, 114–15 (9th Cir. 2003)(citing Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir.
1991)(citations omitted)). “As a practical matter . . . the form of a general verdict with
interrogatories is [often] virtually indistinguishable from that of a special verdict.” Floyd, 929 F.
2d at 1395. However, “[j]uries rendering general verdict[s] face a dual task. First, they are
responsible for finding facts, which are reflected in their answers to special interrogatories.
Second, they must reach a general verdict by applying the law to their findings.” Id. “[S]pecial
verdicts compel the jury to focus exclusively on its fact-finding role . . . [and] empower the judge
to play a more prominent role by applying the law to the jury’s findings of fact,” which “permits
the judge to give a minimum of legal instruction to the jurors.” Id.
Here the jury was asked to both find facts by a preponderance of the evidence and to
apply those facts to the law. In addition, the Court provided substantial legal instruction to enable
the jury to complete both tasks. Accordingly, the Court concludes the Verdict here was a general
6 - OPINION & ORDER
verdict pursuant to Rule 49(b) and, therefore, will apply that Rule in deciding Defendant’s
Motion to Correct the Verdict.
II. Jason Diaz
Plaintiffs agree that counsel inadvertently showed the jury a document that included
WBF class penalty wages for Diaz and asked the jury to award an amount that included those
penalty wages for Diaz. Plaintiffs concede Diaz settled this matter and the amount of WBF
penalty wages should not have included penalty wages for Diaz. Plaintiffs, therefore, agree the
amount of minimum-wage penalty wages for the WBF class should be $2,690,544 rather than the
$2,692,542 awarded by the jury.
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Correct Verdict to the extent that
the Court reduces the award of WBF class minimum-wage penalty wages by $1,908 to
$2,690,544.
III. Named Plaintiffs
Defendant asserts the jury’s award of penalty wages for the named Plaintiffs improperly
included penalty wages for minimum-wage, overtime, and late pay violations arising out of shoe
deductions. Defendant contends the jury found that all of the named Plaintiffs authorized the
shoe deductions in writing and, therefore, penalty wages attributable to shoe deductions “have no
legal basis.” Def.’s Mot. at 4. Accordingly, Defendant asks the Court to correct the Verdict to
remove the penalty wages attributable to the shoe deductions from the named Plaintiffs.
7 - OPINION & ORDER
A. Facts
The jury was instructed that the named Plaintiffs brought claims to recover
statutory damages for payroll deductions made in connection with their purchase of slip resistant
shoes. The Court instructed the jury as follows regarding shoe deductions:
Under Oregon law, a payroll deduction for the purchase of shoes is
permissible when the deduction was authorized in writing by the
employee.
Each Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Defendant made deductions from her wages for shoe purchases on or after
August 13, 2004 and on or before September 30, 2011.
Defendant asserts the deductions were permissible because each Plaintiff
authorized the deductions in writing. Defendant bears the burden to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the named Plaintiffs provided
written authorization for each shoe deduction.
To the extent Defendant fails to establish each Plaintiff authorized each
shoe deduction in writing, that Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages,
which I will explain.
Jury Inst. 22. ECF 382. The Court also instructed the jury regarding statutory damages pursuant
to Oregon Revised Statute § 652.615: “For each individual Plaintiff who had a shoe deduction
that was not authorized in writing (“improper shoe deduction”) taken between August 13, 2004
and September 30, 2011, you must determine damages. The measure of damages for each
Plaintiff is $200 or the aggregate amount of shoe deductions, whichever is more.” Jury Inst. 24.
The jury was instructed regarding penalty wages for shoe deductions pursuant to § 652.150 as
follows:
Each Plaintiff seeks penalty wages for improper shoe deductions that
caused her to be paid below minimum wage on or after July 14, 2007. An
improper shoe deduction caused a Plaintiff to be paid below minimum
wage if it caused the Plaintiff to be paid less than Oregon’s minimum
8 - OPINION & ORDER
wage rate in any workweek on or after July 14, 2007. . . . Plaintiffs have
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence whether an
improper shoe deduction caused the Plaintiff to be paid below minimum
wage on or after July 14, 2007.
Jury Inst. 25. Similarly, the Court instructed the jury:
An improper shoe deduction caused a named Plaintiff to be paid
insufficient overtime if the Plaintiff was paid less than 1.5 times that
Plaintiff’s regular hourly rate for any hours worked in excess of 40 during
any given workweek on or after July 14, 2008.
Plaintiffs have the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
whether an improper shoe deduction caused the Plaintiff to be paid
insufficient overtime on or after July 14, 2008.
Jury Inst. 26. The Verdict Form asked in relevant part: “Did Defendant prove the individual
Plaintiff authorized her shoe deductions in writing?” and listed each named Plaintiff next to
spaces stating “yes” and “no.” The jury was directed that if it found Defendant proved that all of
the named Plaintiffs authorized the shoe deductions in writing it should skip the question asking
for the “amount of statutory damages, if any to be awarded to each Plaintiff who Defendant did
not establish authorized her shoe deductions in writing.” The Verdict Form then asked: “Do you
find Plaintiff was not paid minimum wages, not paid sufficient overtime, and/or received late
payment of final wages due to an improper shoe deduction and/or a WBF violation?” and listed
each named Plaintiff next to spaces stating “yes” and “no.” Finally, the jury was asked to
“[s]pecify the penalty wages, if any, for each Plaintiff who has proved she was not paid
minimum wage, not paid sufficient overtime, or not paid final was on termination due to an
improper shoe deduction and/or a WBF violation” and each named Plaintiff was listed.
The jury found Defendant proved each of the named Plaintiffs authorized their
shoe deductions in writing. The jury answered the question regarding statutory damages for
9 - OPINION & ORDER
improper shoe deductions and indicated “0” statutory damages should be awarded to each
named Plaintiff for shoe deductions. The jury, however, answered “yes” to each named Plaintiff
in response to the question “Do you find Plaintiff was not paid minimum wages, not paid
sufficient overtime, and/or received late payment of final wages due to an improper shoe
deduction and/or a WBF violation?” The jury then specified the penalty wages for each named
Plaintiff “who has proved she was not paid minimum wage, not paid sufficient overtime, or not
paid final was on termination due to an improper shoe deduction and/or a WBF violation” as
follows: Jessica Gessele $4,740; Ashley Ortiz $3,880.80; Nicole Gessele $4,752; and Christina
Mauldin4 $5,760.5
After the Court received the Verdict, defense counsel asserted the jury’s findings
regarding the amount of penalty wages due to a failure to pay minimum wage, overtime or late
final pay should be reduced due to the jury’s finding that no named Plaintiff had an improper
shoe deduction. Plaintiffs’ counsel disagreed, but the parties agreed the matter should be decided
by the Court in post-trial motions.
