Wicks v. District Atty. Columbia Co

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

NORMAN D. WICKS, SR., and

NORMAN D. WICKS, JR.,

Case No. 3:19-cv-01612-AC

Plaintiffs,

ORDER TO DISMISS

v.

DISTRICT ATTY, COLUMBIA CO.,

CITY OF SCAPPOOSE, and COLUMBIA

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,

Defendants.

SIMON, Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to an Order

entered this date, the Court granted plaintiffs’ Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. However,

for the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses plaintiffs’ Complaint.

1 - ORDER TO DISMISS

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs1 name as defendants the Columbia County District Attorney, the Columbia County

Commissioners, and the City of Scappoose. The Complaint is largely incomprehensible. Plaintiffs

allude to alleged assaults against them by unidentified individuals, criminal charges apparently

brought against plaintiffs, treatment one or both plaintiffs received in the Columbia County Jail, and

harassment by unidentified private and public individuals. By way of remedy, plaintiffs seek release

of one of them (it is unclear from Complaint which one) from custody.2

STANDARDS

A district court must dismiss an action initiated by a prisoner seeking redress from a

governmental entity or officer or employee, if the Court determines that the action (i) is frivolous

or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b).

When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the

plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Moreover, before

1The court notes that although the Complaint captions identifies Norman D. Wicks, Sr. and

Norman D. Wicks, Jr. as plaintiffs, only one signature appears on the Complaint, that of “Norman

D. Wicks.” Pro se litigants have no authority to represent anyone other than themselves; therefore,

they lack the representative capacity to file motions and other documents on behalf of other

individuals. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (“a non-lawyer

‘has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself,’” (quoting C.E. Pope Equity Trust

v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d

661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (non-attorney plaintiff may not attempt to pursue claim on behalf of others

in a representative capacity). “Although a non-attorney may appear in propria persona in his behalf,

that privilege is personal to him.” Id. (citations omitted).

2The court notes that the address provided for both individual plaintiffs is a residential

address, and it is unclear which, if either, is or was in custody.

2 - ORDER TO DISMISS

dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the court supplies the plaintiff

with a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839

F.2d 621, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1988); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987). A pro se

litigant will be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is clear that the deficiencies of

the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623; Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

I. Procedural Deficiencies

Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] civil action is commenced

by filing a complaint with the court.” Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” “Each allegation must be simple, concise and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(d)(1). If the factual elements of a cause of action are scattered throughout the complaint but are

not organized into a “short and plain statement of the claim,” dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a)

is proper. Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Nevijel v.

North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court may dismiss an action

with prejudice due to a litigant’s failure to comply with Rule 8(a) if meaningful, less drastic

sanctions have been explored); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1) (“each averment of a pleading shall be

simple, concise, and direct”). Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not satisfy the pleading requirements of

Rule 3 or Rule 8.

3 - ORDER TO DISMISS

II. Substantive Deficiencies

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must allege that a defendant, while

acting under color of state law, caused a deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal rights. 42 U.S.C. §

1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

(9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). A § 1983 plaintiff must establish both causation-in-fact and

proximate (i.e., legal) causation. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir.

2008). Allegations regarding Section 1983 causation “must be individualized and focus on the duties

and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused

a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

“Sweeping conclusory allegations [regarding causation] will not suffice[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages caused by conduct within the

scope of their authority and “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’”

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)).

Absolute prosecutorial immunity is not defeated by a showing of malicious or wrongful conduct.

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. Plaintiffs’ complaint appears to involve conduct associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process. Accordingly, to the extent the Complaint may be construed to seek

money damages, such a claim against the Columbia County District Attorney is barred by

prosecutorial immunity.

To the extent plaintiffs seek injunctive relief barring the prosecution of criminal charges,

such relief is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal courts may not interfere with ongoing

state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,

45-46 (1971); see Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431

4 - ORDER TO DISMISS

(1982) (Younger “espouse[d] a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending

state judicial proceedings”). Abstention under Younger is required when “(1) a state-initiated

proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff

is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal

court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere

with the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of

Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008).

It appears criminal proceedings against at least one, and perhaps both, of the plaintiffs were

ongoing at the time the Complaint was filed. There is no question criminal proceedings involve

important state interests. Accordingly, as to criminal proceedings were alleged to be ongoing at the

time suit is filed, plaintiffs may not proceed in a § 1983 action. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420

U.S. 592, 608 (1975) (holding that Younger applies to state appellate proceedings as well as ongoing

proceedings in state trial court); see also Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1972)

(“[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have federal interposition by

way of injunction . . . until after the jury comes in, judgment has been appealed from and the case

concluded in the state courts”). Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot obtain the injunctive relief sought.

Finally, “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are state and local officials sued in their individual

capacities, private individuals and entities which act under color of state law, and/or the local

governmental entity itself. Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 995-96 (N.D. Cal.

1996). A municipal entity is liable under § 1983 only if the plaintiff alleges his constitutional injury

was caused by employees acting pursuant to the municipality’s policy or custom. Mt. Healthy City

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of New

5 - ORDER TO DISMISS

York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Columbia County and the City of Scappoose may not be held

vicariously liable under § 1983 simply based on allegedly unconstitutional acts of their employees.

Board of Cty. Comm’rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Instead, the

municipalities may be held liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts

the injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Plaintiffs do not allege facts supporting a claim that the

actions allegedly taken by unidentified county and city employees in this case amounted to execution

of a government policy or custom. Accordingly, plaintiffs do not state a claim against Columbia

County or the City of Scappoose upon which relief may be granted.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court DISMISSES plaintiffs’ Complaint. Plaintiffs may file an

amended complaint, curing the deficiencies noted above, within 30 days of the date of this order.

Plaintiffs are advised that the amended complaint must specifically include (1) the names of the

persons who caused or personally participated in causing the alleged deprivation of constitutional

rights, (2) the dates on which the conduct allegedly took place, and (3) the specific conduct Plaintiffs

allege is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs are advised that the amended complaint will operate as a

complete substitute for the present complaint, not as a supplement. Plaintiffs are further advised that

they must each sign the amended complaint. Plaintiffs are cautioned that failure to file an amended

complaint shall result in the dismissal of this proceeding.

Because the court finds no extraordinary circumstances, the court DENIES plaintiffs’ Motion

for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 3).

6 - ORDER TO DISMISS

Because the court finds plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success on the merits,

the court DENIES plaintiffs’ Motion for an Injunction (ECF No. 5).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 2 2 n d day of September, 2020.

/s/ Michael H. Simon

Michael H. Simon

United States District Judge

7 - ORDER TO DISMISS