"Rule 4(m)'s deadline for service is designed to force parties and their attorneys to be diligent in prosecuting their cause of 10 – OPINION AND ORDER action."
How later courts described this case
- "Rule 4(m)'s deadline for service is designed to force parties and their attorneys to be diligent in prosecuting their cause of 10 – OPINION AND ORDER action."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
LINDA SENN, 3:18-cv-01814-BR
Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
v.
CITY OF PORTLAND; LARRY
GRAHAM; JEFFREY MCDANIEL;
MULTNOMAH COUNTY; KYLE SMITH;
and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
CRYSTAL MALONEY
165 Court Street #156
Brooklyn, NY 11201
(541) 646-5130
JUAN C. CHAVEZ
P.O. Box 5248
Portland, OR 97208
(503) 944-2270, ext. 212
Attorneys for Plaintiff
TRACY REEVE
Portland City Attorney
ROBERT T. YAMACHIKA
Senior Deputy City Attorney
Portland City Attorney's Office
1221 S.W. Fourth Avenue, Room 430
Portland, OR 97204
(503) 823-4047
Attorneys for Defendants City of Portland, Larry Graham,
and Jeffrey McDaniel
1 – OPINION AND ORDER
BROWN, Senior Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion (#28) to
Dismiss filed by Defendants Larry Graham and Jeffrey McDaniel.
The Court concludes the record is sufficiently developed, and,
therefore, oral argument is not necessary to resolve Defendants'
Motion.
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendants'
Motion.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 12, 2018, Plaintiff Linda Senn filed a Complaint
(#1) against Defendants City of Portland, Graham, and McDaniel
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries she allegedly
sustained during an incident on October 12, 2016, at Portland
City Hall.
On November 8, 2018, the Clerk's Office electronically
issued Summons for the City, Graham, and McDaniel. Dkt. #7.
On November 9, 2018, the City was served with the Summons
and Complaint. Although a proof of service has not been filed
with the court, the City concedes it has been properly served.
Decl. of Robert Yamachika (#9).
On January 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion (#11) for
2 – OPINION AND ORDER
Leave to File Amended Complaint to add Multnomah County and Kyle
Smith as additional defendants. On the same day Plaintiff filed
her Amended Complaint (#12).
On January 10, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion
to amend and also directed Plaintiff to file proofs of service
of the Amended Complaint. Order (#14).
On February 8, 2019, the City filed its Answer (#20) to
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
On April 4, 2019, Plaintiff submitted an Amended Proposed
Summons (#21) for Graham, which the Court issued on April 5,
2019 (Dkt. #22).
On April 11, 2019, the Court noted Plaintiff had failed to
file proofs of service of the Amended Complaint as to any
Defendant and directed Plaintiff to file such proofs of service
no later than April 18, 2019. Order (#23).
On April 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Certificate of Service
(#24) showing service on "Jeffrey McDanie" (sic) on April 8,
2019, by serving Alli Chasteen.
Although Plaintiff has not filed a proof of service, Graham
concedes he was served on April 26, 2019. Defs.' Mot. (#28)
at 3.
On May 5, 2019, Graham and McDaniel filed a Motion to
3 – OPINION AND ORDER
Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5)
and (6). They contend Plaintiff did not timely serve them with
Summons and Complaint and that Plaintiff's action is barred by
the applicable statute of limitations, and, therefore, Plaintiff
fails to state a claim against them.
On July 1, 2019, the Court took the Motion under
advisement.
STANDARDS
Although injury claims under § 1983 claims are federal
causes of action, such claims are governed by the statute of
limitations for personal-injury torts of the state in which the
injury occurred. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
Oregon's statute of limitations for personal-injury actions is
two years from the date of the injury. Or. Rev. Stats.
§ 12.110(1).
An action is commenced in federal court for purposes of the
statute of limitations when the complaint is filed. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 3. See also Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1138
(9th Cir. 2002). After an action is commenced, the plaintiff
must serve the complaint on the defendant within 90 days. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(m). Rule 4(m) provides:
4 – OPINION AND ORDER
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the
complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own
motion after notice to plaintiff—must dismiss the
action without prejudice against that defendant or
order that service be made within a specific time.