B. Analysis
At trial, Plaintiffs’ witness, Jennifer Murphy, testified that she calculated the
named Plaintiffs’ penalty wages as follows: $1,896 for minimum wage violations; $9,520.80 for
overtime violations; and $9,696 for late pay violations, totaling $21,112.80 in penalty wages for
the named Plaintiffs. Maher Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1 (trial transcript) at 18. Murphy set out penalty wages
4 By the time of trial Christina Mauldin was proceeding as Christina Peacock. The Court
refers to her as Christina Mauldin in this Opinion and Order to avoid confusion.
5 Penalty wages awarded to Tricia Tetrault on her individual claims are not at issue in this
Motion.
10 - OPINION & ORDER
for the relevant named Plaintiffs as follows: $4,740 for Jessica Gessele; $3,880.80 for Ashley
Ortiz; $4,752 for Nicole Gessele; and $5,760 for Christina Peacock. Maher Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2 (trial
transcript) at 644. Murphy testified that she calculated these amounts by awarding penalty wages
for both WBF over-withholding and shoe deductions and by first awarding for a minimum wage
violation if applicable, then an overtime violation if applicable, and then late final pay if
applicable. Maher Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1 at 45, Ex. 2 at 31-33. Plaintiffs’ counsel asserted in closing
argument that the jury should award the penalty wages to named Plaintiffs in the amounts
testified to by Murphy and the jury did so.
Defendant asserts the amount of penalty wages awarded by the jury to named
Plaintiffs does not conform to the evidence and requests the Court to reduce the amount of
penalty wages awarded to named Plaintiffs to account for the jury’s finding that Defendant did
not take improper shoe deductions. Specifically, Defendant asserts the jury found Defendant did
not take any improper shoe deductions from named Plaintiffs’ wages and, therefore, pursuant to
the Court’s instructions and the Verdict Form, the jury did not intend to award penalty wages
arising out of improper shoe deductions. Defendant notes based on Murphy’s stated
methodology and the chart shown to the jury, that $1,896 of the penalty wages that Murphy
calculated for Ashley Ortiz are solely attributable to shoe deductions because that is the only
deduction Murphy attributed to a minimum wage violation for Ashley Ortiz. Maher Decl. ¶ 4,
Ex. 3. Similarly, for Jessica Gessele, $2,460.00 in penalty wages that Murphy attributed to late
final pay are based solely on shoe deductions because Jessica Gessele had no minimum wage
violations, and her overtime violations were due to WBF over-withholding. Maher Decl. ¶ 4, Ex.
3. Murphy calculated two sets of penalty wages for Nicole Gessele each in the amount of $2,376
11 - OPINION & ORDER
attributed to WBF over-withholding and shoe deductions. Maher Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 3. Similarly,
Murphy calculated two sets of penalty wages for Christina Mauldin each in the amount of $2,880
attributed to WBF over-withholding and shoe deductions. Maher Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 3. According to
Defendant, therefore, the Court should correct the Verdict to conform to the evidence and reduce
the penalty wages awarded to Ashley Ortiz to $1,984.80; reduce penalty wages awarded to
Jessica Gessele to $2,280; reduce the penalty wages awarded to Nicole Gessele to $2,376; and
reduce the penalty wages awarded to Christina Mauldin to $2,880 for a total award of penalty
wages for named Plaintiffs of $11,500.80.6
The jury was instructed that under the circumstances of this case an improper
shoe deduction is one that was not authorized in writing; was asked to determine by a
preponderance of the evidence if named Plaintiffs had authorized their shoe deductions in
writing; and was instructed that it could award penalty wages to named Plaintiffs for minimum
wage, overtime, or late pay violations only if they were caused by a WBF or improper shoe
deduction. As noted, the jury found there were no improper shoe deductions and, therefore, to
the extent that their factual findings regarding penalty wages for minimum wage, overtime, or
late pay violations included penalty wages for violations arising out of improper shoe deductions,
they are inconsistent with the evidence and the general Verdict. The Court, therefore, grants
Defendant’s Motion to Correct the Verdict pursuant to Rule 49(b) and amends the Verdict to
conform the jury’s answers regarding penalty wages to its answer to the special interrogatories.
Accordingly, the Court amends the Verdict to award named Plaintiffs’ $11,500.80 in penalty
6 Opinion and Order, Ex. 1.
12 - OPINION & ORDER
wages for violations caused by WBF over-withholding as set out in Exhibit 1 to this Opinion and
Order.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO REDUCE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
EXCESSIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
Defendant requests the Court reduce the penalty wages awarded to the WBF class on
the basis that the penalty-wage amount violates constitutional due process because it is “so
severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportionate to the offense and obviously
unreasonable.” Wakefield v. ViSalus, Inc., 51 F.4th 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2022). Plaintiffs oppose
Defendant’s Motion.
I. Facts
The WBF is a program authorized by Oregon Revised Statute § 656.506 that provides
various benefits to workers injured on the job in Oregon. Every year the State of Oregon
publishes a WBF assessment rate and mails the information about the rate and a written notice to
all employers registered with the Oregon Secretary of State. Pursuant to Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 656.506(2) and (3) employers are required to pay at least 50% of the WBF assessment rate set
by the State and permitted to withhold only the remaining percentage from employees. For
example, in 2003 the WBF assessment rate was 3.6¢ per hour. Employers, therefore, were
required to pay to the WBF at least 1.8¢ for every hour that each of their employees worked
during 2003. Although employers were permitted to pay more than 1.8¢, per hour they were not
permitted to withhold from their employees’ paychecks more than 1.8¢ for each hour that their
employees worked during 2003.
The record at summary judgment reflected Oregon mailed the annual WBF
13 - OPINION & ORDER
assessment-rate notices to Defendant and it received the notices. The record also reflected
Defendant paid the correct total amount of WBF assessments to the State every year during the
relevant period. Defendant, however, over-withheld WBF assessments from Plaintiffs during the
class period. Specifically, Defendant over-withheld between .1¢ and .4¢ per hour in WBF
benefits from the wages of nearly 5,000 employees over the six-year limitations period for a total
of $21,945.29 in WBF over-withholding.7 At summary judgment Defendant conceded that its
over-withholding of WBF assessments from its Oregon employees was a wrongful deduction in
violation of Oregon Revised Statutes § 652.610(3). Accordingly, Judge Brown concluded at
summary judgment that Defendant violated § 652.610(3) when it improperly over-withheld WBF
funds from Plaintiffs throughout the class period. Defendant concedes that pursuant to Oregon
Revised Statute § 652.615 the WBF class is entitled to an award of $993,4008 in statutory
damages for the over-withholding of WBF benefits in violation of § 652.610(3).
