The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
TYLER GARDNER; 1,700 JOHN DOES; Case No. 2:21-cv-01256-SB
and all others similarly situated,
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
v.
KATE BROWN et al.,
Defendants.
BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
Tyler Gardner (“Gardner”), a self-represented litigant in the custody of the Oregon
Department of Corrections (“ODOC”), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“Section 1983”) against Governor Kate Brown (“Governor Brown”), Colette Peters, Oregon
Health Authority (“OHA”), and 100 John Does (together, “Defendants”), alleging violations of
his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the Religious Land and Institutionalized
Person Act.1 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion to stay this litigation.
For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to stay.
1 Gardner purports to represent himself and “1,700 John Does and all others similarly
situated” and captioned his complaint as a “Class Action Allegation Complaint.” However, as
BACKGROUND
Gardner is an AIC currently housed at the Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution . On
August 23, 2021, Gardner filed this action against Defendants, alleging that (1) Defendants’
failure adequately to respond to COVID-19 violates his Eighth Amendment rights; (2)
Defendants “forc[ed] mask mandates on incarcerated vaccinated individuals, while excluding
non-incarcerated individuals from the mask mandates” in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights;2 and (3) Defendants terminated religious services and practices in violation
of his First Amendment rights and the Religious Land and Institutionalized Person Act. (ECF
No. 2.)
Sixteen months earlier, on April 6, 2020, seven AICs (the “Maney Plaintiffs”), housed at
four ODOC institutions, filed a civil rights action under Section 1983 against Governor Brown
and several ODOC officials (together, the “Maney Defendants”). (Defs.’ Mot. to Stay at 3, ECF
No. 10; Maney et al. v. Brown et al., 6:20-cv-00570-SB (“Maney”), ECF No. 1.) The Maney
Plaintiffs allege that the Maney Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to their health and
safety by failing adequately to protect them from COVID-19 through social distancing, testing,
sanitizing, medical treatment, masking, and vaccines. (See Maney Sixth Am. Compl., ECF No.
282.)
On December 13, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to stay this matter pending resolution
of the motion for class certification in Maney. (Defs.’ Mot. to Stay at 1.)
the Court has recently held under similar circumstances, a self-represented adult in custody
(“AIC”) may not represent other plaintiffs in federal litigation. See Parkerson et al. v. Brown et
al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00214, 2021 WL 2188234, at *1 (D. Or. May 28, 2021).
2 Gardner separately alleges that the mask mandate, generally, is a violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
DISCUSSION
I. APPLICABLE LAW
“District courts have the discretion to stay proceedings pending before them.” Patton v.
DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 19-cv-00081, 2019 WL 851933, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019)
(citing Landis v. N.A. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936), and Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d
1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakama Nation v. Airgas
USA, LLC, 435 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1127 (D. Or. 2019) (“This court has the inherent power to
control its docket to ‘promote economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants.’”) (citation omitted). In deciding whether to grant a party’s motion to stay, courts in this
circuit typically consider the following three factors: “‘(1) [the] potential prejudice to the non-
moving party; (2) [the] hardship and inequity to the moving party if the action is not stayed; and
(3) the judicial resources that would be saved by avoiding duplicative litigation[.]’” Patton, 2019
WL 851933, at *3 (quoting Rivers v. Walt Disney Co., 980 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (C.D. Cal.
1997)).
II. ANALYSIS
The Court finds that, on balance, the relevant factors weigh in favor of staying this action
pending resolution of class certification in Maney.
First, there is substantial overlap between the parties and legal issues to resolve in the
Maney case and this case, as both actions include Section 1983 claims alleging that ODOC
officials acted with deliberate indifference to AICs’ health and safety by failing adequately to
protect them from COVID-19. (Maney Sixth Am. Compl. ¶ 92; Compl. at 2.) A stay will
conserve judicial resources by avoiding duplicative litigation.
Furthermore, a stay in this case will not result in significant delay, as the motion for class
certification in Maney will be fully briefed by January 7, 2022. (See Maney ECF No. 280.) If the
Court grants the Maney Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, Gardner may have the option of
proceeding as a member of the Damages Class if he has tested positive or has otherwise been
diagnosed with COVID-19, or he may opt out and litigate his own case. See McDaniels v.
Stewart, No. 15-CV-05943-BHS-DWC, 2017 WL 132454, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 2017)
(granting stay pending class certification and noting that “Plaintiff may elect to be a member of
the class if it is certified, or opt-out and proceed with his own case”). On the other hand, if the
Court denies class certification, Gardner faces only a brief delay in this matter.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that staying this litigation will conserve judicial
resources by avoiding duplicative litigation, and a stay will not unduly prejudice Gardner. See
McDaniels, 2017 WL 132454, at *2 (granting stay because “staying this action pending
resolution of class certification . . . promotes judicial economy and does not prejudice
Defendants”); see also Hilario Pankim v. Barr, No. 20-cv-02941-JSC, 2020 WL 2542022, at *11
(N.D. Cal. May 19, 2020) (staying habeas petition pending adjudication in separate class action
because “[t]he potential relief available to [the petitioner]—immediate release due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, the conditions of confinement at the Yuba County [Jail], and his
medical vulnerabilities—is the same substantive relief sought in this action and is based on the
same underlying facts” and therefore “a stay pending adjudication of [the class action] is
warranted”); Duong v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-02864-RMI, 2020 WL 2524252, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 18, 2020) (same); Calderon v. Barr, No. 2:20-cv-00891 KJM GGH, 2020 WL 2394287, at
*4-5 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2020) (same).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to stay (ECF No. 13), and
STAYS this action pending resolution of class certification in the Maney case.3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 29th day of December, 2021.
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
3 “[A] motion to stay is nondispositive where it ‘[does] not dispose of any claims or
defenses and [does] not effectively deny . . . any ultimate relief sought.’” James v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Corrs., No. 18-4545, 2019 WL 7494660, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2019) (quoting S.E.C. v.
CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 1260 (9th Cir. 2013)). Defendants’ motion to stay does
not dispose of any claims or defenses and does not effectively deny any ultimate relief. Thus, this
Court may resolve the motion to stay without full consent to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate
Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).