But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure,
the court must extend the time for service for an
appropriate period.
DISCUSSION
As noted, Graham and McDaniel contend Plaintiff did not
timely serve them with Summons and Complaint and Plaintiff's
action is now barred by the statute of limitations.
I. Plaintiff's action was timely commenced.
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on October 12, 2018, exactly
two years from the date of the incident, and, therefore, the
action was timely commenced under Oregon Revised Statutes
§ 12.110(1).
II. Graham and McDaniel were not timely served.
As noted, Graham and McDaniel contend they were not timely
served, and Plaintiff's action is, therefore, barred against
them.
A. Service on Graham and McDaniel
Pursuant to Rule 4(m), the 90-day deadline to serve the
Summons and Complaint on Graham and McDaniel was January 10,
2019. Graham was served on April 26, 2019, which is 196 days
5 – OPINION AND ORDER
after the filing of the Complaint. McDaniel was served on
April 8, 2019, which is 178 days after the filing of the
Complaint.
Accordingly, Graham and McDaniel were not served within 90
days of the filing of the Complaint as required by Rule 4(m).
B. Plaintiff has not shown good cause or excusable
neglect for the failure to serve Graham and McDaniel.
Plaintiff contends the delay in service should be excused
for good cause or excusable neglect. Moreover, Plaintiff
contends Graham and McDaniel have not shown they have been
prejudiced by the late service.
1. Standards
"Rule 4(m)'s deadline for service is designed to
force parties and their attorneys to be diligent in prosecuting
their cause of action." Fimbres v. United States, 833 F.2d 138,
139 (9th Cir.1987). See also Golf Sav. Bank v. Walsh, No. 09-
973, 2010 WL 3222112, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 2010). When a
plaintiff fails to serve a defendant within the time limit, the
action is subject to dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
For a plaintiff who does not comply with the
service deadline, Rule 4(m) provides two avenues for relief.
"The first is mandatory: the court must extend time for service
upon a showing of good cause. The second is discretionary: if
6 – OPINION AND ORDER
good cause is not established, the court may extend time for
service upon a showing of excusable neglect." Lemoge v. Unites
States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th Cir. 2009)(citations omitted).
Good cause to avoid dismissal may be
demonstrated by establishing, at minimum,
excusable neglect. In addition to excusable
neglect, a plaintiff may be required to show
the following factors to bring the excuse to
a level of good cause: "(a) the party to be
served personally received actual notice of
the lawsuit; (b) the defendant would suffer
no prejudice; and (c) plaintiff would be
severely prejudice if his complaint were
dismissed."
Id. n.3 (quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756 (9th
Cir. 1991)).
Excusable neglect is an equitable determination
based on four factors: "(1) the danger of prejudice to the
opposing party, (2) the length of delay and its potential impact
on the proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, and (4)
whether the movant acted in good faith." Bateman v. U.S. Postal
Svc., 231 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. Analysis
Plaintiff contends she served the City Attorney's
Office with Summons and Complaint for all three Defendants and
"presumed" the City Attorney's Office had accepted service for
Graham and McDaniel individually. Plaintiff also asserts she
7 – OPINION AND ORDER
was unable to locate either Graham or McDaniel in order to
timely serve them. Finally, Plaintiff argues the City, Graham,
and McDaniel share a common defense deriving from common facts,
and Graham and McDaniel will be subject only to "de minimis"
prejudice by the delay in service.
Graham and McDaniel, however, contend Plaintiff
has not shown good cause or excusable neglect. They assert
Plaintiff did not request a waiver of service for any of the
Defendants, and counsel for the City specifically told
Plaintiff's counsel that he represented only the City. In
addition, Plaintiff was told McDaniel could be served through
the Portland Police Bureau Court Coordinator and that Graham had
retired from the Portland Police Bureau, moved out of state, and
would have to be served where he resided.