Defendant asserted at summary judgment that the over-withholding of WBF benefits
was not willful within the meaning of Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.150 because it was the result of a
payroll software issue and, therefore, an unintentional miscalculation. Specifically, when
Defendant’s payroll software was initially programmed and put in place in 2003, the WBF
assessment rate for employees was properly calculated. Beginning in 2004, however, when the
State decreased the WBF assessment rate, the employee portion of the assessment remained
fixed at the 2003 rate in Defendant’s computer system causing Defendant’s portion of the
7 $13,468.37 of the $21,945.29 was over withheld during the three-year limitations period
applicable to claims under Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.150 for penalty wages.
8 The amount is calculated as $200 for each of the 4,967 who had WBF over-withholding
during the class period.
14 - OPINION & ORDER
assessment to decrease. As a result, Defendant paid less than 50% of the WBF assessment rate
and its employees paid more than 50%. The record at summary judgment reflected Defendant
was aware of Oregon’s annual changes in the overall WBF assessment rate and that Defendant’s
corporate agents entered the changed overall WBF assessment rate in Defendant’s computer
system. Judge Brown, therefore, found Defendant’s failure to adjust the employees’ assessment
rate was not an unintentional miscalculation. Judge Brown concluded “[r]egardless whether
Defendant failed to review the employee withholding rate during the relevant period or whether
Defendant was unaware of its legal requirement not to withhold more of the WBF assessment
from employees than from itself, Defendant’s failure makes Defendant the kind of ‘careless
employer’ the Sabin court concluded willfully violated Oregon’s wage-and-hour laws.” Opinion
and Order [217] at 55 (citing Sabin v. Willamette–Western Corp., 276 Or. 1083, 1093 (1976);
Elonis v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015)(“The familiar maxim ignorance of the law is no
excuse typically holds true. Instead, . . . a defendant generally must know the facts that make his
conduct fit the definition of the offense even if he does not know that those facts give rise to [an
offense].”)(quotation omitted)). Judge Brown concluded Defendant’s over-withholding of WBF
benefits was willful within the meaning of Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.150 and, therefore, Plaintiffs
were entitled to penalty wages pursuant to § 652.150 for the over-withholding.
Ultimately the jury found WBF class members established that Defendant’s over-
withholding of WBF benefits caused class members not to be paid minimum wages or sufficient
overtime or not to receive all of the wages due in their final paycheck. The jury identified the
amount of penalty wages for WBF over-withholding that caused class members not to receive
minimum wage to be $2,692,452; that caused class members not to receive sufficient overtime to
15 - OPINION & ORDER
be $909,368.80; and that caused class members not to receive all of their wages in their final
paychecks to be $1,705,768.80, for a total of penalty wages for over-withholding of WBF
benefits of $5,307,589.60 for the class.
II. Penalty Wages and Due Process
Plaintiffs are entitled to penalty wages for Defendant’s over-withholding of WBF
benefits pursuant to Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.150(1), which provides in pertinent part:
if an employer willfully fails to pay any wages or compensation of any employee
whose employment ceases . . . then, as a penalty for the nonpayment, the wages or
compensation of the employee shall continue from the due date thereof at the
same hourly rate for eight hours per day until paid or until action therefor is
commenced. However . . . [i]n no case shall the penalty wages or compensation
continue for more than 30 days from the due date.
The Oregon Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of § 652.150 in State ex rel Nilsen v.
Johnston, 233 Or. 103 (1962). The Court noted the purpose of § 652.150 is “to protect
employees from unscrupulous or careless employers who fail to compensate their employees
although they are fully aware of their obligation to do so” and that § 652.150 “operates only
where the employer has ‘wilfully’ failed to meet [its] obligations” under Oregon’s wage-and-
hour laws. Id. at 108. The Court rejected the defendants’ argument that § 652.150 violated the
due process clause of the United States Constitution because “application of the penalty results in
an arbitrary and unreasonable confiscation of property” pointing out that the defendants “proceed
on the assumption that the employer who is being penalized is ignorant of the fact that he is
indebted to his former employee. We have already shown that this assumption is erroneous and
. . . the statute penalizes only employers who do not pay even though they know . . .
compensation is due.” Id.at 109. The Court also found without merit the defendants’ argument
16 - OPINION & ORDER
that the “amount of the penalty is arbitrary and unreasonable in that it has no relationship to the
employee’s loss” because the Court was “unable to discover any evidence in the record which
supports [that] contention.” Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded § 652.150 is constitutional on
its face and as applied under the circumstances of Johnston. Oregon courts, however, have not
addressed whether aggregated penalty wages awarded pursuant to § 652.150 in a class action can
violate the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
In St. Louis I.M. & S. Railway Company v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919), the United
States Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a statutory penalty that greatly exceeded
the damages amount for the violation. In that case, an Arkansas statute regulated rates for the
transportation of passengers between points within the state and provided that any railroad
company that “demand[ed] or collect[ed] a greater compensation than the statute prescribe[ed]
[was] subject ‘for every such offense’ to a penalty of ‘not less than fifty dollars nor more than
three hundred dollars.’” Id. at 64. The defendant railroad company, which was subject to the
statute, “demanded and collected 66 cents more than the prescribed fare from each of two sisters
carried over part of its line.” Id. The sisters brought two actions against the defendant, and each
obtained a judgment against the defendant for, among other things, the overcharge of 66¢ and a
penalty of $75. Id. The defendant appealed9 and asserted the penalty provision of the statute
violated the due process clause of the United States Constitution because it was “arbitrary and
unreasonable, and not proportionate to the actual damages sustained.” Id. The Supreme Court
noted “the power of the state to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its statutory
9 The actions were consolidated for appeal.
17 - OPINION & ORDER
requirements is coeval with government.” Id. at 66 (quotation omitted). In addition, the fact that
the penalty is “giv[en] . . . to the aggrieved passenger” rather than to the state did not “require
that it be confined or proportioned to his loss or damages; for, as it is imposed as a punishment
for the violation of a public law, the Legislature may adjust its amount to the public wrong rather
than the private injury, just as if it were going to the state.” Id. Thus, although the due process
clause “places a limitation upon the power of the states to prescribe penalties for violations of
their laws,” that limitation includes “the express or tacit qualification that the states still possess a
wide latitude of discretion in the matter, and that their enactments transcend the limitation only
where the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the
offense and obviously unreasonable.” Id. at 66-67. The Court noted that the Arkansas Supreme
Court explained the need for penalty at issue in the Arkansas statute as follows:
‘It is commonly known that carriers are not prone to adhere uniformly to rates
lawfully prescribed and it is necessary that deviation from such rates be
discouraged and prohibited by adequate liabilities and penalties, and we regard
the penalties prescribed as no more than reasonable and adequate to accomplish
the purpose of the law and remedy the evil intended to be reached.’
