The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
TREMAYNE OMAR SLATER, Case No. 3:21-cv-00229-SB
Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
v.
KATE BROWN et al.,
Defendants.
BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Tremayne Slater (“Slater”), a self-represented litigant in the custody of the
Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (“Section 1983”) against Governor Kate Brown (“Governor Brown”), Colette Peters,
ODOC, Kimberly Hendricks, and the Superintendent of Coffee Creek Correctional Institution
(“CCCI”) (together, “Defendants”), alleging violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion to stay this litigation. For the
reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to stay.
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BACKGROUND
On February 11, 2021, Slater filed this action against Defendants, alleging that
Defendants’ failure adequately to respond to COVID-19 violated his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. (ECF No. 2 (“Compl.”).)
On April 6, 2020, seven AICs (the “Maney Plaintiffs”) housed at four ODOC institutions
filed a civil rights action under Section 1983 against Governor Brown and several ODOC
officials (together, the “Maney Defendants”). (Defs.’ Mot. to Stay at 3-4, ECF No. 11; Maney et
al. v. Brown et al., 6:20-cv-00570-SB (“Maney”), ECF No. 1.) The Maney Plaintiffs allege that
the Maney Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to their health and safety by failing
adequately to protect them from COVID-19 through social distancing, testing, sanitizing,
medical treatment, masking, and vaccines. (See Maney Fourth Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No.
223.) The Maney Plaintiffs assert allegations on behalf of a class of similarly situated AICs, and
propose three classes: (1) the “Damages Class”; (2); the “Vaccine Class”; and (3) the “Wrongful
Death Class.” (Maney FAC ¶¶ 24-26.)
On January 21, 2021, the Maney Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring
ODOC to offer all AICs housed in ODOC facilities a COVID-19 vaccine, and sought provisional
class certification of the Vaccine Class, which includes: “All adults in custody housed at Oregon
Department of Corrections facilities (ODOC) who have not been offered COVID-19
vaccinations.” (Maney Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 156; Maney Pls.’ Mot. to Certify Class at
2, ECF No. 154.) On February 2, 2021, this Court granted the Maney Plaintiffs’ motion for
provisional class certification of the Vaccine Class and motion for a preliminary injunction.
(Maney Op. & Order at 34, ECF No. 178.)
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On July 22, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to stay this matter pending resolution of the
motion for class certification in Maney. (Defs.’ Mot. to Stay at 1.) The Maney Plaintiffs filed a
motion for class certification on May 3, 2021. (ECF No. 203.)
DISCUSSION
I. APPLICABLE LAW
“District courts have the discretion to stay proceedings pending before them.” Patton v.
DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 19-cv-00081, 2019 WL 851933, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019)
(citing Landis v. N.A. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936), and Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d
1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakama Nation v. Airgas
USA, LLC, 435 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1127 (D. Or. 2019) (“This court has the inherent power to
control its docket to ‘promote economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants.’”) (citation omitted). In deciding whether to grant a party’s motion to stay, courts in this
circuit typically consider the following three factors: “‘(1) [the] potential prejudice to the non-
moving party; (2) [the] hardship and inequity to the moving party if the action is not stayed; and
(3) the judicial resources that would be saved by avoiding duplicative litigation[.]’” Patton, 2019
WL 851933, at *3 (quoting Rivers v. Walt Disney Co., 980 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (C.D. Cal.
1997)).
II. ANALYSIS
The Court finds that on balance, the relevant factors weigh in favor of staying this action
pending resolution of class certification in Maney.
First, there is substantial overlap between the parties and legal issues to resolve in the
Maney case and this case, as both actions include Eighth Amendment claims alleging that ODOC
officials failed adequately to protect them from COVID-19. (Maney FAC ¶ 101; Compl. at 4.) A
stay will conserve judicial resources by avoiding duplicative litigation.
Furthermore, it appears that Slater is a member of the Damages Class composed of
individuals who have been continuously housed in ODOC facilities since February 1, 2020, and
have contracted COVID-19, based on Slater’s allegation that he contracted COVID-19 while
housed at CCCI. (Compl. at 4; Maney FAC ¶ 24.)
A stay in this case will not result in significant delay, as the motion for class certification
in Maney is currently pending. (ECF No. 203.) If the Court grants the Maney Plaintiffs’ motion
for class certification, Slater may elect to proceed as a member of the Damages Class, or he may
opt out and litigate his case separately. See McDaniels v. Stewart, No. 15-CV-05943-BHS-DWC,
2017 WL 132454, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 2017) (granting stay pending class certification
and noting that “Plaintiff may elect to be a member of the class if it is certified, or opt-out and
proceed with his own case”). On the other hand, if the Court denies class certification, Slater
faces only a brief delay in this matter.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that staying this litigation will conserve judicial
resources by avoiding duplicative litigation, and a stay will not unduly prejudice Slater. See
McDaniels, 2017 WL 132454, at *2 (granting stay because “staying this action pending
resolution of class certification . . . promotes judicial economy and does not prejudice
Defendants”); see also Hilario Pankim v. Barr, No. 20-cv-02941-JSC, 2020 WL 2542022, at *11
(N.D. Cal. May 19, 2020) (staying habeas petition pending adjudication in separate class action
because “[t]he potential relief available to [the petitioner]—immediate release due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, the conditions of confinement at the Yuba County [Jail], and his
medical vulnerabilities—is the same substantive relief sought in this action and is based on the
same underlying facts” and therefore “a stay pending adjudication of [the class action] is
warranted”); Duong v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-02864-RMI, 2020 WL 2524252, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 18, 2020) (same); Calderon v. Barr, No. 2:20-cv-00891 KJM GGH, 2020 WL 2394287, at
*4-5 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2020) (same).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to stay (ECF No. 11), and
STAYS this action pending resolution of class certification in the Maney case.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 10th day of August, 2021.
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
1 “[A] motion to stay is nondispositive where it ‘[does] not dispose of any claims or
defenses and [does] not effectively deny . . . any ultimate relief sought.’” James v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Corrs., No. 18-4545, 2019 WL 7494660, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2019) (quoting S.E.C. v.
CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 1260 (9th Cir. 2013)). Defendants’ motion to stay does
not dispose of any claims or defenses and does not effectively deny any ultimate relief. Thus, this
Court may resolve the motion to stay without full consent to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate
Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).