The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
MEDFORD DIVISION
RONALD VINCENT MELLOW, Civ, No, 1:19-cv-01230-AA
Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER
v.
JOSEPHINE COUNTY,
Defendant.
AIKEN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Ronald Vincent Mellow seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this
action, ECE No. 2, For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint, ECF No. |, is DISMISSED
with leave to amend and Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to file an amended complaint.
The Court shall defer ruling on Plaintiff's IFP petition pending submission of an amended
complaint.
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in United States District Court must pay a
statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C, § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1),
provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to federal courts despite their
inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. To authorize a litigant to proceed
a court must make two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is
unable to pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, it must assess
whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief 28 U.S.C. §
5(e)(2)(B).
In regard to the second of these determinations, district courts have the power under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the complaint on the
defendants and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim, Courts apply the same standard
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison y. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).
To survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading standards, the complaint must
include a short and plain statement of the claim and “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. igbal, 556 U.S, 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard... asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Jd The court is not
required to accept legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as true. Jd.
Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings by attorneys. Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S, 519, 520-21 (1972), That is, the court should construe pleadings by pro se
plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi y. Los Angeles
Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir, 1988), Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice
of the deficiencies in the complaint and the opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s
deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. fd.
9D ODINTON & ORME
DISCUSSION
The Complaint in this case is disjointed and lacks a coherent explanation of Mellow’s
claims, although it generally appears that Mellow intends to challenge tax lien foreclosures
initiated by Defendant Josephine County. The Complaint indicates that federal jurisdiction is
based on “Amendment 14 Section 1, Amendment 15 Right to Vote, Amendment 1 Petition to
Redress Grievances, Due Process, Search [and] Seizure.” Compl, 3. From this, the Court
understands that Mellow intends to bring a claim for violation of his federal constitutional rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19831!
Beyond this, however, the Complaint lacks the details necessary for the Court to understand
Mellow’s claim or claims. Mellow alleges that in recent years, the County has foreclosed on
numerous properties for failure to pay county taxes and has sold those properties at auction.
Mellow alleges that these foreclosure sales have been “illegal” and an “abuse of the legal process,”
but does not explain how, nor does he allege sufficient facts to show that such foreclosures failed
to comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or any
of the other constitutional provisions cited by Mellow.
Mellow also alleges that the County “Board of Commissioners & Co. Attorney illegally
amended a failed Ordinance 2013-002 into law using Ordinance 90-16,” but the Complaint does
not explain this allegation, nor does it connect the cited ordinances to the allegations concerning
forfeiture of property for unpaid taxes.”
Title 42 U.S.C. § [983 “provides a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law,
deprives another of his federal rights.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999), To maintain a claim under §
1983, “a plaintiff must both (1) allege the deprivation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or statutory law,
and (2) allege that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Anderson v, Warner,
451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir, 2006).
7 It appears that both ordinances concern solid waste and nuisance abatement.
Bana MDPDINTITOMAL & ORME
Additionally, although the Complaint alleges in general terms that the County has acted
unlawfully to the detriment of hundreds of Josephine County property owners, it does not clearly
allege that Mellow has personally been harmed by the County’s actions, which raises questions of
standing.
“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article If [of the United States Constitution].” Lujan vy. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992). “Standing addresses whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the matter to the
court for adjudication.” Chandler v, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, Co., 598 ¥.3d 1115, 1122 Oth
Cir. 2010), At an “irreducible constitutional minimum,” Article IIT standing “requires the party
asserting the existence of federal court jurisdiction to establish three elements: (1) an injury in fact
that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent; (2) causation; and (3) a likelihood
that a favorable decision will redress the injury.” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1056 (th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In addition to these constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction, there are also
prudential limitations on its exercise. Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100,
1103-04 (9th Cir. 2006). The doctrine of prudential standing “restrict{s] the grounds a plaintiff
may put forward in seeking to vindicate his personal stake.” Jd at 1104. Courts must consider,
among other things, “whether the alleged injury is more than a mere generalized grievance,
whether the plaintiff is asserting her own rights or the rights of third parties, and whether the claim
in question falls within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the constitutional
guarantee in question.” JVolfson, 616 F.3d at 1056 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“As a prudential matter, even when a plaintiff has Article II standing, we ordinarily do not allow
Pace d OPINION & ORDER
third parties to litigate on the basis of the rights of others.” Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v.
Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 917 (9th Cir. 2004).
The Complaint does not clearly allege an injury that is concrete and particularized, nor is
it clear that Mellow is seeking to vindicate his own rights by bringing this case. Mellow does not
clearly allege, for example, that his own property has been forfeited in an unlawful proceeding.
Rather, it appears that Mellow is attempting to litigate a generalized grievance on behalf of
property owners in Josephine County, in which case Mellow lacks standing to maintain this action.
In light of the deficiencies described above, the Court concludes that Mellow has failed to
state a claim and the Complaint must be dismissed. The Court is mindful of the latitude that must
be accorded to pro se plaintiffs, however, and Mellow will therefore be given leave to file an
amended complaint.
In drafting the amended complaint, Mellow must bear in mind that the Court does not know
anything about the facts of his case or the nature of his dispute with the County, other than what
he chooses to include in the amended complaint. Mellow should allege enough facts for the Court
to understand the nature of the claim, but not so much detail that the amended complaint ceases to
be a “short and plain statement,” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Vague or
conclusory allegations like “the defendant has acted illegally” do not assist the Court in
understanding Mellow’s claims. Instead, Mellow should focus on clearly explaining what the
defendant has done, how Mellow personally has been harmed by the actions of the defendant, and
why the defendant should be held liable for that harm, The Court encourages Mellow to consult
the “Guide to Self-Represented Parties,” which is available on the Court’s website, for additional
advice in drafting the amended complaint.
Page 5 OPINION & ORDER
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED with leave to
amend. Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this Order in which to file an amended
complaint. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file an amended complaint within the allotted time
will result in the entry of a judgment of dismissal. ‘The Court defers ruling on Plaintiff's petition
to proceed IFP, ECF No, 2, until Plaintiff files an amended complaint or the time for doing so has
expired,
It is so ORDERED and DATED this day of August, 2019.
ANN AIKEN
United States District Judge
Pace 6 —OPINION & ORDER