Id. at 67 (quoting Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Davis, 114 Ark. 519, 525 (1914)).
The Supreme Court concluded the penalty did not violate the due process clause even though it
was more than 113 times greater than the damages suffered by the plaintiffs because the validity
of a statutory penalty “is not to be tested in that way.” Williams, 251 U.S. at 67. Rather
[w]hen [the statutory penalty] is considered with due regard for the interests of the
public, the numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for
securing uniform adherence to established passenger rates, . . . it . . . cannot be
said to be so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense
or obviously unreasonable.
Id.
18 - OPINION & ORDER
In United States v. Citrin, 972 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit considered
Williams in the context of an action for violation of the National Health Service Corps (“NHSC”)
Scholarship Program. In that case the defendant received an NHSC scholarship for medical
school, but failed to complete either the required deferral materials or medical service in an
underserved area. The government, therefore, brought an action against the defendant for
payment of damages at the statutorily prescribed amount of “treble the scholarship” and “treble
the interest rate.” Id. at 1048. The district court granted the government’s requested damages and
interest and issued a judgment for $176,026.02. Id. The defendant appealed alleging, among
other things, that the damages were “so excessive that they violate[d] his due process rights.” Id.
The Ninth Circuit described the damages as a “statutorily prescribed penalty” and noted
statutorily prescribed penalties violate “due process rights ‘only where the penalty prescribed is
so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously
unreasonable.’” Id. at 1051 (quoting Williams, 251 U.S. at 66-67). The Ninth Circuit considered
the factors set out in Williams including the public policy underlying the NHSC scholarship
program, which was “to address the maldistribution of health care professionals in the United
States,” and concluded “[g]iven the resources necessary to find a doctor to practice in an
underserved area, the damages in this case . . . are not so unreasonable that they violate due
process.” Id. at 1046, 1051.
Taken together, these cases indicate that the constitutionality of a statutorily prescribed
penalty is generally not to be evaluated by its ratio to the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
Rather, courts should consider factors such as the interests of the public, the opportunities for
committing the offense, and the need for securing uniform adherence to rates established by the
19 - OPINION & ORDER
state in determining whether a statutorily prescribed penalty is so unreasonable as to violate due
process.
Defendant relies on BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), and
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), to
support its argument that the penalty wages in this matter violate due process because they
greatly exceed Plaintiffs’ actual damages. In Wakefield, however, the Ninth Circuit explicitly
declined to apply the tests set out by the Supreme Court in Gore and State Farm both specifically
in that case and generally “outside the context of jury’s award of punitive damages.” 51 F.4th at
1122.
Although Wakefield involved an award of statutory damages rather than a statutory
penalty,10 it provides some guidance on assessing the constitutionality of a damages award
prescribed by statute in the context of a class-action case. In Wakefield the plaintiff filed a class
action for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The jury found the
defendant sent 1,850,440 prerecorded calls to class members in violation of the TCPA and,
because the TCPA sets minimum statutory damages at $500 per call,11 awarded statutory
damages of $925,220,222. The defendant filed a post-trial motion challenging the statutory
damages award as “unconstitutionally excessive.” 51 F.4th at 1113. The district court denied the
motion noting “it was within Congress’s discretion to fix damages for a violation of the TCPA at
10 The trial court specifically declined to award statutory penalty damages based on its
finding that the defendant did not willfully or knowingly violate the statute. Wakefield v. Visalus,
Case No. 3:15-cv-01857-SI, ECF 326.
11 The TCPA provides: “A person or entity may . . . bring . . . an action to recover for
actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such
violation, whichever is greater. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(3)(B).
20 - OPINION & ORDER
$500 and that due process did not require the court to consider the constitutionality of the
statutory damages award in the aggregate.” Id. at 1117. The defendant appealed. On appeal the
Ninth Circuit noted “[j]uries and legislatures enjoy broad discretion in awarding damages,” but
that discretion is constrained by the due process clause. Id. at 1120. The court noted that “[i]n
recent years, numerous cases have outlined criteria for evaluating when punitive damages
awarded by a jury exceed constitutional limitations,” but “[h]ow the Constitution limits the
award of statutory damages is less developed.” Id. “[C]onstitutional due process concerns are
heightened [when] . . . statutory damages are awarded as a matter of strict liability [because]
plaintiffs are unable to quantify any actual damages they have suffered from receiving the
robocalls.” Id. In those circumstances courts “must evaluate an award of statutory damages ‘with
due regard for the interests of the public, the numberless opportunities for committing the
offense, and the need for securing uniform adherence’ to the statute.” Id. (quoting Williams, 251
U.S. at 67). The court noted that although it has “recognized the application of Williams to
statutory awards on a per-violation basis,” it has “grappled with the constitutionality of statutory
damages awards challenged in the aggregate whe[n] the award is unusually high because of
either the large number of violations at issue in a single dispute or . . . the aggregation of
damages in class action litigation.” Id. at 1121 (citations omitted). Ultimately the Ninth Circuit
concluded that even though Williams did not address an aggregated damages award, the
constitutional due-process test set out in that case applied because Williams “did not turn on the
amount of the per-violation penalty,” rather the Court “evaluated the importance of the
proscribed conduct . . . and the likelihood of violations.” Id. at 1122.
The Ninth Circuit also noted its decision in Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus
21 - OPINION & ORDER
Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1990), “provides further guidance for determining whether a
particular statutory damages award is disproportionately punitive in the aggregate.” Id.at 1123.