Plaintiff's presumption that the City Attorney
had accepted service on behalf of Graham and McDaniel was
erroneously based on his past experience with the City in other
cases where the City Attorney had accepted service on behalf of
individual defendants. While this mistaken assumption explains
counsel's state of mind, it does not constitute good cause to
excuse the failure to serve Graham or McDaniel individually and
timely under these circumstances. In addition, the Court notes
8 – OPINION AND ORDER
the City requested two extensions of time to file an Answer in
this case, and those requests were made only on behalf of the
City and not any other defendant. This should have served to
signal Plaintiff's counsel that the City Attorney's Office was
distinguishing between the City and the individual Defendants.
Plaintiff does not offer any evidence as to why
she failed to serve McDaniel timely through the Portland Police
Bureau Court Coordinator. Moreover, Plaintiff does not contend
her failure to serve Graham or McDaniel timely was based on
confusion about service, a calendaring mistake, or any factors
beyond her control that prevented service. In addition,
Plaintiff did not request an extension of time to serve Graham
or McDaniel even though the Court specifically drew attention to
the service issue when it set a deadline for filing proofs of
service. It was not until April 8, 2019, long after the
deadline to serve the individual Defendants that service on
McDaniel was finally accomplished, and the proof of service was
not filed until April 24, 2019.
The record also reflects the following: On
February 8, 2019, the City Attorney filed an Answer on behalf of
the City only; on April 4, 2019, Plaintiff requested the Clerk
to issue an amended summons with an out-of-state address for
9 – OPINION AND ORDER
Graham in order to serve him; on April 11, 2019, the Court
directed Plaintiff to file proofs of service by April 18, 2019,
and advised Plaintiff that failure to file proofs of service
could result in dismissal of her case; and on April 23, 2019,
which was after the deadline set by the Court, Plaintiff filed a
proof of service that was for McDaniel only.
Finally, the Court notes Plaintiff does not point
to any evidence that Graham or McDaniel had actual notice of her
lawsuit before the time they were ultimately served.
Plaintiff's argument that Graham and McDaniel will not be
prejudiced by the delay in service because they will not be
responsible for paying any settlement or judgment if they are
found to be liable is irrelevant to the issue of good cause or
excusable neglect for failure to serve them timely.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate
proper and timely notice to a defendant in order to promote the
timely resolution of disputes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (requiring
the Rules to "be construed, administered, and employed . . . to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action"). See also Fimbres, 833 F.2d at 139 ("Rule 4(m)'s
deadline for service is designed to force parties and their
attorneys to be diligent in prosecuting their cause of
10 – OPINION AND ORDER
action.").
On this record the Court concludes Plaintiff has
failed to show good cause or excusable neglect for failing to
serve Graham and McDaniel within the time prescribed by Rule
4(m).
III. Plaintiff's claims against Graham and McDaniel are
dismissed with prejudice.
As noted, Rule 4(m) states the court "must dismiss the
action without prejudice" or direct service to be made within a
specified time when service is not accomplished in 90 days. The
Court also may extend the deadline for service if the plaintiff
demonstrates good cause or excusable neglect.
For the reasons indicated, the Court concludes Plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect. The
Court, therefore, does not see any basis to extend the time for
service.
Inasmuch as the statutory period under Oregon law as to
Plaintiff's claims has expired against Graham and McDaniel the
Court concludes Plaintiff's claims against Graham and McDaniel
are now barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff's
claims against Defendants Graham and McDaniel.
11 – OPINION AND ORDER
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion
(#28) to Dismiss and DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint as to Defendants Graham and McDaniel.
The Court DIRECTS the parties to confer and to file no
later than August 28, 2019, a joint proposed case-management
schedule. The Clerk will set a Rule 16 Conference to occur
shortly thereafter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 6th day of August, 2019.
/s/ Anna J. Brown
___________________________________
ANNA J. BROWN
United States Senior District Judge
12 – OPINION AND ORDER