In that case the Ninth Circuit “reviewed an aggregated damages award in a class action lawsuit
for violations of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act (‘FLCRA’).” Id. at 1122. The court
found “the individual awards exceeded both ‘what was necessary to compensate any potential
injury from the violations’ and the awards, in the aggregate, exceeded ‘that necessary to enforce
the Act or deter future violations.’” Wakefield, 51 F.4th at 1122 (quoting Six Mexican Workers,
904 F.2d at 1309). The court noted Six Mexican Workers “addressed a somewhat different issue
than the one [in Wakefield]: the case dealt with the reduction of damages per violation to an
amount within a statutorily defined range [and] [t]he FLCRA . . . did not contemplate punitive
penalties in the calculation of liquidated damages.” Wakefield, 51 F.4th at 1123 (citations
omitted). Nevertheless, the court found Six Mexican Workers “points courts to factors to help
assess proportionality and reasonableness and so can guide trial courts in determining when an
award is extremely disproportionate to the offense and ‘obviously’ unreasonable.” Id. (quoting
Williams, 251 U.S. at 67)(emphasis in Wakefield). The factors include: “1) the amount of award
to each plaintiff, 2) the total award, 3) the nature and persistence of the violations, 4) the extent
of the defendant's culpability, 5) damage awards in similar cases, 6) the substantive or technical
nature of the violations, and 7) the circumstances of each case.” Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d
at 1309 (quotation omitted).
The Ninth Circuit concluded in Wakefield that “evaluation of an award’s relationship
to the offense requires consideration of the statute’s public importance and deterrence goals” as
well as the Six Mexican Workers factors. 51 F.4th at 1122. The court noted “the goals of a statute
22 - OPINION & ORDER
in imposing a per-violation award may become unduly punitive when aggregated,” but stressed
that “only very rarely will an aggregated statutory damages award meet the exacting Williams
standard and exceed constitutional limitations [when] the per-violation amount does not”
recognizing that “[l]egislatures are empowered to prescribe purely punitive penalties for
violations of statutes.” Id. at 1123. The Ninth Circuit cautioned that reducing aggregated
statutory damages awards without satisfying the Williams criteria would “overstep the role of the
judiciary and usurp the power of the legislature” and noted it was “constrained . . . [to] interpret
statutes with awareness that Congress could have enacted limits as to damages, including in large
class action litigation, provided discretion to courts to award damages within a given range, or
limited liability in any number of ways.” Id. at 1124. Thus, “because the appropriate penalty for
statutory violations is a legislative decision best left to Congress, courts should disregard the
plain statutory language directing damages and allowing class action and other aggregations only
in the most egregious of circumstances.” Id. Ultimately, the Wakefield court did not conclude the
award of $925,220,000 was constitutionally excessive, rather it reversed and remanded the
matter to the trial court to apply the Williams test as well as factors set out in Six Mexican
Workers and to assess whether the award was “so severe and oppressive that it violates . . . due
process.” Id. at 1125.
In summary although the aggregate award to which Defendant objects in this matter is
one of penalty wages rather than statutory damages, the Court believes the Ninth Circuit would
approve the application of tests out in Williams and Six Mexican Workers to evaluate the
constitutionality of the award of penalty wages in this case.
23 - OPINION & ORDER
III. Analysis
A. Williams Factors
As noted, the factors the Supreme Court set out in Williams are the interests
of the public, the opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for securing uniform
adherence to the statute.
1. Public Interest
It is the public policy of this state that no person shall be hired, nor
permitted to work for wages, under any conditions or terms, for
longer hours or days of service than is consistent with the person's
health and physical well-being and ability to promote the general
welfare by the person's increasing usefulness as a healthy and
intelligent citizen.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.010(1). Oregon Revised Statute § 653.015 “declare[s] [it] to be the policy of
the State of Oregon to establish minimum wage standards for workers at levels consistent with
their health, efficiency and general well-being.” “Oregon has expressed in its wage-and-hour
laws a strong public policy interest in the full and timely payment of employee wages generally
and upon termination.” Schedler v. FieldTurf USA, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-0344-PK, 2017 WL
3412205, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 9, 2017). “Oregon's wage and hour statutes were enacted to protect
wage earners from employers who might use their positions of economic superiority to hinder
the payment of such wages, [therefore,] those statutes represent sound public policy geared
toward remediating inequities arising from that power disparity.” Jones v. Four Corners Rod &
Gun Club, 366 Or. 100, 132–33 (2020)(dissent). The importance of Oregon’s public policy to
protect wage earners is indicated by the legislature’s decision to mandate the penalty for unpaid
wages set out in § 652.150. As the Court noted in Johnston, the purpose of § 652.150 is “to
24 - OPINION & ORDER
protect employees from unscrupulous or careless employers who fail to compensate their
employees although they are fully aware of their obligation to do so.” Johnston, 233 Or. at 108.
Oregon has further emphasized the importance of the public policy to protect wage earners by
the fact that the Commissioner of the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (“BOLI”) may
assess civil penalties for employers who violate Oregon’s wage-and-hour laws. See, e.g., Or.
Rev. Stat. § 652.900(1)(“In addition to any other penalty provided by law, the Commissioner of
[BOLI] may assess a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000 against any person who violates ORS
652.020, 652.110, 652.140, 652.145, 652.260, 652.610 (4) or 652.750 or any rule adopted under
those statutes.”
The California Supreme Court noted in construing California’s
Labor Code §§ 201 through 203, which served as the model for Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.150:
The public policy in favor of full and prompt payment of an
employee's earned wages is fundamental and well established:
Delay of payment or loss of wages results in deprivation of the
necessities of life, suffering inability to meet just obligations to
others, and, in many cases may make the wage-earner a charge
upon the public. . . . It has long been recognized that wages are not
ordinary debts, that they may be preferred over other claims, and
that, because of the economic position of the average worker and,
in particular, his dependence on wages for the necessities of life for
himself and his family, it is essential to the public welfare that he
receive his pay when it is due. An employer who knows that wages
are due, has ability to pay them, and still refuses to pay them, acts
against good morals and fair dealing, and necessarily intentionally
does an act which prejudices the rights of his employee. See Gould
v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc., 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1147
(1995)(statute criminalizing prompt payment violations shows “the
policy involves a broad public interest, not merely the interest of
the employee.”). . . . [S]ections 201 and 203 . . . implement[] this
fundamental public policy regarding prompt wage payment.
Smith v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal. 4th 77, 82 (2006)(citations and quotations omitted). Oregon, like
25 - OPINION & ORDER
California, has criminalized violations of Oregon’s wage-and-hour laws. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 652.990(8)(“Violation of ORS 652.610 or 652.620 is a Class D violation”); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 653.991 (“Violation of any provision of this section or ORS 653.010 to 653.565 or of any rule
adopted by [BOLI] under ORS 653.307 is . . . a [Class A] misdemeanor” punishable by up to a
year in jail and/or a fine of up to $6,250). This indicates “the policy involves a broad public
interest, not merely the interest of the employee.” Gould, 31 Cal. App.4th at 1147.
In summary, Oregon’s wage-and-hour laws are based on strong
public policies to protect the full and timely payment of wages, to protect wage earners from
employers who might use their positions of economic superiority to hinder the payment of such
wages, and to remediate inequities arising from that power disparity. The public policies
underlying Oregon’s wage-and-hour laws are of fundamental importance to individual
employees and to the public welfare because the delay or nonpayment of wages results in
deprivation of the necessities of life, including the inability to meet just obligations to others.
The Court, therefore, finds this factor does not favor reducing the penalty-wage award.
2. Opportunities for Committing the Offense
In Williams the Court considered the fact that the defendant had
“numberless opportunities for committing the offense” because individuals rode the defendant’s
railway line regularly. Plaintiffs here note Defendant’s failure to adjust its computer program for
employees’ WBF withholding led to Defendant improperly over-withholding WBF contributions
from every paycheck of every Oregon employee of Defendant for nearly ten years. Plaintiffs
assert “there could hardly be a wage and hour issue that provides for more ‘numberless
opportunities’ than a deduction that applies to every single hour worked by every employee in
26 - OPINION & ORDER
Oregon.” Pls. Resp. at 9.
Defendant points out that after it discovered the over-withholding
in a February 2012 deposition, it corrected the error. The Court notes, however, that Defendant
sold its last Oregon stores on September 30, 2011, and, therefore, by February 2012 it no longer
had Oregon employees. During the period relevant to this action and within the penalty-wage
limitation period Defendant’s ability to commit the offense of over-withholding WBF
contributions was limited only by the number of individuals it employed in Oregon. The Court,
therefore, finds this factor does not favor reducing the penalty wage award.
3. Need to Secure Uniform Adherence to the Statute
The Court noted in Williams that “it is necessary that deviation
from [uniform, established passenger rates] be discouraged and prohibited by adequate liabilities
and penalties.” 251 U.S. at 67. Plaintiffs assert that unless wage-and-hour rules are applied
uniformly across all employers, unscrupulous employers could gain a competitive financial
advantage over employers who adhere to the law. In addition, failure to uniformly adhere to
Oregon’s wage-and-hour laws could result in the failure to protect employees from employers
who “might use their positions of economic superiority to hinder the payment of such wages.”
Jones, 366 Or. at 133. These results are anathema to the stated public policies and purposes
behind Oregon’s wage-and-hour laws. The Court concludes it is necessary that deviation from
the uniform and established wage-and-hour laws must be discouraged and prohibited.
Accordingly, this factor does not favor reducing the penalty wages award.
B. Six Mexican Workers Factors
As noted, the factors set out by the Ninth Circuit in Six Mexican Workers are
27 - OPINION & ORDER
(1) the amount of award to each plaintiff, (2) the total award, (3) the nature and persistence of the
violations, (4) the extent of the defendant's culpability, (5) damage awards in similar cases,
(6) the substantive or technical nature of the violations, and (7) the circumstances of each case.
1. Each Class Plaintiff’s Award
The amount of penalty wages awarded to each WBF class member
varied due to the differing wage rates of class members as well as nature of the wages that were
unpaid (minimum wages, overtime, or late pay). The record at trial, however, reflects most of the
class members were awarded approximately $2,000 in penalty wages. In Six Mexican Workers
the Ninth Circuit found awards to class members that ranged between $400 and $1,600
“exceeded what was necessary to compensate any potential injury” and what is necessary “to
enforce the Act or deter future violations.” 904 F.2d at 1309. Plaintiffs here point out, however,
that the Ninth Circuit reduced the total award in Six Mexican Workers to an amount that resulted
in an average award of $630 per class member, which, adjusted for inflation, would be $1,472.42
per class member today, a sum more in line with the $2,000 per class member here. Plaintiffs
also note that employees in Oregon routinely obtain penalty wages on an individual basis in the
$2,000 range and those have never been found to be unconstitutionally large. The Court,
therefore, finds this factor does not favor reducing the penalty-wage award.
2. The Total Award
The total WBF class penalty-wage award was $5,307,589.60 due
in large part to the fact that there are nearly 5,000 class members. Although Six Mexican Workers
found an award of $1,846,500 for a class of 1,349 members was constitutionally excessive, that
case involved compensatory statutory damages rather than penalty wages. The court in that case,
28 - OPINION & ORDER
therefore, did not cite or analyze Williams in its decision to reduce the damages. In addition,
although the Ninth Circuit in Wakefield expressed concern about the possible constitutionality of
a statutory damages award of $925,220,222, which is more than 174 times the award in this case,
it did not find the award to be unconstitutional. Instead, it remanded the matter to the district
court for further consideration in light of the guidance provided by the court. This factor,
therefore, does not clearly favor either Defendant or Plaintiffs’ position.
3. Nature and Persistence of the Violations, the Substantive or
Technical Nature of the Violations, and the Extent of
Defendant’s Culpability
These three factors are intertwined in this case. As noted, the
record reflects Defendant over-withheld WBF contributions from every paycheck of every
Oregon employee for nearly a decade and corrected its error only after it no longer had any
Oregon employees. Although Defendant notes the individual over-withholdings were very small,
ranging between .1¢ and .4¢ per hour, that does not excuse the fact that Defendant committed the
violation thousands of times as to thousands of employees. These violations were not isolated
incidents or the result of a few mangers engaging in violative behavior, but rather the result of a
state-wide, company-driven system that persisted from 2004 through 2012.
Defendant also relies on the fact that the over-withholding was due
to a computer error. Judge Brown, however, found Defendant’s behavior to be willful and not an
unintentional miscalculation. Defendant’s over-withholding reduced employee’s wages and was
not merely a technical violation of Oregon’s wage-and-hour laws. The Court, therefore,
concludes these factors do not favor reducing the penalty-wage award.
29 - OPINION & ORDER
4. Damage Awards in Similar Cases
There are few Oregon wage-and-hour class-action cases to which
to compare the jury award in this case. Plaintiffs cite Migis v. Autozone, Inc., 282 Or. App. 774
(2016). In that case the plaintiffs filed a class action alleging the defendant failed to pay them for
certain time they spent at work doing work-related tasks and failed to timely pay final wages
when due in violation of Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 653.055 and 652.140. The plaintiffs also
sought penalty wages pursuant to § 652.150. The jury returned a verdict against the defendant as
to the off-the-clock and final-wages claims and awarded the plaintiffs actual damages in the
amount of $110,030. The trial court then held a bench trial and “determined civil penalties
[pursuant to § 652.150] in the amount of $2,439,266.” Id. at 779. The defendant filed a motion to
reduce the penalty wages on the basis that the “penalties exceeded what was permissible under
federal due process.” Id. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant renewed the motion
after the trial court entered a judgment and the trial court again denied the motion. The defendant
challenged the award of penalty wages on appeal on the basis that the jury was required to make
a factual finding of willfulness in order for the court to award penalty wages. The defendant did
not, however, challenge the trial court’s rulings regarding the constitutionality of the penalty-
wage award. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the trial court erred when
it did not require the jury to decide whether the defendant’s failure to pay wages was willful
before the court assessed penalty wages. Although the Oregon Court of Appeals did not address
the constitutionality of the amount of penalty wages, the trial court’s rulings indicate an
aggregate award of $2,439,266, composed of $2,386.75 per class member, is not
unconstitutionally high.
30 - OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiffs also point to Delgado v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.,
Inc., 260 Or. App. 480 (2014), in which a class of 306 plaintiffs was awarded penalty wages
pursuant to § 652.150 of $720,741.86, or $2,355.36 per class member. Defendant points out that
the defendant in that case challenged the award of penalty wages on the grounds that the class
should have been decertified and no “joint employer” relationship existed. The defendant did not
make a due-process challenge to the amount of the penalty-wage award. The Court agrees that
because the due-process issue was not raised, Delgado is not a strong comparator case.
Defendant cites Montera v. Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 16-CV-
06980-RS, 2022 WL 3348573 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2022), as a similar case. In that case the
plaintiffs brought a class action for violations of New York General Business Law (“GBL”)
§§ 349 and 350. The jury found the class proved actual damages in the amount of $1,488,078.49.
The plaintiffs then brought a motion for entry of judgment seeking statutory damages “in the
amount of $50 per unit sold for violations of GBL § 349 and $500 per unit sold for violations of
GBL § 350” totaling a statutory damages award of $91,436,950. Id., at *1. The court declined to
award statutory damages of $91,436,950 and instead found statutory damages of $8,312,450,
which was calculated as $50 per unit sold, to be a more appropriate award. Id., at *6. Montera,
however, has limited usefulness as comparator case because, unlike Oregon, New York law
specifically limits the ability of class-action plaintiffs to obtain statutory damages. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 901(b)(“Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery
specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or
minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class
action.”). In fact, the court noted the New York legislature amended § 901(b) to include the
31 - OPINION & ORDER
limitation on statutory damages in class actions in an effort “to avoid ‘annihilating punishment of
the defendant.’” Id., at *4 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393,
444 (2010)(dissent)). Thus, unlike Oregon, the New York legislature specifically weighed the
public interest and the possibly punitive nature of aggregated statutory damages awards and
decided in favor of limiting statutory damages in class actions. The Montera court noted that the
New York legislature’s “explicit concern about the punitive nature of aggregated statutory
damages differentiates this case from others involving high awards of statutory damages.” 2022
WL 3348573, at *5. The court strongly considered New York’s stated preference to avoid
statutory damages in its evaluation of the request for $91 million by plaintiffs. In addition, unlike
§ 652.150, GBL §§ 349 and 350 do not set out either a specific amount of damages for violations
of those sections or a method required to calculate such damages. Accordingly, the New York
legislature did not indicate what amount of damages or what calculation process was sufficient to
compensate plaintiffs or to deter future conduct by defendants, but that was also unlikely to
punish violators too harshly. This case, therefore, is not a strong comparator.
Defendant also points to Golan v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 950 (8th Cir.
2019), in which plaintiffs brought a class action for violations of the TCPA based on
approximately 3.2 million robocalls made to class members in one week. The jury found in favor
of the plaintiffs and, pursuant to the TCPA’s statutory damages provision, awarded statutory
damages of $500 per call for a total of $1,621,246,500. The defendant moved for a reduction of
damages on the basis that the award was so excessive that it violated due process. The district
court granted the motion and reduced the statutory damages award to $32,000,000 based on $10
per call. The Eighth Circuit affirmed noting “[t]o state the obvious, $1.6 billion is a shockingly
32 - OPINION & ORDER
large amount.” Id. at 962. The defendant “plausibly believed it was not violating the TCPA,” the
advertising campaign that generated the calls was “conducted for only about a week,” and the
“harm to the recipients was not severe - only about 7% of the calls made it to the” relevant
question. Id. at 963. The Court finds this case is also a weak comparator because here there is no
dispute that Defendant understood its obligation to withhold no more than 50% of the WBF
assessment from employees’ wages at the time that it over-withheld WBF funds; Defendant
committed the violation for several years; and although the amounts of individual WBF over-
withholdings were small, Oregon has expressed a strong public policy in favor of employees
receiving all of their wages when they are due. In addition, $1.6 billion in statutory damages is
over 305 times the award of penalty wages in this case and, therefore, is of limited assistance in
evaluating the constitutionality of an award of just over $5.3 million.
In summary, the parties do not point to any case that is extremely similar to
this case, but the Court finds that the Migis decision slightly favors not reducing the penalty
wage award.
C. Conclusion
The Williams and Six Mexican Workers factors mainly favor not reducing the
penalty wage award. The Court notes again that “Oregon has expressed in its wage-and-hour
laws a strong public policy interest in the full and timely payment of employee wages generally
and upon termination.” Schedler, 2017 WL 3412205, at *3. “Oregon's wage and hour statutes
were enacted to protect wage earners from employers who might use their positions of economic
superiority to hinder the payment of such wages, [therefore,] those statutes represent sound
public policy geared toward remediating inequities arising from that power disparity.” 366 Or. at
33 - OPINION & ORDER
132–33. The Oregon legislature balanced this strong public policy with the risk of excessive
penalty awards to employers by enacting § 652.150, which permits penalty wages, but caps them
at the employee’s hourly rate times eight hours times not more than 30 days. The Oregon
legislature also provided other ways in which employers can limit penalty wages under
§ 652.150. This Court must be careful not to “overstep the role of the judiciary and usurp the
power of the legislature” and must “interpret statutes with awareness that [the Oregon
legislature] . . . enacted limits as to damages.” Wakefield, 51 F.4th at 1124. As noted,
Defendant’s violations occurred against every Oregon employee in every paycheck for years. In
addition, many of the employees impacted by Defendant’s violations were minimum wage
workers. Finally, Oregon’s need to secure uniform compliance with its wage-and-hour laws is
fundamental and important. The Court, therefore, finds based on the Williams and Six Mexican
Workers factors that this case does not present the “most egregious of circumstances” in which
the Court should “disregard the plain statutory language directing damages and allowing class
action and other aggregation” and concludes the penalty-wage award is not “so severe and
oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously unreasonable.” Williams,
251 U.S. at 67. Accordingly, the Court concludes the penalty-wage award does not violate due
process.
D. Discretion to Reduce Penalty Award
Defendant asserts even if the Court concludes pursuant to Williams and Six
Mexican Workers that the penalty-wage award is constitutional the Court should exercise its
discretion to reduce the award. Oregon Revised Statute § 652.150, however, mandates that the
Court award penalty wages under the circumstances of this case. That statute also sets out the
34 - OPINION & ORDER
required method of calculating penalty wages as well as specific limitations on such an award.
There is no provision in § 652.150 that allows for the reduction of penalty wages outside of the
limits provided in that statute. Under these circumstances, courts have made clear that damages
“may only be reduced if the award would be unconstitutional.” Golan, 930 F.3d at 962. As the
court explained in Golan “nothing in the relevant provision of the TCPA itself . . . allows for the
reduction of statutory damages. . . . A separate provision of the TCPA allows damages of “up to
$500 . . .” per violation, illustrating . . . that Congress knows how to create flexibility in statutory
damages, but did not do so here.” Id. Accordingly, when, as here, the legislature has established
a specific amount or method of calculating statutory penalties, the Court does not have discretion
to reduce a penalty award unless the award is unconstitutional. The Court, therefore, concludes it
does not have discretion to decrease the penalty-wage award because it has concluded the
penalty-wage award is constitutional. In addition, even if the Court had discretion to reduce the
award, it would decline to do so for the same reasons that it found the penalty-wage award does
not violate due process. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Reduce Damages
Award.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO LIMIT PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
FOR DELAYS ATTRIBUTABLE TO PLAINTIFFS
Defendant requests the Court toll prejudgment interest for a total of three years and
four months on the basis that Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed this action in two separate periods:
(1) November 1, 2011, through June 10, 2014, and (2) from December 6, 2021, through
October 17, 2022.
35 - OPINION & ORDER
I. Prejudgment Interest
It is undisputed that prejudgment interest in this case is governed by Oregon Revised
Statute § 82.010(1)(a), which provides: “The rate of interest . . . is nine percent per annum and is
payable on . . . [a]ll moneys after they become due.” “[T]he general rule, reflected in ORS
82.010(1)(a), [is] that interest accrues on money only after it ‘becomes due.’ Once due, the
debtor has the use of money to which the debtor is not entitled, while the delay in payment
deprives the creditor of that use.” Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Or., 353 Or. 210, 241 (2013)
(citation omitted).
“The allowance of prejudgment interest in an action is not a matter of judicial
discretion, but is required by ORS 82.010(1)(a) on ‘all moneys after they become due.’”
Highway Comm. v. DeLong Corp., 275 Or. 351, 357 n.2 (1976). The Oregon Court of Appeals
explained the “uncompromising language” of Or. Rev. Stat. § 82.010(1)(a) “has long been
subject to a judicial gloss” that indicates “a party can receive prejudgment interest only [1] when
the exact pecuniary amount was either ascertained, or ascertainable by simple computation” and
(2) “the time from which interest . . . must run . . . can be ascertained.” Wilson v. Smurfit
Newsprint Corp., 197 Or. App. 648, 673 (2005)(quotations omitted)(emphasis removed).
II. Analysis
Defendant does not dispute that the exact amount of the damages in this matter are set
by statute or that the date from which prejudgment begins to run is October 31, 2011, as decided
by the jury and by the parties’ stipulation. The sole limiting factors identified by the “judicial
gloss” on Or. Rev. Stat. § 82.010, therefore, have been satisfied. Defendant also concedes no
Oregon court has found that “the period of time during which [prejudgment interest] may be
36 - OPINION & ORDER
awarded is subject to judicial discretion based on unreasonable delays caused by a party to whom
money is due.” Def.’s Mot. at 5. Nevertheless, Defendant points to decisions by courts in other
states and asks this Court to read into § 82.010 the authority to “toll” prejudgment interest.
When “‘interpreting a state statute, a federal court applies the relevant state's rules of
statutory construction.’” LL Liquor, Inc. v. Montana, 835 F. App'x 917, 920 (9th Cir. 2020)
(quoting In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 746 (9th Cir. 2013)).
Accordingly, the Court applies Oregon’s rules of statutory construction to interpret § 82.010.
Oregon Revised Statute § 174.010 provides:
In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and
declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has
been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several
provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will
give effect to all.
When construing a statute, “a court shall pursue the intention of the legislature if possible.” Or.
Rev. Stat. § 174.020(1)(a). See also State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 165 (2009)(“ORS 174.020
codifies - as it has for many years - the cardinal rule of statutory construction that a court shall
pursue the intention of the legislature if possible.”)(quotation omitted).
The language of § 82.010 is clear and unambiguous: prejudgment interest at the rate
set out in that statute is required to be paid on all funds after they are determined to have been
owed to the creditor. The jury determined all funds for the WBF claims became due on
October 31, 2011, and the parties determined by stipulation that all other funds became due that
same day. The Court is not free to ignore the clear language of § 82.010 or to create exceptions
to the rule set out clearly therein. The Court also finds that tolling prejudgment interest would
not pursue the intent of the legislature to compensate creditors for the deprivation of the use of
37 - OPINION & ORDER
money to which debtors were not entitled. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to
Limit Prejudgment Interest.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Correct Verdict, ECF
394; DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Reduce Unconstitutionally Excessive Damage Awards,
ECF 397; and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Limit Prejudgment Interest for Delays
Attributable to Plaintiffs, ECF 399.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:________M_a__rc_h_ _3_0_,_ 2_0_2__3__
MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ
United States District Judge
38 - OPINION & ORDER